C-thesis
Comparative analysis of radicalization in the cases of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf
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(Växjö, 2018-01-05)
Abstract

This study investigates the terror groups Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf. The study starts with the Islamic history in both Nigeria and The Philippines in order to get a broader picture and understanding of the subject. The purpose with this research paper is to study the radicalization process of these two movements listed above. To study the radicalization process of these two movements I will be using Eitan Y Alimi, Chares Demetriou and Lorenzo Bosi, *relational, dynamics and process* analytical framework. The question this thesis is trying to answer is how these two social movements eventually became two notorious terror organizations.

This research paper is carried out as a comparative case study in order to find similarities and differences between the two cases so it can be generalized. The research paper also applies the method of abduction.

The findings show that there are many similarities between Boko Haram as well as many differences. But also that specific political decisions made by the governments in both countries helped to further radicalize Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, Abu Sayyaf, Nigeria, Philippines, Terrorism, Radicalization, Case Study
Appendix:

**Attribution of similarity**- Identification of another political actor as falling within the same category as your own.

**Boundary Activation**- Increase in the salience of “us-them” distinction separating two political actors.

**Boundary Formation**- Creation of “us-them” distinction separating two political actors.

**Evolution**- A shift of social movement toward increasing demands of moral conduct regarding what is right and wrong on its constituency.

**Legitimization**- Increase of positive and popularly resonating representations of actors and their actions.

**Marginalization**- Exclusion or distancing of an actor from decision-making.

**Polarization**- Increase of ideological distance between political actors or coalitions.

**Repression**- Informal outsourcing by state actors to non-state actors of law and order activities.

**Retaliation**- Reprisal by an actor of wrongs experienced by the actor or members of its constituency.

**Withdrawal**- Decline in the support of individuals or groups toward movement activities and goals.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Research Problem

The use of terrorism to further a political cause has accelerated in the recent years. The modern terrorism as we see today came into use after the second world war. This is due to the rise of different national and social movements in the former colonies of the European superpowers. These anti-colonial movements saw the ability to use violence to get their will through. But also to generate publicity for their cause and to influence societies and the global policy (Roser et al, 2017). Basically to transform local conflicts into international issues.

Terror related incidents has steadily increased since 1970, (Roser et al., 2017) which makes the causes of terrorism extremely relevant to study such as the radicalization processes, both of individuals and groups/organizations/social movements. In 1970 the number of registered terror related incidents were 651. 46 years later namely in 2016, the number of terror related incident was 13 488 (Roser et al, 2017). The increase of terror related incident is shocking (Roser et al, 2017). The numbers listed above comes from Our world in data and they define terror related incident as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-stat actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through, fear coercion or intimidation” (Roser et al, 2017).

Now when I have shown how much terror related incident has increased since the 70s, it is also good to show how much the number of people killed by terror-related incident have increased. In 1970 the number of people killed by terror-related incident was 171. This to compare with 2016 when the number of people killed was 34 676 (Roser et al, 2017). Due to that this thesis focus on Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf there is a need to look into Nigeria and the Philippines to see how the situation is in those two country. Nigeria had 0 registered number of terror-related incident in 1970. Boko Haram was created in 2002, the registered number of terror incident in 2002 was 6. In 2016 the number was 531. So the increase of terror incident was extremely high. With an increase number of terror incidents in Nigeria, there is also an increase number of deaths. In 1970 there were 0 registered deaths. In 2002 it was 28 deaths and as by 2016 there was 2164 deaths by terror incidents (Roser et al, 2017).
In the Philippines the number of terror incidents in 1970 was 10. In 1991 when Abu Sayyaf was created there was registered 162 terror related incident and by 2016 it had raised to 633 incidents. The number of deaths by terror incident was 41 in 1970. By the creation of Abu Sayyaf in 1991 it had increased to 432 deaths. By 2016 the number of deaths by terror incidents in the Philippines was 411 (Roser et al, 2017). So it was a little decrease in people killed by terror attacks in the Philippines 2016 compared to 1991.

The numbers listed above tells us that terror incidents and people killed by terror incidents overall has increased but also in the two cases which this thesis is going to focus on, namely Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf.

This lead us to to the question what this thesis will contain of. This thesis will be based on a comparative case study between Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf. The comparison will focus on the radicalization processes of these two organization, how they went from social movements into radicalized terrorist-groups. The analytical framework which will be used to study this radicalization process is Eitan Y Alimi, Chares Demetriou and Lorenzo Bosi, relational, dynamics and processes (Alimi et al., 2015). The purpose with the study and the comparative approach is to find similarities and differences between the two cases. What factors played a role in the radicalization process of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf? When red flags emerge the government of a country or the international community can stop the process of radicalization before it really breaks out.

Previous research on radicalization has identified two different explanations of radicalization according to Alimi (Alimi et al., 2015, p.7). The first explanation focus on why the shift to political violence happened. The second explanation focus on how and when the shift to political violence happened. The first explanation focus on the root conditions, facilitative causes and the added impact of precipitating events at either the macro or the micro level of analysis. Previous research on radicalization concludes that what pushes individuals and organizations to engage in political violence is related to profound grievances, violence prone ideologies, aggressive impulses, incentives and motives (Alimi et al., 2015, p.7). It is argued that these factors are triggered by environmental reasons or conditions or changes in the environment (Alimi et al., 2015, p.8). It could be argued that these factors are related to psychological and behavioural explanations.

The second explanations of the of radicalization focus more on the activation of the root causes. Scholars in this tradition focus on the when and how questions of radicalization.
Holding those root causes and motivations to be potentially necessary yet never sufficient conditions. These previous works hold interactions as the key to the emergence and dynamics of violent strategies (Alimi et al., 2015, p.8). These works pay greater attention to the meso-level of analysis.

It is on these second explanations of radicalization that Alimi have expanded and created his own framework for the study of radicalization.

1.2 Research Objective
The research objective of this paper is to analyse the radicalization process of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf. How these two social movements eventually became two notorious terrorist-organization and compare them to each other to find similarities and differences between the two cases, in order to prevent other social movements in the future to become radicalized.

1.3 Research Question
How did Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf go from social movements to radicalized terrorist groups?

1.4 Relevance
There exists a lot of research regarding violent radicalization, but according to a new report by Daniela Pisoui and Reem Ahmed from 2016 there is a need for more research to understand the causes, processes and mechanisms of radicalization in order to be able to develop effective measures to tackle it. There is also a need for more research to understand the dynamics between radicalization violent extremism and terrorism (Pisoui & Ahmed, 2016). In regard to this I find the subject and this thesis extremely relevant due to this thesis purpose to analyse the causes, processes and mechanisms of radicalization in the light of a social movement. Hopefully the findings and the analysis could enlightenment the factors and processes of how social movements can be radicalized into terrorist-groups in order to prevent other social movements to take the same step as Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf did.

1.5 Analytical Framework for the Study
The analytical framework for this research paper will be Eitan Y Alimi’s, Chares Demetriou and Lorenzo Bosi’s relational dynamics and process to study the radicalization process (Alimi et al., 2015) of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf and compare them with each other.
1.6 Methodological Framework for the Study

The research is conducted as a qualitative desk study. I will be using the method of text analysis and an abductive reasoning which I will apply to the case study of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf, as well as a comparison between the two cases.
2 Analytical framework

2.1 Introduction to the analytical framework

In this chapter I will present and explain my chosen theoretical framework for this thesis. The topic which I have chosen to study is the process of radicalization. The framework chosen is *relational dynamics and processes*. The two cases chosen is Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf. The focus in the cases of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf will be on the different episodes of political contention in each case. Contentious politics can be described as “*episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.*” (McAdam et al., 2004, p.5). Basically this definition refers to a collective political struggle between a government and a social movement or organization (McAdam et al., 2004, p.5).

Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf will be presenting us different instances of social movement organizations shifting to political violence. The framework reject that radicalization is only attributable to a certain class of people. The authors also state that radicalization is not deterministic or just an expression of a groups ideology, they mean instead that the factors which affect the radicalization process are context-sensitive and interactive. The authors mean that the framework sees that radical groups usually evolve from splinter factions of a broader opposition movement. The authors found a growing emphasis on “relationalism” (Alimi et al., 2012, p.7). A relational approach “depicts social reality in dynamic, continuous and processual terms, and sees relations between social terms and units as pre-eminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substances” (Emirbayer, 1997, p.289).

A relational approach to radicalization offers tools to capture the continuity among the different stages of and manifestations of political violence. The analytical framework used will a have relational approach on the study of contentious politics and political violence. The framework is based and expanded on other works of McAdam, Tilly, Tarrow and Emirbayer (Alimi et al., 2015, p.11).
Several recent studies by scholars of political violence and terrorism have called to pay greater attention to the actual content of interactions in the radicalization process (Alimi et al., 2012, p.7).

2.2 Outlining the analytical framework

This thesis has listed the advantages of the framework above to get an understanding why I have chosen specifically this framework to see the radicalization processes.

This framework states that it exists four arenas in the radicalization process. Each one of these arenas interact and corresponds with four relational mechanisms. The mechanism is considered to provide causal analogies with wide applicability and offer the key in understanding and explaining the radicalization process. A relational approach to radicalization takes the existence of different fields or arenas of interactions and mechanisms as a starting point and considers examination of their interrelatedness from a comprehensive theoretical point of view (Alimi et al., 2015, p.11).

The first arena described is the one between movement and political environment. It basically state that changes in the political environment affects organizations and social movements within a country. The political environment has a strong impact on the decisions and actions of a social movement or organization. If changes in the political environment occur it does not matter if they came before, during or after the establishment of the movement. The focus in this “arena” lies on the relations between the social movement/organization and the state and interstate institutions. Examples on interstate institutions are international organization, formal channels of representation and the court system. This arena also focuses on the relations between non-state elite centres of power. Examples of non-state are media, parties and moral authorities. It last focus is on the symbolic configuration. Such as the public opinion, trust towards political institutions and the structures of political legitimacy (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10).

The mechanism which connects with the first arena is the opportunity and threat spirals (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10). The purpose with this mechanism is to be able to sort out if decision, actions, events and development in the political environment were in favour or not for the social movement/organization. Opportunities and threats are not reciprocally exclusive
but may work together and they do so in a state of flux. The opportunity and threat spirals are seen as a part of a changing structure which are related to different actors under analysis, it should therefore be evaluated from the specific social location of a given actor. The authors states that the opportunity and threat spirals is specified on actors instead of general conceptualization of structural change (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10). The focus lays on the social movements/organizations strategic change against the political environment and the social movements influence on the political life rather than focusing on the social movements leader.

The second arena is movement among actors. This arena sees opposition movements as fields of actors with varied and changing relational configurations. According to the authors, one of the most basic characteristics of opposition movements are that the different actors and groups within the movement have the same interests and beliefs. The actors interact with each other and affects each others strategy (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10). One exception occurs though according to the framework; this is homogenous movements. Even though a movement begins it political campaign as homogenous, there is a high possibility that differences within the movement will emerge over tactics and strategy. Actors can for example deviate on strategy, ideology, modes of actions and goals. The internal dynamics, power relations and division of labour during contention creates tensions among movement actors (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10).

The central mechanism for movement among actors is competition for power. This mechanism state that challengers sometimes complement and undercut each other strategies and tactics because they simply struggle which of the different vision will dominate (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10). They will also compete with each over the support of uncommitted followers as well as allies. The tactics which are used are not merely a tool for the battle with an external enemy. It is also a very good tactic to drive out political competitors within the movement itself. At last, sometimes in the competition of power there is a need of going beyond the tactics and strategy in order to achieve the goal. One example is popular support which can be used as a strategy to pursue goals other than the one the movements usually goes for (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10).

The third arena is the interaction between movement activists and security forces. As the dynamics with the effects on radicalization exists both inside and outside the movement. They
also exist at the area of contact between the movements activists and the states security forces according to the framework. This arena is basically seen as the distinct relational arena with its own evident influence on the processes of radicalization (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10). It differs from the arena between movement and the political environment because it is the security forces which are ones who engage with the social movement activists. The security forces are actually the ones who must take the decision which at time could go beyond the law or against formal political directives (Alimi et al., 2012, p.10). It happens time to time that the decisions made by the security forces are over ambiguous.

The central mechanism in this arena is **outbidding**. This arena refers to action-counteraction dynamics where each side raises the stake in response to each other, as for example during the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union. Such interactive behaviour between two actors may stay only to what is called “negotiated management” (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11). But there is also a possibility when two actors raise the stake in response to each other that it may transform and shift to violence. This type of violence is called “interactive violence” (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11). This mechanism strongly affect which tactic will occur, if it is disruptive, conventional or violent. It also figures out when a transgressive mode of contention becomes part of the episode of contention. What means with “mode of contention” are that all parties are pre-established actors which employ what the authorities consider legitimate means of claim making. A transgressive mode of contention differs in terms of means, actors or both. It develops as soon as a newly self-identified political actor enters the stage and/or at least when one party faces innovative action or repression (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11).

One thing to have in mind when we approach the last arena is that authorities and actors are not the only parties which are involved in episodes of contention. One central actor which in fact is usually part of cycles of of contention is the **one between a countermovement or rival movement** (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11). One can think that this arena is similar to the other ones but the difference is in the cases where ethnic contention is featuring and where social boundaries predating contention are the subject to activation and mobilization (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11). The conclusion which can be made are that this is the arena where two opposing movements interact with each other. For example, the arena between movement and authorities which purpose is to define the contact between movement and countermovement,
the dynamics generated in the two arenas can be differentiate from each other (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11).

The final mechanism in this arena is **object shift**. The features of object shift are the change in the relation between claimants and the objects of claim. This is specially the case when an additional actor enters the field and attacks it. When this occur there is a possibility of a change in the object of claims and discontent (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11). This change could be permanent or just temporary. An object shift occurs when the new claims of the movement pertain to the countermovement and thereby complementing the already existing claims aimed at the authorities. Which are usually the immediate central object of claims. The introduction of a countermovement with a clear agenda of inflicting damage on the movement and undermining its struggle and goals opens up a new front of contention with significant influence on the processes of radicalization (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11).

Each of these mechanisms listed above has its own distinctive influence on the processes of radicalization they also connect with each other and this framework will show how it drives the radicalization process forward (Alimi et al., 2012, p.11).

**2.3 Conclusion of Analytical Chapter**

In this chapter I have introduced the analytical framework and tried to show its flexibility as well as the core concepts such as the “mechanisms” and “arenas”. The next chapter which will be brought up in this thesis is the methodological framework.
3. Methodological Framework

3.1 Introduction

The purpose with this chapter is to explain and justify the methodological framework which will be used in this research paper. The first thing I will do is to present the chosen research method and justify why this particular method were chosen. Furthermore, it highlights the boundaries and ethical considerations of this study.

3.2 Qualitative or Quantitative

This thesis will have a qualitative research strategy. The differences between a quantitative and qualitative research strategy is that the quantitative research strategy have a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research. By deductive means, testing a theory and developing a hypothesis to see if the theory “works” (Bryman, 2015, p.36). It has also incorporated the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism in particular. A quantitative approach embodies a view of social reality as an external objective reality. A qualitative research strategy usually emphasizes an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of theories. A qualitative research strategy also rejects the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism in particular in preference for an emphasis on the ways in which individuals interpret their social world. It views the social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individual’s creation. (Bryman, 2015, p.36)

There is some argument why this thesis has chosen a qualitative research strategy instead of a quantitative one. The qualitative researcher is more concerned with the meaning of action. (Bryman, 2015, p.408). This argument suits this thesis due to its goal to study the radicalization process of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf. What factors played a role to radicalized these groups? Probably the actions of another actor. There is also an argument that qualitative research often is depicted as attuned to the unfolding event over time and to the interconnection between the actions of the participants. The qualitative research method goes deeper than quantitative one. One example could be that a quantitative researcher often is involved in uncovering large-scale social trends and connections between variables and qualitative researcher often are seen as being concerned with small-scale aspects of social reality, such as interaction (Bryman, 2015, p.408). This is an argument which suits my subject
and thesis very well due to that I am concentrating on two specific cases. The last argument for the use of a qualitative research method instead of a quantitative one, is that the qualitative researcher seeks a contextual understanding of the case. Such as understanding the behaviour, values and beliefs of the actors in terms of the context in which the research is conducted. (Bryman, 2015, p.408)

3.3 Abductive Reasoning
The mode of reasoning which this thesis has chosen is abductive reasoning, which will be applied to the empiric material for the study. Abductive reasoning is mainly used in qualitative research were the perspectives of those one studying is the empirical point of departure. By abductive reasoning means that the “researcher grounds a theoretical understanding of the contexts and people” (Bryman, 2015, p.401) What is studied is the language, meanings and perspectives which form their worldview. One important thing with abductive reasoning is that the theoretical account is grounded in the worldview of those one researches. (Bryman, 2015, p.401) An abductive approach can be seen as a mixture of deductive and inductive approaches. An abductive approach is especially giving if the objective of the researchers is to discover new things such as other variables or other relationships, which is an argument that fits good with the radicalization process in social movements. (Dubois, 2002, p.559) Another argument for the use of abductive reasoning are that the conclusion will provide new insight as an outcome of interpreting or explaining something new. The purpose with abductive reasoning are to show how something might be. (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 90-91)

3.4 Case study
A case study can best be described as a research design which contains a detailed and intensive analysis of a case. (Bryman et al, 2016). The pros with a case study is that it allows a researcher to attain high levels of conceptual validity or leading to the identification and measures the indicators that could best suit the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure. (Bennet et al, 2005, p.19) The case study approach can best be defined as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events”. (Bennet, et al, p.5) A case study seems as the best method to be able to answer my research question how Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf went from a social movement into a terrorist group. The advantages when doing a case study is that there exist potential for conceptual validity, strong procedures which can
lead to new hypotheses, the value in examining causal mechanisms in the context of the cases and its capacity for addressing causal complexity. (Bennet et al, 2005, p.19).

3.5 Comparative Case Study

This study will analyse how social movements become radicalized into terrorist groups. As mentioned before in the thesis, the two cases which are being investigated are Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf. The following process will be conducted as a comparative case study. The purpose with the study is to answer the research question stated above. The chosen research method is structured focused comparison. According to Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett the method of structure focused comparison is simple and straightforward (Bennet, et. al., 2005, p.58). Therefore, by making systematic comparison in each case it is possible to find a pattern, if it exists any. The research method is focused due to it only deals with certain aspects of the cases which will be examined. The method was developed to study historical experience in ways that would be useful knowledge of important foreign policy problems (Bennet, et. al., 2005, p.58). Which suits this thesis very well due to that the purpose is to study the radicalization process from a social movement until it becomes a terrorist group. The challenge was to analyse a specific phenomenon that would draw the explanations of a particular phenomena in to a broader and more complex theory. The aim was to discourage decision-makers relying on one single case.

There are a few things to think about while doing a comparative case study according to the authors, which this thesis has to take into consideration. The first thing to do is to clearly identify what the study tends to focus on. It could for example be crisis management, alliance formation or the impact of domestic politics on policymaking (Bennet, et. al., 2005, p.58). This thesis though as mentioned above is focusing on the radicalization processes in social movements, with a comparison between two cases. When making a structured focused comparison it is important with a well-defined research objective and research strategy. Another thing which is important is that the study should employ variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explanation (Bennet, et. al., 2005, p.58-59).

The advantages with a comparative research design is that it becomes easier to understand a social phenomena better when two cases are compared to each other.
When using a qualitative research strategy in a comparative design which this thesis has done, it takes the form of a multiple case-study. In the recent years a number of writers have argued for a greater use of case study research that investigates more than one case (Bryman, 2015, p.74). The comparative case study design is quite common when it comes to organization studies, as this thesis will investigate Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf which are two terrorist organizations the comparative case-study design is appropriate. The main argument for the use of a multiple case-study are that it improves the theory building. By comparing two or more cases, the researcher is in a much better position to establish the circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold. It is also a possibility that the comparison itself suggest concepts that are relevant to an emerging theory. The multiple-case study also offers the researcher to be in a position to examine the operation of generative causal mechanism in contrasting or similar contexts. (Bryman, 2015, p.74)

3.6 Case Selection:
The case study of boko Haram was mainly chosen because it is a large terrorist group in Africa, Nigeria. Secondly, Boko Haram were at first a “social movement” for Muslims in the northern part of Nigeria. It took them a couple of years until they became aggressive towards the Nigerian government and neighbouring countries. There exists much material and research about Boko Haram, because they are world famous. Boko Haram were created in 2002 and became violent in 2009 which means that the radicalization process took 7 years. I could have chosen another group but my choice is motivated that it exists much material about them which ease the research about them. The case of Abu Sayyaf was mainly chosen because it is a terrorist group active in Asia, Philippines. I wanted to have two different terror-groups from two different continents in order to see the similarities and differences between them. Abu Sayyaf was created in 1991. The members of Abu Sayyaf at that time was dropouts from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). So the radicalization process started in MNLF which made them later create Abu Sayyaf. The analytical framework which I have chosen state that dissimilarities also could be similarities which I think fit these two cases.

3.7 Limitations and Delimitations
The delimitations of this research are specific since it will not cover the entire field of terrorism research. As mentioned before this thesis will only look at the radicalization
processes in two cases. The two cases which are being investigated are Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf as. The result of this study will only concern these two cases and there is a big possibility that the framework which are being used only is applicable on specific cases.

This research will not be indifferent to the dynamics unfolding at either the micro or the macro level of analysis, the research will light the attention on the mechanisms which operate and exert their influence at the group and organization level. Even though the research does not reject the influence of certain individuals or of systemic changes as for example, war, economic crisis or demographical shifts on processes of radicalization. The purpose is to show that these influence listed above rise and fall within the context of organizations and also how they are factored in organizational dynamics and reflected through mechanisms at the meso-level which will be the core of this investigation. The research will focus on recurring relational mechanisms and arenas of interaction which will show a process of radicalization in a historical and political context. (Alimi et al., 2015, p.18)

The selected period for the case study in this research paper in the Boko Haram case is from 2002-2009. 2002 was the year when they were created and 2009 were the year when they became violent. So during 2002-2009 they became radicalized which are the years to be investigated in this research paper. In the Abu Sayyaf case, the selected period for this research is 1972-1991. This is due to the creation of Moro national front in 1972.

3.8 Text analysis

The purpose with a social scientific text analysis is to explain the life-world within which the text is embedded and to open up the perspective of the author that is delineated by his/her social and cultural context and to draw attention to the structural aspect of everyday practices and meaning patterns. (Bauer et al, 2014)

I have chosen this method of analysis text because it allows me to analyse the gathered information in a new way. It is then possible with the chosen framework to deduce a new reasoning in to the chosen subject. Since the aim with this study is to find out how it was possible for Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf to go from a social movement into two terror-organization it seems appropriate with a qualitative abductive case comparison with a text analysis. The method of text analysis has weaknesses and limitations. One example of this could be that the texts and documents which is analysed could be old and produced before new information existed. Another weakness is that the purpose with this method is to analyse
text gathered and reach a new conclusion and hypothesis and due the views of the author will be seen through the text, it is important to stay as neural as possible.
The sources which will be used for this study are secondary sources. It contains of journals, articles and literature which contains useful information about Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf. The primary sources used comes from historical document. Another example of primary sources could for instance be the literature for the method used.

3.9 Ethical Considerations
There are no ethical considerations which need to be taken into account due to that this is a desk study. There is for example no need in my research to have IS or terror propaganda on my computer because I will not be studying that kind of material. In my research I will not be making any interviews so I do not have to take any consideration with questions that might be sensitive for the person being interviewed. When doing a research, it is always good to stay as neutral as possible, which sometimes can be hard.

3.10 Conclusion of Methodological Framework
To conclude which different methodological approaches that will be used I have decided to use a structured focused case study. With applying a qualitative text analysis with an abductive reasoning. These methodological approaches were considered the most appropriate for this research in order to get the most out of it.

4.0 Literature Review
4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will introduce and try to explain the definition and symbolic characteristics of radicalization and terrorism. Furthermore, this chapter will look at previous research within radicalization. What the radicalization research tend to focus on.

4.2 Previous research on radicalization

The word “terrorism” is hard to define, there exists hundreds of definitions of terrorism. But the symbolic character of terrorism is the focus on civilian and non-combatant targets. They often have an indiscriminate nature and often provocative and retributive aims in the eyes of the public or state. The disruption of the public order and threats against the public security is often characteristics of terrorism. Another symbolic character of terrorism is the creation of a climate of fear to influence audience wider than the direct victims. The disregard of the rules of war and the rules of punishment is also a symbolic character for terrorism. Another symbol of terrorism is it’s asymmetric character, such as weak versus strong and armed versus unarmed. The key element of terrorism is the fact that terrorism is usually an instrument for the attempted try to receive political and religious influence (Schmid, 2011, p.59-60).

Before terrorism and terror attacks happens it has somehow occurred a radicalization process. It exists many different views and definition of radicalization. The symbolic characteristics of radicalization which most scholars agree on is that radicalization refers to a process of ideological socialization of usually young people towards effectuating fundamental political changes. Usually through the use of violent tactics of conflict waging against the political enemies and their followers (Schmid, 2011, p.237-238).

With the symbolic characteristics of radicalization stated above, this thesis has chosen to define radicalization from the book “The dynamics of Radicalization, A relational and Comparative perspective”. Due to that this thesis will use the framework from this book it also seems appropriate to use the definition of radicalization from the book. It states that radicalization is a “process through which a social movement or organization shifts from predominantly nonviolent tactics of contention to tactics that include violent means, as well as
The radicalization research has grown significantly in the last years due to the increase of active terrorism groups around the world. Especially since the Western world has had an increase in terrorist attacks against them (Global Terrorism Index, 2016). The research on radicalization have focus on different social sciences paradigms. As a result on this there exists a lot of research with deterministic explanations on radicalization. As well as rational choice models and global explanations of radicalization. There has also been a lot of research considering the micro, the meso and the macro levels of radicalization. There have also occurred different social movement theories, such as attempts to reduce the explanation of radicalization to one underlying and overarching factor. Much of the western research on radicalization has focused on the cognitive and behavioural level (Pisoui & Ahmed, 2016). There is a lack of sufficient understanding concerning the way radicalization works

As Randy Borum professor in the college of Behaviour and community sciences at the university of South Florida states in “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A review of Social Science Theories, the academic literature on radicalization is limited. It has concerned itself with the question of why and to a much lesser extent on how radicalization occurs. Since the 60s the academic research has tried to find the answers on why certain groups becomes radicalized. The researchers have analysed terrorist activity at different levels such as at the group level, individual, group, network, organization, mass movement, socio cultural context and international context (Borum, 2012).

One of the leading researchers at radicalization from a psychological perspective is the professor Fathali M. Moghaddam. His most recognizable work is his Staircase to Terrorism, which are a psychological exploration of the radicalization process which has come to be recognized. His intention with the work was to contribute to the terrorism discussion with a more dynamic and comprehensive account of the psychological and social processes which eventually lead to terrorist acts (Moghaddam, 2005).
4.3 Conclusion of Literature review

In this chapter I have explained what the previous research on radicalization have focused on. As I mentioned above much of the previous research has prioritized the individual, why do certain individuals use terror acts as a political tool. I do not neglect these findings by recognize scholars, I do question that there is more to find about radicalization and radicalization processes. It will anyway help me in my analysis of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf. I have also in this chapter stated the symbolic characteristics of radicalization and terrorism, due to it harshness in defining them and also justified why I have chosen specifically these symbolic characteristics.
5 Findings

5.1 Islamic history in Nigeria

In order to get a better understanding of the problems with Boko Haram, we must take a look into the history of Islam in Nigeria. Islam was introduced in Nigeria in the 11th and 12th century through migration and trade. Islam was also introduced through the travels of mystic wayfarer along the trade routes in the old empire of Kanem-Bornu (Harvard, 2017, a). Historically Islam has always been more established in the northern regions of the country. (Schacht, 1957) During the 15th century the Malian Songhay empire spread into the Nigeria’s Hausaland. The empire established a dynasty there under the king Askiiyya Muhammad. The City of Kano come to be important for Islamic literature and studies. Arabic was well spoken in the city of Kano and it provided the groundwork for religious scholarship which facilitated exchanges between Muslims in Sudan and Mali. It was the city of Kano which created the basis for classic Islamic education in West-Africa.

In the 19th century Usman Dan Fodio who was the founder of Sokoto Caliphate led a jihad against the religious injustice through all of Hausaland and other neighbouring states. The purpose was to expand and strengthen the influence of Islam in what later would become Nigeria (Harvard, 2017, a). The Sokoto caliphate was an empire in the West of Africa which lasted from 1804-1903. The Sokoto caliphate were defeated by the British empire in 1903 and were put under British rule in what came to be called as the northern Nigerian Protectorate. The Sokoto Caliphate was based on Islamic Sharia law and Values. The Sokoto caliphate stretched itself in todays western and central parts of Sudan, Senegal, and Chad and northern parts of Nigeria (Audu & Osuala, 2015). When the British forces conquered the northern parts of Nigeria in 1905 they were met by resistance but the British forces were much better equipped than their opponents which led to a quite easy victory for the colonial power. The descendants from the Sokoto caliphate still lives in the northern parts of Nigeria and Neighbouring countries explained above. The resistance against western influence is still very strong in the northern parts of Nigeria and it is believed to originate from the conflict with the British in the beginning of the 20th century. The unification in 1960 (both parts got their independence from the British empire) between the southern part of Nigeria and the northern part of Nigeria was met with very strong opposition from both part. This helped in somehow laying the corners for the modern problems with Nigeria such as ethnic, social and religious
tensions. Usman Dan Fodio still today have a strong legacy and image in the northern parts of Nigeria and is in some parts considered as a national hero. (Ngwodo, 2010)

Maitatsien or Mohammed Marwa was an individual who was a result of the environment in northern Nigeria and adapted an Islamic fundamentalist approach. He was one of the reason for the Maitatsine riots which occurred between 1980 and 1885. It was considered as Nigeria’s first major wave of religiously inspired violence in modern times. He considered himself as a prophet and a reformer of Usman Dan Fodio. Mohammed Marwa was especially notable for his unconditional condemnation of the western culture, technology and education. Mohammed Marwa is known to refer to people which put their child in a state school as infidel. Most of Mohammed Marwas followers were young poor men from the northern parts of Nigeria. (Harvard, 2017, b) The people who had it though, most of social and economic issues became receptive to Mohammed Marwas anti-government message and his religious thoughts. One of the deadliest clashes during this period happened in 1980 when 4000 people got killed including Mohammed Marwa himself. Even though he died the influence he had on the northern parts of Nigeria were big. He is now a hero and martyr for many people in the northern parts of Nigeria and for Boko Haram. (Harvard, 2017, b)

The religious diversity of the country is that 50 % of the population are Muslims, mostly living in the northern regions of Nigeria. (Al-Jazeera, 2010) 40 % of the population is Christians and most of them lives in the southern regions of the country. (Al-Jazeera, 2010) The remaining 10 % of the population have traditional indigenous beliefs. (Al-Jazeera, 2010)

5.2 Radicalization process Boko Haram 2002-2009

Boko Haram, otherwise named Jam’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad is a terrorist group which was formed in 2002. The name of the group means western education is forbidden (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). Boko Haram has been engaged in conflict and guerrilla warfare around Nigeria, mostly in the northern parts of the country. The clashes have mostly been with Nigerian military and police. But also civilians have been victims of their attacks. Boko Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf 2002 in Maiduguri (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). Due to that Boko Haram is a religious organization it is very hard to separate the activities from the group from the political problems in the northern parts of Nigeria such as the political, economic and territorial struggles. Even though Nigeria has a secular constitution the country is divided on religious lines which distinct Nigerian citizens
from each other. Boko Haram’s radicalization process intensified during the years of 2002-2009. During this period, they spread their disdain on western education which they thought was a huge problem to the Nigerian people, especially the ones in the north were the majority of the population are Muslims. (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015) The government corruption was also a factor which intensified the radicalization process of the organization. This on one hand led to the creation of alternative schools, these alternative schools were Quran-schools. In these Quran-schools, the leaders propagated for Boko Haram’s cause and the radicalization of young people occurred. During the period of 2002-2009 there were very few attacks from Boko Haram. When it occurred, the attacks were mostly concentrated on symbols of state power such as police stations. In 2009 Boko Haram changed tactics and the attacks intensified. It happened after their leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed in police custody in 2009 after being arrested (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015).

Boko Haram aims to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria, the legislation should be based on Islamic Sharia Law. The founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf was a trained Salafist. A Salafist is a school of thought in Islam which is often associated with Jihad. Mohammed Yusuf was influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah who were a 14\(^{th}\) century legal scholar. He preached Islamic fundamentalism and is often considered as an important figure for radicalized groups around the world. As mentioned above, the purpose with Boko Haram before 2009 was not to overthrow the government violently. Instead the focus lay on criticize northern Muslims which participated with an illegitimate non-Islamic state. The main reasons for the radicalization of Boko Haram were the clashes between Christians and Muslims. The Nigerian governments hard treatment of them, which includes police brutality and the aggressive approach of the security forces. The pulling trigger which made Boko Haram change tactic to violence occurred in July 2009 when Boko Haram members allegedly refused to follow a new motorbike helmet law. This led to aggressive police tactic which started an armed uprising in the state of Bauchi which eventually spread to the states of Borno, Yobe and Kano (Sergie & Johnson, 2015).

During the 5 day riots between July 26 to July 30 2009, over 700 people were killed. Mostly of them were Boko Haram members and policemen. Mohammed Yusuf was shot dead on the 30 of July by police while being in police detention (Counter Extremism, 2017).
After these event in the end of July 2009, boko haram changed tactic and eventually come to be classified as a terror organization, 2013 by USA and 2014 by the European Union and United Nation (Counter Extremism, 2017). After the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the organization splintered into different factions. Which made it impossible to have the control of the organization who Mohammed Yusuf had (Counter Extremism, 2017). The origins of Boko Haram seem to be rooted in grievances over poor governance and the inequalities in the Nigerian society especially in the north. Boko Haram is an effect of this. The emergence of a group like Boko Haram is signified by long festering extremist impulses which runs deep in the northern Nigeria society. The socio-political and the economic conditions of the north as well as it´s history is crucial to understand in order to to be able to understand a group like Boko Haram. In Northern Nigeria there is a high amount of illiteracy, misery, poverty and beggary. Overall, Nigeria has a bad index when it comes to human development. But in northern Nigeria, it is even worse than the national average. Basically if a child is born in Northern Nigeria it will have a lower quality of life than a child being born in the South of Nigeria. (Ngwodo, 2010)

During the years 2002-2009 there occurred several clashes between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria which come to further radicalize Boko Haram. Such as in 2002 when 216 people died in riots due to one newspaper published an article about the Prophet Muhammed in a bad lighting. The same thing happened again in 2006 when a Danish newspaper published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and 157 people died in riots between Muslims and Christians. (Al-Jazeera 2010).

One factor which came to make Boko Haram more popular and also could be seen as a development in the radicalization process was the dispute over the theological issues. Mohammed Yusuf (the founder of Boko Haram) had a dispute with his former teacher Ja’far Mahmud. The dispute was about the use of cassettes and CDs as well as mobile phones. Ja’far Mahmud critized Mohammed Yusuf as being ignorant and stupid due to that Mohammed Yusuf used these devices while preaching (Loimeier, 2012). It was seen as dangerous for the political ambitions for Muslims in Nigeria. But Ja’far Mahmud saw the importance of western and secular education. It was not forbidden it was rather something that he encourages people to do. He saw the adoption of western and secular education as key to be able to fight it. In order to fight your enemy, you must be able to understand him. He also defended the strategy.
of slowly Islamizing the institutions. He also saw the militant struggle against the Nigerian State as counterproductive (Loimeier, 2012).

Boko Haram on hand has rejected the modern Islamic schools as well as Nigeria’s secular system. They also turned against the Nigerian State and has critized the arbitrariness of Nigerian institutions, especially the police and security forces. Boko Haram with Mohammed Yusuf at the front also refused to recognize the sultan of Sokoto as the head of all Nigerian Muslims. In December 2003 there were clashes between Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces in the state of Yobe, which was Muhammed Yusuf’s home state. In January 2004, 200 Boko Haram members attacked police stations on a massive scale (Loimeier, 2012). A consequence of this was that the Nigerian Media started to call Boko Haram members as Nigerian Talibans. Another attack on police stations occurred in Borno state in September 2004. The military then killed 27 members of Boko Haram which came to radicalize them even more. Even if Boko Haram did reject western education they did not reject western technology such as mobile phones, television, motorbikes and modern medicine, it was acceptable in Islamic terms (Loimeier, 2012).

The restoration democracy in Nigeria in 1999 and the liberalisation of the political atmosphere provided an opportunity for the restoration of sharia legal system. At first in the Zamfara state and later spread to other predominantly Muslim states. Due to this, religion was reinforced in the politics again. The Sharia law is fully entrenched into laws and policies in these states. Islamic indoctrination is the basis of family upbringing and social formation in the northern states of the country. They are being taught and told in their homes, mosques, and at Arabic schools (Omotosho, 2015). Boko Harams emergence can not be seen as anything else as an answer to the sensitive political issues in the country. In northern parts of Nigeria, politics and religion goes hand in hand and it is a miss trust against the state because of it’ s secular tradition and legal framework. According to Omotosho the contention is that the Islamic fundamentalist believes that there is no separation of the sacred and the profane and the legal system that governs them. They found a linkage between Nigerian secular state and Christianity (Omotosho, 2015). Also states that the people of the north tend to view their religious traditions as closely tied to their community that any threat to any of them is seen as a threat to their religion and existence (Omotosho, 2015). According to Agbo, Boko Haram were motivated by the neo-imperialism as well as the liber underpinning of Western culture,
which they saw as threatening to Islamic tradition as well as prioritising the individual over the collective (Agbo, 2008). The emergence of Boko Haram can not be seen as anything else than an answer to the bad social and political situation in the country as well as the bad governance by the Nigerian state. Abdu states that Boko Haram engaged in their militant activates as a reaction to the loss of power by the Northern Muslim elites (Abdu, 2008). Albert state that one of the reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram was that some northern Nigerian governors abandoned the Sharia laws which had been implemented before. Another thing was that the political leaders of Nigeria failed to conduct themselves according to the tenets of Islam as they promised during their political campaigns in 1999, 2003, and 2007 in the general elections (Albert, 2008)

5.3 Islamic History in The Philippines

In order to be able to study Abu Sayyaf there is a need of looking into the history of Islam in the Philippines, as well getting a historical and geo-political view of the country. The Muslims in the Philippines is referred to as “Moros”. The Philippines archipelago is divided into three bigger islands groups. The “Moros” are living in the most southern part of the country which are called Mindanao. The Christian majority has traditionally lived in the other two larger island groups namely, Visayas in the middle and Luzon in the north. In the Philippines there lives approximately 5,5 million Muslims (Bara, 2015). The “Moros” makes up to 5.5 % of Philippines 100 million inhabitants (Bara, 2015). Around 90 % of Philippines population consist of Christians. (Bara, 2015)

Islam was introduced to the Philippines in the 13th century. When an Arab religious leader landed on the province of Sulu in the southern Philippines. By the end of the 15th century, most inhabitants in the southern Philippines had accepted Islam as their religion (Taylor, 2017, a). This on one hand led to the establishment of an Islamic state. The state called itself Sultanate of Sulu. Another Muslim Sultanate was established in central Mindanao in 1515. The Spanish colonizer arrived at the islands in 1565 and begun to conquer the Islands. The Spaniards tried to conquer the territories of the Sultanates. But they struggled to effective control these areas, when the Spaniards left the Philippines in 1898 the Americans took over (Taylor, 2017, a). It took the Americans 17 years to overcome the resistance of the “Moros”. When the “Moros” accepted the American colonial rule they did not want to be incorporated into what would come to be the independent Philippine nation. The Christian Filipinos viewed
the “Moros” as the enemy and the Muslims viewed the Christians as infidels. The Philippine nation gained their independence from USA in 1946 and the southern Islands were incorporated in the Philippine nation (Taylor, 2017, a).

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) started a war against the Philippine government in 1972 (Taylor, 2017, a). The purpose was to create an own Islamic state. The “Moros” felt that they belonged to another nation as well as being the victims of injustice and oppression. One factor also was that they did not want to Philippine Christians to rule over them. To conclude it, Muslims in the southern islands of the Philippines has becoming a minority in what historically they have considered as their homeland. They have also come to see themselves disadvantaged socially and economically towards Filipino Christians. After the independence from USA many Christian Filipinos emigrated to the southern islands as a government tactic in order reduce Islam’s impact in the region. (Taylor, 2017, a)

Abu Sayyaf has its roots in the centuries of struggle of the “Moro” people against the colonial administrations as well as against the Christian Filipinos and the state of Philippines.

5.4 The Birth of the Abu Sayyaf Group and Moro National Liberation Front (MNFL)

The founder of Abu Sayyaf Group was Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani. He was born on Basilan in the southern Philippines in 1959 (Taylor, 2017, b). During the 60s voices were heard from the “Moros”, they wanted to create an Islamic State in the southern Island of Mindanao. In 1961 a congressman of the Sulu province filled a bill in the Philippines house of representatives which he wanted the Sulu province to gain independence. The argument which he had was that the Sulu province received no national aid and he declared here that Sulu was a forgotten corner of the republic of the Philippines (Taylor, 2017, b). Another incident which neglected the “Moros” status in the Philippines were the Jabidah Massacre. It was a Massacre of 60 Muslims soldiers in 1968. The soldiers belonged to the Filipino army and were being trained to infiltrate in Malaysia. The “Moro” soldiers rebelled against their superiors and were killed. Almost every soldier who were killed came from the Sulu Province. The same year the Muslim independence movement were created (MIM) which latter comes to be renamed as Mindanao independence movement. It was considered to be a
peaceful movement and the purpose was to declare an independent state on the island of Mindanao. The foundation of the movement led to violence between Christians and Muslims in Mindanao (Taylor, 2017, b).

As mentioned before the Moro National Liberation Front began to take shape in 1969, on the reasons listed above. In 1972 the (MNLF) started a secession war against the Philippine government. In 1977 a split occurred in the movement and a side organization were founded. It called itself Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). They started to launch their own attacks against the Philippine government. As it is standing today, they are in peace talks with the government. The (MNFL) signed a peace agreement in 1996 but in 2001 the peace was broken and the fighting continued (Taylor, 2017, b).

The rise of Islamic militancy during the 70s in the Muslims world come to affect the rest of the world. In 1979 there occurred three events which came to shock the Muslim world. The first happened in the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Where dissidents of Saudi-Arabian descendants threaten to overthrow the Saudi royal family. The other incident was the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the last incident was the revolution in Iran when the Shah got overthrown and the establishment of an Islamic republic. These incidents led to that the royal Saudi family started the promotion of Wahhabi-Salafi Islam around the world. They made funds to build mosques and religious schools as well as they sponsored scholarships for young Muslims to study Islam in Saudi Arabia (Taylor, 2017, b).

Due to that Abdurajak Janjalani has been an important factor in the foundation of the Abuu Sayyaf Groups, it is necessary to look into his life a little deeper. As mentioned above he was born in 1959. In the early 80s he studied the Arabic language and Islamic jurisprudence at the new Umm Al-Qura university in Mecca in Saudi Arabia (Fellman, 2015). It is possible that during this time he came to adopt the Wahhabi-Salafi view on Islam. Janjalani returned to the Philippines in 1984 where he started to teach Arabic and Islamic studies. It is not very clear when Janjalani joined (MNLF) but it is believed to be when he arrived in the Philippines again in 1984 (Fellman, 2015).

In 1976 the (MNLF) signed the Tripoli agreement with the Philippine government which was a cease fire between the two parties. In this agreement it was agreed that the Muslims in the southern Philippines would get autonomy in 13 provinces in the south (Tripoli, 1976). But the
demand from the Philippine government was that (MNLF) should lay down their arms and their wishes of an independent Islamic state in the south (Tripoli, 1976). By 1980 (MNLF) declared publicly that they would not demand independence from the state of the Philippines (Taylor, 2017, b).

By 1987 new negotiations took place in Jeddah. In 1986 there was a revolution in the Philippines in which the former president had to resign and a new president with a new government took the power (Taylor, 2017, b). That is why new negotiations occurred in 1987. A peace agreement was signed but it collapsed same year. Janjalani was sent away by (MNFL) in 1987 to Libya as a scholar. He was sent away because of his disagreement with (MNFL) new policy of abandoning the struggle for independence and critical of (MNFL) action which he thought was to weak. It was also because he openly critized the (MNFL) chairman Nur Misuari. Janjalani later returned to the Philippines in 1990 after having spent some time in Pakistan after the studies in Libya, where he is believed to have met Osama bin Laden. After his return he joined one of the main fighting (MNLF) units where he fought as well as strengthen the groups faith in Islam (Taylor, 2017, b). The collapse of the peace talks between (MNFL) and the Filipino government made many young Muslims angry. They here understood the futility of the peace process. Which made them receivable to Janjalani. There was also a leadership vacuum in south-western Mindanao and this made it easier for the establishment of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the path to jihad. Abu Sayyaf’s first attack were launched on April 4th 1991, it was a grenade attack in Zamboanga City which killed two American Christian missionaries. (Samuel, 2016, p.86)

5.5 Conclusion of Findings

The findings chapter have now listed the Islamic history in both Nigeria and the Philippines with the purpose of getting a bigger picture of the countries. It has also listed political decisions which might have had an impact on the radicalization process of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf, how these two movements eventually come to be two notorious terror organizations.
6.0 Analysis

6.1 Introduction
The purpose with this chapter is to analyse the information I have gathered in the findings chapter above by using Alimi's framework for radicalization processes. I will present this analysis in two sections. At first I will analyse the case of Boko Haram and after that I will analyse the case of Abu Sayyaf. At last I will have a conclusion on the analysis chapter where I will conclude the similarities and differences between the two cases.

6.2 Boko Haram

As mentioned before the analysis will be based on Alimi's framework for the study of radicalization processes. Here I will explain how the different arenas, general mechanisms and sub mechanisms connects with each other and drives the radicalization process forward. The first arena which will be analysed in the case of Boko Haram is the one between movement and political environment. The mechanism which are attached to this arena is the opportunity and threat spiral.

The formation of Boko Haram, as well as its radicalization was primarily a result of the socio-economic inequalities between the Nigerian people which goes back to the colonial period and before (Ray, 2016). So the radicalization process has been long and slow. But in this analysis I will focus on more recent events, with the start just before the creation of Boko Haram and till 2009 when their radicalization process could be considered over.

The restoration democracy in Nigeria in 1999 and the liberalisation of the political atmosphere provided an opportunity for the restoration of sharia legal system. At first in the Zamfara state and later spread to other predominantly Muslim states. This was the first sign that religion was reinforced back in to the politics again. When the sharia laws were abolished, there was a mistrust against the state because of it secularity and their secular legal framework (Owolade, 2014). It is possible to conclude that the emergence of Boko Haram was an answer to the sensitive political environment in the country. In the northern parts of Nigeria religion and politics has always been connected with each other. Omotosho states that the Islamic fundamentalist beliefs that there is no separation of the sacred and the profane...
and the legal system that governs them (Omotosho, 2015). The fundamentalists basically found a link between the Nigerian secular state and Christianity. Omotosho also states that the people of the north tend to view their religious traditions as closely tied to their community and that any threat to any of them is seen as a threat to their religion and existence (Omotosho, 2015). This has led to boundary formation and evolution, which are the sub mechanism which works in this arena. It has created a society of we and them. Muslims against Christians, North against the south. When religion was introduced into the politics again as I mentioned above, they come to be radicalized through the sub mechanism of evolution. They felt that the Nigerian government stood for something else, that they did not stand for basically a lack of moral.

According to Agbo Boko Haram were motivated by the neo-imperialism as well as the liberal underpinning of Western culture, which they saw as threatening to Islamic tradition as well as prioritising the individual over the collective (Agbo, 2011). Another thing was that the political leaders of Nigeria failed to conduct themselves according to the tenets of Islam as they promised during their political campaigns in 1999, 2003, and 2007 in the general elections (Albert, 2008). Which also come to further radicalize Boko Haram. One can state the decisions made in the political environment were not in favour for the radical Islamist which eventually led to the foundation of Boko Haram and the radicalization of the social movement (Omotosho, 2015).

The second arena is movement among actors. The central mechanism for movement among actors is competition for power. This arena focuses on internal struggles within a social movement which in this case are Boko Haram. The internal struggles of Boko Haram in this case were the one between Mohammed Yusuf (the founder of Boko Haram) and his former teacher Ja’far Mahmud who were a member of the Izala Society also called JIBWIS (Loimeier, 2012). They had different views on how create an Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria. It also differed in how they interpreted the Quran. As mentioned in the findings part their main concern with each other were the dispute over which technological devices who were allowed to use. Ja’far Mahmud saw the use of technological devices as a sin to use while Muhammed Yusuf used devices such as mobile phones, radio, CDs etc. But their main concern between these two men was how they wanted to achieve an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria. Ja’far Mahmud saw the western and secular education of Nigeria as an important tool to show people what was bad with it and how to fight it. Muhammed Yusuf on the other hand wanted
to forbid the western and secular education (Loimeier, 2012). Muhammed Yusuf also encouraged Muslims to militant struggle against the Nigerian State, police and security forces while Ja’far Mahmud saw it as contra productive. Mahmud also defended the slow Islamising of Nigerian institutions. Muhammed Yusuf and later Boko Haram sees other Muslims who do not participate in the fight against the Nigerian state as infidels and they are even worse than the Christians. Ja’far Mahmud was later murdered in 13th of April 2007, still today his murderer is free (Loimeier, 2012). The struggle for power within Boko Haram and which direction the movement should take can best be explained through the sub mechanism of boundary formation. It created a us-them distinctions not only against the Nigerian state and the people in the south, byut also within the movement and against all Muslims. “You are either with us or against us”. Another sub mechanism which works in the struggle for power are polarization. Which are defined as the increase of ideological distance between political actors or coalitions, which in this case were Ja’far Mahmud and the organization JIBWIS. This contributed to further radicalize Boko Haram and introduce violence within the movement.

The third arena arena which come to further radicalize Boko Haram is the one between movement activists and security forces. The main mechanism working is this area is outbidding. The tension between Christians and Muslims increased during the years of 2002-2009 as well as with the police and military. The sub mechanism which works in this area is retaliation and legitimization. The legitimization of the violence and retaliation came at the same time. 4th of May 2004 hundreds of people were killed, mostly Muslims by Christians tarok fighters. Just 8 days later, 12th of May 2004 Muslims with Boko Haram connections wages street battles in the Northern city of Kano (Al-Jazeera, 2010). At this event 500-600 people were killed and most of them were Christians. Here the retaliation came fast, and the legitimization of violence had occurred. In February 2006, a Muslims protest against the Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammed runs out of control. The clashes here were between Muslims and police. In these clashes around 150 people died (Al-Jazeera, 2010). The worst riot though occurred between 26th of July 2009 to 30th July 2009. These riots are called the Boko Haram uprising. As mentioned before over 700 people were killed mostly Boko Haram members and police officers as well as the Boko Haram leader at his time Muhammed Yusuf. (Last, 2009) The legitimization of violence and retaliation for losses come to radicalize Boko Haram over a few years’ time until it all culminated in the end of July
2009. After Muhammed Yusuf were killed, Boko Haram came to change tactics and go from a social movement into a famous terrorist organization.

The last arena is the one between a countermovement or rival movement and the mechanism in this arena is Object shift. This arena and mechanism have close ties with movement among actors and competition for power. Especially in the case with Boko Haram. Therefore, I have chosen to combine these two arenas and mechanism together. Boko Harams rival movement was JIBWIS. As I mentioned before they had the same goal but different views on how to get there. Therefore, I have chosen to have them under the mechanism for competition for power. Because there was a power struggle between them as I described above.

6.3 Abu Sayyaf

The first arena which will be brought up in the analysis of Abu Sayyaf is the one between movement and political environment. The mechanism which works in this arena is the opportunity and threat spirals. The sub mechanisms which works in this arena are boundary activation and marginalization. Historically as mentioned is the findings chapter the Muslims of Philippines has lived in the southern parts of the country on the island Mindanao (Bara, 2015). The boundary activation started early due to that the country of Philippines always has been divided between religion. This has created a “we and them” think from both sides. Due to that the Christians dominates in number they have also been in majority in every state institution as well as in the politics. Due to this, the Muslims of the Philippines has always felt marginalized (Bara, 2015).

Their struggle goes back to colonial times both fighting against the Spaniards and the Americans and on later days the state of the Philippines. When the independence was gained, the immigration of Christian Filipinos started to Mindanao were the Muslims mainly lived. This created a feeling of being attacked, especially on their culture and views and religion (Taylor, 2017, a). During the 60s voices were heard for a creation of an Islamic state on Mindanao. As I have mentioned in the findings chapter a Sulu congressman concluded pretty much how many “Moros” felt. They received no national aid and the congressman stated that Mindanao were the forgotten corner of the Philippines (Taylor, 2017, b).
The conclusion you can draw from this is that many Philippines in the south felt marginalized by the Philippian state.

In response to the massacre of 60 Muslims soldiers in 1968, (MIM) were created. The foundation of the Muslim independence movement led to clashes between Christian and Muslims. A response to these clashes came when the Moro National Liberation Front was created. Due to the insecurity for Muslims in the Philippines, the (MNLF) started a secession war against the Philippine government in order to protect their own and to create an Islamic State. To conclude it, the absence of Muslim influence in the political environment and the marginalization of Muslims eventually led to the foundation of (MNLF). This on the other hand eventually led to the foundation of Abu Sayyaf.

The second arena is movement among actors. The central mechanism for movement among actors is competition for power. The sub mechanism which is working in this arena is attribution of similarity and withdrawal. This arena focus on the internal struggles within a social movement which in this case are Abu Sayyaf. The focus though on this arena lays on the mechanism which eventually led to the foundation of Abu Sayyaf. (MNLF) signed the Tripoli agreement with the Philippine government in 1976. In this agreement it stood that the southern Philippines would get autonomy in 13 provinces in the south. But the demands from the Philippine government was that they should stop with their wishes of an independent Islamic state in the south. The (MNLF) agreed on these term with made some members within the MNLF) furious. This led to the foundation of (MILF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 1978. (Taylor, 2017 b) Eventually the peace agreement broke and the Philippine government had now two guerrilla movements to fight against.

By 1987 new peace negotiations took peace with (MNFL) and the government. But the peace agreement collapsed the same year (Taylor, 2017 b). This eventually led to the creation of Abuu Sayyaf. Many young Muslims was very angry with both the guerrilla groups and the Philippian government. By using attribution of similarity and withdrawal we found an interesting pattern of the radicalization process of Abu Sayyaf. (MIM) the most peaceful movement for an independent Islamic state failed with it´s goal. This led to the foundation of (MNFL) which took up arms against the Filipino government. They also failed in the creation of an independent Islamic State. Which eventually led to the foundation of (MILF) due to the
abolishment of an independent Islamic State from (MNFL). The failure of (MILF) eventually led to the foundation of Abu Sayyaf in 1991. Here it is possible to see that all these organizations have radicalized themselves when they have failed in achieving their goal and all of them have had the same goal. It started with a peace movement as (MIM) ended up with an Islamic terrorist group as Abu Sayyaf. They have all take distance from each other even if their goal in the end was the same.

The third arena is the one **between movement activists and security forces.** The main mechanism working in this area is **outbidding.** The purpose with this arena is to show how certain events made the radicalization process develop further. The sub mechanism which works in this arena is **repression** and **boundary formation.** There are some specific events which occurred in the Philippines during the 60s and 70s which came to further develop the radicalization process and eventually led to the creation of (MNLF) and Abu Sayyaf. The most famous one were the Jabidah massacre. This event occurred at March 18th 1968. The Jabidah massacre was the killing of a number of Muslim soldiers which were recruited for the special forces in guerrilla warfare (Curaming & Aljunied, 2012 p.90). The exact number of death is not known but it is believed to be between 14-28 soldiers. The soldiers were reportedly killed because of they did not want to be a part of an attack on Muslims (Larousse, 2001 p.130-136). No one was ever charged for these killings which made the Muslims angry and this indicated that the government seen as Christians was not really serious in seeking justice over the deaths of young Muslims. The incident led to demonstrations and protests in Manila by Muslims youths and students which eventually suppressed by the police. This also helped the Muslims to get justification for the believes that the government was against them. Just two months after the massacre Mindanao Islamic movement was founded (MIM). As a response to (MIM), Christians formed an armed group called Ilaga. These two organizations were created in direct response to each other and the Jabidah massacre (Larousse, 2001 p.130-136). This helped to divide the Muslims and Christians even more from each other. Which the boundary formation also helps us to understand.

By the early 1971 over 500 had been killed in clashes between Muslims and Christians. Another incident which had an effect on the radicalization process of (MNFL) where the Manili massacre. It occurred in June 1971 when a group of armed men went into a mosque and killed 65 people. The signing of the martial law was an attempt to disarm the Muslims. (Larousse, 2001) The Philippian state was afraid that the Muslims would get to strong. This
was instead a proximate cause and not a consequence of an armed Muslims insurgency against the Philippine state. To conclude, the main drivers for the radicalization process in this arena were the oppression by the Philippian government which come to increase the “we and them” thinking from both sides. As well as the events which I have listed above which come to increase the mistrust against the Filipino government and Christians.

The last arena is the one Between a countermovement or rival movement and the mechanism in this arena is Object shift. The sub mechanism which works in this arena is polarization. This arena as I mentioned in the case of Boko Haram is quite similar with the arena movement among actors. The sub mechanism of polarization explains to us the distance which developed from the (MNLF) to Abu Sayyaf. As mentioned before Abu Sayyaf were a splinter group of (MNLF) It here occurred a distance ideological speaking between the two groups. As well as the goal of the groups changed, (MNFL) in some sort got de-radicalized due to abandonment of their previous which were to create an Islamic state on Mindanao, they now settle with semi-autonomy. While Abu Sayyaf’s goal was the previous goal of (MNLF), namely to establish an Independent Islamic state on the island of Mindanao. This is were the object shift occurs, a shift in the political goals by the two groups. As I tried to explain before in previous arena movement among actors, when two groups with a similar political goal occurs, there is a big chance they influence and radicalize each other. As the stake raises in the same way between security forces and movement activist. The stake raises between two similar movements which at least will further radicalize one of the groups which in this case is Abu Sayyaf. One example which is interesting in the perspective of polarization is that the (MNLF) and Abu Sayyaf now are far apart from each other ideologically. They have now clashes with each other and (MNLF) are now helping the Filipino government to fight Abu Sayyaf. (CNN, 2016)

6.4 Comparison

When the different mechanisms now are listed it is possible to do the comparison between the two cases. In the first arena which are the one between movement and political environment it is easy to see similarities between the two cases. Both cases have their population divided by religion in different areas within the country. In Nigeria the majority of Muslims lived in the north by contrast in the Philippines were the majority of Muslims lived in the south. This has created a “we and them” society in both of the cases through the sub-
mechanisms of **boundary formation**. The differences between the two cases in the first arena was that in the Nigeria case the sub-mechanism of **evolution** occurs. This is due to that Sharia laws were introduced in the northern states of Nigeria right after the restoration of democracy in 1999 (Owolade, 2014). When the abolishment of sharia law later occurred this come the radicalize Boko Haram because what they felt was lack of moral. In the Abu Sayyaf case it was more of a question of being **marginalized** by the Filipino government which come to radicalize Abu Sayyaf.

In the second arena, which was **movement among actors** it differs between the two cases. In the Boko Haram case it was two political actors who competed for the power which eventually made them enemies, namely Boko Haram and JIBWIS. They had different views on how to establish an Islamic Caliphate. Which divided Muslims into categories through the sub-mechanism of **boundary formation** and **polarization**, basically Muslims was faced against each other in views of Islam through politics and competition of power and this competition for power come to further radicalize Boko Haram. Abu Sayyaf differs from Boko Haram in this arena due to that Abu Sayyaf creation is a response to the failures of (MIM), (MNFL) and (MILF). In this case Muslims overall was more united, with the establishment of the peaceful organization (MIM) (Taylor, 2017, b). This can be seen through the sub-mechanism of **attribution of similarity**. Due to different political events stated above in the analysis the radicalization increased in every new social movement which were created after (MIM) and it culminated with the creation of Abu Sayyaf. The ideology changed with every new movement and this resulted in a **withdrawal** from each other, which was the second sub-mechanism.

In the third arena, which was the one **between movement activists and security** it differs between the two cases. In the Boko Haram case it was huge tensions between Christians and Muslims during 2002-2009 and with the police and military. The clashes between Muslims and Christians and with the police and military resulted in the sub-mechanism of **retaliation**. This can also be seen through the other sub-mechanisms which was **legitimization**, namely the legitimization of violence. The clashes just become more violent and violent and it culminated with the killing of Muhammed Yusuf. After this Boko Haram became militant. The clashes between the different actors came to further radicalize Boko Haram. In the Abu Sayyaf Case the tensions were between the Muslims, Christian and the military. Here the sub-mechanism of **repression** works due to to signing of the martial law which purpose was to disarm the
Muslims (Larousse, 2001). But also the discrimination by the Philippian state were the next sub-mechanism worked, namely the **boundary formation.** The bad investigation of the Jabidah massacre also came to radicalize Muslims which led to the foundation of (MNFL)

The fourth and last arena was the one **between a countermovement or rival movement.** In the Boko Haram Case as stated above I chose to combine the second and fourth arena. In the Abu Sayyaf case though it occurred **polarization** between different movements. Abu Sayyaf was created as a splinter group of (MNFL). Abu Sayyaf basically took over the previous goal of (MNFL) due to the de-radicalization which occurred within (MNFL) So the radicalization process differs here from the one in Boko Haram. Boko Haram did not really have a countermovement after the killing of Ja’far Mahmud.

### 6.4 Conclusion of Analysis

In the analysis I have now listed the events which came to further radicalize Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf through the framework of Alimis radicalization processes. How it was possible for these two organizations to go from social movements and eventually come to be classified as terrorist groups by most countries and organizations around the world. I have tried to show how these arenas are linked with each other through different mechanisms and sub mechanisms, mostly through political and historical events or decisions. How the power relations between the state and the movement have shifted and the approach by both sides has changed during the process of radicalization. In the end of the chapter I made the comparison between the two cases to show the similarities and differences between them.
7. Conclusion

Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf have similarities with each other this comparative case study can conclude. Both groups emergence from a struggle of inequalities which seem to be deeply rooted back in the history. Through Alimi's analytical framework of radicalization processes this thesis has shown the political decisions which has come to affect and further radicalize these movements. Both groups emergence from the failure of internal politics in Nigeria respective Philippines. But the struggle goes longer than that. As for in the Boko Haram case I agree with Ngwodo when he state that the socio-political and the economic conditions of the north as well as the history of the north is crucial to understand, if we want to be able to understand a group as Boko Haram (Ngwodo, 2010). All of these arenas and mechanisms are linked to each other.

It is the same with Abu Sayyaf, but the difference here which eventually led to the foundation of Abu Sayyaf are the failed peace talk during the 70s and 80s between the Filipino government and the (MNFL) (Taylor, 2017, b) If they would have succeeded we might not have this problem today, who knows? (Taylor, 2017, b) Overall by comparing these two cases two each other, I found many similarities between the two cases but also differences. As Alimi concludes, it is possible to find similarities within the differences (Alimi et al., 2012, p.7).

What the research within radicalization process should focus on in the future is the history and social movements. Countries which has a troubled history with much violence should be aware and take movements even if they are small and insignificant at that time serious. The answers and justifications of a cause can always be found in the history. Future research in the subject should also be around the fourth arena between a countermovement or rival movement due to its similarity with the second arena.
8. Bibliography


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