Peaceful Struggle or Violent Jihad?

_A comparison of three Islamic-inspired magazines of propaganda on the topic of Jihad_
Abstract

In the Islamic world, the term Jihad bears intricate meaning, and its rightful interpretation has occupied many scholars and Muslims across the globe. For some, it relates to the personal struggle that one may have to deal with on a regular basis. For others, the term operates on the basis of a willingness to fight. While the latter interpretation seems to be shared by extremist terrorists of organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, the majority of Muslims have an entirely different interpretation of jihad.

This essay wishes to delve deeper into this intricate term in order to come closer to an understanding of Jihad. This is done by conducting a qualitative and comparative analysis of three magazines of propaganda: the Ahmadiyya Community, the Islamic State and Al Qaeda respectively.

The results of the study showed that the Ahmadiyya Community claim that a vital aspect of jihad is “jihad-of-the-pen”, a concept which aims to educate other people on the peaceful nature of Islam. Because of the wrongful interpretation of Jihad by extremist organisations, the Ahmadiyya Community take to the pen in order to battle these misinterpretations while also wanting to show that Islam is a peaceful religion. Furthermore, they claim that this wrongful interpretation affects the way ordinary law-abiding Muslim citizens are being viewed upon.

Moreover, the findings also showed that ISIS and Al Qaeda interpret jihad as being the “jihad-of-the-sword”, whereby it is considered to be the sixth pillar. While ISIS use the concept of jihad to justify its fighting of the disbelievers, including Muslims who deal with ‘Crusader’ Western democracies, Al Qaeda aims their jihad towards the United States, whom they feel are the root to everything terror.

The essay concludes with the notion that research on this topic should focus more on peaceful jihad, the kind of personal and inner struggle that is being advocated by the Ahmadiyya communities. Literature, such as Understanding Jihad, Field of Blood, and The Secret History of Al Qaeda, has all too much tended to the violent-nature of jihad and left the peaceful,
inner struggle out of the discussion. More research can be conducted on this topic to further paint the picture of peaceful struggle, which is a struggle that is felt for the absolute majority of Muslims throughout this world.

Keywords: Jihad, Religion, Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Ahmadiyya Community, Qualitative Analysis, Comparative theory, Propaganda
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1. Introduction

1.1 Contemporary Islam: the abundant ideological worldviews of revivalism and how it affects a Muslim’s way of life

An intricate and prevalent feature of contemporary Islam is concerned with its resurgence. As John Esposito denotes, whether in public or personal life, Islam has reasserted itself as a vigorous force in Muslim societies and has had a more profound impact on Muslim life than ever before. The adaptation of several Islamic laws, by governments alike, as well as the introduction of Islamic taxes, punishments and banks are the first few careful steps, towards, what is sometimes dramatically referred to as the Islamic resurgence, Islamic fundamentalism or the Islamic revival (Esposito, 1988: 156).

What is interesting about the current-day religious resurgence is the emphasis that is placed on religious identity and practice in individual and corporate life (Esposito, 1988: 156). “Islamic revivalism is reflected in an increased emphasis on religious observances (mosque attendance, fasting during Ramadan, abstention from alcohol and gambling), … the proliferation of religious literature, television and radio programs, … and the reassertion of Islam in Muslim politics” (Esposito, 1988: 156). This highlights the fact that for many Muslims, Islam is a way of life - in other words - religion is integral to life. What stems from this ideology is the profound use of Islamic symbols, slogans and ideological worldviews in Muslim politics as of late. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Taliban, among many others, are example of organisations that have all adopted Islamic traits to strengthen their legitimacy and political agenda (Esposito, 1988: 157). The Jordanian-Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam, a central figure in the Afghan-Russian war that was fought during the 1980s used the aforementioned Islamic ideological worldviews and gained huge popularity as a result. Azzam summoned and gathered Muslims to fight alongside each other as brothers. His glorification and praise of martyrdom would later be the catalysator the Islamic State and al Qaeda used in their political programs. Azzam argued that “a community that cannot defend, … will inevitably be dominated by military power. His goals was to create a cadre of scholar-warriors, whose sacrifice would inspire the rest of the [community]” (Armstrong, 2014: 368). He believed that jihad
was the Sixth Pillar: a Muslim who abandoned this philosophy and did not wander this path, would have to answer to God on the Day of Judgment (Armstrong, 2014: 368).

The Islamic State, which will be discussed in-depth below, managed to completely break down existing political structures in Western Asia. The borders between Iraq and Syria, which had been in place since the 1920’s were questioned by the Islamic State as a result of their effective use of the Qur’an, its extremist view on religion as well as its military capabilities and advances. Politically they motivated their expansion with the term jihad, which is ingrained in their ideology. By analysing jihad, I hope to form a better understanding how this organisation, as well as other Islamic organisations, motivate their political agenda with regards to jihad.

The way modernity posits a major issue for the Muslim community in the wake of Islamic revivalism, is highlighted by Esposito. He claims that in the pre-1950 period, modernity came in the form of an external force that infiltrated or invaded Muslim lands, but that the period after 1950 was characterized by an internal established order, “present in the institutions of society and the outlook of its leaders” (Esposito, 1988: 157). “Most governments had tackled the arduous task of nation building by establishing states with a more secular orientation, circumscribing the role of religion in public life, and fostering various forms of secular nationalism, both local and regional” (Esposito, 1988: 157). This secularisation-path that many a state had travelled on, was retreated and favoured for a more deliberate, and religion-based ideology from 1960’s onwards, for example by the Arab socialist regimes in Egypt, Iraq and Algeria as well as during the Afghan-Russian war of the 1980’s (Armstrong, 2014: 368). As a reaction to the invasion of Russia, and the 1973 October-war, Muslim leaders continued to praise the glory of martyrdom up until this day.

Unsurprisingly, the late 1980s saw a sudden burst of religious fanaticism and indeed resurgence as one could call it. These stem mainly from: (1) the sense of failure or loss of Islamic identity in the globalised world; (2) the adversity with the West regarding the integration and cooperation with many Muslim rulers and their “Western-inspired governments”; (3) the sense of pride, found afresh as a result of several military and economic successes, most notably
the 1978-79 Iranian revolution and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973; and (4) the mapping of a
more authentic and rooted Islamic identity (Esposito, 1988: 158). Especially the latter proved
to be a problematic issue in the wake of the liberation of Jerusalem, or, according to Arab li-
terature, “the disaster”. Muslims alike started posing several questions with regards to their
precious religion: “if Islamic belief and history taught that success and power were sign of a
faithful community, many again asked … What has gone wrong in Islam? Why has God see-
mingly abandoned His community?” (Esposito, 1988: 159).

Religious leaders and politicians asserted that Islam had not failed the Muslims. Instead, they
claimed that Muslims had failed Islam by relying on the West for their guidance and devel-
opment (Esposito, 1988: 159). Referring back to the religious and Islamic revivalism, calls
were heard for a return to Islam. Fueled and inspired by the early expansion and conquests
under the leadership of the tribes of Muhammad and the glories of Islamic empires and civiliza-
tions served as a groundbreaking and motivating force in revivalist reforms (Esposito,
1988: 159). Furthermore, Esposito states: “for these religious leaders, the lessons of faith and
history were clear. Muslim strength and success were dependent on faithfulness to God’s
Word and Prophet. Massive failure could only be a sign of waywardness and faithlessness.
Coping with modernity did not require new, foreign-inspired alternatives when the communi-
ty had a tried and true faith and way of life” (Esposito, 1988: 159).

The sense of military failure that resulted from the 1967 war sparked debate on how Islam’s
relationship with the West was, a quest for identity and authenticity, which was “manifested
in a nostalgia for the past golden age of Islam; efforts to recover and incorporate an aware-
ness of native (Islamic) cultural and historical identity; and emphasis on traditional moral va-
lues. There was a general consensus that Muslims had failed to produce a viable, authentic
cultural synthesis and social order that was both modern and true to indigenous history and
values” (Esposito, 1988: 159).

It is important to describe briefly Mawlana Sayyid Mawdudi’s thoughts on Islamic reviva-
lim. Mawdudi is generally considered to be one of the first Islamic thinkers who developed a
plan for social action to realize an Qur’an-based Islamic governed state. He articulated an
elaborate organization of an Islamic state based on Islamic ideologies. It eventually led to the rise of contemporary revivalism. His Islamic party (Jama’at-i Islami), based in Pakistan, influenced many other contemporary Islamic revivalist thinkers: ISIS and al Qaeda included (Nasr, 1996: 3). Important to note too, as Nasr (1996: 4) suggests: “Mawdudi’s life and thought also suggest that Islamic revivalism is more than just some reactionary effort born out of a cultural rejection of the West. In Mawdudi’s case, at least, it is closely tied to questions of communal politics and its impact on identity formation, to questions of power in pluralistic societies, and to nationalism” (Nasr, 1996: 4). Moreover, Mawdudi sought the kind of interpretation that braised cultural coexistence. Islamic revivalism therefore entailed a process of identity formation that could compete with both traditional Muslim identity and secular nationalism. … To do this, it borrowed from the West, even as it challenged it, and used its tools to achieve its purpose, particularly the printed word in lieu of the oral tradition that had dominated Muslim life and thought until then” (Nasr, 1996: 4).

At the core of the Islamic revival lays the following framework: Islam is a total ideology, with provides the basic framework of meaning and direction for Muslims with regards to their political, social and cultural life (Esposito, 1988: 162).

The ideological beliefs that follow, are part of the ideological framework of Islamic revivalism. They are not limited to these, as will be clear in this essay. All are taken directly from the book *Islam: The Straight Path* by John Esposito:

1. “Islam is a total and comprehensive way of life. Religion is integral to politics, law and society.
2. The failure of Muslim societies is due to their departure from the straight path of Islam and their following a Western secular path, with its secular materialistic ideologies and values.
3. The renewal of society requires a return to Islam, an Islamic religiopolitical and social reformation or revolution, that draws its inspiration from the Quran and from the first great Islamic movement led by the Prophet Muhammad.
4. To restore God’s rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order, Western-inspired civil codes must be replaced by Islamic law, which is the only acceptable blueprint for Muslim society.

5. Although the Westernization of society is condemned, modernization as such is not. Science and technology are accepted but they are to be subordinated to Islamic belief and values in order to guard against Westernization and secularization of Muslim society.

6. The process of Islamization, or more accurately, re-Islamization, require organizations or associations of dedicated and trained Muslims, who by their example and activities, call on others to be more observant and who are willing to struggle (jihad) against corruption and social injustice” (Esposito, 1988: 163)

Several militant combat forces and self-proclaimed states adopt these ideologies with the believe that in order to operate these, violent revolution is needed:

1. “A Crusader mentality, Western (in particular, the United States) and Eastern neocolonialism, and the power of Zionism pit the West again the Islamic world.

2. Establishment of an Islamic system of government is not simply an alternative but an Islamic imperative, based on God’s command or will. Therefore, all Muslims must obey and follow this divine mandate by struggling to implement and follow God’s law.

3. Since the legitimacy of Muslim governments is based on the Sharia, governments that do not follow it are illegitimate. Those who fail to follow Islamic Law, governments and individuals, are guilty of unbelief. They are no longer Muslims but atheists whose unbelief demands holy war.

4. Jihad against unbelief and unbelievers is a religious duty. Therefore, all true believers are obliged to combat such governments and their supporters whether individuals or foreign governments. Radicals demand total commitment and obedience. One is either a true believer or an infidel, saved or damned, a friend or an enemy of God. The army of God is locked in battle or holy war with the followers of Satan” (Esposito, 1988: 163-164).
The moderate majority for example, seek reform through a slow and gradual transformation of Muslim society, reacting to trends of predominantly Western societies, running educational and social programs, youth camps and centres, partaking in governments elections. The radical minority on the other hand, such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda, pursue a policy of violent confrontation, “based on their conviction that the political realities of Muslim life require armed struggle or jihad. Radicals view Muslim governments as anti-Islamic regimes that either co-opt and control religion or repress the attempts of authentic Islamic movements to implement Islam” (Esposito, 1988: 166). Esposito goes on to say that these radicals refuse to accept a Muslim government’s abandoning of the Islamic law book, as well as their repression of Islamic activism, and that that ultimately necessitates an armed struggle against enemies of God, “despotic rulers and their foreign allies” (Esposito, 1988: 166). It is their religious obligation to resist and fight these so called infidels. Finally, Esposito (1988: 166) mentions that in stark contrast to conservative and modernist leaders “who have tended to emphasize nonviolent interpretations of jihad, for example as the struggle to be virtuous, radicals believe that Islam is in danger, locked in a defensive war against repressive anti-Islamic or un-Islamic rulers and states. They regard themselves as the true defenders of Islam”, in whose name they have killed” (Esposito, 1988: 166).

1.2 Thesis’ Aim and Questions

The aim of this essay is to find out how interpretations of personal and religious jihad, as a result of a renewed concept of political Islam, differ in three magazines of propaganda. The essay’s point of departure is a critical analysis of printed sources, a theoretical post-colonial approach and a comparative method through which the data found on the topic of jihad in three magazines of propaganda will be categorised. Studying and interpreting different perceptions and implications of jihad, through magazines published by Ahmadiyya, ISIS and Al Qaeda, form an important part in understanding Jihad’s relation with a Muslim’s view on life. Therefore, this study will compare and analyse a variety of sources that bring up jihad in different contexts. It is also worth noting that the view on jihad that we get via the media is ra-
ther lopsided and not at all representative of the many different views on jihad that exist, as has been mentioned previously. Jihad certainly holds more aspects than these alone; this study wishes to discuss and compare these.

The comparative method is much concerned with a critical analysis of printed sources. By analyzing elements of jihad which make up an organization’s discourse, we ought to get to a closer understanding of how jihad operates for every organisation.

The following questions are central in this essay:

1) What view on jihad is presented in the three different magazines?
2) How does the view on jihad differ, or are there similarities between the three?

1.3 Disposition

The essay started with a general introduction to the concept of Islamic revivalism which begins with a segment pertaining to the renewed ideological forces at work in Islam. Then, an ideological framework of Islamic revivalism is laid out, with focus on the concept of jihad. 1.2 presented not only the essay’s central questions, but also discussed the materials that will be used in regards to the essay. In section 1.4, the previous research is mentioned and discussed. It will form the core content on which the results of the essay are based. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 further present the methods, delimitations and analyses on which this essay is based.

The background section delves deeper into the concept of jihad by discussing issues of authority and interpretation of Islam and of jihad. It also features a brief segment on the founding and rise of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Ahmadiyya before turning to the main body. The main body brings up aspects of modern interpretations of Islam, where views on Muslim Family law, life and concepts such as women’s right will be discussed with regards to jihad.
A discussion will take place, comparing and analysing the findings thoroughly. What follows next is a didactical application and a list of references to round of the essay.

### 1.4 Previous research

Abdel Bari Atwan has conducted research on al Qaeda and published a book on the subject titled *The Secret History of al Qaeda*. Atwan has put together a detailed and chronological agenda of Bin Laden’s strategic warfare against the United States. Its focus on the so-called Holy War and central issue of *jihad* are of vital importance to this essay as it will aid in establishing Al Qaeda’s view on this central issue. It would not be impossible if the findings in *Inspire* can be connected to the views presented in this book.

John Esposito covers many vital aspects of Islamic growth, Islamic revivalism and the concept of jihad in his book titled *Islam: The Straight Path*. Its in-depth discussion of Islamic revivalism and jihad form the core for the essay in both the introduction and the background-section.

The book *Understanding Jihad*, by David Cook will be used in the discussion of ISIS’ view on jihad, following the findings which this essay has presented. The book’s discussion of religious jihad is problematic, as will be clear below.

The previous research section lacks any kind of comparison between organisations that advocate non-violent jihad and violent jihad. Neither does it categorise and group findings in regards to jihad. This essay hopes to add to the growing body of knowledge and material of jihad so that we can form a better understanding of the term. This essay further wishes to address multiple different interpretations of this term, and bring it up to speed with modern interpretations in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
1.5 Method and Theory

When discussing religious aspects of the Qur’an and its interpretation, one needs to understand the theory which is based off a moralistic view of history. It is much concerned with the theory that is coined ‘history of ethics’, whereby right and wrong moral behaviour is linked with social order. What is at play here is that moral codes, and in essence views on jihad, create social order and provide meaning to its citizens (MacIntyre, 1998: 92). The study’s findings will in turn provide insight into moral behaviour which will be helpful in describing the present of Islam.

Post-colonialism, as Loomba denotes, can be defined by the conquest of other people’s land as well as by the control of people’s land and assets (Loomba, 2005: 24). It gave rise to the idea that there is an inherit difference between people in terms of their skin colour, generic features and their ability to think. Loomba also points to the Marxist theory, which states that modern colonialism arose simultaneously with the rise of capitalism in the West. Interestingly, both Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’ view on jihad is preoccupied with a loath towards the capitalism West on the basis of post-colonialism.

The method that will be used is deductive, in that it is expected that the three magazines have different views on jihad, which is the reason they have been picked. As mentioned in 1.2 Thesis’ Aim and Questions, the essay’s point of departure is a critical analysis of printed sources, whereby physical traces of human activity will be compared (Peter Esaiasson, 2017: 195). Firstly, a qualitative method will be utilised. As part of qualitative analysis, Esaiasson (2017: 219) mentions the interest for normative behavior. It is a social expectation of how a certain performer is expected to behave and adhere to certain social and normative rules. Esaiasson goes on to mention that “all societies are emotive, which are filled with normative ideas, ranging from virility standards and parental norms, to norms that regulate how political authority relate to normative behavior. The existence of these norms is not something inherently negative or positive, they are inexorable in any given society. Because norms communicate what is considered to be normal and valid, so too do they, at the very least, draw the
lines between the norm and the deviant, between the morally accepted and morally reprehensible aspect of norms.” (Esaiasson, 2017: 219 - my translation).

The content of the magazines will be investigated in order to determine what view on jihad, as well as other aspects of everyday life with regards to the term, these magazines provide. It will be done by the listing of instances where the term jihad is brought up in these magazines. The findings will then be grouped in several categories to differentiate the different concepts of jihad that will be found. Rather than listing the number of instances where jihad is brought up, I have chosen to discuss in-depth the different concepts of jihad. As will become clear, it will be easier to gain more insight into the concept of jihad in this way.

The empirical findings will then be compared via a comparative analysis of three magazines (Ahmadiyya, Inspire and Rumiyah), in terms of the aforementioned implications of jihad. In the materials section the magazines will be discussed more in-depth. Esaiasson mentions that there are two types of analysis for comparative and qualitative analyses (Esaiasson, 2017: 213). For the purpose of this study, critical analysis will be used as a means to extract the viable information that is of interest to this study.

Esaiasson notes that unlike systematic analysis, which is about clarifying and extracting ideas and opinions from texts, critical analysis goes one step further (Esaiasson, 2017: 214). It is critical in its analysis on the basis of two concepts: firstly its argumentation part, and secondly the mapping of relations of power that are mediated by the text (Esaiasson, 2017: 214).

Critical analysis of written sources in particular is a method through which to judge the truthfulness of alleged statements about reality (Thurén, 2003: 8). A source in this case is simply the origin of these statements. It should be noted too, that one should always realize that critical analysis is neither an unerring method, nor is it the only possible route to the truth (Thurén, 2003: 8). It is simply the question of some inherently basic rules of thumb to determine what is plausible. Thurén goes on to mention that a restriction of critical analysis is that it operates almost exclusively on the principle of concrete and rather limited subjects (2003: 8). For instance, it is possible to determine whether someone is guilty of a crime through cri-
tical analysis of sources. What is not a question that can solely be answered through critical analysis of written sources, is if it was a troublesome youth that got the criminal in this position. Bearing this in mind, determining what views on jihad exist in the three magazines should be possible, since the essay’s field of operation falls into the first category. Here, it is not the question of what could possibly lie behind these different views because they are outside of the scope of critical analysis of written sources. Instead, I am after the magazines’ view on jihad, not what reasons could be behind this view; these are left untouched.

Aside from this, one should also look at what type of written sources we are dealing with. Remnants of the past (kvarlevor) possess their worth in that they are inherently a snippet, a small window to and of the past. Unlike narration, written remnants do not forget and are not manipulative; they are what they are (Thurén, 2003: 22). It is the general consensus that the magazines that will be discussed below, are reliable and valuable sources which provide its content in a truthful manner.

Finally, I would like to point to the nature of physical remnants in its broadest sense: while remnants were generally considered to be an expression of an individual’s views, nowadays, remnants are seen more of a reflection of a culture and its collective nature (Ågren, 2005: 11). The consensus here too, is that the magazines that will be dealt with in this essay are part of a culture and are collective in the sense that almost all of its citizens hold the same truth, especially when it comes to religious practices and beliefs.

1.6 Delimitation and samples

To get a representative and present-day picture of the views of jihad and its implications for Muslims, the magazines published during the period from 2010 to 2017 have been chosen. Despite the fact that both Ahmadiyya and al Qaeda are more historically rooted in their respective areas than the Islamic State, picking materials that have been written and published during the last 8 years provide insight into present-day issues regarding the interpretation of jihad and its implications on personal life. The publication dates of al Qaeda’s magazine In-
spire, range from 2010 to 2017, while the magazines distributed by the Islamic State are even more recent - their run started in 2016 and continues to this day.

### 1.6.1 Materials

The material that will be investigated are the booklets published by Ahmadiyya, a Muslim Community that founded in 1889, with headquarters in the US, which highlight the peaceful nature of true Islam. Since 1925, this party has published articles and magazines which bring up important aspects of how a Muslim is thought best to live its life. It also addresses misconceptions and assumptions by the Western world on violent jihad as well as on domestic life. 28 magazines in total will be analysed, which are written in English.

Al Qaeda first started publishing the ‘Inspire’ magazine in 2010 following an increase of media activity during this time. It focuses mostly on its loathe towards the United States, while descriptions on how to conduct shootings are also central themes. Of interest to this study is its justification of its loathe through religious fanaticism via the Qur’an and the Shari’ah and on the concept of violent jihad. A total of 14 magazines will be analysed.

The central issue in the ‘Rumiyah’ magazines is the establishment and outlining of a new Islamic state, the khalifah. By way of religious fanaticism and the distortion of the shari’ah laws and jihad, they fight a Holy war with its opponents. For this study it is interesting to note that, unlike ‘Inspire’, ‘Rumiyah’ focuses more on ideological aspects than on the undertaking and conduction of shootings and attacks on foreign soil, which should mean that the bulk of information is relatively larger for this organisation. Ten magazines will be analysed in total.

When it comes to the collection of data, firstly the title was looked at, to determine whether or not it was deemed fitting for the research, after which the words jihad and struggle were highlighted and analysed.
2. Background

2.1 Issues of authority and interpretation of Islam

Islamic revivalism has made the interpretation of the Qur’an and the religion’s rightful path a troublesome discussion. Some modern Islam exhibits uphold the belief that there is not one but many Islams. Perhaps, according to Esposito, it is better “to say that Islam … has been mediated through many interpretations and applications throughout history” (Esposito, 1988: 192). As a result of these interpretations, many governments, military regimes, conservative monarchies and extremist groups have upheld a certain ideology and program to legitimize their actions.

The violent nature of Islam of some Islamic groups is concerned with tensions between Islam and nationalism. While the former is the obedience to Allah and recognizing the sovereignty of Him, the latter derives its legitimacy from popular sovereignty. Defence of Islam is also preoccupied with the defence of the homeland (Dalacoura, 2002: 270). Dalacoura further denotes: “they use the concept of jihad to justify their efforts to achieve social justice and the defence of their rights” (2002: 270). Likewise, the Islamic State utilises the concept of jihad which serves as social justification for their actions, while it also pertains to create an all-Qur’an based state based on the first caliphate.

“Political Islam, is at one level, a global, transnational cause and movement. But its national emanations are more important both in affecting people’s lives and in determining the depth and therefore the strength of the cause and movement” (Dalacoura, 2002: 271). It is the modern interpretation of the religion by movements in different countries that forms the way an Islamic country is dictated by the Qur’an, which in turn will have an effect on the interpretation of jihad.
2.2 Jihad

Previously, I described how interpretations of Islam were political and government-based, i.e. the way the regime, through social justification, forces their interpretations on their people. The three magazines that will be discussed and analysed (more on that below), have that one thing in common: they provide their readers (and arguably also their ‘own’ people) with a mindset and a framework of rightful interpretations. The correct practice of Islam can be, each claims, interpreted through these magazines. It should be stated that jihad means different things for different people, as the previous research section has shown. What one organisation or state holds as its own interpretation of the concept of jihad could differ entirely to how a second organisation claims to have the rightful interpretation of the concept. The aim of this essay is to resonate around the concept of everyday life with regards to jihad. As an example, there is military jihad - the Holy War concept - and a personal struggle, both having close ties with political and religious Islam. How do these magazines of propaganda then advise its readers on how to interpret jihad? These are some of the core questions that will be answered in this essay.

When it comes to jihad, it can be said that it falls into two categories: jihad as part of ‘religious’ Islam, where it is subject to a salafi-jihadi interpretation and jihad as part of ‘political’ Islam where it is subject to the interpretation of many Muslims and resonates around the concept of everyday struggle, rather than jihad per sé. For many years now there have been contrasting views by Muslims alike on Jihad, its rightful interpretation, its relation between itself and the Qur’an as well as Jihad’s interpretation among extremist groups and mainstream scholars and practitioners. As Abdel Bari Atwan (2006: 65) denotes, the call to jihad is an important part of the life of a Muslim. As is understood, jihad has implications on many aspects of everyday life. The Qur’an, in which the call to jihad is central, also informs a Muslim of several aspects of his existence: “behaviour, education, clothes, eating habits, and personal relationship” (Atwan, 2006: 65). For several centuries, Muslim scholars have developed general frameworks and ideologies around the concept of jihad. Originally it derived from the Prophet Muhammad where it saw several general applications, such as exercising constraint, (both morally and from acts of violence) to even offering oneself as a sacrifice for
a noble cause (Atwan, 2006: 65). It could also mean the moral battle “a person undergoes in resisting sin and temptation” (Atwan, 2006: 66).

As a result of the national and local struggle, first discussed by Azzam, combatant groups such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, envisioned a global jihad: “unfortunately, when we think about Islam we think nationally. We fail to let our vision pass beyond geographical borders that have been drawn up for us by the kafir” (Atwan, 2006: 74). Atwan (2006: 74) claims that this was the first ideological step that would characterize the al Qaeda project, and arguably also the Islamic State project.

It should be stated that there are three main sources (the Qur’an, the Hadith and the Sharia laws) which provide moral guidelines to all Muslims with regards to political Islam: the Qur’an - the true and trustworthy words of Allah as revealed by the Prophet Muhammad and written down in the Qur’an, the Hadith - either actual saying of the Prophet or “descriptions of his actions as reported by his companions” (Atwan, 2006: 68). The Hadith complements the Qur’an. Just like the Ten Commandments for Christians, which are derived from the words of God, the Shari’ah, are a set of guidelines derived from the Holy Book and the Hadith. Extremist groups such as al Qaeda, highlight the defensive and offensive call to jihad, in which a Muslim can contribute in one of three ways to fulfil the Shari’ah: become a fighter, guaranteeing the mujahidin (one who undergoes jihad) access to Paradise; financially support jihad; or support it morally, take care of a family member of the one who has undergone jihad. Finally, when it comes to offensive jihad, “the absence of a caliph is seen by some Muslims as a violation of the shari’ah, and restoring it a crucial first step in reversing their fortunes” (Atwan, 2006: 70). This has been a central part of both al Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s vision on the preservation of an Islamic heritage.

What has been described above are characteristics of ‘’religious’’ jihad. The concept of defensive jihad, martyrdom and offensive jihad are central to followers of this orientation. ‘’Political’’ Islam is more concerned with a typically Western-oriented lifestyle with regards to jihad. Not much is known about the kind of personal struggle that Muslims are preoccupied with on a weekly basis. The Ahmadiyya magazines should guide us in regards to this concept.
2.3 The Islamic State

The ideology of the Islamic State (ISIS) is based on a combination of two political currents: the early Wahhabite movement, led by Muhammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, harks back to the fundamentals of Islam. Their interpretation of *takfir*, a religious and political war on opposers or those who wish to withdraw from combat, is a recognizable factor in ISIS’ ideology and their respective political agenda. The thesis that a true confessor of the unity of God could only be fulfilled with religious acts and the following of the *shari’a*. The general hypothesis is that the majority of Muslims is indeed *kuffar*, unbelievers. Hjärpe (2010: 51) denotes that the hypothesis, coupled with the allowance of military combat against other Muslims, was only viable if the other Muslims were considered *kuffar*: ISIS jihadists legitimize attacks on Muslims with the believe that they are *takfir*; unbelievers who have not followed the correct path of Islam, and are generally considered to be outside of the Muslim community. Important to note too, is that the early Wahhabite movement, in important respects, rejects the predominant theological directions in the present-day Islamic world and their respective development and evolution. What is needed is a return to the correct path of Islam, to the time of the Prophet Muhammed and other founding Fathers.

Finally, the second political movement that plays a pivotal role in the ideology of the Islamic State is the Salafiyya-movement. It is synonymous with extremist combat; as Abdullah Azzam (closely linked with Al Qaeda) claims, it is about the defence of Muslim lands. It has created a safe haven for salafi-jihadi in the Islamic State. Salafiyya’s ‘sacrifice for desire’ ideology as well as the *tahwid* (monotheism) further legitimize their actions against other Muslims who have abandoned the straight path of Islam and allow them to be killed. For that reason, the Islamic State fights other Muslims, for example Shia-Muslims, the Nusra government, Alawites etc (Bhatt, 2014: 33).

2.4 Brief introduction of Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda was the first of the contemporary combatant groups to utilize the concept of martyrdom, holy war and jihad, thanks to the virtuousness of Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s first mentor. Much of their ideological and political agenda is based on these interpreta-
tions, which have been discussed above. Although their number one target is the United States, their call to jihad stems from the national and regional struggle, in an area where both the United States and Russia have raged war against members of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda continues to provide a long-term compelling, ideological and political vision, “where faith, Islamic identity and the desire for political justice converge, creating a heady sense of the possibility of change that the region has lacked for many decades” are central issues (Atwan, 2006: 225). Al Qaeda also wishes to instigate a ‘clash of civilizations’, one where Christian fundamentalism is opposed to Islamic fundamentalism. Eventually, al Qaeda claim, this should result in an all-out war between the ‘believers’ and the kafir (Atwan, 2006: 225). What makes al Qaeda different to other Islamist organizations is the flexibility of its ideology, and in its wide range of aims: “while the leadership’s own theological platform is essentially Salafi, the organization’s umbrella is sufficiently wide to encompass various schools of thought and political leanings” (Atwan, 2006: 233).

2.5 Ahmadiyya

At the end of the nineteenth century, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiyan, (at the time British Punjab) emerged at the scene of political and religious interpretations of Islam. The community he coined, titled “The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community” would later become a religious organization with branches in 207 countries. Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be the expected reformer of the later days, the Messiah (“The Ahmadiyya Community” Fall 2017: 2). He would go on to claim he was the prophet himself. Ghulam and his followers claim the Movement (the term which will be used for the remainder of the essay) “is an embodiment of the benevolent message of Islam - peace, universal brotherhood, and submission to the Will of God - in its pristine purity” (“The Ahmadiyya Community” Fall 2017: 2). The movement also encourages interfaith dialogue, it diligently defends Islam and tries to correct misunderstandings about Islam in the West. “It advocates peace, tolerance, love and understanding among followers of different faiths” (“The Ahmadiyya Community” Fall 2017: 2). The movement also rejects any form of violence and terrorism and for any reason.

The rest of the Muslim community was quick to announce Ghulam Ahmad and his followers as kafir on the basis of the view on a possible successor of the Prophet Muhammad.
3. Empirical study

3.1 Jihad and the Islamic State

I have grouped the view on jihad by the Islamic State in three broad categories: (1) offensive; (2) etiquette; and (3) educational. Note however, that some aspects may be overlapping and be less clear-cut than others. When one term is discussed in multiple magazines, the findings will be bundled.

Offensive Jihad & Etiquette

In the article “Stand and die upon that for which your brothers died”, the reasoning behind its ideology is outlined: “as for the mujahidin in Allah’s cause … running head first into hardships” and battle for their religion, “only increases their firmness and determination in fighting the enemies of Allah” (Rumiyah 1: 3). Furthermore, ISIS argues that the mujahidin will continue to fight and frustrate the ‘unbelievers’, whereby it actually heals the hearts of believing people, in the same way that the first khalifat did under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad (Rumiyah 1: 3).

According to the Islamic State, the five pillars of Islam are as follows: (1) the believe that there is only one God; Allah and that Muhammad is His messenger; (2) establishing the prayer; (3) giving the Zakah; (4) performing hajj to the sacred house and (5) fasting Ramadan (Rumiyah 1: 4 - 8). The article also mentions that whoever wishes to make light of these pillars, by abandoning their duty or struggle, could see the figurative building ( = Islam) collapse on him at any moment. If it does, he is to be killed by the sword: “whoever changes his religion, kill him (Rumiyah 1: 6). It also mentions that it is strictly forbidden to partake in so called “Islamic” parties since these people live in secularised countries, which is not allowed. Moreover, the article mentions that those who believe, should take up arms and fight the unbelievers: “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day … and who do no adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Book” (Rumiyah 1: 7). The article also mentions that the Prophet Muhammad commands Muslims to fight until they adhere to the manifest pillars of Islam: these people will wage jihad for the cause of Allah and who do
not fear the blame of a critic. Finally, the article also hints that jihad should be considered one of six pillars instead and that the State is built upon these: hijrah, listening, obeying, prayer and jihad. “Go forth and attack in the name of Allah, for the cause of Allah. Fight he who disbelieves in Allah” (Rumiyah 1: 8).

The prevention of wrongdoing and the elimination of injustice among the people is another crucial duty that is compulsory for every Muslim, according to ISIS. The article “Interview”, states that this duty becomes even more compulsory when it comes to the soldiers of ISIS, where they have to assist each other in battle (Rumiyah 1: 11). They speak of injustice when a person idolises a God other than Allah.

Moreover, ISIS state: “so here before you are the doors of jihad - unhinged, and in [the Crusader’s] homelands! Light the ground beneath them aflame and scorch them with terror. Kill them on the streets of Brunswick, Broadmeadows … and Bondi… Kill them wherever you find them until the hollowness of their arrogance is filled with terror and they find themselves on their knees with their backs broken under the weight of regret for having waged war against the believers, and by Allah’s will, and then through your sacrifices, this [community] will be victorious” (Rumiyah 1: 14).

The giving of money to charity is also a central aspect for the concept of jihad. Using your wealth, ISIS claim, for the benefit of the community, and wage jihad for his cause, should be central in the life of a fighter. Since women are exempt from the battlefield they have to help the men prepare for battle, by helping fund weapons and preparing troops. According to ISIS, Allah’s Messenger said: “wage jihad against the mushrikin with your wealth, your souls, and your tongues” (Rumiyah 1: 18). In terms of conduct, women also have specific guidelines to adhere to: show gratitude towards their husbands and praise and encourage them, also by giving and not hoarding items in one’s home that the community might need. “Whoever gives freely without counting how much he gave, then he will be given without measure” (Rumiyah 1: 19). Furthermore it is stated that whoever prepares a fighter has fought himself, also when it comes to the caretaking of the family of a fighter (Rumiyah 1: 19). Finally, ISIS state that
the gate of jihad with wealth is left wide open for those women who will make deals with their Lord, which will never end poorly (Rumiyah 1: 20).

Offensive jihad is further discussed in “The Virtue of the 10 Days”, where it is stated that offensive jihad is the best of deeds while nothing is equal to it. There are no voluntary deeds that are better than jihad, because it is better than voluntary hajj (pilgrimage), better than voluntary fast, and better than voluntary prayer (Rumiyah 1: 33).

The article “The Kafir’s Blood is Halal for you, so shed it” mentions that the raging of an offensive jihad is a religious duty (Rumiyah 1: 34). “Muslims … must be reminded that the blood of the disbelievers is halal, and killing them is form of worship to Allah”. Striking fear and terror into the hearts of all disbelievers is a Muslim’s duty. The reasoning behind this is also written down: because Muslims suffer in the world while under the rule of “manmade monstrosities of democracy”, instead of the rule of Allah (Rumiyah 1: 36).

In “Paths to Victory”, it is mentioned that the waging of jihad is an obligation for every Muslim. Whatever is required for an obligation to be fulfilled is in itself also an obligation. Making preparations for the ‘current battle against the Crusader’ enemies is an obligation upon every Muslim who is obliged to perform jihad (Rumiyah 5: 22). Accordingly, producing weapons is considered to be one of the greatest aids to the waging of jihad against the opposition (Rumiyah 5: 22).

Similar results can be found in the list of references under Rumiyah 2, 5, 7, 9 and 10.

**Educational Jihad**

In the article “Recommended Deeds and Etiquette Therein”, the reader is educated on how to pray accordingly. For the first nine days of the twelfth month, one should fast. Sacrificial slaughter should also be conducted, offering two gray rams. Recognizing the ‘fact’ that there is no God other than Allah, mentioning that God is the greatest, and praying regularly are central and vital aspects in the life of a ‘jihad’. Moreover, the article states that the person
should perform righteous deeds, which are much beloved by Allah, and include: combat (either by giving charity or by fighting on the battleground), helping build houses, meditation, praying (one of the five pillars), reading the Quran, upholding family ties, etc (Rumiyah 1: 21). Dabiq 1). The article “The Virtue of the 10 Days”, also outlines virtuous deeds that Muslims should perform (Rumiyah 1: 31).

These deeds should be performed in the first ten days of the twelfth month:

- Jihad for the cause of Allah, reciting the Quran, diligently attending the congregational prayer in the masajid, being dutiful to one’s parents, upholding the ties of kinship, being good to one’s neighbors, spending for the cause of Allah, visiting the sick (Rumiyah 1: 31).

“Paths to Victory” mentions how the spreading of jihad propaganda is an integral aspect of jihad as a whole. ISIS mention that jihad media should be spread to the Crusader media, which has distorted the identity of the Community, because it has perverted its values and “propped up the pillars of humiliation and psychological defeat” (Rumiyah 5: 23). The waging of ‘jihad by the tongue’ is also a central aspect at play here. ISIS claim that it is part of a counter-attack via the media, because they claim that “the blazing missiles of media are more lethal and more dangerous for the [community] and its men than the infernal missiles fired from warplanes” (Rumiyah 5: 23). The article also mentions four reasons as to why jihad of the tongue is important: (1) defending Muslim honor and creed; (2) raising the moral of the community; (3) exposing the lies in morals of the disbelievers and the Crusaders; and (4) conveying a truthful picture of the battles, documenting the ‘true heroism of the men of Islam’ (Rumiyah 5: 24).

Similar results on the topic of educational jihad can be found in the list of references under Rumiyah 2, 5, 7, 9 and 10 respectively.
3.2 Al Qaeda’s Jihad-vision

One group pertaining to the concept of jihad has been found in the magazines. As with the Islamic State, the call to offensive jihad is central but is instead related to the attacking of the United States. Interestingly, the analysis of the magazines showed that there is no other call to jihad, other than offensive jihad.

Offensive Jihad & Lone Wolf Jihad

“Those who defy injustice” outlines why it is a Muslim’s duty to wage war against the United States. The 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda claim, slapped America in the face, and reminded them of its true position: it is no more “than a weak tool in the hands of Satan”, facing and fighting the religion of Islam. “Those who believe, fight in the cause of Allah, and those who reject Faith, fight in the cause of evil” (Inspire 1: 7 - 8). The aftermaths saw the awakening of Jihad, one which was hidden and one which was a response to the aggression by the United States on Al Qaeda’s soil. Al Qaeda will continue the confrontation, and not surrender nor relent in the face of the great criminals. “Our message to the Americans is … as cutting as the edge of the sword: the events on the 11th of September were a direct results of your crimes against us … and the result of your occupations of the lands of the Muslims, and your plundering of their fortunes” (Inspire 1: 7). This warrants the right for Al Qaeda to fight the ‘West’.

The article goes on to list three main goals in the life of a jihad: (1) battling America and taking the battle to their homes; (2) unifying the ranks of the Mujahideen with the pledge to join the Islamic Emirate, and (3) demand the rule of Islam everywhere. Even for Al Qaeda, Jihad is part of the Shariah. They state that they welcome attacks on American soil, calling them Lone Jihadi operations because they are on the correct and legitimate path of Shariah (Inspire 1: 15 - 17).

In the article “Interview with the AQ-Chef”, the concept of Lone Jihad is also mentioned, as part of the offensive jihad. The article states that lone jihad has great importance, surpassing other Jihadi activities. This type of jihad against the West will create a state of terror, public
resentment and “complaint against the governments and policies that brought about lone ji-
had” (Inspire 13: 10).

Khalid Umar Batrafi, in the article “Jihad upon clear insight”, also mentions the call of offen-
sive jihad but also provides the reasoning behind it. “It is upon a Muslim to learn and under-
stand what he is assigned to know from the knowledge of his religion and rules of worship
which will lead to righteousness and for Allah to be contented with him.

Similar results on the topic of offensive jihad can be found in the list of references under Inspire 1, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12 and 15 respectively.

3.3 Ahmadiyya’s violence-repellent view on Jihad

I have grouped the view on jihad by the Ahmadiyya Community in five broad categories: (1) defensive; (2) educational; (3) etiquette; (4) economic, and (5) political. Note however, that some aspects may be overlapping and be less clear-cut than others. When one term is discus-
sed in multiple magazines, the findings will be bundled.

Defensive jihad

In the 2011 Fall edition of its magazine, the issue of military and violent jihad is addressed:
“according to the Holy Qur’an, Jihad, even when it means armed struggle” implies only de-
defensive war and not a pre-emptive strike (Fall 2011: 17). Furthermore, the magazine notes:

Jihad is not an act of offensive aggression. It is a permission to defend the faith and religious liberty for all who worship God. The Holy Qur’an declares: permission to take up arms is given to those against whom war is made, because they have been wronged, and God indeed has the power to help them - those who have been driven out from their homes unjustly, only because they pro-
fessed ‘Our Lord is Allah.’ And if God had not repelled some people by means of others, then cloisters, churches, synagogues and mosques, wherein the name of God is oft remembered, would surely have been destroyed (Fall 2011: 17).

The permission is purely granted in self-defense, against an armed aggression for the protection of freedom of speech, religion and faith. It is also a fundamental human right to worship any God, whether in churches, synagogues, cloisters or mosques.

The Spring article of the 2011 magazine presents a review by Atif Munawar Mir on the book Connivance by Silence. It mentions the theory that the peaceful teachings of Islam now have become political tools in the hands of extremists. The author, Humayun, urges Muslims to both (1) rediscover the true teachings of Islam; and (2) become a strong voice against radical elements that have hijacked Islam purely for political gain (Spring 2011: 38). Moreover, Humayun also highlights and discusses the historical instances when Islamic beliefs were “deformed to fit the perceived political needs of a relevant Muslim population” (Spring 2011: 38). Taking the doctrine of Sayyid Qutb as an example, Humayun concludes that these were based less on pure Islamic teachings and the Qur’an, but more on what they perceived to be the political needs of the Muslims at the time. What they had in common was that all rejected European political ideas and instead started advocating jihad as the need of the hour and as an integral part of Islamic faith. Moreover, they tried to revive the caliphate system, and aimed to establish a global Islamic State. The problem that I have outlined here is that, as I wrote previously, there are two ways of adapting to modernity: either by the raging of a supposed Holy War stemming from a sense of failure as a result of an abandoning of the straight path, or by promoting what the Ahmadiyya Community call jihad of the pen; the rightdoing, via communication and peaceful manners. This is the vital message the Ahmadiyya Community is putting forward (Spring, 2011: 38). Their view of the Caliphate is much like a community, that knows no boundaries and is not claiming to be an all-knowing Islamic State which has adopted Shariah Law (Spring 2011: 12).
In the summer issue of 2011, the true meaning of Jihad is explained. While some organizations consider the greater Jihad to be the Holy War, the Ahmadiyya community consider it to be the overcoming of one’s own baser self: “purify your connection with God. Give up vain mockery, derision, vengeance, obscene language, avarice, lying, wickedness, evil glances … and you will get the assistance of Heaven which will invest you with true morals (Summer 2011: 37).

According to Ahmadiyya, Islam never allowed the use of sword for spreading religion. It was only when the idolators of Arabia came down to fight the Muslims, that they took up the sword to defend their women and children and themselves from the aggressing enemy. Only after the enemies of Islam had raged war on innocent Muslims that they were allowed to take up arms and guns. “Jihad means a strong effort in the way of Allah. This effort may require even our lives, but it should not be misconstrued into the sense of waging war to forcibly convert the non-Muslims. It is expressly forbidden by the word of God” (Summer 2011: 39). The summer-edition of 2012 also brings up defensive jihad, but it is further explained with the statement that Allah forbids the creation of disorder “in a society where peace has already prevailed. Thus, the idea of killing in the name of Allah, let alone suicide bombing, are both un-Islamic and also disobediences to Allah” (Summer 2012: 25).

Similar findings pertaining to defensive jihad are also brought in the list of references.

**The Jihad of Etiquette (= personal struggle)**

The broadest aspect of jihad has been overlooked and overshadowed by the military jihad. Under this category fall the so called personal struggles concerned with jihad: family life, domestic life, view on marriage, interfaith marriage and conversation as well as headscarf the hijab, the Ramadan etcetera.

In the fall 2016 edition, women speak out about the wearing of the hijab, and how it is a personal struggle, in the wake of 9/11, after which we saw in increase in hate crimes against Muslims. While some take it off with the thought that it opens doors of discrimination, or that
is perhaps a choice. But all admit that it is not easy to wear the hijab, especially after the negative image Islam in general has formed thanks to extremists. But it is not a choice, it is an obligation, as evidenced by the words of Allah:

Say to the believing women that they restrain their looks, and guard their private parts, and that they display not their beauty or their embellishment except that which is apparent thereof, and that they draw their head coverings over their bosoms (Fall 2016: 50).

Instead, the Ahmadiyya Community wishes to point to the liberalisation the hijab offers, whereby the outer appearance does not distract the personal potential and intellect. A Muslim woman covers herself because she wants to be recognized for her talents - not her appearance (Fall 2016: 51).

Today, we must fight the battles through education and academia. As Muslim women, we are in a prime position to partake in the jihad of spreading the true teachings of Islam. We must not let fear of discrimination deter us from our true purpose in life. Let’s keep our hijab on and proudly educate people about the true teachings of Islam (Fall 2016: 51).

More on the topic of the hijab can be read about in “Does Islam Allow Women to Work” Farrah Qazi, p. 37 - 40 (Fall 2015) and “Hijab” Saima Sheikh, p. 48 - 51 (Spring 2015).

Another aspect of the jihad of etiquette is concerned with morale; incidentally it also called the selfreproving stage “because the struggle to do good is accompanied by an effort to refrain from doing bad deeds” (Winter, 2011: 22). According to the Prophet Muhammad, this is the greatest of all jihads. It consists of five gradual stages; for the purpose of this study, simply naming them will suffice. (1) justice, (2) act of goodness regardless of the treatment received in return (God’s creations), (3) refraining from indecency (vices of which the knowledge is confined to the doer alone: jealousy, (4) wrongful transgression: “vices that are not
only seen, felt and condemned by society but which also bring devastating harm to the individual and others; killing, persecution, acts of terrorism, acts of violence, hate crimes and so on” (Winter, 2011: 22). Morale is further discussed in “The Promised Messiah’s teachings on love and serving others” Monsura Sirajee p. 18 - 19 (Spring 2014).

The abstention of food, as part of a personalised struggle is also discussed. The winter issue of 2011 reports that Muslims should be taught the elementary social values, pertaining to eating and drinking. These abstention of pig meat and alcohol benefit not just the individual, but society at large as well. “Certain food and drinks, deemed to have such a foul effect on the body and soul of its consumer, have been prohibited to Muslims. These foods and drinks include pork and alcohol” (Winter 2011: 26). Violence, accidents and assaults are linked with alcohol, while the eating of pork leads to shamelessness and damages the faculty of modesty, since a pig knows no shame. Perhaps the most well-known dietary prohibition in Islam is the prohibition of drinking and eating during daytime in the month of Ramadan. “Hunger reminds fasters of the needy, motivating them to increase their charity, which stretches across national boundaries. … Fasting becomes a means of attaining forgiveness from, and nearness to Allah” (Winter 2011: 26).

A struggle that is more closely linked with women is the responsibility for the care of parents and parents-in-law when they no longer can do it themselves. The bond that forms between mother and child should be ongoing, even after the child moves out of the house to live on its own. Mirza Tahir Ahmad, the founder of the Community, mentions it is the child’s responsibility to look after those who stand in need of care, be it her parents or parents-in-law.

They remain as precious and respected as before and continue to be integral members of the family. The mother plays a major part in looking after them and providing them with her company, not as drudgery and tedium, but as live natural expression of human kinship. Thus, when she grows older she can rest assured that such a society will not eject her nor leave her abandoned as a relic of the past (Summer 2017: 45).
Educational jihad & Political jihad

The educational struggle as one could call it, stems from the expression coined by the Ahmadiyya Community: “Jihad of the Pen”, through which it wishes to correct and refute the misinterpretations and misrepresentations of Islam in the media and in everyday life (Fall 2011: 26). The Ahmadiyya Community puts strong emphasis on education, interfaith conversation and dialogue, so as to convey the true meaning of Islam; brotherhood, equality and freedom of speech. Hatred knows no place; universal brotherhood rises above racial, ethnic and class differences that divide man and man (Fall 2011: 27).

The winter edition of 2012 delves deeper into this concept. Jihad of the pen is a concept that is used to discuss aspects of the Qur'an, and educate others on the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the true teachings of Islam (Winter 2012: 24). The Community continues “to defend Islam with the use of the pen, and it prevents the use of destructive weapons of war in the name of Islam” (Fall 2012: 35). They argue that it is in the best interest of the country to create political stability, and that the use of violence is forcefully criticized. Instead, the Muslims are admonished to use lawful methods to bring about political change. “Loyalty to the country of one’s residence is an essential Islamic trait”, and that the Community has always instructed its members to “remain devoted and loyal to their countries” (Fall 2012: 35). By criticising Robert Spencer, an American professor who has studied Islamic propaganda, in the summer issue of 2012, the Community wishes to address certain falsehoods; including the one where Islam is not considered the religion of peace and Christianity is. By discussing these topics, the Community wishes to point to the wrongdoings of the extremists, not of the law-abiding citizens that are part of the Community. Further reading on this topic can be done in “Editorial”, p. 8 (Fall 2014).

Another important aspect that is highlighted in the magazines sprung from the controversy surrounding the double standards of Charlie Hebdo. Thanking the Western world for the institutionalization of democracy and the freedom of speech, the article titled “Charlie Hebdo’s Double Standards” written by Atif Munawir Mir, then goes on to criticize that these traits have become less and less available to Muslims and other religious groups. While it is allo-
wed to print religious caricatures in the name of freedom of speech, wearing the hijab is considered to be a religious symbol and should only be worn at home, away from the public space. According to these standards, religion has no place in the public space. However, as Munawir states, “the cartoon controversy suggest that religion is allowed in public space, as long as it is being subjected to mockery and insult” (Winter 2015: 20) So what is at play here seems to be no the upholding of secularism, tolerance or freedom of speech; instead a growing prejudice against marginal groups, in particular Muslims can be noted. Ahmadiyya’s aim to fight against these prejudices in the sense of the jihad of the pen. Further reading can be done here: “Defending the Faith” Saima Ahmad p. 49 - 51 (Winter 2015).

**Economic jihad**

An aspect that belongs to the concept of the economy type of jihad is the caretaking of the underprivileged groups in society. The giving of charity is exemplified in “The Holy Prophet’s Example in Serving Humanity” by Bushra Bajwa, whereby it is required that a certain percentage of an individual’s wealth has to be given to the poor every year (Spring 2014: 16). The giving of money to charity out of a person’s own means, is a duty both men and women should fulfill (Fall 2017: 39 - 40).

Economic jihad in relation with women’s right of inheritance, is another central issue in the Ahmadiyya magazines. This is as much a personal struggle as it is an economic jihad, because it advises women to stand up to the injustices that they might face in terms of rights to inherit, which automatically make it an economic struggle. The magazine goes on to state that Islam has prescribed a share in inheritance for women in her various role and capacities. “The fact that Prophet Muhammad stood up as a champion of women’s right” at a time when women had no voice of their own and had no right of inheritance, makes it truly remarkable (Fall 2017: 39). As a critique on the Islamic State and Western-oriented countries, the magazine states that it is remarkable to note that Islam had granted women the right to inherit a mere 1500 years ago, while most women only enjoyed it within the last 200 years. Further reading is directed to “Inheritance in Islam” Lutf ur Rehman p. 18 - 20 (Winter 2013).
Another aspect relates to the household but involves a personal struggle as well. The article “Position of Woman in Islamic Law” mentions that it is entirely the husband’s responsibility to pay, according to his means, items and expenses pertaining to food, housing, heating etc. This is why the man inherits twice the amount than that of the woman (Winter 2013: 35 - 36). On the other hand, it is the wife’s responsibility to take of the house and all its cores. Similar results are found in “Shari’ah and Family Laws” by Seher Chowdhry who shares a similar view on marriage and the caretaking of the home and its inhabitants (Winter 2013: 40 - 41), as well as “Shari’ah and Freedom of Speech and Expression” (Winter 2013: 44 - 45)

“Does Islam Allow Women to Work”, this article by Farrah Qazi (Fall 2015) looks at the economic struggle women face in each country. It concludes that women should stand up to the gender-based division of labor that many hold as the truth. Instead, no job is considered to be beneath the dignity of a man to perform within the household, “nor is a women restricted from pursuing her duties outside the home” (Fall 2015: 38).

4. Discussion and analysis

The common issue in much of the Islamic texts that have been analysed in this essay is the religion’s adaptation to modernisation, which was also brought up in the introduction. It also seems to be applicable to the term jihad, a term which has been problematic to implement in modern times. Particularly problematic seems to be the distinction between greater and lesser jihad. As was discussed previously, the Ahmadiyya Community claim that the greater jihad is a complicated process, whereby the process of struggling or the making of an effort to spread the word of God, found in the Quran in a non-violent fashion is central (Summer 2016: 14). They claim that, when the Quran commands: “So obey not the disbelievers and fight against them by means of the Quran with a mighty striving” (Summer 2016: 14), it must mean the jihad of the pen; it refers to the struggle to educate people on what the Quran truly teaches. By using the wisdom and the teachings of the Quran, in the best way possible, one can defend Islam against unjust interpretations and spread its true teachings (Summer 2016: 14). Fur-
thermore, the emphasis on non-violence as the means to spread the teachings of God is further discussed: “Hazrat Ghulam Ahmad made it clear that the Jihad he calls his followers toward is what he called the jihad by the pen” (Summer 2016: 14). The “jihad of the sword” was just a temporary condition “when Muslims had no choice but to physically stop religious persecutors. He declared over 120 years ago that such conditions do not exist in the current age. As such, he called Muslims to peacefully use the pen in a rational and non-violent defense of Islam” (Summer 2016: 14). ISIS on the other hand, claim that greater jihad is the upholding of the caliphate and the fighting of the unbelievers, while Al Qaeda aims their campaign of greater jihad towards the United States (Summer 2016: 2).

Previously, I mentioned that ISIS’ interpretation of greater jihad is the fighting of infidels. Interestingly, much of the literature published on this topic brings up the violent nature of extremists. The personal struggle is related to this term, and does not include the peaceful jihad-of-the-pen interpretation by the Ahmadiyya Community. Unfortunately, the literature found on this subject does not take into account the peaceful interpretation of jihad, and only looks at the violent nature of it. David Cook in Understanding Jihad for example, brings up “lesser” and “greater” jihad but fails to take into account interpretations that include non-violence and peaceful solutions to the concept of greater jihad. He mentions for example that greater jihad stand for the “servant to fight his passions”, but this is taken in the literal sense: the taking up of swords and arms and the fighting of non-believers (David Cook, 2005: 35). To include, it seems that martyrdom, the caliphate and greater jihad go hand-in-hand with ISIS, with focus on dying for a noble cause, while Ahmadiyya advocate the concept of the jihad of the pen.

At the beginning of this essay, I asked myself what view on jihad is presented in the three magazines. The findings suggest that emphasis is placed on either the defensive or offensive call to jihad, which was the case for all three magazines. The Ahmadiyya Community featured no less than 25 articles pertaining to defensive jihad, with a similar trend noticeable among Islamic State’s magazines which advocated offensive jihad. Interestingly, only the concept of offensive jihad, with emphasis on lone wolf jihad was noticeable in the Al Qaeda magazines.
Earlier I also asked myself the question in what way the view on jihad differs, and if there might be similarities between the three. The findings suggest that the people on the receiving end of jihad differ for all three magazines. ISIS targets disbelievers among Muslims and non-Muslims, while Al Qaeda targets the United States. David Cook denotes that this targeting stems from the opposition's conspiracy to destroy Islam. This rings true for both ISIS and Al Qaeda, but differ in the sense that ISIS also feels that Muslims who have not accepted its ideology are dishonoring Islam in the sense that they have left the straight path and have accepted Western democratic traits as well as the Shariah (Cook, 2005: 136 - 137). The findings are similar to those that are presented by David Cook, in that jihad is motivated by the headline “defenders of the faith” (Cook, 2005: 141).

Interesting too, is the notion that jihad is part of the Shari’ah laws, which both ISIS and Al Qaeda uphold as fact, the findings of which are in line with the results provided by John Esposito (2016: 204).

This essay has showed that jihad is a complex term, with multiple interpretations and multiple uses. For the majority, it relates to a personal struggle that oftentimes includes the caring for people close to oneself, the abstention from alcohol and pork, as well as the following of the five pillars in their basic form. The Ahmadiyya Community claim that a vital aspect of jihad is done via jihad-of-the-pen, by trying to convince other people who are not Muslims that Islam is a peaceful religion. The community also tries to correct and change the misconceptions of Islam that many people have. They claim that these misconceptions have been caused by organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, who claim that jihad-of-the-sword is the rightful interpretation of the term jihad and the Shariah laws, whereby jihad is considered to be the sixth pillar. What we have to bear in mind however, is that a minority holds this interpretation of jihad as the truth, and that this affects the way ordinary law-abiding Muslim citizens are viewed upon. Communities like Ahmadiyya try to correct the wrongdoings of these extremists, by showing that people with different religious beliefs can indeed live together in peace. What research on this topic should focus on in the future is that of peaceful jihad, the kind of personal and inner struggle that is being advocated by the Ahmadiyya communities.
Literature, such as *Understanding Jihad, Field of Blood,* and *The Secret History of Al Qaeda* has all too much tended to the violent-nature of jihad and left the peaceful, inner struggle out of the discussion. More research can be conducted on this topic to further paint the picture of peaceful struggle, which is a struggle that is felt for the absolute majority of Muslims throughout this world.

5. Didactical application

The prospect of teaching about jihad in classrooms is a rather daunting one to say the least. Discussions on these kind of religious topics tend to become heated quickly, with the added fear that students with different religious backgrounds can turn against each other. Even generic religious debates tend not to be fruitful in terms of the wanted outcome. Because of these problems, I propose that the introduction of the concept called ‘roundtable discussion’ can be stimulating with regards to how religion can be treated in classrooms. One must make sure though to include a historical aspect to these discussions if it is to work within the history classroom sphere. Making groups of five among students, each group is assigned a major religion; Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism. Instead of focusing too much on jihad, which is much more articulate in the Quran, than say, the Bible, each group is to focus on a significant historical event that formed and/or redesigned the way people worshipped this religion. For Islam, this could be the migration of the Prophet Muhammad from the city of Mecca to the city of Medina, from which his teachings were spread. For Christianity, this could be the birth of Jesus, his crucifixion and his rebirth. In this way, other students both acquire the knowledge of the said religion and will at the same time get the correct historical context. This type of project lends itself for interdisciplinary teaching; both religion and history have to work together. As a consequence, students can work more actively with this project, using both the time that was allocated for history lessons as well as the lessons on religion. During this project, students are to make a collage, with numerous pictures and/or descriptions of each stated religion. This will test their creativity skills as well. After a set number of weeks, students are then encouraged to present these collages in a roundtable discussi-
on, where it is imperative that each groups forms a question and or valuable comment to every presentation. Grading if based off of participation and a final test, conducted a week after the presentations are done. If proven successful, this is something that the teacher can work with throughout the remainder of the year.

6. Literature and references

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