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Cooperation of INGOs in times of humanitarian crises. A case study from Rwanda.

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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AICF</td>
<td>Action Internationale Contre la Faim (International Action Against Hunger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces armées rwandaises</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>presidential guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>MERLIN</td>
<td>Medical Emergency Relief International</td>
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<td>MRND</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Movement for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTLMC</td>
<td>Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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Abstract

This study is looking at the cooperation between international NGOs within one particular humanitarian crisis, namely the genocide and following refugee crisis in Rwanda 1994. While researching the topic of NGO cooperation, it became clear that plenty research about NGO cooperation can be found whereas very little research exists concerning the cooperation of INGOs. Hence, the relevance to research this topic further stems from the assumption that cooperation is an important tool to organize humanitarian work more efficiently and should, therefore, be improved. The work at hand is a desk study and tries to answer whether cooperation exists and how it is pursued. A theoretical framework was created by combining a model of functions that civil society should fulfil with an inter-organizational knowledge sharing approach in order to elaborate on those questions. The used method is the case study approach. The history of Rwanda in 1994 was used as a setting for the study because it is one particularly well-researched topic and provides a good entry point to explore the field of INGO cooperation with other INGOs. In conclusion, the results show that cooperation exists and is pursued in different sectors. Successful cooperation does, however, always require the willingness to reduce competition and find compromises. The extent to which INGOs are doing so varies. In the future, more organizational documentation is needed to truly explore this topic in-depth. It should also be noted that serious problems were met in finding good sources of information from the INGOs involved in this study and that they did not actively reply to requests of supplying further information.
1. Introduction

1.1 Topic

The present study is focusing on the work of international non-governmental organizations (hereafter INGOs) as an essential part of civil society. An NGO in general is a: “voluntary group of individuals or organizations, usually not affiliated with any government, that is formed to provide services or to advocate a public policy” (Encyclopedia Britannica). INGOs have the same purpose but additionally operate internationally and maintain offices in different countries. They have a headquarter to coordinate the country divisions which are more or less independent from each other. Those organizations are worth being researched closely since they have gained immense importance as actors of civil society in humanitarian crises which is underlined by Morton (2013), stating that “the eight largest INGOs by revenue (World Vision International, Oxfam International, Save the Children International, Plan International and Médecins Sans Frontières, CARE International, Caritas International, and ActionAid International) earned a total of US$11.7 billion in 2011” (p.334). With those revenues, they support humanitarian and development projects all over the world. Their importance ranges throughout both the national and international level. According to Brown and Moore (2001) nationally they “have taken on significant roles in promoting the social, economic, and political development of the particular countries in which they are operating” and internationally they “have been increasingly important in creating a kind of international civil society, animating informal but powerful normative regimes, and influencing the practices and policies of international institutions” (p.1). Apart from the general categories as defined by the World Bank of advocacy INGOs (watchdogs like Transparency International and Amnesty International) and operational INGOs (implementers like Oxfam and World Vision) there are two basic functions INGOs serve on a global level. On the one hand, there are INGOs that provide development assistance, i.e. coordinating long-term projects in order to improve people’s livelihood. On the other hand, there are the ones that provide humanitarian assistance to the population of a certain area during and after times of crises or war. Those urgent relief projects are laid out on a short- or middle-term (resp. for the duration of the crisis) basis. Most INGOs, however, engage in providing both development assistance and humanitarian relief services.

Throughout the research of this study, light shall be spread on how INGOs in humanitarian crises cooperate with each other or that is to say if there is a general will to do so. If so, how the process is shaped in detail and whether it could be the case that the structural frame in
which they act sets certain borders which impede cooperation despite an active will to work hand in hand. As INGOs for several reasons are criticized for working beside and not with each other, it should be interesting to examine their cooperation mode in times of humanitarian crises regarding certain functions civil society should provide like the protection of citizens and satisfaction of basic needs like food and shelter. Shanmugaratnam (2010) exemplifies the problem of malfunctioning NGO cooperation in general when he describes resettlement and reconciliation issues in South-Sudan:

“While organised return was quite well planned, there has been a lack of planning and coordination of resettlement, food relief and assistance for livelihood revival. Several INGOs and local NGOs were engaged in the same activities without any effective interaction let alone coordination between them.”

(p.28)

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda exerted on the Tutsi minority by the Hutu majority shall serve as a generic frame for a humanitarian crisis in a severe magnitude. Within this frame, knowledge about INGOs and their behavior is to be generated. In 1994 the world witnessed the small country of Rwanda - the hitherto showpiece of African democracy, a hard-working peasant society - descend into chaos. On April 6th, the downing of the president’s plane set into action a government-planned genocide of the Tutsi population in Rwanda. Decade-long conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi paved the way for this atrocity. An unprecedented mobilization of the Hutu population to execute the genocide was achieved by state institutions, militiamen and the media. Within one hundred days approximately 800,000 people were killed. The genocide did not only have ethnic but also political features. That was manifested by the aim to not only exterminate the Tutsi population but also all moderate forces and individuals not associated with the radical ‘Hutu power’ movement. The genocide was officially over when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF - a rebel army comprised of exile Tutsi from Uganda) conquered Kigali. Large parts of the Hutu population had been herded out of the country by their authorities (e.g. majors) in fear of a vengeful RPF. Huge refugee waves led to the setup of numerous refugee camps, in which conditions concerning health, sanitation and access to food were found to be catastrophic. The background chapter is to provide further insight into those events. The Rwandan tragedy is apt for this study because it represents an example of great malfunction of the humanitarian system. Instead of reacting to the signals the UN decided to withdraw almost all forces allocated to preserve the Arusha Peace Agreements, thus deserting the Rwandan people. Only when the refugees were pouring into the neighboring countries the international society started taking measures. INGOs had a very strong influence in this crisis since UN bodies were poorly coordinated at times, leading to confusion concerning mandates and responsibilities. In contrast, INGOs were able to act fast and provide the help that was so desperately needed. Though conclusions on how to
handle such a crisis were drawn from the Rwanda genocide, the tragedy keeps on providing further insight concerning the works of INGOs, transforming it into an apt example for today's study of INGO cooperation.

1.2 The debate in scholarly literature

In general, the scholarly debate which has been rather voluminous over the past decades revolves around two standpoints. The first vantage point displays the possibilities and obstacles of liberal market-structures to cooperation of INGOs. There are scholars and practitioners who believe that cooperation is mainly a necessary tool to reduce competition for donors and funds between INGOs in a globally vast and in all its facets hardly assessable movement. Many do see the advantages that come with cooperation (Moss, 2011). However, the cradle of the approach to work together rather appears to be external as well as internal financial pressure, not to mention the structural difficulties than a vision of a unified global civil society (Brown and Moore, 2001; Saunier 2009). They take the stance of cooperation being influenced by the competitive market-structured aid environment (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Smillie, 1997). Thus, the literature review section is structured according to different content-related points of view.

Simultaneously, among popular opinions one can find justifications for working side by side apart from market dependencies. Those scholars and practitioners claim that cooperation as in mutual collaboration and partnership is desirable and advocate the expectance to bring the movement closer together (Murdie, 2013). They recognize a huge potential in the cooperation of INGOs to increase synergy effects concerning coordination of manpower and specialization of each organization. Furthermore, information networks would contribute to cooperation and an avoidance of a duplication of services could be achieved (Marwil, 2012; DeMars 2005). Those scholars and practitioners put the overall objective to maximize aid efforts in conflict situations stronger into focus. Economic efficiency is an important tool to implement this objective (Uvin et al., 2000) but not the driving force behind NGO (resp. INGO) behavior. Based on relative consensus on this side of the debate the particular section of the literature review is structured according to the broader institutional and the more specific organizational level. The study at hand clearly acknowledges this side of the debate as its own point of departure.
1.3 Objective, Relevance and Research Questions

“The task of protecting lives in war has never been as urgent as in the present age, when state legitimacy is on fire from ‘civil wars’ that are ‘breaking out at an all-time record rate’” (Sarkees cited in Chaulia 2011, p.20)

The overall objective shall lie on exploring the cooperation between INGOs in response to the Rwandan genocide. On the one hand, the relevance of looking closer at this topic stems from the practical need to coordinate help missions and increase synergy effects in currently affected areas and populations. This is as urgent as it was twenty-three years ago. On the other hand, the theoretical relevance emerges from interlacing the findings into peace and development research in order to apply additional knowledge to future conflicts and avoid malpractices. Since the available literature on the topic is rare, new findings that could add to the body of knowledge about INGO cooperation in times of humanitarian crises and how to improve the conditions for cooperation could be a possible point of departure for further research. Improving the conditions here does not mean, how to restructure the operational frame for organizations set by governments, since this is not the aim of the study, but how to improve communication, networking and to a certain degree harmonize and align humanitarian strategies of INGOs. Another aspect underlining the relevance of this topic is expressed by Otto (1996) when she observes that “International organizations and movements have been very influential in shaping the discourse within which international decision-making and action occurs” (p.120). Heywood (2014) supports her remarks by ascertaining that they “deliver [approximately] 15% of international aid, often demonstrating a greater speed of response and level of operational effectiveness than governmental bodies, national or international, can muster” (p.10). This especially gains significance while looking at the fact that often even the UN - as a body of 193 states bound to consensus and international law - cannot (or in the Rwandan case was not willing to) provide quick response when it comes to interference, especially in cases like civil war in sovereign states. In the best case, developing this research further could be a contribution to finding efficient strategies and ways for cooperation. INGOs as a group of actors of tremendous importance in the humanitarian sector could work together more smoothly in future conflicts.

To pursue the objective sufficiently, this study is going to examine the background of the situation and focus on answering the following research questions.

RQ1: In which sectors of humanitarian assistance do INGOs cooperate?
In responding to a humanitarian crisis like the Rwandan genocide and the consequential refugee crisis there are several sectors of activities that have to be covered. Those sectors or fields include e.g. the protection of civilians, delivery of food and water, securing hygiene standards, political advocacy, provision of non-food items and shelter. It is the purpose of this study to find out whether INGOs cooperate in every sector or if they just work side by side in those sectors without pursuing cooperative approaches.

RQ2: How and according to which principles are responsibilities between INGOs being split?

Provided INGOs do cooperate in different sectors, the study is going to examine how responsibilities are set (sector coordination and fields of activity) and which underlying principles determine the field of responsibility of an organization. Such underlying principles could be shaped according to less tangible factors like power relations of INGOs to each other or to supra-national bodies like the UN. In this case, results and insights are expected to be fragmentary since finding proof makes itself out to be rather difficult to ascertain for an outsider. Hence, tangible principles like e.g. specialties or monetary means of organizations make up the main body of this research paper.

RQ3: How can INGO cooperation be improved in order to make humanitarian assistance more efficient?

While answering this particular question, the study is going to concentrate on communication and harmonization towards general objectives. As aforementioned, synergy effects could be increased by making sure that operational strategies are aligned. An INGO, for example, that is providing medical services should work aligned with another INGO arranging functioning water, hygiene and sanitation systems in order to prevent diseases caused by insufficient access to clean water. Findings are not supposed to give specific policy recommendations but to provide a new point of departure for further research.

1.4 Analytical Frame

Concerning the theoretical frame, the study relies on two components. Firstly, there is a conceptual model of seven basic functions civil society (respectively NGOs) should fulfill in peacebuilding processes. Those functions developed by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) are: protection of citizens; monitoring for accountability; advocacy and public communication; socialization; building community; intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state
and service delivery (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006, p.13). The framework clearly aims at a holistic approach to civil society but for the purpose of this study it will only be applied to INGOs as part of civil society. Since Paffenholz’s and Spurk’s theory rather focuses on activities of civil society in peacebuilding than on cooperation in any given function, it is necessary to include a framework on how those activities could be pursued in a collaborative style. Here, the second theoretical component a framework on inter-organizational knowledge sharing presented by Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) is introduced. Although, it does not explicitly focus on non-governmental actors it provides an idea on how knowledge is shared and distributed between organizations. The connection between a conceptual framework of inter-organizational knowledge-sharing and this study about the cooperation of INGOs is an underlying assumption provided by Amanda Murdie (2013). Her research attitude, as explained in the literature review and adopted to this study, supposes that organizational dynamics whether in a for-profit or non-profit organization are rather similar and, for the purpose of this study, applicable to INGOs.

1.5 Methodology

The research is going to be a qualitative desk study of INGO cooperation in Rwanda during the time of the genocide and the following refugee crisis from April to December 1994. Multiple cases – INGOs - are analyzed and compared with each other. Qualitative research opens up possibilities for “exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (Creswell, 2014, p.4) through gathering multiple sources of data. The study is conducted abductively from a social constructivist point of view. It is a case study and by using the analytical frame a more developed set of questions that broaden the different research questions will be provided. The INGOs that are to be analyzed are Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). The data source is primarily a comprehensive study called “The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience” (Eriksson, 1996). Within this study, one partial study “Humanitarian Aid and Effects” (Borton et al., 1996) provides information that is going to be elaborated upon in the findings and analysis section. In addition, the MSF Speaks Out (a monitoring unit within MSF International) report (Binet et al., 2003) called “Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi 1994” provides a deeper insight into the work of MSF in particular. It was assumed, that documents like the MSF report from Oxfam and CARE would similarly allow further insights. Unfortunately, for those organizations no further sources of information could be retrieved. Hence, the data
sources from which the findings are extracted are limited to one independent study and one inner-organizational report.

1.6 Structure of the study

In the subsequent section literature review the debate about cooperation of INGOs is going to be examined more thoroughly, presenting arguments from both sides and transforming it into thematic sections. This is to give an in-depth entry point into the research problematic and determine the research gap. Furthermore, the stance of the present study regarding a particular side of the debate is established. In the following section the analytical frame is presented. The model of seven basic functions civil society should fulfill in peacebuilding processes is connected with inter-organizational knowledge-sharing and illustrated by a model. A description of the applied methodology follows where the case as well as the analyzing units and the epistemological stance of the author are explained. Afterwards, the background of the Rwandan genocide and the situation of NGOs and INGOs in particular are described in order to provide a better understanding of the adjoining findings section. Here, the previously developed analytical frame provides the guideline for the evaluation. The research questions are answered and furthermore discussed in the analysis which is connected with the findings. This is where the results are also analyzed and discussed according to the research problem and objective of the study that have been pointed out earlier. Here, weaknesses of the chosen scientific approach are elaborated on. Eventually, the conclusion will sum up the most important results of the study concisely and give a prospect on possible starting points for further research.

1.7 Limitations

The desk study approach has its limitations regarding accessible information. The incorporation of interviews with employees of the chosen INGOs was considered. Unfortunately, none of the contacted INGOs was willing to provide the researcher with an interview or survey possibility. Generally, it seems to be a more apt way to reach the objective by gathering data on the ground but this possibility was - due to different reasons - not a tangible option for the researcher. Furthermore, time is an important aspect. On the one hand, the fact that over twenty years have passed since the crisis in Rwanda makes it more likely, that studies might have been conducted that answer the questions at hand. On the other
hand, it is more difficult to find organizations still evaluating this particular incident. Moreover, it is difficult to find people or employees who could still answer the questions that have not been answered by conducted studies yet without being biased by their own memory. Beyond that, the circumstance that the internet was still in its infancy and virtually did not play a role in storing documentation makes it even harder to gain information about cooperation (which is often rather informal anyway).

1.8 Delimitations

The study is only going to look at three INGOs which operated in and around Rwanda, not all of them. That is why it is going to be rather difficult to draw inferences about INGOs in general and civil society as a whole in Rwanda. The researcher can only focus on the cooperation of INGOs, while widely disregarding cooperative approaches towards smaller (regional, local) NGOs, inter-governmental bodies (UN system) or governmental institutions. The decision to limit the study to Rwanda in 1994 provides the researcher with the possibility to gather information about the questions at hand. This seems quite impossible when looking at many other crises due to a lack of research and informal agreements that cannot be retrieved.

1.9 Ethical Considerations

Since the study is going to be a desk study, it is relatively uncritical to elaborate on the behavior of an organization twenty-three years ago, since a lot of time has passed. Employees who were responsible back then might not be working for the organization anymore and new developments and standards have been adopted. Subsequently, potential misbehavior in 1994 will hardly affect the reputation of the organization today.
2. Literature Review

As stated by Witt, the sphere of NGOs consists of a “knowledge network” of three generations whereby the 1st generation displays the grassroots dimension, meaning the local NGOs that are able to provide basic situational information (Witt, 2006, p. 17). One would assume that it might be pointless for INGOs (3rd generation) to work in the field without cooperating with them and accessing their knowledge. Another problem mentioned by him is the scarcity of resources to publish information in developing countries (resp. in times of war) which curbs the flow of information (Witt, 2006, p. 19) and makes cooperation even more important in order to assess relief work in a quick, sustainable way.

2.1 The market-structure oriented aid environment

2.1.1 Accountability and legitimacy of INGOs

Accountability was a driving force through which political and economic (donors, supporters, volunteers) INGOs were pressured to cooperate and come to terms with an official Accountability Charter for INGOs. It has been signed in 2005 by many of the major INGOs, counting 22 INGOs and their respective national entities as members of the charter today (INGO Accountability Charter website). This clearly represents a step towards a rising transparency. However, INGOs can technically not be held accountable by their self-announced constituencies or a particular government. That is why transparency is a recurring problem. Hence, transparency and accountability are responsibilities INGOs have to face in order to be credible to their stakeholders and eventually to keep the donor support they rely on to survive (Brown and Moore, 2001, p.10). Brown and Moore (2001) also embed the legitimacy issue into the debate: “In many countries INGOs have to work hard to gain the right to exist and to operate and they may need to create alliances with other actors to carry out their programs” (p.13). The statement shows that the need to form alliances (not only with other civil society organizations) often does not stem from an active desire to do so but rather depends on country-specific features imposed on operating INGOs.

The then following quandary INGOs are subjected to is firstly being accountable to all funding contributors and secondly to the aid receivers. Brown and Moore (2001) state:

“It creates the possibility that differences between the preferences of donors and clients might arise [...] to the extent that these differences do arise, the INGO faces the difficult ethical,
legal, and strategic question of to whom the INGO should make itself most accountable” (p.13).

Those receiving people are the core subject to the work of INGOs but not the people they depend on to be able to proceed with their work. This detail makes it delicate to keep the focus of an organizations’ work on the aid receivers. A balance of satisfying the people receiving as well as the people giving has to be created.

2.1.2 Competition and the need to form alliances

Another tension-creating aspect in the civil society movement is its rapid growth throughout the 2nd half of the 20th century until today. As Davies (2008) states: “social factors, demographic changes such as urbanization, and psychological changes such as the development of ‘global consciousness,’ are said to facilitate the growth of transnational civil society” (p.6). The vast “growth of the NGO1 movement” nevertheless “exemplifies the interconnection between protection and betterment within a liberal problematic of governance […] without permanent emergency NGOs would lack the public profile, funding base, media access, civic constituencies and international infrastructure on which their development work depends” (Duffield, 2007, p.34). Thus, whenever an emergency occurs, competing over support and funding is not easy to overcome.

In respect thereof, Saunier (2009) describes INGO cooperation as sort of a safeguard. According to him, the founding of INGO coalitions in the course of the 20th century did not only derive from pressure exerted by the UN to facilitate the efficiency of work coordination and communication with the versatile movement. It also was a necessary tool to reduce the aforementioned competition (for donors and funds) and the rapidly growing elbow-mentality among NGOs and INGOs caused by their steeply increasing number. To some extent it became necessary to “allow peaceful coexistence” (p.10) in order to sustain financial stability (p.8-11). Moss (2011) agrees with Saunier and emphasizes the need to form alliances and coalitions among NGOs because “using hundreds of separate groups makes aid even more uncoordinated, not only with other donors but also with the plans and priorities of the host government” (p.136).

Saunier’s statement is illustrated by Cooley and Ron (2002), who describe the excessive competition over funds on the prominent example of a refugee camp in Goma, Democratic

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1 INGOs are regarded as a part of the NGO movement. Therefore, knowledge about the concept NGO also applies to the sub-concept INGO.
Republic of Congo, shortly after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. To deal with the millions of refugees, immense funds were released by the UNHCR and INGOs were flowing into the country to provide humanitarian aid. “’Contract fever’ was in the air, and most of the international relief groups found themselves slipping into a deeply competitive frame of mind […] no major organization concerned about self-preservation could risk losing such an important source of funding” (p.26f.). Cooley and Ron state that the case “highlights the role of material struggles within the transnational world, rather than the harmonious and liberalizing civil society of globalization theory” (p.31). Moreover, they resume that non-profit organizations behave much like their for-profit counterparts when they find themselves in “market-like” situations (p.36) but unlike other scholars of the same opinion Cooley and Ron do not advocate actively for more collaboration.

2.1.3 Obstacles to alliances

There is, however, the opinion that Smillie (1997) represents. He acknowledges the need for NGOs (resp. INGOs) to cooperate but also points out still existing obstacles to the idea of easily implementable coalitions. Although cooperation and coalition exists and is necessary within the movement, shared ideals and values might, according to Smillie, not necessarily lead to an increased willingness to join forces: “It is not unusual to find two Oxfams at work in the same country and three or four versions of Save the Children” (p.169). This unwillingness fuels the competition over funds and members and results in overly sensational fund-raising campaigns and the impossibility for the public to keep an overview of the many different organizations (p.175). The latter result again impedes the raising of support, especially for small NGOs, and bolsters the growing public saturation to donate money to an, in their eyes, opaque movement. Additionally, Smillie (1997) states that there is a growing gap between southern NGOs (settled in developing countries or, more generally, the southern hemisphere) and their focus on implementation on various levels and their northern counterparts. The former often are dependent on the monetary support by the northern NGOs and global INGOs. Nevertheless, these northern NGOs are rather expressing “concerns” of industrialized nations and are partially very dependent on their government support (p.184). However, at the same time southern NGOs do not feel the need of interference by their northern counterparts when it comes to project-planning. Hence, their cooperation often is not based on an equal footing although this would be tremendously important.

DeMars (2005) puts Smillie’s opinion in a greater perspective of societal structures: “Network linkages among NGOs and other actors are laden with contradictory latent agendas and
subject to capture for unforeseen political purposes. In short, both conflict and cooperation are intrinsic to international NGOs, not only as individual organizations but also collectively in networks” (p. 54). Gourevitch et al. (2012, p. 120) also point out that different stakeholder interests might impede cooperation.

In a broader context, the charter of the UN misses to clarify the role of INGOs in a global context (Hall & Trentmann, 2005, p.295) which increases the difficulty in defining the area and degree of required cooperation with each other.

2.2 Cooperation as a matter of trust and opportunity for mutual gains

2.2.1 Institutional level

Since there are few scholars who have researched the topic of INGO-cooperation in-depth it is important to have a more detailed look on Amanda Murdie’s (2013) research and her view of INGO cooperation on an institutional level. She outlines the market-structure oriented side of the debate as presented above and clearly disconfirms the sentiment that cooperation of INGOs is first and foremost motivated by competitive pressures. Due to a lack of sufficient literature about cooperation between INGOs scholars and INGO staff themselves have, according to Murdie (2013), adapted practices from the profit-oriented organizational sector since the underlying motives and values are somewhat identical. INGO Practitioners “are using insights from for-profits to enrich the strategy set of their organization and their ability to reach organizational goals, regardless of the nature of the motivational underpinnings of those goals […] Material resources can be gained when organizations that share common long term goals and normative outlooks but different specializations join their activities” (p.314). Hence, Murdie found that cooperation in non-profit organizations can and should actually be compared to cooperation between profit-oriented companies since the aim to create synergy effects, reduce costs and improve efficiency does not differ fundamentally from what the non-profit sector seeks to accomplish. This comparison, Murdie infers, can help understanding collaborative behavior and when it is likely to happen. Moreover, she identifies facilitating factors for inter NGO-cooperation as the possession of resources (material, non-material like language and trust), an operation base located in the global north and connections to intergovernmental organizations (UN, World Bank) (ibid, p.315).All of these factors are intrinsic to INGOs. Impeding factors are “a lack of leadership, resources for collaboration, and bureaucratic difficulties” (ibid, p.316).
In sum, Murdie bases inter-NGO (resp. inter-INGO) cooperation on two factors – trust and opportunity. Trust is defined as “good governance […] where corruption is controlled, laws and contracts are observed, and the bureaucracy is well established” (p.316). Opportunity is given “when humanitarian state and inter-governmental military interveners are present” (p.318). In identifying those factors Murdie explicitly objects Cooley and Ron (2002) in their conclusions concerning Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter DRC) and the non-functioning cooperation. “As such, it appears that lawlessness and corruption within the state [DRC] contributed to the lack of inter-NGO cooperation” (p.317). Murdie is consistent with DeMars (2005) who characterizes NGO network channels by the means of “normative frames, material resources, political responsibility, and information” (p.51).

2.2.2 Organizational level

Consensual with the institutional level practitioner Marwil (2012) (NGO “Pencils of Promise”) advocates on an organizational level for joint ventures “for good” and mirrors the common scholarly opinion that one-dimensional aid – for instance merely supporting the economy but not the social sector of a country in crisis or the other way around – is not enabling states and the people within to make their own way out of misery. As stated by him:

“sharing offices, transportation, technology services and even financial and administrative staff will help development organizations to cut down on overhead and create a greater economy of scale […] working together, NGOs can share best practices and lessons learned and, together, develop programming that corresponds to the local context in much more timely and economical fashion” (10 April).

Uvin et al. (2000), who researched reasons and motives for NGO up- and down-scaling falls in line with Marwil’s argumentation by stating that intentional downscaling necessarily leads to more collaboration: “The aim is then to focus on those areas in which the NGO excels, and to collaborate with other organizations in their field of competency whenever required.” (p.1416) Collaboration here does not only include the for-profit and governmental sector but also other NGOs.

In sum, this study is looking at cooperation between INGOs whereas the literature mainly refers to NGOs in general. At large, it could be assumed that much research brought to light about NGO cooperation must also be applicable to INGO cooperation. Technically, they compete over the same resources like smaller NGOs - donor support, state support, voluntary work etc. But eventually we cannot be sure that insights applying to NGOs are congruently
transferrable to INGOs. Hence, the present study identifies a research gap at this very point. A lot of research has been published in the field of NGO cooperation, especially on the grassroots and regional level. Moreover, there has been research about how INGOs cooperate with NGOs. Nevertheless, when it comes to concrete projects that major INGOs collaborated in (possibly split responsibilities and resources) there seems to be a definite need for some additional research. Whenever, for example, Oxfam and World Vision work together they might do so according to the division of labor and competency principles that also apply to smaller NGOs but this cannot be taken for granted. INGOs are very large economic entities with their very own internal organizational dynamics (e.g. many sub-offices regarding issue and location) and research so far has only looked at the general concept of a common NGO. This research gap shall be the point of departure. Generally, it is expected that a cooperative approach is pursued by INGOs due to the listed benefits above and the researcher clearly positions herself with the scholars that view cooperation as a matter of trust and opportunity.

3. Analytical Frame

A key requirement of cooperation between INGOs is the willingness to share knowledge and information with each other. Within this study, knowledge and information are regarded as the basic tools that build the foundation of INGOs working together in humanitarian crises. Financial, labor and material resources are regarded as subordinate. In this sense, inter-organizational information and knowledge sharing as presented in the theoretical approach of Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) influences all seven functions civil society (respectively INGOs) should fulfill and is, for this study, inseparably connected to Paffenhölz’s and Spurk’s (2006) work. Information and knowledge are understood within the context of Heywood’s (2014) definition of an information society: “A society in which the crucial resource is knowledge/information, its primary dynamic force being the process of technological development and diffusion” (p.144). Both concepts information and knowledge are for the
The purpose of this study viewed as one intertwined entity, although there are scholars that separate them. Therefore, from now on it will only be referred to knowledge as the umbrella term.

3.1 Inter-organizational knowledge sharing

According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), the most basic foundation of successful knowledge sharing is the “recipient” being motivated to gain knowledge (p. 679). In the present study, both parties in a cooperative relationship are understood as recipients and donors. For the purpose of this study, the four factors identified by Easterby-Smith et al. that influence the dynamics of a knowledge-transfer relationship of organizations are incorporated: power relations, trust and risk, structures and mechanisms and social ties (p. 679). Concerning power relations, they describe a donor-recipient situation and a certain kind of power asymmetry when sharing knowledge (p. 679). This might not be the case when we look at INGOs - each with its broad field of experience and none of them in a position where one needs to be taught survival principles by the others. It can, however, be assumed here, that there are indeed areas where different INGOs have a different profound knowledge and special skills (e.g. on sanitation systems or power supply). In that case, there is no particular donor-recipient relation because learning is mutual and just applies to particular departments. Still, power relations might become visible when one INGO dominates the knowledge cooperation without set legitimacy to do so. Further on, trust and risk factors are defined as uncertainties in the sense of whether eventual gains are really mutual and knowledge is not exploited by one side (p.680). In short, every INGO should behave according to a code of conduct, in this case the INGO Accountability Charter. Through this instrument, trust could be increased and risks could be minimized for the cooperating INGOs. Structures and mechanisms are understood as organizational structures and methods of working and cooperating with others. INGOs that developed over decades clearly do not have the same internal structures. What matters is that their “absorptive capacity” (p.678) regarding knowledge and information is economic. The phenomenological term describes the importance to value and assimilate external knowledge in a frictionless and efficient manner. In addition to internal structures, strategic alliances of INGOs are acknowledged and regarded as both - a possible facilitator and an impediment to cooperation. In contrast, social ties between employees are assumed to be a clear facilitator of successful knowledge sharing in every stage of the cooperation process and throughout different hierarchy layers within and
between organizations: “Such ties probably also help to alleviate the cultural differences, whether national or corporate, which may exist between organizations.” (p.680)

3.2 Seven functions of civil society in peacebuilding

The upcoming section is going to review the seven functions as described in Paffenholz’ and Spurk’s (2006, p.13) analytical framework in connection to the Rwandan situation. In a situation of armed conflict or war the domestic civil society is deprived of physical infrastructure, state structures and institutions, security (complete or partial lawlessness), basic human rights, trust and free and independent media. That is the point where the international civil society (although facing the same problems to some extent) needs to get involved. It should be acknowledged, however, that cooperation of INGOs is the core concept of this study and it is assumed that the reader notes, that every function is assessed from that vantage point although it is not mentioned repeatedly. Within the frame of this study, cooperation with others is the presumed prerequisite to increase the value of each particular function. Moreover, Paffenholz’ and Spurk’s (2006) research looks at responsibilities every single INGO itself should live up to, while factors for successful knowledge sharing, as explained above, between INGOs should now be kept in mind and connected to the seven functions.

As aforementioned, Paffenholz’s and Spurk’s (2006) research suggests seven basic functions civil society should fulfill in peacebuilding processes. Peacebuilding is defined as the long-term process that follows peacemaking\(^2\) and peacekeeping\(^3\). The three concepts are unresolvably intertwined and can temporarily intersect each other. Peace-building according to Heywood (2014) involves:

“addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict [including] economic reconstruction, repairing and improving the economic and social infrastructure, de-mining, the demobilization and retraining of former combatants, the reintegration of displaced

\(^2\) Peacemaking as defined by the UN: Opening point of a peace process, the aim is to stop overt hostilities and violence. It brings hostile parties to agreement through diplomatic means. The Security Council, in its efforts to maintain international peace and security, may recommend ways to avoid conflict or restore or secure peace. (UN website, 3 June 2015)

\(^3\) Peacekeeping as defined by the UN: Preserving the status quo between the fighting has come to a halt and a peace agreement is negotiated upon. The Security Council sets up UN peacekeeping operations and defines their scope and mandate in its efforts to maintain international peace and security. Most operations involve military duties, such as observing a ceasefire or establishing a buffer zone while negotiators seek a long-term solution. Others may require civilian police or other civilian personnel to help organize elections or monitor human rights. Operations have also been deployed to monitor peace agreements in cooperation with the peacekeeping forces of regional organizations. (UN website, 3 June 2015)
peoples, establishing community organizations and revising governmental arrangements, or ‘state-building’” (p.452).

Although the set time frame this study is going to examine cannot be generally defined as one of just peace-building it is apt to use Paffenholz’s and Spurk’s approach because, as mentioned above, the three concepts are intertwined. This is especially true given the fact that the time span in which the genocide happened was extremely short. Thus, INGOs are expected to strive to serve those functions as early as they can, although other actors in the conflict might not have entered into a peace-building condition yet.

The scholarly accepted foundation for a modern approach of peacebuilding which is also represented by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) is the conflict transformation school. This school of thought, as determined by Lederach (1996), looks at the immediate situation and elaborates the opaque underlying relationships of the conflict parties to develop a common ground. This creates a point of departure to creatively assess both the situation and the relations and find ways to peacefully transform and eventually solve the conflict situation. It can be a complicated and lengthy process but represents the most sustainable approach for peace.

1. Protection of citizens: This basic function of civil society consists of protecting lives, freedom and property against attacks and despotism by the state and other authorities. In Rwanda, this particularly means to secure civilians from open violence within the country. It shall be explored which measures were taken during the genocide (although it already became clear, that this only happened to a limited extent). Moreover, as the RPF advanced and finally took Kigali, civilians (mostly Hutu) within Rwanda were in danger of revenge killings and denunciation of having participated in the genocide, often without proper evidence. What did INGOs do to counteract this? Furthermore, INGOs should help to ensure a peaceful journey to and coexistence in refugee camps. This seems to have been of the upmost importance, since former soldiers, militiamen and ‘authority figures’ (mostly perpetrators of the genocide) continued to exert power in the camps and threaten extremely obedient Rwandans.

2. Monitoring for Accountability: This function mainly entails monitoring the activities of the central powers - the state apparatus and the government. This is also a way of controlling central authorities and holding them accountable. Monitoring can refer to various issues, such as human rights, public spending and corruption. Looking back, it appears as if INGOs (among many others) have failed to monitor the government’s actions before and during the genocide. Afterwards, there was much confusion about what had actually happened and what the distinct magnitude of the events were. It will
be examined, if there was any joint action and/or increased monitoring activities during the course of events.

3. Advocacy and public communication: Civil society has an important task to articulate interests – especially of marginalized groups – and to create channels of communication to bring them to the public agenda, thus raising public awareness and improving the situation.

In the case of Rwanda INGOs, NGOs, other civil society organizations and the media were responsible to keep the human suffering present at the stage of political diplomatic efforts in a global environment. But not only the political sphere was to be made aware. The global public sphere - the global consciousness - had to be encouraged to engage actively in the process of trying to improve the situation. Be it by donating to humanitarian funds or by voluntary supporting humanitarian aid agencies in the region. INGOs would also serve this function by motivating people to further research (outside individuals, employees of INGOs, etc.) the situation in order to extract lessons and eventually facilitate conflict transformation.

4. Socialization: With its rich associational life, civil society contributes to the formation and practice of democratic attitudes among citizens. People learn to develop tolerance, mutual trust and the ability to find compromise by democratic procedures. Thus, democracy is ensured not only by legal institutions but also by citizens’ habits.

Within the Rwandan society associational life had been whipped out to a great extent through the genocide. As mentioned before, approximately half the population was displaced. Foreign NGOs withdrew their personnel, remaining personnel was targeted by the perpetrators of the genocide. So were many intellectuals (doctors, teachers, journalists). Many well-educated people in Rwanda were in fact Tutsi. Well-educated Hutu were also targeted due to suspected support of opposition parties or just due to envy. Problematically, local remaining NGOs were suspected of being associated with the ‘Hutu power’ regime. In short, the genocide itself displays the most radical form of intolerance and mistrust. Hence, the task at hand is difficult to say the least. INGOs should, however, promote tolerance and mutual trust through programs and measures like educational trainings about democracy, discussions about possibilities for reappraisal and possibly in supporting the responsible judiciary institutions in detaining the perpetrators. This could facilitate the establishment of a proper democratic mindset and solidarity in the Rwandan society in the long-run.

5. Building community: Engagement and participation in voluntary associations also has the potential to strengthen bonds among citizens, i.e., building social capital. In cases in which the associations include members from other ethnic or social groups it also bridges social cleavages and adds to social cohesion.
Like the fourth function, building community is something extremely delicate given the fact that one part of the community tried to extinguish the other. It is difficult to apply this function in the sense Paffenholz’ and Spurk’s framework suggests. It can, however, also be applied to refugee camps as long as associational life still exists or currently spawns. It will be researched whether any cleavage bridging activities were thinkable during the time frame.

6. Intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state: Civil society and its organizations fulfill the role of balancing the power of and negotiating with the state by establishing diverse relations (communication, negotiation, control) of various interest groups or independent institutions to the state.

The present study is going to assess whether such diplomatic ties to the newly formed RPF government existed and whether INGOs were successful in voicing the interests of various groups. Shortly before (Habyarimana government) and during (interim government) the genocide such ties are expected to be rather weak. Nevertheless, appearances will be taken into account.

7. Service delivery: The direct provision of services to the citizens forms an important part of activities of civil society associations, e.g. self-help groups. Especially in cases in which the state is weak it becomes a basic activity to provide shelter, health or education.

Eventually, the seventh function is going to be a core aspect. In a country like Rwanda, seemingly deprived of all humaneness, the delivery of services (especially from INGOs since the domestic civil society ranged from being weak to non-existent) is essential for its citizens (resp. refugees). The government apparatus was weak and certainly could not live up to the delivery of tasks and services that a state is normally responsible for. INGOs - particularly if they cooperate with each other - can have an immense impact in this field, especially in the vast refugee camps that have to work according to basic social structures for the time they exist.
Combined, the two approaches of Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) and Pffenholz and Spurk (2006) address how cooperation is done, what kind of facilitating/impeding factors there are and within which different fields of activity INGOs are involved in cooperation could appear. As presented in Fig.1 the two theoretical approaches connect logically and will be utilized to frame the analysis of this study. Beforehand however, it is necessary for the reader to understand clearly what actually happened in Rwanda and how it could come to that.
4. Background

4.1 Historical and political Background of the Rwandan genocide 1994

There are three main demographic groups in Rwanda - the Tutsi (also called Batutsi, approximately 14%), the Hutu (also called Bahutu, approximately 85%) and the Twa (also called Batwa, approximately 1%). Nowadays, the people of Rwanda are all called Bantu as a reference to their shared language and as an effort to reunite them after the 1994 genocide. The differences between those groups are rooted in political status and economic wealth rather than in culture, religion or language since they all share those features to a wide extent. Hutu were small-scale peasants and forest inhabitants. In the pre-colonial era, Tutsi, who were mostly cattle farmers, quickly established themselves as the ruling elite by building up a centralistic monarchy with an army and administrative system. Hence, the Tutsi-Hutu relation developed into a patron-client relationship. Gribbin (2005) notes that, in the “pre-European era, Rwandan society was balanced in large parts by reciprocal obligations. Peasants had to work for their superiors, but in turn received benefits of security from the warrior class” (p.8).

The social and ethnic tensions between the two groups were manifested and exacerbated by colonial rule, starting with colonial power exerted by Germany from 1897 until 1916 and afterwards by Belgium until Rwanda became independent in 1962. From 1900 onwards, when the first missions were founded the Catholic Church had a great influence on society. Hand in hand the colonial powers and the church planted the paradigm of heterogeneity of races into the heads of the up until that point homogenous Rwandans (Gribbin, 2005, p.12).

According to Youngblood Coleman (2015) the Belgian colonialists intensified the ethnic division by favoring and supporting the Tutsi rule (p.9). Tensions between Hutu and Tutsi worsened further in the late 1950s. Democratic trends promoted by the Belgian colonialists (post WWII) were opposed by the Tutsi minority that held on to their privileges. This (and the fear of the country turning to communism) caused the Belgians and the Catholic Church to shift their benevolence towards the formerly marginalized Hutu population resulting in the political Hutu movement gaining “momentum” (UN website 2016). “This marked the start of the so-called ‘Hutu Peasant Revolution’ or ‘social revolution’ lasting from 1959 to 1961, which signified the end of Tutsi domination and the sharpening of ethnic tensions” (ibid.). Hutu took over all political and social institutions in Rwanda. This was achieved through the moral support of the Belgian colonists and the step by step assassination of Tutsi with political and economic power throughout the years of the revolution (West, 2001, p.143f).
The power takeover was accomplished by massive violence which caused a significant part of the population to seek refuge in neighboring countries (120,000 primarily Tutsi) (UN website). In 1961, the Party of the Bahutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEBAHUTU) and Gregoire Kayibanda as the first elected president of Rwanda took office (Youngblood Coleman, 2015, p. 9).

During the 1960s, groups of Tutsi, seeking refuge in Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire (DRC), struck back and repeatedly launched attacks on Hutu representatives and the Hutu government (ten times between 1962-67). This in turn amplified government-supported violence against civilians (foremost Tutsi) in Rwanda and once again caused internal displacement and Rwandans seeking refuge in other countries (UN website). West (2001) notes that: “The same motives which set in motion the 1994 extermination machinery fueled massacres 30 years earlier: racist propaganda, exploitation of old myths, mobilization of local chiefs, fear of Tutsi invasion, government planning of Tutsi extermination, its execution at the grass-roots level, and so on” (p.145). Western governments were in part embarrassed (Belgium) by their role in supporting the murderous regime and in part indifferent due to Rwanda’s relative unimportance within the geopolitical context (USA, Soviet Union) which is (mainly) the reason why no reaction was to be expected (ibid., p.146).

In 1973 Major General Juvenal Habyarimana (National Revolutionary Movement for Development - MRND) took over the power. West (2001) interestingly comments: “As he strongly promoted foreign assistance and aid agencies in Rwanda, his rule marks the beginning of the expansion of NGOs in Rwanda” (p.147). Habyarimana was the leader of a one-party system until 1994.

In Uganda, the exile situation led to the foundation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1988. It was declared “a political and military movement with the stated aims of securing repatriation of Rwandans in exile and reforming of the Rwandan government, including political power sharing” (UN website). A high number of positions of power and leadership were held by Tutsi although Hutu refugees were members as well. Among them was the future prime minister and current president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame (ibid.). From 1990 onwards they launched several attacks on Rwandan territory. In the same year president Habyarimana had declared the transition to a multiparty system due to internal and external pressure (Youngblood Coleman, 2015, p.10). As mentioned by Gribbin (2005), the RPF attacks were also due to said planned transition and the time pressure the RPF felt when they wanted to justifiably pursue their cause through invasion. The RPF felt that the Tutsi population in Rwanda saw the transition of the political system as a step in the right direction on the way to equality (p.59).
The RPF attacks caused a situation in which “all Tutsis inside the country were labeled accomplices to the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition parties were labeled traitors. Media, particularly the radio, continued to spread unfounded rumors, which exacerbated ethnic problems” (UN website). Furthermore, another incident, namely the collapse of the international coffee market agreement in 1989 (Rwanda’s main export product) did not work to mitigate the situation, on the contrary.

In 1993 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the governments in the region initiated peace negotiations between the Habyarimana government and the RPF. Eventually, the Arusha Peace Agreements were signed by all parties although some parts of the Hutu government were suspected of not having truly being willing to adhere to the agreements. Thus, the Security Council additionally established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to support the implementation of the peace agreements (ibid.). Here Prunier (1995) concludes that by signing the agreements “[Habyarimana] changed in status from protector to enemy, or at least […] an accomplice of the enemy” (p. 227) for many ‘Hutu Power’ proponents.

4.2 Timeline of the genocide

Within 100 days from April 6th to July 1994 between 800.000 and 1.000.000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. The massive mobilization of the Hutu population to participate in the genocide was only possible because of a culture of impunity fostered by the Hutu governments during the tree decades preceding the genocide (Kayigamba, 2008, p.34f).

On April 6th 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda (Habyarimana) and Burundi died when their plane was shot down by a rocket. It remains unclear until this day, who or which group was actually responsible for the attack. This event is often depicted as the trigger of the genocide, because Hutu (starting with the presidential guard (GP), the military (FAR) and militiamen (Interahamwe)) almost immediately started encroachments on Tutsi civilians, meaning identifying and killing them (Youngblood Coleman, 2015, p.2/11). However, Clark and Kaufman (2008) note that this was - although the starting point in the timeline of the genocide – preceded by “the long-term planning of the genocide [and it] would likely have happened anyway, such was the government’s degree of planning” (p.5f; Melvern, 2008, p.31). The following day, the so-called Hate Radio station RTLMC (a major player in the stimulation of the population to execute the genocide) forthwith blamed the plane attack on the RPF and

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4 For an attempt of an explanation in the sense of who benefited most see Prunier, 1996, p. 213-229.
called for “‘resistance to the attempted coup’” (Prunier, 1995, p. 217). Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (moderate Hutu) and 10 Belgian peacekeepers were assassinated soon afterwards. Other moderate Hutu intellectuals were to face the same destiny (ibid., p. 230f). Subsequently, the international community evacuated all foreign expatriates from Rwanda within the next few days, strictly leaving all non-foreigners behind (ibid., 234). Seemingly incapable to deal with the situation because of “the unwillingness of [its] member states […] to strengthen UNAMIR’s mandate and [to contribute] additional troops” the UN reduced the UNAMIR troop from 2,165 to just 270 on April 21st (UN website). On June 22nd, France launched a military-based humanitarian intervention called Operation Turquoise in the southwest of Rwanda. The genocide, however, officially continued until July 4th. From the onset of the genocide, the RPF had tried to conquer the country from the interim government and thus from ‘Hutu power’. On the 4th of July, they took Kigali and aborted the old leadership almost completely.

Prunier (1996) states that by that time approximately 2 million Rwandans (Tutsi fleeing the Hutu massacres but mostly Hutu fleeing advancing RPF soldiers, among them many participants of the genocide seeking to cover up their trails) had left for the border regions of Zaire (today’s DRC), Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania, where they found themselves in massive refugee camps. Another 1.8 million people were internally displaced, so more or less half of the population was displaced (p.312). Especially in the beginning international help was carried out slowly and poorly coordinated. This immensely exacerbated the sanitation and health situation (especially in the camps around Goma, Zaire (DRC)) and eventually led to a great loss of lives due to actually preventable diseases. Prunier remarks further: “UNHCR and other agencies had no real control over what went on in the camps, a situation which eventually led to strong protests of some of the biggest and most efficient NGOs” (ibid., p.313).

On November 8th 1994, the Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to deal with the human rights violations (UN website 2016). Alongside the national justice system, a participatory justice system, the so-called Gacaca courts5, has been established to keep the pace with thousands of suspects and trials. The national justice system is dealing with charges for planning the genocide as well as rape-cases, whereas the Gacaca courts deal with ‘less severe’ charges. Gacaca as a deep-rooted tradition in Rwanda is

5 UN website: Communities elected judges [village representatives] to hear the trials of genocide suspects accused of all crimes except planning of genocide or rape. The defendants in Gacaca courts have been released provisionally awaiting trial. The releases have caused a lot of unhappiness among survivors who see it as a form of amnesty. The Gacaca courts give lower sentences if the person is repentant and seeks reconciliation with the community. These courts are intended to help the community participate in the process of justice and reconciliation for the country.
especially considered significant for reconciliation as it empowers the people (survivors and perpetrators) to participate and interact directly. Nevertheless, the fear of repetition and the cultured impunity (Youngblood Coleman, 2015, p.13) breed hesitation of survivors to stand witness in trials. A crucial factor that makes reconciliation an exhausting and difficult process.

Reconciliation efforts are ongoing to the present day. The internal forces responsible for the genocide have been named. Concerning the international actors unable to stop the atrocities and beforehand possibly blindly fostering this development to a certain extent, Youngblood Coleman (2015) mentions that: “the role of the United Nations, the United States, France and Belgium have also been recognized as significant” (p.10). Still in 1994, a new parliament consisting of a majority of seats for Hutus and a minority for Tutsi was formed. Pasteur Bizimungu (Hutu) became president and Paul Kagame, military leader of the RPF, became vice-president and minister of defense (ibid., p.10). From 2000 until today he has been holding office as the president of Rwanda (ibid., p.12).

4.3 The situation of NGOs in Rwanda

Looking at the recurring violence in Rwanda in the 1960s to 1980s and the question why NGOs did not intervene earlier, West (2001, p.146-166) points out that organizational structures of NGOs (monitoring systems, field-offices, logistics, resources, etc.) were still developing and that many of the INGOs we know today as key-players in humanitarian response were still to be founded (Oxfam and Caritas were the first to establish regional offices). Furthermore, they did not have the aspiration or radical attitude to target change in the political system. Violence within African populations was perceived as somewhat normal. Many of those early organizations were faith-based and local farming cooperatives also played a quasi-humanitarian role. However, their efforts in crises were mostly relief-oriented although sometimes small-scale developmental-oriented as well. Moreover, the media did not have as much power as it does these days (or even in 1994). Thus, information about the conditions in Rwanda did not spread easily. Besides, in the international community, Rwanda was seen as one of the most stable states in Africa back then, which was due to its elaborate administrative system and democracy-based ideology. Nevertheless, there were warning signs and some activists also sensed and articulated them. Unfortunately, the transformation of those warnings into action was lacking sincere motivation. Maybe because the problem was not regarded as urgent as it turned out to be.
Concerning the NGO-community or civil society in Rwanda from 1990 onwards Pottier (1996) attests that they could be associated to a large extent with the ‘Hutu Power’ government than with conceptual civil society. After the genocide, so Pottier, it is even more questionable how unbiased the remaining NGOs were since the staff of many non-traditionalist NGOs was targeted as well (moderate Hutus) (p.406-408). Thus, the progressive forces were neutralized and the left-over personnel and agencies have to be considered very critically because the reason for their survival was most likely that they either agreed with the genocide or at least accepted that the Tutsi minority had to be extinguished.

During the genocide of 1994, Prunier (1995) points out that only one INGO voluntarily remained inside Rwanda – Médecins Sans Frontières (p.273). The evacuated agencies failed to properly alert the international community about the actual genocide that was taking place in Rwanda⁶.

After the genocide, Rwanda was a so-called humanitarian shadow state in which NGOs and other organizations attracted more of the educated people because of good salaries and future prospects than the state apparatus itself (West, 2001, p.167). The new RPF-led government disfavored this development quite a lot, given the circumstances that they had grave difficulties to find people who wanted to work with them and build a new government. The RPF did not receive funds to re-build the country from the international community for a disproportionate amount of time (Prunier, 1996, p.336) with the result that they could not offer good salaries and promising job prospects. A certain competition with a subordinate role of the new Rwandan government was evident.

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⁶ The international community however avoided using the term ‘genocide’ as long as they could. Had they acknowledged what was happening the UN would have been forced to intervene as they were bound to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) effective since 1951.
5. Methodological Frame

Within this chapter, the applied method of the case study is going to be elaborated on. It will be explained why this particular design – a holistic multiple-case study - was chosen and what the reasons were for setting the study in Rwanda. Subsequently, we turn to the causes for the selection of the data sources and their introduction to the reader. They are going to represent the material for the analysis. The analysing units, i.e. three INGOs, are introduced and a short background on them is being provided. Hereafter, a construct of questions that connects the research questions with the theoretical frame is to be introduced. This construct or survey-like list is supposed to be the foundation of the following findings and analysis chapter. Finally, the epistemological stance of the researcher, thus the distinct perspective of the analysis and conclusion will be explained.

5.1 The case study

The study is a case study which is a method with a variety of definitions that are more or less scholarly accepted. Gerring (2004), however, tries to condense those definitions into one that is applicable to generally any kind of case study as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (p.342). In this study, the analyzing units - the multiple cases - are INGOs in the Rwandan crisis deriving from the general entity of INGO cooperation, thus behavior. It is apt to use a case study to answer the presented research questions because “case study research seeks to identify behavioral and procedural patterns” (Green, 2011, p.3) from which this study can conclude on how specifically INGOs in Rwanda cooperated. Multiple-case studies allow to get a more general view on a situation and within those multiple cases a holistic approach (Yin, 2003, p.7f.) is pursued because within the single units (INGOs) only the phenomenon of cooperation is researched.

Since the purpose of this study is to find out about cooperation of INGOs in a humanitarian crisis it has the typology of an *instrumental* case study describing a *social situation* where “some restricted and limited set of events is analyzed so as to reveal the way in which general principles of social organization manifest themselves in some particular specified context” (Mitchell, 2000, p.171). An instrumental case study plays a supportive role in understanding and facilitating knowledge extraction concerning the general phenomenon of cooperation of INGOs in humanitarian crises (Stake, 2005, p.445). The present study contains elements of a *descriptive* case study asking in which sector cooperation happens (RQ1) and elements of an
explanatory case study, when it seeks to answer questions of how cooperation is organized (RQ2, RQ3) (Yin, 2003, p.5). Case studies do not easily draw general inferences because “the particular events described in the case are usually presented in the first instance at a fairly low level of abstraction” (Mitchell, 2000, p.182). They do, however, give an insight into a problem, which in following research can be developed in a broader context in order to generalize findings to some extent. Furthermore, it is an appropriate method to approach the objective because there is little information about the topic of cooperation of INGOs in humanitarian crises. Hence, it makes sense to explore and describe the small picture of multiple similar cases in the same environment to assess valuable points of departure before moving on to more extensive methods of data collection. The various reasons to look at INGOs in particular are furthermore laid out in the theory chapter of this study (chapter 2), i.e. in defining the research gap.

5.2 The setting of the case study

In this study, Rwanda was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the genocide but mostly the following refugee crisis, drew extraordinarily much on-the-ground media coverage and attention. Thus, the situation created extreme incentives for (not only) INGOs to work and assist in Rwanda and its neighbouring countries with the aim to improve the situation and eventually improve the organization’s reputation. In a climate of so much competition – even for INGOs – and social pressure from their supporter and donor communities it is expected that INGOs would be more prone to cooperate in order to achieve their organizational goals than in other situations without so much competition.

Secondly, the topic of INGO cooperation is not documented or researched very extensively yet. The Rwandan tragedy with all its facets however has now been a popular research topic over the course of more than twenty years. It is expected that the research material about this particular case is holding the data necessary to answer the research questions. Unfortunately, in many other, newer cases of humanitarian intervention with INGO involvement, obtaining such data seems to be rather unlikely (either undocumented or not accessible). It should be mentioned that the original setting of the case study was supposed to be recent Syria. Literally no information concerning the research topic of INGO cooperation could be obtained. This might have various reasons. The most plausible is the possible danger INGOs would put their personnel in, when talking about current strategies in an ongoing civil war (with facets of an aggressive war) situation to outsiders. But still, it was very disappointing to find zero
documentation or strategy papers that held valuable information for the purpose of this study. When going deeper into the topic and looking at other newer (from the year 2000 onwards) historic events all over the globe, this phenomenon seems to repeat itself. There is a severe lack of formal documentation of cooperation between INGOs. Furthermore, informal documentation is virtually inaccessible without personal connections it seems. Nevertheless, the researcher cannot claim to have tested every single incident in recent history. After all, Rwanda – although the genocide happened more than two decades ago – provided the most promising entry point for the purpose of this particular study.

The geographical area of interest are refugee camps inside Rwanda and the neighbouring countries DRC, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda, i.e. where the respective INGOs worked.

5.3 The time frame of the case study

Due to functional reasons the time frame for the analysis is going to be oriented towards the main source “Humanitarian Aid and Effects” (Borton et al., 1996) and its particular time frame. Beginning with the starting point of the genocide, 7 March 1994, until the refugee crisis was somewhat under control by November 1994 which is also the time frame the study dealt with.

5.4 The data sources

This study is going to examine the characteristics of INGO cooperation in the Rwandan genocide by assessing study 3 of the Report “The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience” (Eriksson, 1996), that is called “Humanitarian Aid and Effects” (Borton et al., 1996). It was drawn up by the team “Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda” consisting of multiple independent specialists and researchers from different countries. A steering committee (representatives from 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, the EU, the DAC; nine multilateral agencies and UN units; the ICRC and IFRC; five INGOs) was responsible to oversee the efforts of the Joint Evaluation team. The purpose and objective of the report were purely scientific in asking which lessons can be drawn from the Rwandan genocide for the practice of humanitarian aid and from the devastating response of the humanitarian system towards the situation in Rwanda. It is the most comprehensive official study about the events of the genocide and its
aftermath that specifically involves the performance of INGOs and is thus judged as a reliable source of information. It is, however, a secondary source. The researchers were not present in Rwanda to witness the genocide or the following refugee crisis themselves but interviewed humanitarian personnel, the respective population and political representatives and analyzed media and official document content in order to draw lessons from the practice in the emergency for the future.

Furthermore, the report “Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi 1994” (Binet et al., 2003) by a group of MSF employees for the report database MSF Speaking Out is going to be included in answering the research questions. The document provides detailed statements of eyewitnesses and people involved in the response to the genocide. It is a valuable piece of documentation for the purpose of this study because it provides first-hand documentation. It might be biased concerning MSF’s organizational practices and standards although it is perceived as a fairly neutral account of the events from different people’s perspectives which cannot be considered objective anyway.

The websites of the other observed INGOs were also evaluated in terms of information concerning the field of cooperation with other INGOs in Rwanda 1994. Unfortunately, they do not provide any kind of eye-witness accounts of employees or similar documentation. Thus, no further data sources could be included in this study.

There are limitations to the choice of this material. First of all, it might not provide all the information this study is aspiring to assemble. Data is hard to obtain when informal communication between organizations often is not recorded. Emergency situations and a lack of communication devices might increase this problem. Furthermore, other information might be secret to students and only designated for inter-organizational or accredited research purposes. That is why additional interviews with people who are or were employed by the INGOs at the time, i.e. primary sources, would have been an asset in order to answer the research questions. Unfortunately, only one of the interview requests sent out by the researcher to organizations, to NGO consortia and independent scholars was answered. In fact, the only reply was from MSF telling the researcher very politely that they do not have the resources to do interviews with master students. This circumstance only leaves the possibility of assembling the data through secondary sources without the possibility of asking additional questions in order to remove ambiguity. Moreover, the official websites of the INGOs might not contain all the data about cooperation and partnership they are or were involved in. Nevertheless, it is the only way for the researcher of collecting data directly from the analyzing units and hence will be evaluated in addition to the Joint Evaluation Report.
There might always be another or better way to assemble information and it is regrettable that the goal of gathering a sufficient amount of information for this study was missed by the researcher.

In sum, a desk study of secondary sources might not be the classic implementation of a case study but secondary sources “allow research on subjects to which the researcher does not have physical access and thus cannot study by any other method” (Bailey, 1978, p.291). The researcher neither has the financial means nor the societal connections to conduct primary research in order to answer the research questions. It is a rather non-reactive method which allows the researcher to study the subject without the editors being involved and thus minimizes the bias of the data itself that is collected. Also, interviews or surveys that would be conducted today (twenty-three years later) might cause errors due to memory failure or biases.

5.5 The analyzing units

The analysing units will be three international NGOs. They are chosen because of their frequency of appearance in the main source “Humanitarian Aid and Effects” (Borton et al., 1996). Leaving out the ICRC and IFRC due to their hybrid nature between an NGO and an intergovernmental organization the remaining INGOs are MSF (France, Belgium and Holland combined) (71 mentions), Oxfam (49 mentions) and CARE (including offices in Australia, Canada, Germany, UK and US) (37 mentions).

5.5.1 Background on MSF

Médecins Sans Frontières was founded in Paris, France in 1971 and is a worldwide movement of 21 sections and 24 associations. They are bound together by MSF International, based in Geneva, Switzerland, which provides coordination, information and support to the MSF movement. Several thousand health professionals, logistical and administrative staff – most of whom are hired locally – work on programmes in some 69 countries worldwide. Their work is based on humanitarian principles. MSF operates independently and 90 per cent of the overall funding comes from private sources. MSF is generally neutral, although at times, they speak out publicly in an effort to bring a forgotten crisis to public attention and thus serve an advocacy function when necessary (MSF website 2016).
Although MSF is made up of different country divisions, that act mostly independent from each other, the country divisions that were actually present on the ground during the crisis (MSF-France, MSF-Holland, MSF-Belgium) in Rwanda are treated as one organization and cooperation between those is not explicitly researched since it is alleged that they should to their best interest cooperate with one another anyway. The same principle applies to different country offices of the following organizations Oxfam and CARE.

5.5.2 Background on Oxfam

The “Oxford Committee for Famine Relief” was founded in Oxford in 1942 by a group of Quakers, social activists, and Oxford academics. The trigger was the occupation and systematic exploitation of Greece by Nazi Germany and the subsequent famine the Greek population had to endure. After WWII, they continued their relief work, especially in delivering food assistance. In 1958 the name Oxfam was established and shortly after the first independent branch of the organization was founded in Canada in 1963. It was not before 1995 that an international umbrella organization “Oxfam International” was founded to coordinate the today 17 affiliate offices in America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Québec and Spain. Together they perform relief, development and advocacy work in 90 countries worldwide. Naturally, the organizations goals and focus have enhanced. The main causes of Oxfam’s work today are self-empowerment of people in developing countries (with an emphasis on women and girls) thus alleviating poverty and promoting gender equality and sustainable development in the face of major climate change. Funding comes from various sources and the affiliates have different policies when it comes to accepting donations from their respective country governments (Oxfam website 2016).

5.5.3 Background on CARE

In 1945 CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) was founded in the USA by 22 charity organisations. Originally, it was established as a relief agency delivering care packages to Europe’s starving populations after WWII. Although the initial focus was on Europe, CARE quickly began to establish offices in the rest of the world and broadened its approach by also delivering non-food items. When Europe didn’t need urgent help to recover anymore the focus shifted to the developing world. By cooperating with distinct partners
(organizations, governments, military) and merging with the medical organization MEDICO the organization’s abilities and skills to deliver relief and support development amplified through the course of the 20th century. The umbrella organization that was to coordinate the different country offices, CARE International, was founded in 1979. Today, the INGO consists of 14 country offices (Australia, Canada, Danmark, Deutschland-Luxembourg, France, India, Japan, Nederland, Norge, Österreich, Thailand, UK, USA, Peru) and is funded by various sources comprising private individuals and companies as well as government agencies and supranational bodies like the EU and the UN. One of the most important topics in the new century is the empowerment of girls and women worldwide (CARE website 2016).

All three INGOs represent the rights-based approach concerning their policy and when implementing projects.

5.6 The case study protocol

Since this study is not a field study involving several researchers an extensive case study protocol is not necessary. The study provides all the information the reader would otherwise get from the protocol. That is why the protocols for MSF, CARE and Oxfam only contain the questions and results. The following questions constitute the data collection frame according to the theoretical superstructure.

RQ1: In which sectors of humanitarian assistance did INGOs cooperate in the Rwandan emergency?

- In which sector(s) does the organization work?
  - protection of citizens (from revenge killings, on journey to refugee camps, in refugee camps)
  - monitoring for accountability (any joint INGO action and/or increased monitoring activities during the course of events)
  - advocacy and public communication (engagement of political and public sphere – awareness raising, research motivation)
  - socialization (promote tolerance and mutual trust through programs and measures)
  - building community (cleavage bridging activities in refugee camps)
  - intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state (any ties or relations to newly formed RPF government)
  - Service delivery
- Were efforts made in order to share knowledge with other INGOs and if so, how did these efforts look like?
- With which other organizations (if any) does the organization cooperate?
- Why do they cooperate?
- Which knowledge is shared by and/or with the organization?

RQ2: How and according to which principles were responsibilities between INGOs split?
- Who assigned the responsibilities to the organization?
- Why were those responsibilities assigned to that organization?
- Did power relations between INGOs play a role?
- Which organizational structures and mechanisms did facilitate/impede cooperation?
- Did social ties between employees influence the cooperation?

RQ3: How can INGO cooperation be improved in order to shape humanitarian assistance more efficiently?
- How did the cooperation partners (if any) benefit from the cooperation?
- What was cooperation hindered by (people, organizations, logistic circumstances, attitudes)?
- What measures could have been taken in order to improve cooperation with other present INGOs?

5.7 Epistemological stance

The study is using an abductive approach from a social constructivist point of view.

This study cannot be done inductive since a field study is financially precluded for the researcher. Moreover, inductive research is hardly possible. Circumstances that allow empirical research without any kind of predetermined anticipation arising from personal experiences are hard to contrive. Furthermore, there is no “lack of theory or an existing theory fails to adequately explain a phenomenon” (Merriam, 2009, p. 15) when dealing with civil society, resp. INGOs. Thus, the inductive approach for this particular research is improper. Neither is it going to be a deductive study because the objective is not to test a theory but to spread new light on a process. This is done by abductively re-contextualizing findings by applying them to a certain theoretical framework, hence concluding on measures applicable to practice. Ultimately, abduction is about the interplay of theory and empirical findings.
Social constructivism is apt for the study since the researcher is convinced that human beings are shaped - not only but to a considerable extent – by their environment, their social, cultural, political and historical background. Hence, to explain cooperation of INGOs it is important to recognize the certain area of tension they are rooted in and move in as well as the particular interests and agendas they are pursuing. Moreover, the researcher acknowledges that personal worldviews and values shape the interpretation of the findings according to constructs that are deeply rooted in the personality and cannot be overcome or ignored (Creswell, 2014, p.8).

Having said this, taking a social constructivist point of view is not meant to diminish the findings or the analysis regarding the reliability of the study “acknowledging that qualitative data are social constructions […] does not render them theoretically useless or irrelevant […] rather recasts them as aspects of a distinctive discourse that treats the practices of everyday life as worthy topics of analysis” (Silverman, 2004, p. 51). It shall be perceived, that in the understanding of the researcher objectivity can never be achieved. Subjectivity, nevertheless, shall also be reduced as far as possible although eventually relying on a social constructivist worldview. In this sense, this research seeks to accomplish descriptive understanding without claiming to draw general, objective conclusions on reality, because the specific background of a person, conflict or organization cannot be excluded from any kind of qualitative analysis.
6. Findings and Analysis

This section is organized in accordance to the analytical frame and the methodology. The research questions are going to be answered by using the case study protocol as established in chapter 5. It combines the theoretical framework of Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) with the inter-organizational knowledge sharing approach by Easterby-Smith et al. (2008). Hence, light shall be spread on the cooperation practice of the three chosen units for analysis. For the purpose of this study the findings and analysis are combined since it is easier for the reader to grasp the whole picture when explanation and interpretation elaborate directly on the findings. It is hoped, that confusion can be minimized this way.

Firstly, some general statements concerning the cooperation of organizations (NGOs – local, regional, international, IGOs) on the site in and around Rwanda shall be summarized in order to give an impression on how functional it was.

In the RPF controlled zones in northern Rwanda the report mentions that: “Coordination amongst the agencies appears to have been poor, probably as a result of the intense competition between them and also the RPF’s close control of their activities” (Borton et al., 1996, p.40). Concerning advocacy and representation of the Rwandese people and the terrible security situation within some camps (mainly in Zaire (DRC), let alone Rwanda itself, cooperation was pursued differently: “A group of 15 NGOs joined together to lobby for more effective action […] and in November called upon the Security Council to provide UN troops to police the camps” (Borton et al., 1996, p.44f). In Tanzania (Bukavu area) coordination amongst organizations in order to ensure a frictionless routine in the camps appears to have been rather elaborate: “Coordination meetings were held every morning attended by WFP, UNHCR, ICRC, UNICEF and NGOs” (Borton et al., 1996, p.47). In responding to new developments, organizations were able to act quick and jointly motivate others. This happened for instance after the Cholera outbreak in Goma (Zaire (DRC)) led to a repatriation effort of refugees: “several agencies, including UNHCR, CARE, AICF, Concern, German Emergency Doctors and the Canadian Field Ambulance, MSF and SCF set up waystations and medical posts along the Gisenyi–Ruhengeri–Kigali route” (Borton et al., 1996, p.53). Here it already becomes clear, how different cooperation was pursued depending on the area, organization and time when they entered the humanitarian response.

Generally, the country specifics of Rwanda’s neighbours partially posed difficulties on organizations, whether they wanted to cooperate more or not. The unstable political situation in Zaire (DRC) and Burundi (mixed with their own problems between ethical groups) made it
more difficult for everyone to ensure an adequate emergency response. The situation in Tanzania was relatively stable. The UNHCR and the respective governments distributed responsibilities, sometimes leaving little room for inter-organizational cooperation, since the tasks were distinctly defined. In the best case, i.e. if the UNHRC functions perfectly in its coordinating role, cooperation is enacted from above so that self-initiated cooperation becomes redundant. In Rwanda, however, this best-case scenario did not apply.

One by one, each research question is going to be answered by looking at the organizations in the following order: MSF, Oxfam, CARE. The complete case study protocols can be found in the Appendix. Sub questions that could not be answered on the basis of the data sources are not presented.

6.1 RQ1: In which sectors of humanitarian assistance did INGOs cooperate in the Rwandan emergency?

6.1.1 MSF

➔ In which sector(s) does the organization work in cooperation with other INGOs?

MSF has its main focus on three sectors. Within those, cooperation can be found.

Somewhat out of the general structure falls the sector protection of citizens. The underlying principle of the work of MSF is to treat people regardless to who they are, what they have done or what their beliefs are. Their work in other sectors always encompasses the protection of people. MSF however, was not able to directly defend people in the face of danger, since this is not their mission. Their work - especially with the ICRC – is nevertheless an act of protection. For the purpose of this study, the medical assistance however is regarded as part of the service delivery sector.

The first sector is monitoring for accountability. In the MSF report (Binet et al., 2003, p.30) it is stated that one of the conclusions of the general assembly in the first week of May 1994 was to: “Continue internal debate and joint debate with other organisations”. This implies the will to communicate and counsel with others.

The second one is advocacy and public communication. On the “22nd April 1994 MSF publicly condemned the withdrawal of UNAMIR forces, which left Rwandans alone to face the killers” (Binet et al., 2003, p.8). It is known that the head of the UNAMIR forces in Rwanda Roméo Alain Dallaire did the same thing and repeatedly called for support. Although
we do not see INGO cooperation here, it is very probable, that more INGOs would have joined MSF if more INGOs had still been in the country and able to assess the situation like MSF and Dallaire. Six days later on the April 28th, MSF is one of the first organizations to publicly say the word at a press conference in Brussels and name the events in Rwanda as what they are – genocide (Binet et al., 2003, p.27). This was an important step for knowledge sharing with others. As aforementioned, most INGOs were not able or willing to stay in Rwanda in April and unsure about what to do next. But the term genocide obliges every international actor to act. Hence, it is possible that MSF made the situation a lot clearer for other INGOs. Their main (and in the beginning only) implementing partner on the ground was the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). In May 1994, MSF wants to launch a public appeal for military intervention (after all, it is genocide and the international community is obligated to step in according to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) and communicate this intention to the ICRC (President MSFF and ICRC operational director). The ICRC does not agree to do this at that point of time but MSF continues as intended although the ICRC does not agree (Binet et al., 2003, p.48). Here, the communication practice of MSF is illustrated. They do communicate everything of importance with the ICRC in order to not put them in danger or surprise but eventually every organization still has its own standpoint. Cooperation does not always mean consensus but it shows respect.

The third sector where MSF can be found to actively cooperate are different areas of service delivery on almost every site where they work.

Firstly, they did joint exploratory missions with the ICRC in northern Rwanda to identify sites for new camps and research the situation in the RPF-controlled areas (May 1994) (Binet et al., 2003, p.30). Another example for shared responsibility with the ICRC is Nyamata (Rwanda): “An agreement was made with the ICRC: MSF would have overall responsibility for the hospital in Rilima and the ICRC would provide medical back-up (two nurses) during the set-up phase. Thereafter, the ICRC would deal with food aid (general distribution). As for the local staff for the hospital, the ICRC will lend us their local staff (protected by the Geneva Conventions and therefore under ICRC protection)” (Binet et al., 2003, p.59). It is obvious, that MSF and the ICRC had a quite close relationship in this crisis. Both organizations focus on medical relief and put the people in the center of their work. Economic disadvantages or advantages do not seem to have been of central importance when those decisions were made which supports the collaborative approach with opportunities for mutual gains as explained in chapter 2.2.
Secondly, they worked on establishing water provision systems. Specifically mentioned is a project in camps in Tanzania (Ngara) together with Oxfam (Borton et al., 1996, p.92). In the Gikongoro area (Rwanda) MSF pursued similar activities and AICF, Oxfam and the ICRC are mentioned to do the same there (Borton et al., 1996, p.94). This implies some kind of cooperation although eventually no concluding statement concerning the details can be made. Furthermore, MSF dealt with vaccination. In Goma (DRC) for example there was a: “prompt and effective vaccination campaign that was well coordinated by UNHCR and which benefited from good support and technical backup from UNICEF, BioForce (French INGO that provides services and personnel) and MSF” (Borton et al., 1996, p.96). This again implies some kind of cooperation but unfortunately further information on the specific conditions is lacking. In south-west Rwanda, there were vaccination: “campaigns organized by MSF-France and Merlin” (Borton et al., 1996, p.96). Merlin is a British INGO (merged with Save the Children in 2013) that also dealt with the provision of health care services. Here, the cooperation is clearly stated but no further information about the division of labor between the organizations could be obtained.

 актуально? With which other organizations (if any) does the organization cooperate?

As mentioned above, MSF mainly cooperates with other medical organizations like the ICRC (which is mentioned repeatedly) and AICF. This is probably due to the fact, that they have similar experiences in humanitarian emergencies, worked together before and are able to support each other easily. This especially applies since MSF’s and the ICRC’s own personnel was decimated by the perpetrators of the genocide and they were in need of manpower in order to pursue the tasks at hand. Moreover, a joint convoy organization for transportation inside Rwanda with Caritas is mentioned (Binet et al., 2003, p.21). Oxfam as an implementing partner for water systems in Tanzania also stood out earlier. Additionally, Concern and IRC are mentioned: “MSF, subsequently assisted by Oxfam, quickly established a system to pump, store and distribute water from the lake and MSF-Holland, AICF and Concern established health services in Benaco […] Responsibility for sanitation and hygiene education within the camps was shared - between CARE, MSF-Holland, IRC and IFRC” (Borton et al., 1996, p.38). It is not clear how the responsibilities were determined or if they were overlapping. Most likely the different organizations met for strategy meetings and decided with the help of an UN entity. Protocols of meetings could be a valuable asset for further research in determining the dynamics of collaborative decision making. Several other agencies were implementing partners for MSF, for example a Christian-based American NGO called Operation Blessing (Borton et al., 1996, p. 101) and an associate of MSF called Epicentre
(Borton et al., 1996, p.187). For the purpose of this study, those have to be neglected though since they are not INGOs.

Why do they cooperate?

They cooperate for different reasons. With some, like the ICRC, they share a similar set of skills (medical). Skills that were urgently needed and that multiply the more people work together. On the contrary, with organizations like Oxfam a rather different set of skills also opened up new possibilities for the involved organizations. Moreover, there were very few agencies in the country at the time the genocide gained pace and they were direly in need to support each other concerning knowledge, logistics and supplies. One reason for this need of support was that many Tutsi and Hutu employees of each organization were killed and the lack of personnel made it impossible for one organization alone to treat all the injured people or set up camps for refugees. Besides, the UN was not present in the beginning to take over the coordination of the organizations which is why they had to deal with this themselves. Aside from that, it was particularly dangerous for MSF employees (working for an organization from France and Belgium brought up issues of colonial history) to be in Rwanda. In order to be able to work inside the country they needed to operate under ICRC flag (of Swiss origin) for security reasons: “Every morning a convoy of ambulances (Rwandan Red Cross volunteers and ICRC delegates) left for the various districts of the city to try to get the casualties out to the ICRC field hospital. I [MSF employee] joined the ICRC delegates in this operation.” (Binet et al., 2003, p.19).

Were efforts made in order to share knowledge with other INGOs and if so, how did these efforts look like?

Yes, such efforts were made. In Kigali (Rwanda) they took the form of meetings where responsibilities for the different hospitals (first aid, recovery of bodies) were shared between the ICRC, AICF and MSF (Binet et al., 2003, p.12, 16). Protocols or further specifics could not be obtained. Knowledge sharing also happened through communication with the headquarters which then circulated current status updates to organizations it might have concerned (above all to the ICRC). Especially with the ICRC MSF shared insight concerning next steps in public advocacy and vice versa.

Which knowledge is shared by and/or with the organization?
In Kigali (Rwanda) two MSF nurses working under the flag of the ICRC gathered information about target lists which they then shared with the head of the ICRC delegation Philippe Gaillard (Binet et al., 2003, p.32). As mentioned before, “MSF informed the ICRC of its intention to speak out in favor of armed international intervention” (Binet et al., 2003, p.44). Moreover, Situation reports (Binet et al., 2003, p.60) about meetings and further strategies were circulated with other agencies involved in the particular region. Additionally, MSF (together with Epicentre) gathered information about numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (hereafter IDPs), morbidity and mortality in camps they worked in. This kind of data collection was ill-kept in other camps at the time. It is assumed (not literally mentioned in the report but implied), that this collection was very prescient and of great help when the international community (incl. other organizations) tried to figure out the scale of the tragedy and the needs of the population (Borton et al., 1996, p.81, 187). INGOs have great potential for gathering information and since they are present at different sites of the same crisis they have completely different possibilities to contribute to the body of knowledge in an emergency. If this is done in cooperation with other INGOs (who have the same possibilities) lots of time and work can be saved when assessing situations and a more complete picture can be drawn than any single organization would ever be capable of drawing. Here, the right approach is taken but the implementation should have been more holistic. This however is not the fault of MSF.

6.1.2 Oxfam

In which sector(s) does the organization work in cooperation with other INGOs?

Data concerning two sectors where Oxfam cooperated with other INGOs was obtained. The first sector is monitoring for accountability where Oxfam was an active part in further developing the NGO Code of Conduct and set of standards in collaboration with others (Borton et al., 1996, p.196). What the specifics of this collaboration were however is not elaborated upon.

The second identified sector is service delivery. Oxfam played an important role in water management and sanitation: “For instance, GTZ, the Swedish Rescue Board, MSF-France, IRC, Oxfam and Concern all worked in the sanitation sector […] the water management package was effectively undertaken by at least a dozen agencies with the US military/PWSS, Oxfam and THW playing a key role” (Borton et al., 1996, p.75). Further information on the specifics of the cooperation or Oxfam’s key role were not included. It is probably, although not evident, that Oxfam and THW coordinated their work with each other, both being
specialist in implementing water and sanitation systems. Again, INGOs that have the same or similar expertise are working at least next to each other.

> With which other organizations (if any) does the organization cooperate?

The only specific implementing partner mentioned in the sources is MSF. They joined forces to establish water pumping, storage and distribution systems in camps in Tanzania (Borton et al., 1996, p.38, 94). Furthermore, they pre-positioned supplies in Goma (DRC) together (H Borton et al., 1996, p.147). Further information on why they cooperated with each other or whether Oxfam cooperated with other INGOs as well was unfortunately not included in the material. It is conceivable though, that MSF and Oxfam had worked together before and additionally, that their cooperation was rather due to the UNHCR’s coordination efforts.

> Which knowledge is shared by and/or with the organization?

From answering the above questions, it can be said that technical expertise concerning water system engineering was shared with MSF (Oxfam being the provider of the engineering knowledge to MSF). Similarly, they must have shared knowledge with each other concerning the position of the pre-stored supplies in DRC in order to create a systematic supply. Moreover, Oxfam did camp site exploration in cooperation with other INGOs when confronted with overcrowded refugee camps and the need to provide more space: “Assisted by NGOs such as CARE, Oxfam and MSF, UNHCR attempted rapidly to identify potential sites for new camps” (Borton et al., 1996, p.47). Eventually, it has to be stated that hard evidence of Oxfam being the initiator of active cooperation is not provided in the data sources. It could also be the case, that Oxfam only cooperated because the respective UN body determined it like that.

6.1.3 CARE

> In which sector(s) does the organization work in cooperation with other INGOs?

CARE was mostly cooperating with other INGOs in the service delivery sector. They did however also assume a role in advocacy and public communication when CARE withdrew from Goma (DRC) due to high levels of violence among the refugees and so did MSF (Borton et al., 1996, p.62). Whether this was agreed upon together by both agencies or just
coincidentally happened at the same time cannot be said clearly. It did however have a strong impact on the media that two INGOs instead of a single organization left the camp. The media then spread the news about the crisis around the globe. That means – even if unintentional – cooperative action does have a greater effect in the globalized media world we live in today. This phenomenon of the media being a multiplicator has - if anything - only become more important in the past twenty years. And this in turn gives INGOs more visibility, thus power – especially when acting together for one goal.

Concerning service delivery CARE took on an important role in the provision, storage and distribution of food and non-food items: “CARE took responsibility for food and non-food stores management, and CARE, Concern and the IFRC shared responsibility for the general ration distributions using WFP-supplied commodities” (Borton et al., 1996, p.38). “WFP supplied food to stores in Gikongoro and AICF and CARE, with assistance from the French logistics NGO Equilibre, moved the food to the camps for distribution […] However, CARE was able to borrow over 400 tonnes of food from CRS-Burundi and commence distributions in the Rukondo, Kaduha and Musenge camps in July” (Borton et al., 1996, p.51). Food provision in south-west Rwanda was also supported by CARE: “AICF, Merlin and CARE joined the overall efforts around this time.” (Borton et al., 1996, p.49). Food was scarce in the Rwandan emergency and here it becomes very clear again, that the aim to save, protect and feed people was the overall objective for CARE and its partners and not the economic interests. Maybe lists of who brought what where exist but the fact that they – if existent – are very hard to obtain shows that all those organizations worked to serve the people and not the numbers. It also shows poor documentation though. Food management is also an area where not much expertise is needed (in contrast to medical sustenance). Logistics is more important and a cooperative approach seems to be the only reasonable way to ensure food provision (the same applies for daily life non-food items). Synergy effects are very visible in this sector when, for example, one organization arranges the food (like CARE borrowing from CRS), another one might be able to provide an airlift, a third one organizes cars for further transport and all of them distribute it in different areas at the same time. Impossible without cooperation.

Moreover, CARE was in joint action, i.e. shared responsibilities with MSF, IRC and ICRC regarding education about sanitation and hygiene (Borton et al., 1996, p.38). According to the data sources they were a lead agency dealing with provision of services and registration (Borton et al., 1996, p.48). Being the “lead” implies that other organizations were following this lead but it cannot be said which organizations those were and how specifically the provision of services and registration were conducted.
Finally, the organization joined the efforts of: “UNHCR, CARE, AICF, Concern, German Emergency Doctors and the Canadian Field Ambulance, MSF and SCF [to] set up waystations and medical posts along the Gisenyi–Ruhengeri–Kigali route” (Borton et al., 1996, p.53). After the Cholera outbreak in Goma many refugees decided to go back and were supplied with basic necessities through those waystations. Again, without some kind of cooperation much duplication would have happened and is therefore implied but not evident.

➤ With which other organizations (if any) does the organization cooperate?

As mentioned above it could be ascertained that CARE cooperated with IFRC, IRC, MSF, Concern, AICF and Merlin.

6.1.4 In a Nutshell

As far as the data proves the three INGOs mainly worked in cooperation in the sector of service delivery, as could be expected. Advocacy and public communication was rather but not exclusively pursued by INGOs individually. Further functions (such a building community) did not really play a role in the initial response phase since urgent needs needed to be adequately met. It cannot be precluded that such efforts were not pursued by the three INGOs but information about it could not be obtained. Monitoring for accountability does not appear to have been a major topic for those three INGOs. In the Rwandan case, a new government had to be installed and monitoring was something that did not quite come up in the initial response phase.

Furthermore, it can be observed, that the INGOs rather cooperate with similar organizations in order to complement each other when pursuing shared or similar tasks.

INGOs definitely share knowledge and status updates. The documentation by MSF gives good insight into why and when certain information was shared with the ICRC. It is highly regrettable that informal documents about this type of communication could not be analyzed for Oxfam and CARE. It would therefore, be a very good idea for the future if other INGOs would adopt a similar practice as MSF does with their Speaking Out program. This practice could ensure easier follow-up and evaluation on organizational behavior for researchers and internal purposes. In general, MSF appears to be open, not driven by competitive thinking and as a consequence (maybe also due to their Hippocratic ideology) a good example for what matters in humanitarian relief work.
6.2 RQ2: How and according to which principles were responsibilities between INGOs split?

6.2.1 MSF

Who assigned the responsibilities to the organization?

MSF (if not later coordinated by the UNHCR) took on responsibilities themselves and in cooperation with the ICRC since they were working under the ICRC flag inside Rwanda for a while: “We decided to work under ICRC coordination, in a field hospital set up in the Centre of the Salesian Sisters of Don Bosco, on avenue Kyovu [in Kigali]” (Binet et al., 2003, p.19). “MSF and the ICRC agreed on operational and communications arrangements. MSF teams were to be under the banner of ICRC. The ICRC delegate was to be the only spoke person” (Binet et al., 2003, p.20). It is obvious that those two organizations – MSF and ICRC – tried to make responsible decisions concerning their field of duties together as long as no one else would do so and because of their combined experience in disaster situations.

Why were those responsibilities assigned to that organization?

Due to the mentioned safety threat for MSF personnel both organizations decided that the ICRC was responsible to negotiate the conditions for carrying out medical work with the different fighting groups and that MSF would support any actions but had to stay undercover: “The Rwandans do not realise that there are two distinct organisations, so MSF is working under the flag of the ICRC” (Binet et al., 2003, p.20) (Borton et al., 1996, p.11). Moreover, the ICRC was also responsible for communications (MSF was mentioned in their status reports but no specifications were made, no interviews were given by MSF personnel), one MSF employee put it like this: “What’s more he [Philippe Gaillard, head of ICRC mission] gave a very good account of what was going on. There was no MSF statement as such, but in any case, I always thought that if we could have spoken on behalf of MSF, we couldn’t have put it any better than he did” (Binet et al., 2003, p.20). Apparently, the situation was not optimal for MSF but nevertheless according to the data sources the cooperation with the ICRC appears to have been rich in content: “When the installation phase is finished and when conditions are sufficiently safe, MSF will start to act independently again (but still under ICRC coordination)” (Binet et al., 2003, p.20).
Did power relations between INGOs play a role?

Yes, the ICRC was free to operate, MSF depended on them to be able to operate in Rwanda. Consequently, MSF was in a weaker negotiating position than the ICRC but due to the extreme lack of personnel inside the country both organizations depended on each other and on cooperation conducted as smooth as possible. Eventually, both organizations are extremely important in the global disaster relief work and therefore have an active interest in good cooperation no matter who of them is more powerful in a particular context.

Which organizational structures and mechanisms did facilitate/impede cooperation?

The basic claim of both organizations is the supply of medical aid and provision of healthcare. The fact, that they shared a similar set of skills and knowledge, that they used the same kind of equipment and had similar needs for the provision of supplies certainly fostered the cooperation between MSF and the ICRC.

An impediment on the other hand could have been their different approach when it comes to fulfilling an advocacy function (as MSF sometimes does) instead of focusing on medical assistance (as it was the practice of the ICRC in this crisis) (Binet et al., 2003, p.48).

Did social ties between employees influence the cooperation?

This crisis posed an enormous personal danger on all MSF and ICRC staff in Rwanda. Social ties influenced the cooperation in that sense that they appear to have become stronger in the face of danger. Staff members of both organizations tried to convince the Rwandan staff members in Kigali not to leave the team and be all alone without any kind of protection (although the efforts were in vain after all) (Binet et al., 2003, p.31). Furthermore, one of the MSF nurses working in a Kigali hospital said that: “Philippe Gaillard, the ICRC delegate, had told us, ‘If MSF is threatened, I’ll be told about it and I promise to get you out with a UNAMIR armoured car’. Isabelle and I had an excellent relationship with the ICRC people. We had complete confidence in them, so there was no particular problem” (Binet et al., 2003, p.35). Consequently, it seems that social ties between the organizations fostered cooperation and improved working results.
6.2.2 Oxfam

The data sources did not provide any sufficient information on RQ2 concerning Oxfam. Subsequently, no statement can be made.

6.2.3 CARE

- Who assigned the responsibilities to the organization?

According to the data sources all responsibilities CARE fulfilled were assigned to them by UNHCR (Borton et al., 1996, p.39).

- Why were those responsibilities assigned to that organization?

For Tanzania, it can be stated that the: “UNHCR Coordinator limited the numbers who could work in the camps to those already present and those, such as CARE, whose specialist skills were clearly required. Roles were clearly allocated between the various agencies and a highly collaborative approach was established.” (Borton et al., 1996, p.39). Unfortunately, no further specification about the “specialist skills” is made and it cannot be said which other particular agencies worked in cooperation with CARE.

- Did social ties between employees influence the cooperation?

Social ties did influence the cooperation in a positive way – in Tanzania: “The presence of the ERT [emergency response team] resulted in key decisions that were to have a positive impact during the response, such as that to limit the number of NGO implementing partners and to invite CARE to establish a programme. The excellent contacts of the ERT personnel probably contributed significantly to the mobilization of assistance by donor organizations and NGOs” (Borton et al., 1996, p.145). It is not clear which organizations the members of the ERT belonged to (probably UN, rather than INGOs), so that no conclusive statement can be made about how positive relationships between employees of CARE and other INGOs were fostering cooperation.
6.2.4 In a Nutshell

It can be stated that, above all the UNHCR and its respective bodies assigned responsibilities and pursued coordination efforts. As long as the international community (UN) was not present at the scene however, responsibilities were split accordingly by INGOs (the very few present ones). Limitations of responsibility were a matter of safety and decisions were made together to a certain extent.

The results show, that power relations can play a role. When an INGO operates under the flag of another organization the particular rules are accepted. MSF and the ICRC seemed to have worked almost in complete harmony although MSF was clearly subordinated. It is assumed, that INGOs however are such powerful entities that they need to cooperate smoothly if so because they meet again and again all over the globe and power relations might change with different settings. It is not like in the economic world where one company can attain immense power. When it comes to INGOs power is not predominantly defined through monetary means but rather through things like special skills or origin and can change depending on the context.

Of course, social ties influence cooperation. In this study, only positive social ties like those between MSF and the ICRC were depicted. It is assumed though that negative relations can impede cooperation as much as positive relations can facilitate it. Further research could go deeper into this topic.

It is quite unsatisfying that nothing concerning Oxfam can be said here. It is not Oxfam’s fault that the data source did not answer the second research question in greater detail but it is quite impossible to find any hard evidence on Oxfam’s website either. It is - like the official website of CARE - rather vague when it comes to facts about what they have done where exactly, to put it mildly. The advice for many INGOs would be once more be to follow MSF’s example when it comes to candour and transparency. Only being open, also about mistakes, gives others the opportunity to learn.

6.3 RQ3: How can INGO cooperation be improved in order to shape humanitarian assistance more efficiently?

6.3.1 MSF

⇒ How did the cooperation partners (if any) benefit from the cooperation?
The cooperation with the ICRC (known to be Swiss) made it possible for MSF staff (most of them French or Belgian and both groups - even expats - being prosecuted by the perpetrators of the genocide) to move and work in Rwanda, hiding their banner (‘News of evacuated MSF staff’ MSF International Secretariat Situation Report, 12 April 1994, in: Binet et al., 2003). Conversely, the ICRC had access to manpower of MSF. Skilled, humanitarian workforce was extremely scarce inside Rwanda. In this way, both organizations benefited from the cooperation. Most importantly, it should also be mentioned that the people MSF was able to help benefited the most from this cooperation and this was, after all, the main reason for MSF to engage in Rwanda in the first place.

What was cooperation hindered by?

Cooperation was mostly hindered by the circumstance that most other agencies withdrew from Rwanda until a safety assessment was made and the general situation became clearer. That left MSF (and the few other organizations – ICRC, IRC - that stayed during the initial phase of the genocide) in a rather lonely place for approximately two months. In general, according to the data sources MSF appears to have a positive attitude towards and is willing to pursue cooperation with qualified partners.

What measures could have been taken in order to improve cooperation with other present INGOs?

Generally, further conflict research on the ground in cooperation with other INGOs is a valuable tool to assess a situation. Even when in the field, an INGO should have some manpower to research the circumstances of the crisis and to collect data that is urgently needed by every other organization that wants to address the needs of the population properly: “we had a real presence on the ground that gave us the means to have gathered information and data to expose the whole plan and we did not do it. Neither MSF France nor the other sections called a meeting to organise this” (Binet et al., 2003, p.13). Moreover, cooperation can always be improved by more extensive knowledge sharing (if the security situation allows the INGO to do so). Nowadays several international INGO consortia work on said knowledge exchange.

6.3.2 Oxfam

What was cooperation hindered by?
As stated in the data sources, for Oxfam cooperation was partially hindered by coordination failures of UNHCR. This, for example happened in the water sector in Goma (DRC): “there was confusion between the respective roles of the US military, the German agency Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) and Oxfam. At one point Oxfam was informed by UNHCR Headquarters that the US military was responsible for the whole sector and that the very substantial outlays by Oxfam would not be met by UNHCR” (Borton et al., 1996, p.16). Such financial insecurity can be the end of an INGOs work in a crisis and with this the end of cooperation with others.

Another aspect that created tension were different opinions about which approach is the most sustainable to pursue. This so happened when: “Oxfam refused to develop water systems in Kibumba, given its inappropriate location in relation to the nearest water sources, and instead proposed that systems be developed at the Kahindo site, which had been identified on 26 July and was nearer to water sources in the Katale area. This was not accepted by other agencies at the time and water systems developed at Kibumba were supplied by the tankering operation. The Kahindo site was subsequently developed and opened in September 1994” (Borton et al., 1996, p.85). Much time and resources can be lost if every INGO (and every organization in general) does what they believe is best instead of finding a sustainable solution, i.e. a compromise that works for everyone.

In addition, Oxfam appears to have been sloppy in handing over a water pumping facility to the successor NGO the Tanzanian Christian Refugee Service (TCRS). As described in the data sources Oxfam wanted to get rid of the project due to a general lack of personnel capacity and failed to properly hand over the necessary knowledge. Besides, Oxfam did so without coordinating with the UN: “Despite no date being indicated, Oxfam went ahead with the handover and was unwilling to press for the development of alternative, more secure sources” (Borton et al., 1996, p.93). This problem could have been a result of extreme psychological and physical pressure that INGO staff had to cope with. Stress is not unusual in such situations. It shows, however, how important it is that the headquarter keeps an eye on the mental and physical health of their employees. It cannot be determined that Oxfam did not do so, it should still be mentioned in this context because job satisfaction is a very important factor in avoiding sloppy, rash work.

6.3.3 CARE

What was cooperation hindered by?
No specifics concerning this question are provided by the data sources. There was however one grave shortcoming in the work concept of the German branch of CARE that should be mentioned: “Following a campaign in Germany requesting volunteers to work in Goma, CARE Deutschland was swamped by applicants and devised a scheme whereby every two weeks a charter flight would take 200 new volunteers to Goma and would return with the previous batch. Lack of personnel with previous emergency experience and ability to speak French, and a decision taken by the CARE-Deutschland board to operate independently from other agencies, resulted in a poorly-integrated, inappropriate operation with overstuffed facilities and dispensaries sometimes being set up next to existing Zairian facilities” (Borton et al., 1996, p.88 and p.101f.). If cooperation was hindered by someone, in this case it was CARE itself. This incident exemplifies the “old way” of humanitarian thinking – true to the motto: everybody can help the poor people of Africa. It clearly did not work. What humanitarian aid needs next to passion and motivation is especially knowledge, training and skills. If an organization has no concept except sending people into a crisis to eventually “run them into the ground” and send the next batch, the true aim of humanitarian aid is missed. Cooperation is not possible if the foundation (knowledge on what to do exactly) is missing and the operation becomes a publicity event rather than an aid mission. Then again, the data shows that only CARE Germany made this mistake, it should subsequently be a good idea for the international headquarter to coordinate the different country sections accordingly beforehand.

What measures could have been taken in order to improve cooperation with other present INGOs?

The data source itself mentions that: “other studies have concluded there was a need for more training of NGO personnel” (Borton et al., 1996, p.88) in order to prevent such misconduct of humanitarian assistance as mentioned above.

6.3.4 In a Nutshell

Benefits of cooperation are not depicted extensively in the data sources. More research on the various benefits that cooperation can have for an INGO is needed. In the case of MSF, it becomes clear that the biggest benefit of any kind of engagement in a crisis and cooperation with others is the wellbeing of the people that need help. Reputation benefits for MSF are also
imaginable. Nevertheless, there is no hard evidence for this in the data sources. What was proved however, is that cooperation always needs the willingness of INGOs to do so. If the basic foundation (like in the example of CARE Germany) for cautious work on the ground is missing, cooperation (the next step in working harmonized) is not possible. If the INGO (like Oxfam) has a rather strong attitude and is not necessarily willing to compromise, cooperation cannot be fruitful. Another lesson of this research question is that personnel has to be adequately trained beforehand and maintained during the operation. If the humanitarian workers on the ground know what they are doing and have a concept, it becomes easier to find ways and needs for cooperation. Prerequisite for this is also that INGOs accept that sustainable humanitarian aid is not a competition but rather like a clockwork where every part is influencing the other.

6.4 Closing the circle

As the selected data sources show, there is much more research needed about the specifics of cooperation of INGOs. It was shown, that cooperation does exist which proves that the author of this study is not the only one who views the approach to cooperation as a matter of trust and mutual benefits as valuable. However, the market-structure oriented approach to cooperation, thus competition is also still present in the picture of 1994 Rwanda. Nevertheless, what this study is trying to show is that every evidence that was found for cooperation among INGOs was positive because of the synergy effects that come with combining different and similar skills. Unfortunately, the data sources were not the ultimate choice of material so that the results are not as detailed as it was hoped. Another methodological approach like a field study conducting surveys would probably be more fruitful in the future. By all means, it was still shown that cooperation does influence an INGOs work and that it is valuable if the partners are willing to find a common ground. It is definitely worth to explore this topic further in order to improve humanitarian aid on the ground. The analytical framework was apt to analyse the topic’s surface, to answer the basic questions of who and why and how (although the data sources did not contain all this information). For further research and to find out more about the mechanisms that facilitate good cooperation between the big players a more in-depth framework that puts greater focus on personal relations and structural similarities of INGOs would be adequate.
7. Conclusion

Initially, the topic of INGO cooperation in humanitarian crises seemed to be an easily researchable one since there are so many INGOs and crises are plentiful. As it turned out, this assumption was very far off from the truth. Cooperation between INGOs is to the impression of the researcher not a topic that INGOs communicate much about. This is understandable to some extent. Of course, they do not want to give their donors the impression that they cannot function individually. One country manager of an INGO the researcher spoke to even laughed about the question why they should not cooperate and answered that INGOs are working according to the same principles like normal companies. For him, it was evident, that competition is the correct path to choose. The results of this study might not be as extensive as it was the initial endeavour but they give reason to assume that cooperation of INGOs very well exists and holds benefits for the participants.

From this study, it can be seen that INGOs work together at least in the sector of service delivery and also form coalitions when it comes to advocating for a certain cause. The evidence for MSF in particular shows that INGOs do not only cooperate because of economic pressures but rather have their main focus on mutual benefits in pursuing their aim. The researcher believes that this is true for most INGOs and it would be very exciting to learn more about the details of how arrangements and decisions are made. Apparently, informal and undocumented communication is still the foundation of INGO cooperation – even nowadays, twenty-three years after Rwanda. MSF stood out with their practise of “Speaking Out” and pooling staff reports and interviews. This is a valuable approach of communication with the public and gives researchers a foundation for further research. Many INGOs however, among them Oxfam and CARE, are - as far as the researcher has been able to find out - more secretive when it comes to communication and decision-making. That is the reason why it is unnecessarily complicated to research their cooperation with other INGOs. That shows, that in some INGOs competitive thinking is more distinct than in others, which is sad because they are not predominantly marked-based and the sooner they acknowledge this, the sooner humanitarian aid can be more effective.

Another important result is that social ties play a role in the cooperation process. It would be valuable for further research to look into this phenomenon more closely in order to unravel the possibilities that come with good personal relations to people from other organizations. Social connections and ties influence our daily life and in the best case make it better, why shouldn’t the same apply in the work life – especially in the humanitarian sector where everybody is connected through a shared vision of a better world.
In sum, a better documentation of communication processes within an INGO and between them could facilitate the research about cooperation. As long as there is little to no material that can be analysed the processes cannot be researched properly and eventually improved. The inconvenient aspect about not researching further is that a smooth work balance of INGOs in humanitarian crises can preserve livelihoods and save lives. Unwillingness to cooperate and to improve that process due to economic or reputational concerns is irresponsible and cooperation should therefore not be displayed as an extra instead of a must-do by INGOs.
References


## Appendix

**Case study protocol MSF**

RQ1: In which sectors of humanitarian assistance did INGOs cooperate in the Rwandan emergency?

- In which sector(s) does the organization work?
o  protection of citizens (from revenge killings, on journey to refugee camps, in
    refugee camps)

o  monitoring for accountability (any joint INGO action and/or increased
    monitoring activities during the course of events)

  ▪  4 May - exploratory mission in northern Rwanda with ICRC (MSF
    report, p.30)
  ▪  1\textsuperscript{st} week May – general assembly – one of the conclusions: “Continue
    internal debate and joint debate with other organisations” (MSF report, p.30)
  ▪  ”18 May, Médecins Sans Frontières publicly asked the French
    authorities, which had long supported the Rwandan regime, to use their
    influence to convince the regime to halt the massacres. A similar
    approach was made to the Belgian authorities.”
  ▪  “24 May, Médecins Sans Frontières testified before the UN
    Commission on Human Rights and presented a report with accounts
    from its volunteers in the hope of prompting rapid action by UN
    member states.”
  ▪  “18 June, Médecins Sans Frontières called for armed UN intervention.”

o  advocacy and public communication (engagement of political and public
    sphere – awareness rising, research motivation)

  ▪  “22 April, Médecins Sans Frontières publicly condemned the
    withdrawal of UNAMIR forces, which left Rwandans alone to face the
    killers.
  ▪  28 April – MSF is one of the first sources to publicly say the word and
    name the events in Rwanda as what they are – genocide” (Press
    conference, Brussels, MSF report, p.27)
  ▪  MSF practice of “speaking out” by publishing case studies – making
    sure, everybody working for the organization is on the same page
    concerning general guidelines and practices
  ▪  May 1994 – MSF wants to launch a public appeal for military
    intervention (after all, it is genocide and the int. comm. Is obligated to
    step in); they do however inform the ICRC (President MSFF and ICRC
    operational director) although they do not agree with MSF to do that at
    that point of time (MSF report, p.48)

o  socialization (promote tolerance and mutual trust through programs and
    measures)
building community (cleavage bridging activities in refugee camps)
intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state (any ties or relations to newly formed RPF government)
Service delivery
  - “In Ngara, water provision was, initially at least, a success story. The artificial lake next to Benaco camp served as the main source and Oxfam and MSF quickly established a pumping, storage and distribution system that provided satisfactory levels of water in the camp.” (HAAE, p.92)
  - water and sanitation activities in the Gikongoro area: ICRC, MSF-France, AICF, (UNICEF) and Oxfam. (HAAE, p.94) – implies some kind of cooperation although no clear statement can be made
  - vaccination
    - in Goma: “prompt and effective vaccination campaign that was well coordinated by UNHCR and which benefited from good support and technical backup from UNICEF, BioForce and MSF” (HAAE, p.96) – implies some kind of cooperation although no clear statement can be made
    - south-west Rwanda: “campaigns organized by MSF-France and Merlin” (HAAE, p.96)
  - “the MSF doctor in Nyamata and two MSF nurses started to receive patients. An agreement was made with the ICRC: MSF would have overall responsibility for the hospital in Rilima and the ICRC would provide medical back-up (two nurses) during the set-up phase. Thereafter, the ICRC would deal with food aid (general distribution). As for the local staff for the hospital, the ICRC will lend us their local staff (protected by the Geneva Conventions and therefore under ICRC protection)” (MSF report, p.59)

Were efforts made in order to share knowledge with other INGOs and if so, how did these efforts look like?
  - “He organised a meeting with the other medical organisations, the Belgian Red Cross, Action Contre La Faim, the different MSF sections and the ICRC. We shared out responsibility for the different hospitals in Kigali among us and said to ourselves” (MSF report, p.12)
  - “At the moment, the MSF medical team, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross and Belgian Cooperation doctors in Kigali, is
providing first aid for the casualties. The ICRC has started to pick up the wounded in the streets of the city.” (MSF report, p.16)

- With which other organizations (if any) does the organization cooperate?
  - With other medical organizations like ICRC (mentioned repeatedly) and Action Contre La Faim
  - Caritas – joint convoy organization (MSF report, p.21)
  - “MSF, subsequently assisted by Oxfam, quickly established a system to pump, store and distribute water from the lake and MSF-Holland, AICF and Concern established health services in Benaco”
  - “Responsibility for sanitation and hygiene education within the camps was shared - between CARE, MSF-Holland, IRC and IFRC.” (HAAE, p.38)
  - Katale Camp, Goma: “MSF-Holland personnel who worked with the agency [Operation Blessing] […] felt it performed a useful role despite requiring close supervision and its work being constantly filmed by a TV crew” (HAAE, p. 101)
  - Epicentre (HAAE, p.187)

- Why do they cooperate?
  - Because they pursue the same goals, there are very few agencies in the country at the time being and they need to support each other, logistics,
  - MSF needs to operate under ICRC flag for security reasons - “Every morning a convoy of ambulances (Rwandan Red Cross volunteers and ICRC delegates) left for the various districts of the city to try to get the casualties out to the ICRC field hospital. I joined the ICRC delegates in this operation.” (MSF report, p.19) – assessment of the situation, evaluation of who needs surgery (generally treatment), transporting the victims to the hospital while constantly facing personal danger

- Which knowledge is shared by and/or with the organization?
  - Kigali – MSF nurses (2) tried to gather information about name (target) lists that were circulated in the hospital: “We told Philippe, the head of the ICRC delegation, but we couldn’t do anything else” (MSF report, p.32)
  - “MSF informed the ICRC of its intention to speak out in favour of armed international intervention.” (MSF report, p.44)
  - Situation reports (MSF report, p.60)
  - In Goma: “Epicentre supported the work of MSF, an impressive amount of information was available on morbidity and mortality.” (HAAE, p.187) – documentation on refugee populations within camps was much better than on
people still in Rwanda – “By contrast, between July and September 1994, data collection in the IDP camps in Rwanda only took place in those camps where MSF and Epicentre happened to be working.” (HAAE, p.81)

RQ2: How and according to which principles were responsibilities between INGOs split?

- Who assigned the responsibilities to the organization?
  - “We decided to work under ICRC coordination, in a field hospital set up in the Centre of the Salesian Sisters of Don Bosco, on avenue Kyovu [in Kigali].” (MSF report, p.19)
  - “MSF and the ICRC agreed on operational and communications arrangements. MSF teams were to be under the banner of ICRC. The ICRC delegate was to be the only spoke person” (MSF report, p.20)

- Why were those responsibilities assigned to that organization?
  - Mainly safety reasons (HAAE, p.34) – MSF was known to be French and Belgian (the colonial powers) – Belgians were also targeted throughout the killings (e.g. the prime ministers guard); ICRC however was known to be Swiss and therefore not targeted in any sense
  - ICRC was responsible to negotiate the conditions for carrying out medical work with the different fighting groups, MSF had to stay undercover: “The Rwandans do no not realise that there are two distinct organisations, so MSF is working under the flag of the ICRC” (MSF report, p.20) (HAAE, p.11)
  - ICRC was also responsible for communications (MSF was mentioned but no specifications were made, no interviews were given): “What’s more he [Philippe Gaillard, head of ICRC mission] gave a very good account of what was going on. There was no MSF statement as such, but in any case, I always thought that if we could have spoken on behalf of MSF, we couldn’t have put it any better than he did” (MSF report, p.20)
  - “When the installation phase is finished and when conditions are sufficiently safe, MSF will start to act independently again (but still under ICRC coordination).” (MSF report, p.20)

- Did power relations between INGOs play a role?
  - ICRC was free to operate, MSF depended on them to be able to operate in Rwanda

- Which organizational structures and mechanisms did facilitate/impede cooperation?
  - Medical approach, same kind of equipment, same kind of needs

- Did social ties between employees influence the cooperation?
o MSF expatriate staff and ICRC staff tried to convince the Rwandan staff members in Kigali not to leave the team and be all alone without any kind of protection (although the efforts were in vain after all) (MSF report, p.31)

o After MSF went public about the genocide: “Philippe Gaillard, the ICRC delegate, had told us, “If MSF is threatened, I’ll be told about it and I promise to get you out with a UNAMIR armoured car”. Isabelle and I had an excellent relationship with the ICRC people. We had complete confidence in them, so there was no particular problem.” (MSF report, p.35)

RQ3: How can INGO cooperation be improved in order to shape humanitarian assistance more efficiently?

- How did the cooperation partners (if any) benefit from the cooperation?
  o Cooperation with ICRC (known to be Swiss) made it possible for MSF staff (most of them French or Belgian, both groups – even expats - being prosecuted during the genocide) to move and work in Rwanda, hiding their banner (‘News of evacuated MSF staff” MSF International Secretariat Situation Report, 12 April 1994, in: MSF Report)

- What was cooperation hindered by (people, organizations, logistic circumstances, attitudes)?
  o Cooperation was mostly hindered by the circumstance that most other agencies withdrew from Rwanda until a safety assessment was made and the general situation became clearer. That left MSF (and the few other organizations – ICRC, IRC - that stayed during the initial phase of the genocide) in a rather lonely place for approximately two months. In general, according to the data sources MSF appears to have a positive attitude towards and is willing to pursue cooperation with qualified partners.

- What measures could have been taken in order to improve cooperation with other present INGOs?
  o Generally – conflict research. Even when in the field an INGO should have sb. Further researching the circumstances: “we had a real presence on the ground that gave us the means to have gathered information and data to expose the whole plan and we did not do it. Neither MSF France nor the other sections called a meeting to organise this.” (MSF report, p.13)

Case study protocol Oxfam
RQ1: In which sectors of humanitarian assistance did INGOs cooperate in the Rwandan emergency?

- In which sector(s) does the organization work in cooperation with other INGOs?
  - protection of citizens (from revenge killings, on journey to refugee camps, in refugee camps)
  - monitoring for accountability (any joint INGO action and/or increased monitoring activities during the course of events)
    - “A set of standards is being developed by several NGO networks intended to supplement the Code of Conduct developed by the ICRC, IFRC and associations of NGOs. Both the Code of Conduct and set of standards (now being developed by Oxfam and other NGOs) should be widely disseminated and promoted among NGOs, official agencies and governments.” (HAAE, p.196)
  - advocacy and public communication (engagement of political and public sphere – awareness rising, research motivation)
  - socialization (promote tolerance and mutual trust through programs and measures)
  - building community (cleavage bridging activities in refugee camps)
  - intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state (any ties or relations to newly formed RPF government)
  - Service delivery
    - water: “. For instance, GTZ, the Swedish Rescue Board, MSF-France, IRC, Oxfam and Concern all worked in the sanitation sector and, strictly speaking, participated in meeting the needs of Service Package 6. Similarly, the water management package was effectively undertaken by at least a dozen agencies with the US military/PWSS, Oxfam and THW playing a key role” (HAAE, p.75)

- Were efforts made in order to share knowledge with other INGOs and if so, how did these efforts look like?

- With which other organizations (if any) does the organization cooperate?
  - MSF
    - Benaco: “MSF, subsequently assisted by Oxfam, quickly established a system to pump, store and distribute water from the lake” (HAAE, p.38)
- Ngara: “The artificial lake next to Benaco camp served as the main source and Oxfam and MSF quickly established a pumping, storage and distribution system that provided satisfactory levels of water in the camp.” (HAAE, p.94)
- Goma (UNHCR’s Contingency Plan for North Kivu): “pre-positioning of supplies in Goma by Oxfam and MSF-Holland” (HAAE, p.147)

- Why do they cooperate?
- Which knowledge is shared by and/or with the organization?
  - Camp site exploration: “Assisted by NGOs such as CARE, Oxfam and MSF, UNHCR attempted rapidly to identify potential sites for new camps” (HAAE, p.47)

RQ2: How and according to which principles were responsibilities between INGOs split?

- Who assigned the responsibilities to the organization?
- Why were those responsibilities assigned to that organization?
- Did power relations between INGOs play a role?
- Which organizational structures and mechanisms did facilitate/impede cooperation?
- Did social ties between employees influence the cooperation?

RQ3: How can INGO cooperation be improved in order to shape humanitarian assistance more efficiently?

- How did the cooperation partners (if any) benefit from the cooperation?
- What was cooperation hindered by (people, organizations, logistic circumstances, attitudes)?
  - Goma, water sector: “there was confusion between the respective roles of the US military, the German agency Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) and Oxfam. At one point Oxfam was - informed by UNHCR Headquarters that the US military was responsible for the whole sector and that the very substantial outlays by Oxfam would not be met by UNHCR.” (HAAE, p.16)
  - “Oxfam refused to develop water systems in Kibumba, given its inappropriate location in relation to the nearest water sources, and instead proposed that systems be developed at the Kahindo site, which had been identified on 26 July and was nearer to water sources in the Katale area. This was not accepted by other agencies at the time and water systems developed at Kibumba were supplied by the tankering operation. The Kahindo site was subsequently developed and opened in September 1994.” (HAAE, p.85)
Failure to establish adequate water pumping systems in Ngara: “Oxfam’s early handover of the water programme, and questions over the technical and managerial suitability of the successor NGO – the Tanzanian Christian Refugee Service (TCRS). A commitment to hand over management of the water programme to TCRS was made in June at a time when Oxfam felt its capacity in the region was being over-stretched (due to unwillingness to become involved in the development of alternative sources), and TCRS was keen to become more involved in the Ngara operations. Despite no date being indicated, Oxfam went ahead with the handover and was unwilling to press for the development of alternative, more secure sources.” (HAAE, p.93)

- What measures could have been taken in order to improve cooperation with other present INGOs?

Case study protocol CARE

RQ1: In which sectors of humanitarian assistance did INGOs cooperate in the Rwandan emergency?

- In which sector(s) does the organization work in cooperation with other INGOs?
  - protection of citizens (from revenge killings, on journey to refugee camps, in refugee camps)
    - repatriation after cholera outbreak in Goma: “To respond to the needs of those making their way back towards Kigali and to encourage others to follow them, several agencies, including UNHCR, CARE, AICF, Concern, German Emergency Doctors and the Canadian Field Ambulance, MSF and SCF set up waystations and medical posts along the Gisenyi–Ruhengeri–Kigali route.” (HAAE, p.53)
  - monitoring for accountability (any joint INGO action and/or increased monitoring activities during the course of events)
  - advocacy and public communication (engagement of political and public sphere – awareness rising, research motivation)
    - withdraw of Goma due to high levels of violence among the refugees (HAAE, p.62)
  - socialization (promote tolerance and mutual trust through programs and measures)
  - building community (cleavage bridging activities in refugee camps)
intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state (any ties or relations to newly formed RPF government)

Service delivery

- Food: “CARE took responsibility for food and non-food stores management, and CARE, Concern and the IFRC shared responsibility for the general ration distributions using WFP-supplied commodities.” (HAAE, p.38)

- Food storage and distribution: north of Ginkongoro “WFP supplied food to stores in Gikongoro and AICF and CARE, with assistance from the French logistics NGO Equilibre, moved the food to the camps for distribution. WFP began deliveries to Gikongoro in July, but was unable to build up sufficient stocks to enable full general ration distributions in the camps until August. However, CARE was able to borrow over 400 tonnes of food from CRS-Burundi and commence distributions in the Rukondo, Kadauga and Musenge camps in July.” (HAAE, p.51)

- WASH: “Responsibility for sanitation and hygiene education within the camps was shared - between CARE, MSF-Holland, IRC and IFRC.” (HAAE, p.38)

- Provision of services and registration – lead agency (HAAE, p.48)

- Food provision in south-west Rwanda: “AICF, Merlin and CARE joined the overall efforts around this time.” (HAAE, p.49)

Were efforts made in order to share knowledge with other INGOs and if so, how did these efforts look like?

With which other organizations (if any) does the organization cooperate?

- IFRC, IRC, MSF, Concern, AICF, Merlin

Why do they cooperate?

Which knowledge is shared by and/or with the organization?

RQ2: How and according to which principles were responsibilities between INGOs split?

Who assigned the responsibilities to the organization?

- UNHCR (HAAE, p.39)

Why were those responsibilities assigned to that organization?

- Tanzania: “UNHCR Coordinator limited the numbers who could work in the camps to those already present and those, such as CARE, whose specialist skills were clearly required15. Roles were clearly allocated between the
various agencies and a highly collaborative approach was established.”
(HAAE, p.39)

- Did power relations between INGOs play a role?
- Which organizational structures and mechanisms did facilitate/impede cooperation?
- Did social ties between employees influence the cooperation?
  - Ngara: “The presence of the ERT resulted in key decisions that were to have a positive impact during the response, such as that to limit the number of NGO implementing partners and to invite CARE to establish a programme. The excellent contacts of the ERT personnel probably contributed significantly to the mobilization of assistance by donor organizations and NGOs.” (HAAE, p.145)

RQ3: How can INGO cooperation be improved in order to shape humanitarian assistance more efficiently?

- How did the cooperation partners (if any) benefit from the cooperation?
- What was cooperation hindered by (people, organizations, logistic circumstances, attitudes)?
  - Shortcomings: “Following a campaign in Germany requesting volunteers to work in Goma, CARE Deutschland was swamped by applicants and devised a scheme whereby every two weeks a charter flight would take 200 new volunteers to Goma and would return with the previous batch. Lack of personnel with previous emergency experience and ability to speak French, and a decision taken by the CARE-Deutschland board to operate independently from other agencies,30 resulted in a poorly-integrated, inappropriate operation with overstaffed facilities and dispensaries sometimes being set up next to existing Zairian facilities.31” (HAAE, p.88)

- What measures could have been taken in order to improve cooperation with other present INGOs?
  - “Other studies have concluded there was a need for more training of NGO personnel.32 The need for additional training to improve competence among certain NGOs is discussed further in Chapter 8.” (HAAE, p.88)

*31: “In the words of Joël Boutrou, Head of the UNHCR Sub-Delegation in Goma, the agency “came late... a lot of students giving the wrong drugs, creating resistance to diseases and giving inadequate treatment. They were working in total isolation and created a lot of havoc”. Interview, July 1994. UNHCR formally requested that the NGO withdraw from the
camps, a move that received substantial media coverage in Germany. Eventually, after discussions between UNHCR-Geneva and the German Government, and mediation by the German Ambassador in Kinshasa (who deployed to Goma for August), it was eventually agreed that CARE-Deutschland could continue its work in Bukavu, which it did until the end of the year.” (p.101f)