Master Thesis

Discussing the durability of peace: will it prevail in Colombia?

M.A. Peace and Development Studies
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Abstract

This thesis contributes to the debate on what makes peace durable by developing an analytical tool that, based on the current research status on what makes peace agreements last, intends to evaluate peace agreements on their capacity to maintain peace. The research was done through a qualitative desk study, using the Colombian peace agreement which was signed in 2016. The agreement, as it is finally negotiated, is according to the analytical framework estimated to have a reasonably good chance to being durable.

Key words: Peace durability, Peace agreements, Colombia, Case study

Word count: 18241
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List of Abbreviations

ACC  Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá / The Self-Defence groups of Córdoba and Urabá
AUC  Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia / United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia
CELAC  Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños / Community of Latin and Caribbean States
CFHBD  Cese al Fuego de Hostilidades Bilateral Y Definite / Bilateral and Definite Ceasefire and cessation of Hostilities
CNR  Consejo Nacional de Reincorporation / a National reincorporation council
CSVR  Comision de implementacion, seguimiento y verificacion del acuerdo final de paz y la resolucion de diferencias / A Commission for follow-up, verification and a dispute resolution commission for the final agreement
DA  Dejacion de armas / Deportation of weapons
ELN  Ejército de Liberación Nacional / National Liberation Army
EPL  Ejército Popular Liberación / Popular Liberation Army
EU  The European Union
FARC  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia / Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
MAS  Muerte a Secuestradores / Death to Kidnappers
MM&V  Mechanismo de Monitoreo y Verificacion / Mechanisms of monitoring and verification
M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril / 19 April Movement

OAS Organization of American States

UNASUR Unión de Naciones Suramericanas / Union of South American Nations

UK The United Kingdom

UN The United Nations

PDET Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial / Development Programs with a Territorial Approach

PND Plan Nacional de Desarrollo / The national development plan

PNIS Programa Nacional Integral de Substitucion de Cultivos de Uso Illicito / National Comprehensive Program for Substitution of Illicit Crop Crops

PTN Puntos Transitorios de Normalizacion / Transient Points of Normalization

RRI Reforma Rural Integral / Integral Rural Reform

UNHCR United Nations Commission on Human Rights

WOLA The Washington Office On Latin America

ZRC Zonas de Reserva Campesina / Farmer enterprise zones

ZVTN Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalizacion / Transitional Standardization Zones

UNASUR Unión de Naciones Suramericanas / Union of South American Nations
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1. Introduction

1.1 Research problem and relevance

Achieving durable peace in post war environments is challenging, and many agreements relapse into violence, particularly in the case of negotiated agreements intended to end intra-state conflicts. Of 125 intra-state conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2005, almost half of them returned to war (Druckman & Wagner, 2016). Borja et al (2012) also argue that there are many historical examples of failures to make peace durable. Walter (1999) claims that 17 of 41 civil wars that occurred in the 19th century was solved through peace negotiations, but 9 of those conflicts relapsed into violence again.

This situation has triggered a number of researchers to look into conditions that further or obstaculize sustainable peace. However, Druckman and Wagner (2016) claim that the durability of peace agreements is hard to measure. Albin & Druckman (2011) also argue that despite an increased interest in the subject in recent years, there is no clear definition of what constitutes a durable agreement, although there are several factors that seem to contribute to increasing the chances. Hartzell et al. (2001) point out that hypotheses regarding the long-run determinants of post conflict peace await further testing. Thus, there is no consensus on what works and what does not work, and thus a potential gap to evaluate further. Investigating the notion of durability will assist to the debate on what makes peace durable by providing an analytical tool that is based on the current status of research on peace agreements and might be able to be used in future research to predict if peace agreements fulfil the necessary basic conditions to lay the basis for durable peace. This means the saving of lives, money and less suffering, contributing to world peace. If the ability is given to point out the weaknesses in peace agreements in advance, those parts can be adjusted making agreements more durable. Since the Colombian agreement had a renegotiation it is an ideal case for the development of an analytical framework.
1.2 Research objective and questions

The objective of this research is to contribute to the discussion on durability of peace agreements by creating an analytical framework of what has been done so far regarding what makes peace durable, and then applying that to the case of the Colombian peace agreement. I have then chosen the following research question:

**Discussing the durability of peace: will it prevail in Colombia?**

1.3 Colombia as a case study

The background of the civil war in Colombia is over five decades old with many different peace processes developed over time (Crisis group, 2017). The conflict was going on for almost 50 years with more than 45,000 deaths and 3 million displaced as a result of the war between the army, left-wing guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, drug cartels and criminal gangs (MSB, 2016). In 2016 after 52 years of conflict the Colombian government and the biggest guerrilla group FARC reached an historical agreement (HRW, 2016). The final agreement consists of 310 pages with six key points regarding Ceasefire, Disarmament, Justice for victims, Drug Trade, Former rebels in politics and Land reform (FARC-EP, 2017). The challenge for Colombia is now to make sure that the new born peace gets durable (DN, 2016). The Colombian example is seen as a new and inclusive way to do peace negotiations, and can then be stated as a potential forerunner for further peace agreements (McAlevey, 2016).
1.4 Methods

This research is a qualitative desk study. The topic is treated as a single case study, since it is then given the opportunity to get a deep understanding of the specific topic in forms of the Colombian peace agreement. The methodological tool used in the analysis is text analysis, and material consulted are secondary sources as well as the original peace agreement document in its two different versions. Regarding research ethics, there is no ethical issues to be foreseen.

1.5 Analytical and theoretical framework

The main framework for this study is constructed from the literature that outlines different factors of what makes peace agreements durable. The research will be operationalized through a look into the existing literature regarding political, security, justice and historical factors for durability, and then see if the Colombian agreement fulfils those criteria.

1.6 Thesis structure

Following this introductory chapter, the discussion regarding the durability of peace agreements is introduced in chapter two. The chapter consists of a more in-depth review of the existing literature regarding the debate concerning durability of peace agreements, to sketch out of what has so far been determined by different researchers to make peace durable. The circumstances for this research prescribe a qualitative desk study with the method of text analysis, which is further described in the methods chapter three. Chapter four consists of the history and background of the Colombian case. Chapter five presents the findings. In the analysis chapter it will be investigated factor by factor if the Colombian agreement fulfil the criteria of what makes peace durable, according to the developed analytical framework. The last chapter presents conclusions and recommendations for further studies.
2. Analytical framework

2.1 Factors for sustainable peace: The state of the literature

What makes peace durable and how should an agreement look like to increase the possibilities for durable peace? The literature review below consists of a discussion regarding the debate concerning durability of peace agreements, to sketch out what makes peace durable. This will provide an analytical framework, to be applied in the analysis to evaluate if the Colombian agreement fulfils those criteria. The following section outlines the major factors outlined in the current literature as influential for the durability of peace agreements. The selection of authors was made carefully, with focus on newer articles from well-known scientific sources. The state of the literature does not aim to prove if they are right or wrong, but instead to help establish a common platform for discussion. This since there are so many different factors outlined in the literature, and just the major ones were chosen.

2.1.1 Natural resources

Natural resources highly affect the durability of peace negatively. Druckman & Wagner (2016) point out that the distribution of incomes from natural resources have to be equally distributed, otherwise it affects durability in a negative way. According to Stedman (2001) implementation of peace agreements becomes more difficult if warring parties have access to disposable natural resources, since those resources provide armies with a means for continued fighting, become the reward against which they weigh the benefits of peace and embolden spoiler behaviour. When it in opposite is a lack of access to such resources, it is effectively limited the benefits of returning to war for the parties. Ross (2004) claims that natural resources and civil war are highly correlated. Oil, nonfuel minerals, and drugs are causally linked to conflict, but legal agricultural commodities are not. Binningsbø & Rustad (2012) argue that natural resources in forms of oil and diamonds increase the conflict risk, prolong civil war, and negatively affect peace processes and durability. According to UNEP (2017) 40% of all
intrastate conflicts that occurred for the last 60 years were linked to natural resources, and it also doubles the risk of a conflict relapse in the first five years.

2.1.2 Spoilers

Implementers of peace agreements have to look carefully at the threats for peace in terms of spoilers of the peace process. According to Stedman (1997) the difference between successful and unsuccessful implementation of a peace agreement can be the strategy of aggressive management of spoilers, since there are usually spoiler problems in the peace after a peace agreement is reached. The situation is often vulnerable and citizens, international actors and peacemakers have to look carefully at the threats for peace in terms of spoilers. Guardians of peace must constantly seek the intentions of the warring parties to reach agreement and search for evidence to ensure that the signatories to the peace agreement are sincere in their commitment, and to seek and take advantage of the intelligence of the warring parties objectives, strategies and tactics. Custodians should judge what is right, just and fair in the peace process. This can be done either expressly or through international consensus on what is appropriate for the warring parties, or by not taking the measures in view of the violent attacks and spoiler behaviour. Furthermore, Stedman (1994) underline that some civil wars can not end through negotiations, since some parties will use negotiations as a tactic to defeat the opponents. There is always a risk of spoilers using ceasefire strengthen themselves to prepare for return to war. Regarding moral concerns the concern for saving lives must take priority over the moral concern regarding justice for victims. If negotiation can succeed, accountability for war crimes will have to be abandoned.
2.1.3 Power-sharing

Agreements based on power-sharing seem to increase the durability of peace agreements, but it differs which form of power-sharing is used. According to Simons et al. (2013) researchers have questioned whether power-sharing is an effective tool of conflict management, and if its growing popularity is justified by the results. Joshi & Mason (2011) argue that the larger the size of the governing coalition, the greater the opportunities are for any one group to become a part of a governing coalition. This will then influence the policy process in ways that enhance its interests, which increase the chances for durable peace. A larger governing coalition is more likely to emerge following negotiated agreements. On the other hand, peace is more likely to fail where the governing coalition is smaller, and excluded groups then have little to lose from resuming to conflict. Terms of power-sharing agreements between former rivals structure the composition of the governing coalition in the post–civil war state and the rules of the game by which those groups pursue their own interests. Especially territorial power-sharing expanding the governing coalition, positively affecting the durability. Expanding the size of the governing coalition creates stronger incentives for former rivals to sustain the peace because they can pursue their political objectives through means that are less costly and less risky than returning into armed conflict.

Furthermore, Nilsson (2012) argues that peace agreements that contain a higher degree of provisions for power-sharing are more likely to get sustainable peace, independently if the agreement contains military, territorial or political forms of power-sharing. Albin & Druckman (2011) point out that peace agreements based on military and territorial power-sharing probably increase durability. Joshi & Mason (2011) argue that durable peace can be established, if former rivals agree to formalized political and territorial power-sharing arrangements in a negotiated settlement. Hartzell et al. (2001) claim that power-sharing is to recommend, since the ability of territorial autonomy and third-party assurances to mitigate opponent’s security concerns maybe weakens over time. Simons, et al (2013) argue that there is hardly any evidence to claim that including local power-
sharing in national agreements increase durability of peace, at least in a short-term perspective. The importance of the sub-national level is often overestimated, since it might even make the peace process weaker, and can actually lead to renewed conflict instead of ameliorating the situation. Issues that instead need to be considered are the history of spatial-political links, the centralised politics of caring about the periphery as well as the establishment of local balances or monopolies of power. An Issues that need to be taken into account are the history of spatial-political relations, the centralized policy to take care of the periphery and the establishment of local balances or monopoly power.

2.1.4 Inclusion vs. exclusion

There is a debate if inclusion or exclusion is to prefer in a peace agreement. Nilsson (2012) points out that the inclusion of civil society actors in peace agreements are most important for positive effects on the duration of peace agreements. Paffenholz (2014) agrees, but also underline that it needs to be taken into account how and under what circumstances it can be accomplished most effectively. Civil society should therefore be seen as an own actor in the process. However, it is also important to look at other potentially excluded actors such as for example political parties and business organizations, as well as the context of the conflict. Civil society is generally seen as an important actor in peace processes and most researchers argue that civil society participation makes the process more sustainable and democratic. However, it in the same turn makes it more difficult to reach an agreement. Analysis of these models suggests that it will be possible to broaden the participation of civil society in peace negotiations without decreasing the negotiations.
2.1.5 Information asymmetries

There is a debate among authors regarding how information affect the warring parts and chances for creating a stable agreement. Information symmetries have to be avoid, and transparency is to prefer to increase the durability of a peace agreement. Joshi & Mason (2011) argue that when both sides know their rival has the same incentive, they cannot trust the other sides commitment to disarm and demobilize under the terms of a settlement. Mattes & Savun (2010) claim that peace agreements that includes provisions to reveal information about the different fighter’s military resources, increases the likelihood for durability. Therefore, avoiding of information asymmetries can play an important role in peace agreements where uncertainty between parts have to be reduced. Furthermore, the risk of a renewed civil war significantly can be reduced, when fighting parties report their military information to third parties, for security guarantees. Reaching a settlement in a civil war and establishing peace imply that rebels have to be disarmed which can be hard to manage, when information asymmetries between former disputants regarding military capabilities may still persist. This especially if the civil war ended in a negotiated settlement rather than a military victory. The more uncertainty-reducing provisions included, the better chances for durable peace. Commitment problems are viewed as the leading rationalist theoretical explanation for civil war especially in long duration civil wars, although certain types of information asymmetries also play a role (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).

2.1.6 Third party involvement and disarmament

Third party involvement seems to be important for the durability of peace. Walter (1999) states that outside help by a third party that has the political will to verify and enforce the demobilization make the chances for durable peace better. Hartzell, et al (2001) argue that third party security assurances, such as states or regional or international organizations, have a stabilizing effect since they offer security assurances to parties as part of the negotiated agreement. If third parties intervene early into a
conflict that serves to reduce the casualty rate, it also may contribute to a more durable peace. Furthermore, Nilsson (2012) claims that third parties often spend a lot of resources and effort in peace processes, in order to create sustainable solutions to civil wars by providing support to various actors. Joshi & Mason (2011) point out that when third parties such as UN provide security guarantees during the disarming and demobilizing phase, peace agreements are more likely to be durable.

2.1.7 Democratization and institutional design

There are different views between authors in the existing debate regarding the correlation between democratization and the durability of peace agreements. However, states with a democracy tradition have easier to reach sustainable peace after civil war, than those with no tradition of democracy. Senese (1997) underline that there is inconclusive evidence regarding regime type and national conflict involvement. Walter (1999) argues that states emerging from civil war shall be careful in their democratization process, when promising free and fair elections as a means to introduce democracy. Furthermore, combatants that are likely to become insecure as they demobilize, can gain a sense of safety if they are not forced to disarm fully, especially before the political terms of an agreement have been fulfilled. An important deterrent against attempts by some of the groups to establish dictatorial rule, is by offering groups carrots such as territorial autonomy, open borders, and asylum provisions. Military force might be required for demobilization, but the institutional design matters more for the sustainability of the peace. Nilsson (2012) argues that inclusion of civil society actors in peace agreements increases the durability of peace, but that it’s also depends if the country is democratic or not. In combination with democratic political parties, the peace agreements get even better chances to be durable. Civil society actors such as women’s organizations and religious actors are preferably to be given a role in peace settlements. For building legitimacy to the peace process, peacemakers should also strive to involve actors from a wide spectrum of the society as possible. This since it, when a wider spectrum of society becomes involve in a
peace process, it increases the legitimacy of the process, which in turn contribute to durability. Hartzell, et al (2001) adds that durability seems to be positively affected by peace agreements that concern states in which the previous stable regime was a democracy. Furthermore, it is positive if the peace agreement includes provisions for the territorial autonomy of threatened groups. The design of new institutional arrangements for the management of the conflict also seems to significantly stabilizing the peace. On the other hand, civil war resolutions for states with a lack of democracy experience negatively affecting the durability. It is also worthwhile to focus on the security concerns of civil war adversaries. Devising institutional means to enhance the security of former opponents may prove a more productive and stabilizing peace than attempting to identify and address complex origins of disputes. Blattman & Miguel (2010) argue that the extension of national control down to the community level are essential state responsibilities for increasing of peace durability since successful states do so, including the use of force.

2.1.8 Outcome, causes, intensity and duration of the conflict

Conflicts with high intensity that occurred for a long time, negatively affect the chances for durable peace. However, it is not clear if a peace agreement between two parts is actually to be preferred, compared to a military victory by one side when it comes to durability of peace. Joshi & Mason (2011) argue that the durability of peace after civil war depends on the conflict outcome, whether it ended by a decisive military victory or a negotiated agreement. However, some research states that military victory increases the chances for durable peace, compared to peace through an agreement. Nilsson (2012) also claims that the characteristics of the conflict affect the durability of peace. For example, the conflict issue, intensity and duration of the conflict. Hartzell, et al (2001) point out that it is positive for the possibilities of sustainability if the agreement concludes civil conflicts of low intensity, which have last for extended periods of time. In opposite settlements are least likely to endure, when they follow intensely violent conflicts. Albin & Druckman (2011) also underline that chances for durable peace
depends of the conflict intensity, since high intense conflicts tend to negatively affect the durability.

Furthermore, the memory of historical violence of the conflict and its causes have to be addressed in the peace process, since this plays a central role in a nation or an ethnic group’s cultural identity. To just forget about the past does not work as a solution for peace and historical dialogue has to become part of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The Colombian experience may provide an insight regarding the process of validating pluralistic narratives and multiple perspectives contributing directly to confidence building in the peace negotiations to have potential representing a growing national political culture. Similar to human rights advocacy, there is no reason to expect a quick solution through historical dialogue, but it can still provide a framework for cooperation, as part of resolving its tension with conflict resolution. There is a need to deal with the past and treat history as part of the political agenda during conflict resolution. It is also preferable to incorporate it as an integral part into peace negotiations and post conflict institutions (Barkan, 2016).

2.2 The analytical framework: Factors needed for durable peace

When comparing the factors needed for durable peace, researchers come up with many points, but do not necessarily agree. The framework below summarizes and categorizes the factors outlined in the literature debate on factors that influence sustainable peace agreements and is used as an analytical framework for this research. When factors overlapping each other, they are put in the box where they make most sense. The factors will be used for research and are divided into four categories. However, it was not easy to categorize, since many factors are overlapping each other. A short explanation is given for all four categories how defining the different factors and why those are choosing. Some factors overlap, others actually disagree. There is no consensus belong all authors for no factor.
The graph below is created by the author, from the above literature review.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political factors</th>
<th>Security factors</th>
<th>Justice factors</th>
<th>Historical factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Design</td>
<td>Third Parties</td>
<td>Power Sharing</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>Spoilers</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Information Asymmetries</td>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Victim Policy</td>
<td>Duration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.1 Political factors

Political factors are defined as factors related to government policies, such as institutional design, democratisation and inclusion or exclusion of political actors. Those factors are chosen, since they are highly important for stable conditions in the building of a state. Regarding democracy, it can also be seen as a historical factor, affecting durability of peace but it made most sense to put this factor in this box. Institutional design is of course also important for security, and overlapping that box as well.

2.2.2 Security factors

Security factors are defined as factors needed for a stable and secure environment such as third-party involvement by other organisations or states, which also overlapping the box of political factors. Regarding the avoiding of information asymmetries and spoilers they could also be seen as political factors. The importance of disarmament by the fighting parties was clear to put in the security factor box, since it highly affecting security.
2.2.3 Justice factors

Justice factors are defined as power sharing, justice, equal distribution of natural resources and victim policy. Regarding natural resources, it could of course have been put in a separate box of economic factors. It is however put in the box of justice, since the relation to equal distribution of resources. Power sharing also fits in the box political or security factors, but make more sense as a factor for justice. Victim policy also overlapping the security factor box. Natural resources are another factor highly affecting security as well.

2.2.4 Historical factors

Historical factors are defined as factors concerning conflict history such as outcome, causes, intensity and duration of the conflict. Those actually also overlapping with justice and political factors, but are mostly correlated to the history and then put together in the box of historical factors.
3. Methodological framework

3.1 Case study

A classic case study consists of an in-depth inquiry into a phenomenon that is complex and specific in its real-world context. It should examine the likely interaction when the case is in its context (Yin, 2013). The basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case or event, and often favour qualitative methods (Bryman, 2012). The circumstances for this research prescribe a qualitative desk study over a field study. It is qualitative since the research strategy used emphasize words rather than quantification. A desk study fits best, since the aim is a theoretical contribution of an analytical framework, and there is then no need going into the field. I just apply it to a case. This is why I do a desk, and not a field study. The topic is treated as a single case study, since it is then given the opportunity to get a deep understanding of the specific topic, compared looking into many cases. It could have been an idea doing so, but then it had not been possible going into depth on all the cases. The choice of the Colombian peace agreement as a single case make sense, since it is the newest, highly transparently signed agreement given much attention recently. Furthermore, Colombia is a democracy, and a lot of international advisors were included in the process. I then assume that the agreement was made by people that were consulting about the peace agreement, and who actually know about the debate. It is also the most possible advanced case, with an August and November agreement and a renegotiation.

3.2 Text analysis

The methodological tool used to process the information from the sources is text analysis. Frey, et al (1999) define text analysis as a method to describe and interpret the characteristics of a message, with the purpose to describe the content, structure, and functions of the messages contained in texts. The selection of texts to be studied, acquiring appropriate texts, and determining which particular approach to employ in
analysing them have to be considered when using textual analysis as a method. McKee (2003) define text analysis as a way, methodology and data gathering process for researchers to gather information how other human beings make sense of the world. Blattman & Miguel (2010) argue that case studies are crucial to decipher war’s causes, conduct, and consequences.

3.3 Sources

Apart from the August and November Peace agreements itself in Spanish, Acuerdo Final and Acuerdo Nuevo Final, there are not any primary sources used. The material consulted are relevant literature, electronic sources, various press, journals and newspapers. The choice of those secondary sources focused on those stakeholders who were involved during the peace process, such as the Colombian Government, WOLA and Crisis Group, the latter which its policy recommendations were used by both FARC and the Colombian Government. Reports from Crisis Group (2016) named “Reassembling Colombia’s rejected peace deal”, “In the shadow of No Peace after Colombia’s plebiscite” and “Colombia’s FARC end its 53-year insurgency” and from WOLA (2016) “Key changes to the new peace accord” contributed with important background information. Furthermore, facts regarding the Colombian conflict were provided from the credible sources of Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP (2016) and the Swedish Civil Protection and Preparedness Authority, MSB (2016) as well. Reports from international organizations HRW (2017) “World report 2017: Colombia” and UN (2016, 2017) named “Agreement on the Bilateral from Peace to Democratization: Lessons from Central America, and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities, and the Laydown of Weapons between the National Government and the FARC-EP” and “Building solid Foundation for Peace in Colombia and “Conflict and resources” Regarding sources in the debate on durability, that served as ground for the analytical framework developed in this thesis, those focused on peer-reviewed, scientific articles by prominent, international authors, PhD’s and professors in the field of international relations, negotiations and peace and conflict research as following: Albin & Druckman (2011),

3.4 Limitations and delimitations

Since a large part of the material on the Colombian peace agreement is written in Spanish, the language barrier is a weakness and risk. However, the articles used in the debate regarding what makes peace durable are all written in English, which get a solid base. The circumstances prescribe a desk study when operationalising the research. However, using just the single Colombian case is a delimitation, and a limitation in terms of generalizability of the results, but it is then given the possibility to go more in-depth. Furthermore, as said one obvious limitation in this research is the language barrier, since the peace agreements is written in Spanish and my mother tongue is Swedish. However, the agreement is translated but it is anyway a risk to do not get the right context. This will be balanced through a good theoretical and in-depth understanding on the debate on durability of peace agreements as the main contribution of the research. Since we cannot actually see if peace will prevail in Colombia, this thesis is limited to providing an analytical frame that can help to provide that service. We cannot today really prove the factors as right or wrong on different cases on beforehand either. However, this can be done and evaluated by future research. The other authors, those who came up with the factors in the first place, used peace agreements in order to provide their factors. Based on that this thesis provide a predictive tool.

3.5 Ethical considerations

Regarding research ethics, there is no ethical issues to be foreseen when carrying out this desk study research. There is not any personal interviews or ethnographic studies.
4. Background to the case of the Colombian conflict

4.1 History and origins of the conflict

The colonization of present-day Colombia began at 1525. The name was Gran Colombia and included todays Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama until 1819 when they got independence from Spain (Gonzales, 2004). The northern part of South America constituted the former Spanish Colony New Granada. In 1830 it collapsed into the states of Colombia (Panama included until 1903) Venezuela and Ecuador. There has since then been clashes between the opposite political parties in Colombia, the conservatives and the liberals (UCDP, 2017). Colombia got it’s name in 1886. The Conservative and Liberal parties launched it`s political programs in 1848 and 1849, and the Conservatives dominated the politics from 1885 to 1930. In the 1930s the Liberal Party launched social, economic and political reforms aimed to modernise the society. But the result went out the opposite way, since those reforms instead created an atmosphere of polarisation that prepared the way for the explosion of later violence in Colombia. Despite its duration there is no consensus on the causes of the complex Colombian conflict, since it has changed over time and are not just about two opposing parts or a single issue. The conflict involves a number of local, regional and national dynamics, different historical processes, structural factors such as political exclusion and socio-economic inequality, land settlement, state building, geographic differences and the coca production. Furthermore, two historical phenomena are fundamental to understanding the Colombian conflict which both have their roots in the history of the settlement of the country from colonial times till nowadays. The first is the so called campesino colonisation of other areas, where Colombia failed to implement agrarian reform to redistribute land ownership. The presence of the central state's institutions and interaction with the rest of society, and the national economy was then minimal. Secondly, this dynamic was reflected in a gradual state-building process, where delayed transposition of territories and populations resulted in an unequal state presence in
these regions. Since the beginning of the 16th century, it is the most isolated and unavailable territories were settled by marginalised groups and the organisation of social relations then was left to individuals and social groups, since the state lacked to make it. The combination of the colonisation process with it’s dependency on local powers made the integration of recently settled territories into the rest of the country highly conflictual. From the end of Spanish rule until the consolidation of today’s Colombia, many of the rural and political structural problems that came from the years of Spanish colony deepened (González, 2004). There have been some key factors that have been fuelling the violent conflict in Colombia such as economic forces, state weakness, U.S. policies, long-duration and spin-off violence, and malicious opportunism by non-combatants (Gray, 2008).

4.2 The process towards peace 50s to 00s

4.2.1 La Violencia

When liberal leader and president aspirant Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated in 1948, violent fighting broke out. The clashed were between the two major political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals in particular, but different non-state armed groups, socialists, private armies of landowners, bandit’s peasant organizations, and liberal self-defence groups as well (UCDP, 2017). In the period from 1946 to 1953 it is estimated that 200,000 were killed, which became known as La Violencia. Colombia then got a period of military rule, when general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla took power in 1953. His government tried to pacify the country through an amnesty for the Liberal fighters, but its anti-communist attitude instead drew it into confrontation with the guerrillas (Gonzales, 2004). In 1958 Conservatives and Liberals agreed on a system of power sharing, and a Joint Board name the National Front was established. But the power division created political problems, since all other groups were excluded and the two major political parties no longer needed to compete for power. (MSB, 2016).
4.2.2 The emergence of left-wing guerrilla

The need to end the conflict and the military dictatorship that led to an agreement between the two traditional parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, was followed by 16 years of power sharing together. Colombia then got a period of stability, but the price was high. This since the political expression of new local powers was prevented, which led to more tensions and the appearance of left-wing guerrilla movements in the 1960s (Gonzales, 2004). The different guerrilla groups expressed demands for social reforms, and started armed struggle against the state. (UCDP, 2017). The self-defence groups influenced by the Communist Party in outer areas of campesino colonisation, were in 1966 transformed into the left-wing FARC guerrilla group (Gonzalez, 2004) FARC was the largest guerrilla group, developed from the self-defence groups in rural areas under the period of La Violencia. The guerrilla with its Marxist-Leninist ideology, were early supported by the Communist regime in Moscow. The goal of FARC was to overthrow the regime, limit US influence in the country and implement reforms in the agricultural sector. However, it was not until the 1980s that FARC was considered a serious threat, with strengthened military capabilities and a bigger recruitment. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, FARC’s ideological motivation increasingly diminished (MSB, 2016). During the 1990s the support for FARC eroded, and more of the group's finances were coming from the coca sector and kidnapping (Gray, 2008). Other left-wing guerrilla groups emerged in the 60’s were ELN, founded in 1965, with its origins in the group of radicalised university inspired by the Revolution in Cuba and announcing its goal of overthrowing the regime (MSB, 2016). The Maoist-influenced EPL was created as the armed wing of the Leninist Communist Party in 1967. In 1972, the more urban M-19 was formed in reaction to perceived electoral fraud in the 1970 elections. (Gonzales, 2004).
4.2.3 Drug trafficking

The magnitude of drug cartels has a central role in Colombia's violent history. Already in the late 1960s, Colombia was an important supplier of marijuana used in the United States. The centre of marijuana production, however, was during this time in Mexico. During the 1970s Colombia took over Mexico’s export of Marijuana with 70% of marijuana smuggled to the United States. When US demand for Cocaine increased the trade dramatically changed the drug industry. During the 1980s and 1990s there were two major associations of drug cartels in Colombia, in Medellin and Cali. The cartels also declared war on the government and thousands of people lose their lives in the fighting. One of the most noticed attacks was when the Medellin cartel bombed a passenger plane in the air over the capital Bogotá in November 1989 killing all 107 passengers (MSB, 2016). The cartels were defeated in the mid-1990s by the Colombian government, with US military support.

4.2.4 Lack of institutional trust

The expansion of illicit crops in the 80’s led to the transformation of the relationship between the guerrillas and drug trafficking. Some argue that the violence after 1980 represents a fundamental rupture with previous violence. FARC was later controlling the production and trafficking of coca and the income derived from illicit crops increased the FARC’s autonomy, which no longer depended on its integration into the rural communities. At the same time, the penetration of drug-trafficking in Colombian society has contributed to widespread corruption. The infiltration of the drug trade further deepened the fragmentation of state power and the crisis of legitimacy. In the absence of the state the conflict was further developed and the population were left without a fixed system of institutional references. They therefore resort to the use of terror in order to ensure the loyalty of the civilian population and to deny the adversary support. The Colombian conflict can then be described as a war through third parties, and characterised as a war against the civilian population (Gonzales, 2004).
4.2.5 The growth of right-wing paramilitaries

In the early 80’s the left-wing guerrillas began to expand towards richer areas more integrated into national economic and political structures, and increased the use of kidnapping and extortion as one of it’s main financing. In this environment right-wing paramilitary groups emerged, in opposite to the guerrillas (Gonzales, 2004). The Paramilitary forces were created by large land owners and drug lords in protection against the guerrillas. To some extent, those groups received support from local politicians and people from the army. (UCDP, 2017). The paramilitaries quickly strengthened their power and got control over increasing lands in central Colombia. From being a loose network paramilitaries began to gather into a common organization in the 1990s and in 1997, the Colombian united self-defence, AUC, was formed (MSB, 2016). The aim with AUC was as an umbrella group for paramilitaries across Colombia (Gonzales, 2004). Within the drug industry, there was a lot of money and the AUC grew from being an organization with 850 members in 1992 to an armed group with more than 8000 members in 2001 and with presence in almost all of Colombia. The AUC has long been an important part of the conflict and was responsible for a large part of the violence against civilians (MSB, 2016). AUC attacked and tried to affect the the government, especially in the case of not extraditing drug lords to USA. (UCDP, 2017) However, there have been allegations and strong suspicions that, in fact, they supported the AUC and their struggle against the left-handers since it was found that a number of politicians, police and military workers collaborated with the AUC (MSB, 2016). Another group of paramilitaries created in 1982, in response to guerrilla kidnappings, was the group named MAS. It was created by landowners, politicians, military personnel, ranchers, businessmen and a large oil-company. The phenomenon of paramilitary groups began to extend across the country after 1984 when other groups were created such as the ACCU (Gonzales, 2004). During the 90’s paramilitary groups rose dramatically. Their objectives were to control businesses where they could extract large rents, and to deny the left-wing guerrillas access to the same areas, targeting the oil refinery industry, banana export and the agricultural business (Gray, 2008).
4.2.6 Attempts of peace talks with the guerrillas

In the early 1980s, the government attempted to negotiate peace talks with the guerrilla groups in Colombia (MSB, 2016). This by the former Colombian presidents Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978) and Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978-1982). However, when guerrilla attacks intensified, the lack of credibility of President Turbay’s efforts made any meaningful progress impossible. Only after Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) won the election, comprehensive peace efforts were undertaken, at a time when the legitimacy of the government had suffered seriously (Behar, et al, 1989). However, the interest in ceasefire was cool among the rebel groups and a serious backlash came in 1985 when the M-19 group attacked the highest court in Bogota and took about 300 people hostage. Drama ended since the military intervened and over 100 people lost their lives. Among the dead were 11 prominent judges. The smaller guerrilla groups concluded peace talks with the government in the early 1990s, but the conflict escalated yet uncontrolled. FARC and ELN did not signed an agreement and instead they grew stronger. At the same time, they lost their motivation in peace talks when they saw what happened to the around 5,000 rebels from other organizations demobilized in the early 1990s. The political parties formed from the demobilized guerrilla groups had difficulty in receiving support and the disarmed rebels became targets for paramilitaries. Hundreds of disarmed members from Colombian minor guerrilla groups were killed in the 1990s (MSB, 2016).

4.2.7 Peace talks with the guerrillas

When Andrew Pastrana was elected President of 1998, he was convinced that he would resolve the conflict in Colombia, since he already had established good contacts with FARC leader Marulanda before he was elected as president. A new period of peace talks then between leaders of FARC and Pastrana. Although the peace talks between the FARC and the government were more comprehensive than ever, violence continued to increase sharply in Colombia, and there were also battles between the paramilitary AUC
and FARC. There were massacres of civilians by both groups (MSB, 2016). Political violence in Colombia took thousands of life’s and leaved millions displaced, and in the 1990’s the term civil war were used (Gray, 2008). A peace agreement was signed by president Pastrana and FARC in January 2002, supervised by former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan. However, it soon collapsed since the promised stop of kidnappings and ceasefire remained. Pastrana accused FARC of being a terrorist organization and with help from the army he took control over the demilitarized zone that were earlier established during the peace process. The ELN then also left the negotiations. (MSB, 2016) Toward the end of the Pastrana administration in 2002 the negotiation position prevailed, and talks with the FARC were ended (Gray, 2008).

4.2.8 Disarmament of paramilitaries

In 2003, the AUC signed an agreement with the government where they promised to lay down their weapons. During the three years of the disarmament process, about 30,000 paramilitaries were demobilized (MSB, 2016).

4.2.9 The Uribe era

Colombia got a new president when Alvaro Uribe was voted in the 2002 election, with promises to making war against FARC to improve national security. After six years of Uribe’s hardliner policies it seemed that the strategy succeeded, since the FARC were weaker and security improved (Gray, 2008). In 2003 Uribe initiated a DDR-process with the paramilitaries, which was a new deal, since negotiations in the past were held only with guerrilla groups (Rozema, 2008). Uribe promised that the fight against the guerrilla would be intensified, and a security tax was introduced to finance it. But parallel with the battle against the guerrilla, the government continued to negotiate a solution. A prerequisite for negotiations was that the groups promised ceasefire. (MSB, 2016). Every Colombian president since 1982 has attempted to reach a peace accord with FARC. In 2002 Uribe initiated a series of offensive military actions that led to a recovery of territorial control, and a rebuilt trust of citizens in their Public Forces across Colombia.
(Pinzon, 2017). The AUC joined a ceasefire in December 2002 and agreed to to
demobilize in 2003. However, FARC did not seemed to be interested in negotiations
with the Uribe government. After the AUC demobilized, the number of dead clearly
decreased even if some members instead joined criminal gangs doing business in drug
trafficking and oil smuggling. In May 2004 Jan Egeland from UN described the situation
in Colombia as the largest humanitarian disaster in the Western Hemisphere, since
many of the death victims in the conflict continued to be civilians. Both left-wingers and
paramilitaries also largely used child soldiers, according to reports from Human Rights
Watch. When Colombia expanded its military cooperation with the United States during
the summer of 2009, it contributed to increased tensions in the region. Venezuelan's
former President Hugo Chavez said that the presence of the United States could lead to
war in the region. There were struggles in the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian border
territory. Chavez was in turn accused by Colombia and USA in autumn 2009 of
supporting FARC and rebuild its military capacity by importing military material from
Russia. The United States gave its support to the Colombian government through
millions of dollars in military aid to combat drug trafficking (MSB, 2016).

4.3 The Santos era begin

When Colombian population returned to presidential elections in 2010, the threat of
war against Chavez was heavy. The former Colombian minister of defence Juan Manuel
Santos won the elections and took up his presidency in August the same year. The first
action was to deal with the current crisis with Venezuela. He solved the crisis through
negotiations, entrusted by UNASUR. The countries agreed to peace and instead work
together to reduce FARC's presence. However, the Colombian government were still
fighting with the guerrillas, but with reduced regional pressure he could focus on
domestic problems. In order for negotiations to begin, the government has maintained
that FARC has to release kidnapped prisoners. A new military strategy was also used by
the Colombian government, which aimed at eliminate FARC leaders on middle level,
rather than as previously looking for senior leaders. This led to the death of several
FARC leaders. In addition, FARC released some prisoners from the hostage (MSB, 2016).
4.4 The current peace process

After FARC for a period of time signalling to the government that they were willing to initiate peace talks, it became public in September 2012 that secret negotiations were taking place between government and FARC. A first round of negotiations was established in Oslo, Norway (MSB, 2016).

In 2012 president Santos announced that FARC had formally agreed to negotiate a peace deal based on five points:

- Rural land reform
- Political participation by FARC
- Drug trafficking and illicit drugs
- Victim’s rights
- End of the internal armed conflict

The negotiations were hold in Havana, Cuba (Pinzon, 2017).

In late 2012 the peace process is accelerating, since it became public that secret negotiations had taken place between the government and FARC in September 2012. Following a first round of negotiations in Oslo, they were moved to Havana. In May 2013 it was announced that the negotiations had led to a breakthrough, a land reform agreement. In November 2013, the next success came when the parties agreed on FARC’s political representation. The negotiations continued in 2014 with the issue of illegal drug trafficking. As part of the ongoing negotiations, FARC called for a one-sided ceasefire in December 2014. In the beginning of 2015 it resulted in reduced violence (MSB, 2016). When the Colombian government struck a rebel base in May 2015, FARC declared that the ceasefire was broken. This led to the resumption of battles between the parties for a few months, until a new ceasefire was established in July the same year. Santos was elected as president for a second run in June 2014, still struggling for a peace agreement with FARC. During this time preparatory talks also were held with the left-wing guerrilla group of ELN, to agree on an agenda for these negotiations. In 2016,
the talks finally led to an agreement between the parties on an agenda for future negotiations. Further negotiations between the government and the FARC in the autumn of 2015 led to the conclusion of two agreements. One on how the judicial review of those involved in the conflict is going to take place, and another regarding compensation of victims. A deadline was then set for the final agreement until March 23, 2016 (MSB, 2016). However, it took until 23 June 2016 the Colombian government and FARC announced a plan to gather 15,000 former FARC fighters to a ceasefire, disarming and being democratic integrated in the society. A peace agreement was then presented on August 24 2016, which resolved the recent disputes and introduced agreements previously established to launch an ambitious transitional system. It addressed to reduce areas in rural Colombia from inequalities, to further open up the country’s democracy and, with FARC help, begin a program to replace coca with legal crops. Another agreement between FARC and the Colombian government was launched in October 2016 but it failed. A new and final agreement was then announced on 12 November 2016, including numerous changes based on opposition proposals. Contrary to the opposition changes, the revisions were beyond cosmetic. However, numerous implementation proposals were added, including the accord’s financial stability, the equal rights between men and women and explicit respect for religious liberty. The government and FARC argued they made changes to 56 of the discussed 57 topics with the opposition, except the FARC political participation. After five decades of conflict with many different peace processes the Colombian government and the former FARC guerrillas finally signed an agreement (Crisis group, 2017).

4.5 The last months of the peace processes

In January 2016 FARC was asking EU to be removed from the list of terrorist groups. Colombia’s congress unanimously voted in favour of the creation of special areas where FARC guerrillas could concentrate in the event of demobilization, and US then guaranteed protection. The FARC also invited Colombia’s former president Alvaro Uribe
to join the peace talks. Public support for a pending peace deal have continued to grow. Colombian president Santos and FARC leader Timochenko signed the definite bilateral ceasefire, effectively ending 52 years of hostilities. US, UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon and five Latin American presidents attended the ceremony. Colombian military then begun taking control of traditional FARC territory in the areas around the camps where the guerrillas were expected to demobilize and disarm. In July 2016 multiple polls indicated that Colombians were vote “Yes” to the FARC peace deal. The government and the FARC kicked of a pilot project that aiming to setting the standard for the crop substitution programs. In August 2016 president Santos and the government coalition formally kicked of the “Yes” campaign. Ex-president Uribe and his Democratic Centre party in the same time launched their” No” campaign. However, the first poll released by Datexco now indicated that a majority of Colombians were against the peace deal with the FARC. The ceasefire between the state and the FARC that effectively took effect on in June, formally came into force, which was marked the formal end of hostilities between the warring parties. In September President Santos announced that the formal signing of the peace accord should be on September 26 in Cartagena. A poll released by Datexco revealed that a comfortable majority of Colombians again were likely to say “Yes” to the peace deal in the October 2 referendum. Santos formally handed in the peace agreement with the FARC to UN secretary General Ban Ki-moon in New York. World leaders from around the globe come together to witness the signing of peace between the state and the FARC by President Juan Manuel Santos and Timochenko, who from then could be called by his real name, Rodrigo Londoño (Colombia reports, 2016).
4.6 The critic launched against the agreement

The “No”-side led by Colombian former president Uribe, complained about not having an opportunity to weigh in more on the new November version of the peace agreement. The Santos government argued that it was necessary to quickly get the un-demobilized FARC-members out of their legal limbo (WOLA, 2016). The “No” supporters led by Uribe accused the Colombian government of giving away too many rights to FARC (The Washington Post, 2016). The main criticism from Uribe and the “No”-side were the impunity and political-participation by former FARC-rebels, who in many cases have committed serious crimes in the war, but despite this from now on being able to sit on the same table. There were also criticized that FARC would get too much control over state laws in Colombia, and if it is really feasible making justice for victims and displaced persons, since there are too many of them affected by this long duration conflict (Huffington Post, 2016). Furthermore, Uribe’s expressed critics that the peace accord would hurt the private sector, and warned about that the amnesty of FARC-members could lead to the taking over of the country by Marxist rebels (New York Times, 2016).
5. Findings

The following chapter consists of the key points from the 297-page August Peace Agreement named *Acuerdo Final* (Final Accord) and the main changes in the 310-page, Final November Agreement *Nuevo Acuerdo Final* (New Final Accord). Summaries in English from the Colombian Government, the independent organization WOLA and citations from the real peace agreement texts written in Spanish are presented.

5.1 Summary of the august peace agreement

According to the FARC-EP (2017) the peace agreement will led to “the termination of the conflict, and the construction of a stable and lasting peace” consisting of six key points.

- **Item 1:** Rural land reform
  
  (Acuerdo Final, 2016, 8-29).

- **Item 2:** Political participation by former FARC rebels
  
  (Acuerdo Final 2016, 30-49).

- **Item 3:** Ceasefire and Disarmament to end of violence
  
  (Acuerdo Final, 2016, 50-87).

- **Item 4:** Combating Narcho-trafficking and reducing illicit drugs
  
  (Acuerdo Final, 2016, 88-111).

- **Item 5:** Justice for victims of the conflict
  
  (Acuerdo Final, 2016, 12-170).

- **Item 6:** Implementation and verification
  
  (Acuerdo Final, 2016, 171-192).
5.1.1 Item 1 - Rural land reform

The Comprehensive rural reform aims at strengthening the Colombian countryside and is named Reforma Rural Integral (RRI) and an agreement to provide land, loans and basic services to rural poor population. It includes three million hectares of land during the first ten years of creation (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 1.1.1, 12). It seeks to assure state presence across the country and close the gap between the countryside and the urban areas. Furthermore, it will improve the agricultural industry, protect environment and ensure food. The land reform will be undertaken nationwide, and cover all rural areas, but with priority on zones with higher poverty levels, institutional weakness and presence of illicit crops. The specified areas mainly targeted is as below.

Land access and use, creating a land fund with 3 million hectares of land disposal for a 10-year free distribution for rural people without land, prioritizing rural women’s, female heads of households and displaced persons. (Colombian government, 2016). It also gives an improved access for credits, includes a plan for land registration to formalize 7 million hectares of land (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 1.1.5, 13). Furthermore, it includes a land access programme with roadways, healthcare, education, market access and housing. The programme will also promote citizens to participate in the creation of territorial regulations (Colombian government, 2016). Farmer enterprise zones named Zonas de Reserva Campesina (ZRC) will strengthen rural economy and family-run business (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 1.1.10, 17). A land registry will be put in place, for productive use of land. Citizen participation will be promoted in the creation of territorial regulations. (Colombian government, 2016). Furthermore, it includes Territorial-based development programmes named Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDET) will be established in areas that are most affected by the conflict and drug trafficking, aiming to strengthen institutions (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 1.2.1, 17). It also includes National plans that will be implemented to eradicating extreme poverty and reduce rural poverty by 50%. It also aims to reducing overall inequality within 10 years (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 1.3, 19). Social development is also taken into account, such as investments in infrastructure, reconstructing of the rural
road network, power and internet services, education, drinking water services and housing. It aiming a greater rural inclusion in the national economy (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 1.3.1, 20). A specialised system on the right to food for the rural population, aiming strengthening local production and markets are also in the agreement (Colombian government, 2016).

5.1.2 Item 2 - Political participation by former FARC rebels

The reintegration of former FARC rebels in politics aims to build peace and requires the democratic opportunity to strengthen pluralism and promote citizen participation to outlaw violence as a political tool. A commission will be created to define guidelines for political parties or movements in opposition. Furthermore, a comprehensive security system for the exercise of politics will be established for prevention and protection measures. A national forum will also be created to discuss guidelines for citizen participation in for example community radio projects, and guarantees for social protests and demonstrations as well. A national council for reconciliation and coexistence Will assist the government in the implementation phase of the agreement and for public transparency. Citizen participation will be expanded through the composition of territorial planning councils. Electoral participation and transparency will also be measured with the aim to greater election participation and transparency. Finally, 16 new, temporarily electoral districts will be established, for the house of representatives’ elections, to make sure that zones hardly affected by the conflict will get better participation with strengthen institutional presence. In summary, the key points are as below (Colombian government, 2016). Guarantees and rights for exercising political opposition are given, with the purpose defining guidelines for political parties or movements in opposition. Promotion of political pluralism (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 2.3.1, 44). There are also Security warranties for the exercise of politics, with regulatory and institutional amendments, measuring and follow-up (Colombian government, 2016). Furthermore, Democratic mechanisms that promoting participation of citizens, with guarantees for participation in social protests and demonstrations are considered
(Acuerdo Final, 2016: 2.3.5, 47). Transparency will be promoted, and effective measures for greater political participation, enhancing educational programmes and democracy (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 2.3.3, 45).

5.1.3 Item 3 - Ceasefire and Disarmament to end violence

The agreement on the bilateral and definitive ceasefire, cessation of hostiles and laying down of arms consists of seven key points and is named Cese al Fuego de Hostilidades Bilateral Y Definite (CFHBD) y dejacion de armas (DA). The purpose is to ensure national security and prepare for institutional framework and reintegration of former FARC rebels into civilian life. The DA procedure will be transparent and certificated by UN, which will receive the weapons from former FARC rebels and those will in turn be used to construct peace in Colombia. When it is needed UNHCR will also contribute on security issues. Furthermore, 20 transitional local zones for normalisation being established named Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalizacion (ZVTN) and 6 transitional local points for normalisation named Puntos Transitorios de Normalizacion (PTN). The main points are as below (Colombian government, 2016).

A timeline of events during the 180 day CFHBD & DA processes with necessary logistics and personnel adjustments will be established (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.1, 51). Rules will be written for the governing of CFHBD & DA to avoid situations jeopardise the fulfilment of the agreements, and ensure that the civilian population not are affected. Furthermore, the agreement points out Mechanisms of monitoring and verification, named the Mechanismo de Monitoreo y Verificacion (MM&V) aiming to follow-up compliance with the agreement on CFHBD, DA and verify the laying down of arms. It is constituted through the rule of law and the operation of state institutions across Colombia (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.1.1, 51). Another security issue in the agreement is the deployments in the field and procedure of movements of FARC units to the ZVTN and PTN zones, during a 180-day period. It also includes control of weapon, ammunition and explosives, setting up sections to ensure that necessary security conditions are considered during the CFHBD and DA processes. Issus of logistics are also taken into
account, according to the ZVTN, PTN and MM&V procedures during the CFHBD & DA (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.1.6, 58). The laying down of arms in the so called DA process, will be verified by UN in a transparent process, aiming a final disposal of all the FARC`s weapons in a complete disarmament. Reincorporation of former FARC members into society will be done, in accordance with their interests in economic, political and social matters. This aiming strengthen the social fabric and local democracy across Colombia. Furthermore, the approach will be equity-based, in a gender perspective emphasizing women’s rights (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.2, 61). Former FARC members will be reincorporated and transitioned into legal political life and status (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.2.1, 61). An annual allowance for operational expenses will be given between 2018 and 2016 with 10% om the funds for political parties and movements and an annual 5% allowance for the disclosure and dissemination of its platform till 2022 (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.2.1.1, 63). Regarding the issue of social security, former FARC members that fulfill the criteria of laying down of arms and transition into civilian life, will receive economic help from the Colombian government based on the list submitted by FARC. This process of economic and social reincorporation includes a financial support package to start a socially-productive project, with a conditional monthly salary for 2 years. It also gives access to the Colombian social security system (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.2.2.7, 67). When the final agreement is signed, two members from the Colombian government and two from FARC will constitute a National reincorporation council named Consejo Nacional de Reincorporation (CNR) (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.2, 61, 2016). There are also agreement son security warranties and against criminal organisations, such as those criminal organisations labelled as successors to paramilitaries (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.4, 69). A National commission regarding security warranties will be established, and a special judicial unit and elite national police as well. It will also be a comprehensive security system for exercise of politics including institutional amendment’s including members of the new political movement emerged from FARC. Other factors aiming security and protection across the country are measuring and prevention instruments (Colombian Government, 2016). There will also be Instruments of institutional
verification, control and transparency, for territorial supervision and preventing measures against corruption (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 3.4.11.1, 86).

5.1.4 Item 4 - Combating drug-trafficking and reducing illicit drugs

In the agreement FARC had committed the definite stop regarding drug production in areas under their control, and farmers will be helped to earn a living from legal crops instead of illicit. A commitment between the Colombian government and FARC towards the historical clarification of the relationship between the armed conflict and illicit drugs have the main points as below (Colombian Government, 2016). Firstly, a solution to the problem of crops made for illicit drug production will be established through the creation of a program named Programa Nacional Integral de Substitucion de Cultivos de Uso Illicito (PNIS) as a chapter to the RRI (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 4.1.1, 92). Furthermore, it includes substitution and non-replanting agreements targeting rural farmers commit to crop substitution, non-replanting and not engaging in any drug-trafficking activities. The Colombian government will implement alternatives for growers, collectors and sharecroppers in an Immediate response plan named Plan de Atencion Immediate formulated through a process of public consultation named Planes Integrales de Substitucion y Desarrollo Alternativo (PISDA) (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 4.1.3.5, 98). Small growers will be given alternatives to illicit drugs, through the arranging of legal alternatives for and prioritize property registration in areas where PNIS will be operating and also conducting a de-mining process (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 4.1.3.6, 103). The agreement also includes evaluation and follow-up of actions for public health taken in the area of consumption of illicit drugs, based on a human rights approach aiming public awareness through a new national program for comprehensive intervention into drug use. The program implements the state policy against illicit drugs on local level (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 4.2.1.2-3, 106-107). The fight will be intensified against criminals and asset laundering at both national and local level, in a solution against production and commercialisation of illicit drugs (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 4.3, 108). Within the framework of UN and through regional dialogues including OAS, UNASUR and CELAC it support the
undertaken of an international conference and objective evaluation and consensus of what is needed regarding counternarcotic policies. This aiming stronger control by the state regarding chemicals used for drug production (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 4.3.5, 111).

5.1.5 Item 5 - Justice for victims of the conflict

Crimes committed during the conflict will be addressed in special courts, and amnesty will be granted for minor offenses, but not of massacres, rape and torture. The agreement regarding justice for victims is made up from judicial and extra-judicial mechanisms aiming achieve maximum realisation of victims rights. It also aims to ensure accountability what happened in the conflict, facilitating guarantees for non-repetition. Comprehensiveness, Conditionality, Universality and Participation are key words, where victims will participate in all processes. The key points are as below (Colombian Government, 2016). A Comprehensive system will be created for truth, justice non-repetition and reparation, named Sistema Integral de verdad, justicia, reparacion y no repeticion (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 5.1, 115). The mechanisms of the system will promote truth, coexistence and non-repetition through a commission. It will have a territorial-based approach, seeking the realisation and recognition of victims rights, in a coexistence across Colombia. It objective to contributing towards the historical clarification of what happened (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 5.1, 117). It promoting coexistence across Colombia, objective search for missing individuals, and realisation of truth and rights for victims (Colombian Government, 2016). Furthermore, a special jurisdiction for peace will be established named Jurisdiccion Especial para la Paz (JEP) which will exercise judicial functions fulfilling the duty of the Colombian state against crimes committed during the conflict (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 5.1.2, 131). It is claimed in the agreement that there will not be any pardon for crimes against humanity, genocide, serious war crimes, kidnappings, torture, recruitment of minors, sexual violence, etc. Sanctions will be received for those who decisively participated in the most serious crimes and recognise their responsibility obligated to carry out public works and reparation efforts. The JEP will be created by magistrates chosen by a committee of
delegates representing the criminal chamber of the Colombian supreme court of justice, UN, the international centre for transitional justice and the president of the European court of human rights and the state university system. Comprehensive reparation measures for peace building purposes will be established by the state through the Comprehensive victim reparation programme. It also aims to strengthening the process of collective reparation with territorial-based development programmes, land restitution processes and social care promoting social coexistence. Commitments regarding issues of human rights is duty by the Colombian government, and FARC as well in their transition to legal political life in a peaceful social coexistence across Colombia (Colombian government, 2016).

5.1.6 Item 6 - Implementation and verification

In order to guarantee implementation and verification of the agreement mechanisms are established for proper implementation, monitoring, measuring and verifying of compliance through the points as below (Colombian government, 2016). It will be a Implementation and monitoring Commission, for follow-up, verification and a dispute resolution commission for the final agreement named Comision de implementacion, seguimiento y verificacion del acuerdo final de paz y la resolucion de diferencias (CSVR) (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 6.1.3, 173). In the CSVR process 3 members each from the Colombian government and FARC will contribute. It will organise a system of territorial and thematic commissions with broad citizen participation (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 6.1.7, 175). The CSVR council will also establish a framework plan for the implementation of the agreement, running for 10 years addressing specific needs for woman and applying an ethnic-sensitive approach. Four-year plans for implementation of the final agreement will be included in the national development plan, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (PND) prepared over two presidential periods (Acuerdo Final, 2016: 6.1.1, 172).
5.2. The referendum

On July 18, 2016 the Constitutional Court in Colombia approved the holding of a national plebiscite to validate the peace agreement (El Tiempo, 2016). The first agreement between Colombian government and FARC were signed on August 24 (Crisis group, 2016). In August 2016 the Colombian government reveals the question asked in the referendum that seeks ratification of the FARC peace deal: “Do you support the final agreement to end the conflict and the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace?” (Colombia reports, 2016). The aim of the vote was to get a direct approval or rejection by voters of the agreements signed September 27, 2016 between the Colombian government and the FARC (El Comercio, 2016). The Colombian peace plebiscite was held on October 2, 2016 to ratify the final agreement on the termination of the Colombian conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas (Elmundo, 2016). 50.2% were voting against it and 49.8% voting in favour for the agreement (BBC, 2016). The outcome of the plebiscite on 2 October clearly strengthened the opposition, with ex-president Uribe as the front person. Many explanations were given for the vote. One explanation was that Uribe backers in general were more inclined to vote than other groups, and that the plebiscite was ideal for mobilising his right-wing committed base, fears Colombia turning into a left-wing ruled state like Venezuela. Voters concerned about the gender ideology, were also in general voted against the agreement. However, in areas with higher concentrations of victims, high poverty rates, and in rural areas, the “yes” vote were stronger. But in big, formerly conflict-affected cities such as Medellin and Bucaramanga, among in higher-income brackets the “No” side got votes, since it irritated people that members of an illegal armed group would receive overly generous benefits. They also fear that the country would be handed over to FARC. However, the opposition’s victory in the referendum meant its proposals for a new agreement had to be seriously taken into account, if the process should have the possibilities to go further, despite the result. Political and social actors who actively opposed the original agreement handed in their proposed changes, shortly after the plebiscite. After that it as three renegotiations, on three negotiation processes. The first was between the
opposition and government, the second with civil society supporters of the peace agreement and the government and the third negotiation was between the government and the FARC. The second and final agreement was announced on 12 November included a lot of changes, which were based on opposition proposals (Crisis Group, 2016).

5.4 Comparison between the August and November agreements

After the results of the October plebiscite, the Colombian government held a number of meetings with representatives from the sectors of “No”-voters in society taking into account their concerns on the Peace Agreement. However, the government also held a lot of meetings with supporters from the “Yes” side of the agreement, including victims of the conflict, indigenous communities, organizations and people from the private business. FARC also had a several meetings with delegations in Havana. Those meetings resulted in a number of important changes, adjustments and precisions in the text of the original August Peace agreement to the signing of the new and final November Agreement. The Colombian government believes that the changes, adjustments and precisions made strengthen the Peace agreement significantly and the base to build a stable and lasting peace (Colombian government, 2017).

The new peace agreement was produced only 41 days after the October 2 plebiscite, by Colombia’s government and the FARC, released on November 15, 2016. The government and “No” supporters led by former president Uribe came up with a document outlining more than 500 proposed changes on the original 297-page peace accord. Below is a summary of some key changes in the new 310-page agreement. Firstly, due to Colombia’s current financial situation, the new accord extends by 5 years from 10 to 15 years for the rural development plan. There are also changes regarding the creation of special congressional districts, which are now meant to be occupied by representatives of victims instead of former FARC members. It also reduces campaign finance assistance to the ex-FARC political party. Changes regarding drug-trafficking
charges against former FARC members are also made. Those will in the new agreement will be decided case by case depending how the money earned were spent. Furthermore, penalties for those found guilty of war crimes are specified more clearly in the latter agreement. Finally, the FARC had suggested the accord to be viewed as equal to the Colombia’s constitution. This had in legal terms worked as a guarantee for FARC, that it could not being changed by the government. However, the final agreement will not be a part of the Colombian institution, which means that FARC have to trust the Colombian government hold on to its commitment (WOLA, 2016).

5.4.1 Item 1 - Rural land reform
The new accord extends by 5 years from 10 to 15 years as the timetable for investments in rural development programs (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 23). It also specifies that the so called cadaster, a nationwide mapping of landholdings foreseen in the accord, will have no effect on property valuations used to collect taxes which was an issue for rural land owners in the first agreement (WOLA, 2016).

5.4.2 Item 2 - Political participation by former FARC rebels
Changes were made regarding the creation of special congressional districts for zones that were hit hardest by the conflict (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 54). Ex-FARC members may not run as candidates for the seats in the new record, which are instead meant to be occupied by representatives of victims and social movements (WOLA, 2016).

5.4.3 Item 3 - Ceasefire and disarmament to end of violence
The new accord reduces campaign finance assistance to the ex-FARC political party. (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 69). It is reduced from 10 percent of public campaign funding between 2018 and 2026 in the first accord, to the average amount given to parties and political movements in the latter agreement (WOLA, 2016).
5.4.4 Item 4 - Combatting drug-trafficking and reducing illicit drugs

All demobilizing guerrillas must in the new accord provide detailed information about the group’s relationship to the drug trade (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 101). However, this can put them in danger and being targeted as so-called snitches by criminals (WOLA, 2016). Charges against ex-FARC members, will in the new accord be decided case by case, to determine whether the proceeds truly went to the guerrilla war efforts or not (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 190). The new accord claims that if the drug-trade only paid for guns, food, and similar needs, participation may be amnestied, but if it in opposite is evidence of personal enrichment, it will be subject to criminal prosecution (WOLA, 2016).

5.4.5 Item 5 - Justice for victims of the conflict

Penalties for those found guilty of war crimes are specified more clearly in the final agreement (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 164-5). The JEP set up to try war crimes will be a little reduced. It will now have 10 years to operate, with the possibility of adding 5 more years (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 145). Another small change is that it will have no foreign judges among its 38 magistrates and 13 auxiliaries, compared with 10 foreign legal experts as observers in the August agreement (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 016, 167-9). The tribunal judge’s rulings can now be appealed to Colombia’s Constitutional Court (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 160-1). The new accord tightens up the concept of responsibility for war crimes (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 151-2). The new agreement holds responsible for war crimes all commanders who should have known about the crimes, given the position he or she had. The new accord also excludes from transitional justice those who committed war crimes for personal benefits (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 149). Military personnel involved in so called false positive killings, where they got bonuses for killing innocent people that they false claimed as guerrillas, will through the change in the new accord not get shorter sentences. Those persons should instead stay in Colombia’s regular justice system (WOLA, 2016). The new accord sharpens up language on gender equity (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 192).
5.4.6 Item 6 - Implementation and verification

Another change is that the November accord will not become a part of Colombia’s constitution (Nuevo Acuerdo Final, 2016, 277-8). The original accord contemplated its gaining constitutional status via an international-law manoeuvre. Proponents of the “No” vote viewed the first agreement as a 297-page back-door constitutional amendment. The revised accord instead only gives constitutional status to parts on human rights and international humanitarian law. The FARC had firstly suggested the accord to be viewed as equal to Colombia’s constitution, as a guarantee for its commitment. (WOLA, 2016).

5.5 The current status on implementation of the final peace agreement

The FARC has in the middle of 2017 finished the handover of over 7,100 weapons to the UN Mission, making an important step in the implementation of the peace agreement. However, major challenges still remain. According to the agreement the destruction of remote arms dumps should be done before 1:st of September. Another issue is the reintegration of ex-combatants, and peace processes with other armed groups such as ELN. The next step is to ensure security, and the reintegration of former FARC combatants into civilian life. The FARC’s proposal that its fighters remain in areas of Colombia characterised by poverty, bad infrastructure and lack of markets. Finally, the peace agreement still faces serious political resistance, and with the elections scheduled next year, they could soon have the opportunity to change their case. Furthermore, current trends regarding coca production witnessing record-high coca cultivation levels, which critics to the peace agreement have linked to the peace process. The agreement instead aimed substitution of illicit crops for legal. The transitional justice mechanism in the so called SPJ-process needs to demonstrate it is making a difference and enforcing accountability. The upcoming 2018 elections will also affect the implementation, in one way or another depending on the result. The crisis in the neighbouring country of Venezuela is also a risk for negative impact on Colombia (Crisis Group, 2017).
6. Analysis

In the analysis chapter the analytical framework is used, analysing how the political, security, justice and historical factors actually apply to the agreement or not. Here it will be given an answer to the main question: if the Colombian peace agreement, as it was finally negotiated in November, has promise to be durable, based on those factors. It will be investigated factor by factor if the Colombian agreement are durable, according to the analytical framework.

6.1 Political factors

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Based on the analytical framework, the institutional design in Colombia is likely to affect the conditions for durability on the Colombian agreement negatively, while the democracy tradition, and management of, included and excluded actors in the agreement talks in favour for durability.

Regarding *Democratization*, the Democracy tradition was pointed out by researchers as a positive factor for durability. Colombia has a tradition of democracy, except of a short period of time. There was a referendum and renegotiation. This is positive for durability. Many of the oppositions concerns were included in the final agreement in a democratic process. This is positive for the durability of the agreement, since tensions probably decreased thanks to the renegotiations. The reincorporation of former FARC members into society aims at strengthening the social fabric and institutions across Colombia and contribute to local democracy. Even though the political participation by FARC is not
popular by the opposition, this according to the analytical framework also increasing the chances for durability. Furthermore, the *institutional design* affects the chances for durability. Government control down to community level is to prefer. Weak institutions make it hard to implement an agreement and get it sustainable. When looking at the Colombian agreement the RRI Rural land reform seeks to make states presence across the country and close the gap between the countryside and the urban areas, and conceives various communities across Colombia to play a leading role in the reform. It is a priority on zones with higher poverty levels, institutional weakness and presence of illicit crops. Another example is the new, temporary electoral districts which will ensure better participation with strengthen institutional presence. Researchers also pointed out that *inclusion* of a large spectra of the society, and civil society actors such as women’s organizations will preferably be given a role in peace settlements. This is satisfying for durability since the Colombian agreement in many parts focusing on women’s rights and empowerment, although the first version of the agreement focused even more. The empowerment of women have succeeded in many other poor, conflict parts in the world, so probably it will in Colombia as well if it work as intended in the agreement. The rural land reform, for example, prioritizes rural women, female heads of households and displaced persons. Furthermore, the reincorporation of former FARC members into society will have an equity-based, gender perspective, emphasizing women’s rights. The debate among researchers also point out that there is important to look at *exclusion* of actors. In the Colombian case this could be other guerrilla groups such as ELN and the still existing paramilitary groups, which should be handled carefully not taking over areas previously ruled by FARC. Especially regarding drug production, there is a risk that the vacuum created when FARC hopefully quit its engagement, will lead to violence among other, excluded groups. However, the reintegration of former FARC rebels in politics strengthens pluralism and promote citizen participation to outlaw violence as a political tool. Discussions with ELN is for example also currently ongoing. In the Colombian agreement, a commission will be created to defining guidelines for political parties or movements in opposition. This is also satisfying for durability, since a concern
from the opposition were that FARC will grew too strong and taking control over Colombia. The national forum will also be created to discuss guidelines for citizen participation, and guarantees for social protests and demonstration. When looking into Colombia’s history this is also satisfying, so the same mistake as in the 60’s when the political opposition was excluded, tensions increased and guerrilla groups emerged, is not repeated. Summarizing the political factors, the final peace agreement clearly includes civil society actors, on a local level. Thanks to the renegotiation the concerns from the opposition also where seriously taken into account as well in the new agreement. The Colombian government will provide economic and social help aimed at reincorporating former FARC-members into society. If worked as aimed it might be predicted to achieve those goals, which in that case possibly will have a stabilizing effect, strengthen the institutions and then durability, based on the analytical framework used. However, it will be very hard to implement, especially in hard-accessible, poor rural areas with low state control and trust. The Rural land reform includes a land access programme with roadways, healthcare, education, market access and housing, which also will strengthen institutions, if it succeeds. It might be predicted to achieve those goals, based on the analytical framework, but we actually do not know yet.

The different programs in the final agreement aiming strengthen the institutions in Colombia are probably very difficult to establish, since Colombia’s history with lack of institutional trust in many areas. There is then a risk for further institutional weaknesses. This is not good for the durability of the agreement. Citizen participation will be promoted in the land registry and creation of territorial regulations. The territorial-based PDET development programmes, aiming to strengthen institutions, will contribute to the durability if it succeeds, but the implementation will not be easy. There are worries if this is really going to work, in for example rural areas with low state control and trust, where former FARC guerrillas sometimes have ruled for decades. Even though Colombia in modern time mostly has a history of democracy, the central
government and institutions has been weak. To sum up the aiming of strengthen the institutional design is in the agreement, but it will be hard to implement in reality. This can possible affect the durability negatively. If the central government cannot give quick and concrete results in the Rural land reform in forms of of jobs, better infrastructure, economic help and profitable coca substitution crops, the durability could be on thin ice since it then contributes to further institutional weakness. The rural land reform has to make quick results for the durability of the agreement, which not will be easy. The 2018 Colombian election will be important for how the political factors affect the durability of the agreement, and how the implementation of the agreement runs will in opposite also affect the political factors. There is also a risk of a possible spill-over effect from the chaos in Venezuela, affecting the implementation of the Colombian peace accord regarding both the political and security factors. The countries have a common history.

6.2 Security factors

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The involvement of third parties, such as UN, in the disarmament process and the transparency of the final peace agreement and the peace process itself, talks in favour for durability. In opposite the spoiler behaviour from the opposition talks against, since it is likely to affect the implementation, and then durability, of the peace accord negatively.

Researchers pointed out that management of spoilers are essential for durability. The Colombian agreement and peace process have different kinds of spoilers. The most prominent is the “No”-voter’s opposition led by ex-president Uribe. However, since the renegotiated agreement takes into account many of the concerns from the spoilers, it
must not be bad for the final agreements durability. It may even be said that the renegotiated, final agreement is stronger than the first one, thanks to the spoilers. However, it decreases the chances for durability when spoilers are involved, since there is a risk that Spoilers negatively affect the implementation of the agreement, and then durability. Furthermore, Natural resources embolden spoiler behaviour, which is also a risk in the Colombian agreement. Another security factor pointed out by researchers affecting durability is the involvement of third parties giving a stabilizing effect, helping to verify and enforce the demobilization. This especially when third parties provide security guarantees during the disarmament process and demobilizing phase. When looking at the Colombian agreement this is satisfying, since the final agreement include much of both local, regional and international third-party involvement. The most prominent example of international third-party actor inclusion is in the CHFBD and DA agreements on the bilateral and definitive ceasefire, cessation of hostiles and laying down of arms. This aiming a final disposal of all the FARC`s weapons in a complete disarmament, with the purpose to ensure national security and preparing for institutional framework and reintegration of former FARC rebels into civilian life. It is verified by UN, in a transparent process. Despite some delays, this process has worked out well. Another is the help with security issues from UNHCR. The JEP system for justice also include third-party involvement from UN and the international centre for transitional justice, making pressure on the implementation, and then positively impact the durability of the agreement. The high involvement of international, third parties is satisfying for durability of the agreement. Researchers also argue that combatants shall disarm fully. The disarmament of FARC is a good example and then positive for durability of the Colombian agreement. Another security factor that researcher’s point out as important for durability is the avoiding of information asymmetries between the previous combatants of the conflict. When looking at the Colombian agreement this is considered since transparency is a key word used in the final agreement. For example, will a national council for reconciliation and coexistence be established for public transparency. Another example is that electoral participation and transparency will be
promoted and measured. The DA procedure is transparent as well, and certificated by UN. This is satisfying for durability.

6.3 Justice factors

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<td>Victim Policy</td>
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Based on the analytical framework, Colombia’s big assets of Natural resources in forms of illicit crops for coca production, risks to jeopardise the durability of the peace accord, In opposite the victim policy, justice and power sharing agreements in the final accord talks in favour for durability.

Researchers pointed out that political, territorial and military forms of Power-sharing positively affect durability. The larger size of the governing coalition, the greater chances for peace to be durable. Expanding the size of the governing coalition creates stronger incentives for former rivals to sustain peace, since it is then too costly and risky returning into armed conflict again. When looking at the final Colombian accord this is promising durability, since one of the six cornerstones is the power-sharing agreement between the Colombian government and FARC. It also includes territorial power-sharing, in forms of decentralized governance in many ways. For example, regarding the so called CSVR process in the implementation phase of the agreement. Another example is the PDET development programmes in the RRI Rural Reform. Citizen participation will also be promoted in the creation of territorial regulations. Furthermore, Justice and Victim policy are other factors pointed out by researchers as important for durability of peace. One of the six key points in the Colombian agreement is the Justice for victims.
The final peace agreement includes justice factors as one of the six cornerstones in the so-called JEP process, where crimes committed during the conflict will be addressed through a commission in special courts, aiming to achieve maximum realisation of victims’ rights. It promotes coexistence across Colombia, objective search for missing individuals, and realisation of truth and rights for victims. It also sharpens the sentences for war crimes and persons involved in drug trade for personnel enrichment and militaries involved so-called false positive killings. All those factors together are satisfying regarding the durability of the agreement. The critics from the opposition regarding that former FARC-members that committed serious crimes will get impunity too easily, must however seriously being taken to account during the justice process, in order not to create further tensions. It can also be questioned regarding the possibility of creating a fair justice, since there are too many victims. Furthermore, researchers pointed out that there is a negative correlation between natural resources and durability. This is a big challenge for the Colombian accord, since Colombia has a large amount of natural resources in forms of crops used for illicit drugs, mainly coca production. FARC have in the agreement committed the definite stop regarding drug production in areas under their control. A solution to the problem of crops made for illicit drug production is also established in the so-called PNIS program, as a chapter to the RRI Rural Reform. Substitution and non-replanting agreements targeting rural farmers commit to crop substitution, non-replanting and not engaging in any drug-trafficking activities is in the agreement in the PISDA response plan. Despite all these plans, and within the framework of third-party actors, it will be very hard to implement and control by the state or by the FARC. If previous growers of illicit crops do not see quick results, there is a huge risk that they go into drug business again, if there is no better option. It shall also be taken into account that there is no signs that the world demand for coca decrease. As long as it is a demand for this drug, the market will be there, and with huge amount of dollars involved comes the violence, since there is a price worth fighting for. The Colombian conflict was originally not created by the drug trade, but it has clearly affected, fuelled and prolonged the conflict. If FARC leaves drug
business as intended according to its commitment in the agreement, other groups will take over. To summarize, Colombia’s Natural resources in forms of illicit drugs are highly negative for the durability of the peace agreement, and also affect the security negatively. Finally, the Colombian history talks against this reform to succeed. A very controversial proposal could maybe be some form of legalisation, aiming better state control, tax incomes and less violence, since all previous attempts have failed.

6.4 Historical factors

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<th>Causes</th>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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Since the final agreement aim is to bring up historical factors to the table, this talks in favour for durability, but the 52-year long duration of the conflict in opposite talks against sustainable peace in Colombia, based on the analytical tool.

Researchers point out that historical factors such as the Outcome and Causes of the conflict have to be brought up if a peace agreement should be sustainable. When looking at the Colombian agreement this is satisfying, for example in the JEP-process, with the objective contributing towards the historical clarification of what happened in the conflict. Another example is the commitment between the Colombian government and FARC towards the historical clarification of the relationship between the armed conflict and illicit drugs. That the historical factors are taken seriously is positive for durability. It probably also decreases tensions between parts, if those guilty of war crimes got their sentences. However, it is also a risk for the opposite when some former FARC guerrillas on lower levels instead get benefits from the states. It is then good that this is investigated case by case in the final agreement. Regarding the Intensity and Duration of the conflict, researchers pointed out that a short and low intensity conflict
affect the chances for durability positively. When looking at the Colombian agreement this is both satisfying and not, since the conflict has a five-decade long duration which is negatively correlated to durability, but with mostly the character of low intensity which are in opposite. However, it is positive for durability that the historical factors are brought up to the table, since justice for victims are one of the six key points in the agreement. Colombia has a long history of violence and struggle with guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug lords and other criminal groups. To make a final deal with the past is then crucial to create a better future, decrease tensions and create sustainable peace.

6.5 Comparison on durability of the August and November agreements
When comparing the August and November agreement the conclusion is that the latter is more durable than the former. This since the opponent’s concerns were included in the new agreement. The broader inclusion, the better chances for peace durability. Despite concerns regarding weak institutional trust, spoilers, drug trade and the violent Colombian history, the final agreement is estimated to have larger chances than the first for being durable, according to the analytical framework, as shown in the graph below. The final peace agreement is more sustainable, according to the analytical framework, since it includes changes, adjustments and precisions that strengthen the chances for durability in terms of greater inclusion, power-sharing and justice. The concerns from the opposition were taken seriously, including victims of the conflict, indigenous communities, organizations and people from the private business. For example, regarding victims of the conflict the new congressional districts, are now meant to be occupied by representatives of victims, instead of former FARC members. The campaign finance assistance to the ex-FARC political party were reduced in the final agreement, which otherwise could have led to further tensions from the opponents. Changes regarding penalties for those found guilty of war crimes are specified more clearly in the latter agreement, which means greater chances for justice. Another positive change regarding fair justice is that charges against ex-FARC members will in the new accord be decided case by case. However, the final agreement could maybe have been even
stronger if it, as FARC had suggested, being a part of the Colombian institution. Now it partly can be changed depending on the result in the upcoming 2018 elections.

6.6 The durability of the final Colombian peace agreement

The green boxes include factors that are positive for the durability of the final Colombian agreement. The Red boxes in opposite include factors that are negative for durability in the final Colombian agreement. To summarize, 12 of the 16 factors chosen are positive for durability of the final agreement.

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</table>
7. Conclusions and recommendations for further studies

This research has contributed to the development of an analytical tool, that possible can be used by other researchers when evaluating durability of peace agreements. The Colombian Peace Agreement, as it is finally negotiated, are according to the analytical framework estimated having a great chance to being durable. Despite this there are four issues that have to be taken seriously, according to the analytical framework, and that talks against the agreement. Firstly, the duration of the conflict which goes back over five decades in history. Secondly, the lack of institutional trust and low control by the state, especially in poor, rural areas highly affected by the conflict. Thirdly, the Colombian agreement and peace process have been affected by spoilers, mainly the “No”-voter’s opposition, which also influence to harm the implementation and durability of the agreement. The result in the upcoming 2018 elections is then crucial for the further implementation of the accord. Fourthly, natural resources in forms of illicit drugs and mainly Coca, have been linked to and fuelled, the conflict for a long time. This also really challenging the prospects for a sustainable peace. However, If peace fails in Colombia, future researchers can look into those weaknesses through this analytical framework and check which factors that failed. Future researchers are also suggested looking into a few more cases, and then test this analytical framework further on a number of peace agreements. It would also be interesting to evaluate how this analytical tool works in different contexts, for example in former non-democratic countries, and on interstate conflicts as well. Another idea for future research could be if a referendum is to prefer or not, on highly important issues like peace agreements. An interesting topic would also be to further evaluate how the role of women affected the Colombian peace process and agreement. To sum up, this analytical tool is useful for many different kinds of future peace and development research, preventing of conflicts and contribute make the chances for durable peace better, in this world of uncertainty.
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Appendix

Map of Colombia