Swedish Municipalities and Their Strategies Against Radicalization

A case study of two municipalities in Kronobergs County and their implementation of the National Strategy Against Violent Extremism

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Abstract


In 2001, George W. Bush, the former president of the United States, declared war on terrorism after the 9/11 attack at the World Trade Centre in New York. Since then, terrorism and terrorist attacks have perceived to be rather frequent and the problem of radicalization has become a new phenomenon in societies, especially the western societies. Therefore, in 2014, the Swedish government decided to create a National Strategy Against Violent Extremism (NSAVE) which was released in 2016. In this strategy, it is argued that the main responsibility of the preventative-work against radicalization is directed at the local levels in Sweden, which is the municipalities. The research on the implementation of the strategy is however limited to non-existing. Therefore, this study is conducting a review of the national strategy and two case-studies with a qualitative approach to get an understanding of how municipalities are working with prevention of radicalization and violent extremism as well as how the national strategy is implemented at the local levels. The data collection that is used is semi-structured interviews with professionals working within two municipalities in Sweden. The findings show that the two municipalities are working with prevention of radicalization but use different strategies. The result is analyzed with the theoretical approach of inclusion and exclusion. The result shows that both municipalities are using the inclusive and development approach in their strategies. The last part of the thesis argues for recommendations in future work on national, regional and local levels as well as direct recommendations towards the two municipalities.

Keywords: Terrorism, radicalization, de-radicalization, inclusion, exclusion, municipalities, The National Strategy Against Violent Extremism, Sweden
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Abbreviations

SÄPO – Swedish Security Police
NSAVE – National Strategy Against Violent Extremism
NCT – National Centre for Terrorism
NCAVE – National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism
1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction and research problem

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (George W. Bush, *Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks*. 2001)

This is the words by the former American president, George W. Bush, who in 2001 declared a war against terrorism worldwide (Wall, 2011, pp 97-100). The main argument in the speech was that the United States, and also the world, now was under attack from a global threat which was presented as terrorism. Terrorism was described as a security risk for societies and in order to create a secure environment for the population, the terrorist and terrorist groups had to be eliminated. This is why, George W. Bush in his speech, argue that the nations need to come together and unite against the threat, terrorism, that is creating unsafety and insecurity in every nation (ibid). One definition of terrorism is; “the intentional generation of massive fear by human beings for the purpose of securing or maintain control over other human begins” (Cooper, 2001, p. 883), which is of importance in the understanding the main purpose of terrorism, which is to get control by fear. As Coopers (2001) definition of terrorism is rather specific and described from an individual perspective, the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) has developed the definition of terrorism as “an act of violence that will consciously hurt a governmental organization with a purpose to strike terror amongst the population and disturb the social structure” (2018c), which also is the definition that will be used in this study. The description from SÄPO (2018c) is focusing on two perspectives; 1) that terrorism is specifically directed towards governments, and 2) that terrorism is a threat in Sweden because as the definition states, the purpose is to strike terror amongst the population and disturb the social structure. Even though George W. Bush defines terrorism as a threat in 2001, it is still a current topic and still considered as a threat.

It can be argued that terrorism is an uprising problem, especially in the western society such as the continent of Europe. Even though Europe has been rather spared from terrorist activities since after the World War II, the noticeable uprisings began at the beginning of this century and the attack on World Trade Centre in 2001 (Gleditsch & Polo, 2016, pp. 208-216; The Global Terrorism Index, 2017).
Countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Turkey and Great Britain have seen a rapid increase in terrorist activity which often is explained by the easy access to the continent and the mid-westerns malice towards the western society (Engene, 2007, p 116; The Global Terrorism Index, 2017).

Since there is a global concern about terrorism, even though most terrorist activities are domestic and often executed by groups who revolt against their own government, the level of threat from terrorism, has grown stronger, especially in Sweden (Gleditsch & Polo, 2016, p. 208). SÄPO (2018a;b;b) describes a terrorist attack as an attack on the democratic society and values and that the main strategy for prevention of terrorism is to strengthen the democratic society (Justitiedepartmentet, 2011; Säkerhetspolisen 2018a;b;c;d). To invest in the democratic system and provide the idea of democracy for the population, usually decreases the possibility for terrorist attacks within a democratic society. The groups within the society that are marginalized often tend to remain small due to the fact that there is a dominant national group, which in this case is the democratic society (Gleditsch & Polo, 2016, pp. 222-224). Therefore, in order to strengthen the democracy and prevent terrorist attacks, the Swedish government agreed in June 2014 to create a national strategy and appoint a National Coordinator for Protecting Democracy Against Violent Extremism. The National Strategy Against Violent Extremism (NSAVE) was presented in 2016 with guidelines for working and implementing prevention of radicalization-processes, how to decrease extremist groups within the societies and support individuals who want to leave an extreme environment. The report states that the main responsibility for creating strategies, policies, and action-plans is directed to the local levels in Sweden, which is the municipalities. The municipalities are also encouraged to engage in collaboration with different institutions such as the local police and civil society organizations, in order to get a better overview of the situation within the municipality. The NSAVE (2016) also recommends that the municipalities implement strategies that will increase the level of understanding for the democratic society because the main focus in the strategy is to focus on the preventative-work.

Since the terrorist attack in Sweden 2017, the level of threat from terrorism has increased and the major threat against Swedish society is currently two groups: terrorist-groups motivated by Islam and the right-wing extremes (National Center for Terrorism- assessment, NCT, 2018).
According to NCT (2018), more terrorist attacks is a risk for Sweden in the future and it is therefore important to strengthen the level of security within the nation (pp. 1-4). The importance of preventing terrorism and radicalization has, because of the increasing fear of a threat, been more prioritized and the Swedish government has made different adjustments in the law for the crime of terrorism. For example, traveling and joining a terrorist group will be illegal, it will count as a crime if you engage in terrorism online or finance a terrorist group and it will be possible to prosecute individuals who have been engaging in terrorism in other countries (Regeringskansliet, 2018a).

Presented above are some of the actions implemented in the prevention of terrorism in Sweden. However, as the NSAVE was approved in 2016, before the terrorist attack in Stockholm, the last year has been crucial for Sweden in terms of working with the question of terrorism and radicalization. Many different changes have been made and municipalities have started to work more intensely with the question. The research of how the Swedish municipalities are working on implementing the strategies and policies against violent extremism and radicalization is however limited, or non-existent, which is a problem. The NSAVE (2016) directs the implementation of strategies and policies towards the municipalities. The understanding of what the municipalities have done, in terms of strategies and policies, is a question that affects all of the population in terms of the perceived security and safety within the societies. To increase the level of security, it is important for the population to have access to information on what the municipalities are doing and which strategies are used in the work against radicalization and violent extremism. This is important in order to build a trust between the population and municipalities as well as a to create a secure environment.

1.1.1 Research problem
When terrorism is displayed as a threat, the level of security is important in order for populations to feel secure and safe. At the same time, the population needs to get an understanding of how to react to radicalization and violent extremism if it ever occurs. In order to for the population to get an understanding of strategies for radicalization, it is important to have access to information on how these are implemented to create a secure environment. As the level of security amongst the population can increase when the sense of belonging and inclusion occurs the information about strategies is positive aspect of the development of a society.
However, the research on how strategies and policies are implemented at the different levels, are limited, especially in Sweden. This will not create inclusion but rather create exclusion when the population's insight in the implementation of strategies are restricted. Therefore, this thesis is going to analyze how Sweden is working with prevention of terrorism and also the subject of radicalization and de-radicalization. Since the NSAVE was presented in 2016, each municipality has taken part of the framework but other than that, there are no studies on how, or if, there has been strategies or policies implemented at the local levels. The purpose is, therefore, to contribute to the research with a study that research how the level of threat from terrorism is perceived in Sweden according to the national level, through the national framework. Thereafter, the study will use case studies to see how the national framework is implemented at the local levels in Sweden since the research in this area is non-existing from the municipalities that participates in this study. It is important to get an understanding of how the municipalities are using the national framework and also understanding the level of threat perceived by the municipalities in Sweden today.

1.2. Relevance

As terrorism is a perceived threat to the society, working with preventative-strategies of radicalization and de-radicalization is important to all of us since it is happening in our own societies. It is also important to understand how to act in these situations and who to contact for help. The purpose for the study is to understand how municipalities are and have been working with the question of extremism and radicalization since the information that has been presented is limited. The subject of terrorism and radicalization is a subject that is discussed frequently, especially since the terrorist attack in Sweden 2017. There has been much done on a national level, such as law-changes but there is limited information on what has been done on the local levels. The NSAVE (2016) recommends that the implementation of strategies should be at the local levels in Sweden which makes it important to understand how the municipalities are handling the subject of radicalization and violent extremism. It is essential for the society to get an understanding of the work and for the municipalities to show transparency towards the population, in what they actually are doing. The study is also relevant for the municipalities to use in their future work with radicalization and having the opportunity to learn from each other.
1.3 Research objective
The objective of this study is to examine what the National Strategy Against Violent Extremism recommends in order to deal with radicalization and terrorism. As the NSAVE directs the responsibility for implementing strategies for radicalization to the municipalities in Sweden, this study also wishes to get a better understanding of how the municipalities are working and if they are using the recommendations from the national strategy. Furthermore, the study also wishes to understand if the municipalities believes that terrorism is perceived as a threat to the Swedish society, and if it is, which strategies are used in order to protect the society?

1.4 Research questions
The study answers the following questions:

- How does the Swedish national framework for radicalization define the strategies, objectives, the perceived threats, and the aggressors?
- How do the national strategies for de-radicalization translate into local implementation plans?
- How do the municipalities implement policies and strategies on prevention of radicalization?
- How do they evaluate their work on de-radicalization?

1.5 Methodological considerations
The method used in the study is case studies with a qualitative approach. The interviews were semi-structured with an abductive approach. As the semi-structured interview strives towards achieving natural conversation between the interviewer and the respondents, it was preferable due to the fact that then the respondents had the opportunity to speak openly about the subject as well as there was time for questions during the interview. The targeted sampling for the study was professionals working with radicalization and de-radicalization within these two municipalities. Since the different respondents within the municipalities worked with different tasks in excess to radicalization, an interview-guide (Appendix 2) was used in order to be able to ask the same questions to all of the respondents as well as having a structure to be sure that the topic where consistent.
Initially, four municipalities in the Kronoberg County where approached and also the County Government (Länsstyrelse) but only two municipalities chose to participate. These two municipalities will hereafter be referred to as Municipality 1 and 2. Contact with the municipalities was conducted via e-mail to the municipalities who referred me to a key-person within the municipality and from that, a snowball sampling was used. Eight interviews were conducted, five from Municipality 1 and three from Municipality 2. The interviews were conducted and transcribed in Swedish.

1.6 Theoretical considerations

The first part of the theoretical approach will explain the concepts of radicals, extremist, terrorist and criminals in order for the reader to get an understanding that there is a difference amongst these concepts, especially in Sweden because of the legislative system. Furthermore, the chapter will discuss concepts of leaving an extreme environment as well as preventative-strategies for terrorism and radicalization.

The second part of the theoretical framework, that will connect to the field of peace and development, is Buur et al (2007) theory about biopolitics and inclusion versus exclusion. In order to understand how to respond to radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism, two options have been identified from the theory; development through inclusion versus security through exclusion. These two approaches are often used in conflict or post-conflict areas where the politics is directed towards excluding the security threat or including the threat into the society. These options were chosen as a way of analyzing the national strategy as well as the strategies that are implemented against radicalization and terrorism within the municipalities.

1.7 Disposition

Following this introduction, the theoretical framework chapter will be presented with the theoretical approach and concepts that were presented in the previous section. The methodology chapter will present the design of the study, which is a qualitative approach with a case-study design. Methodological considerations such as limitations, delimitations, and ethical considerations are also presented. The first part of the findings chapter reviews the National Strategy Against Violent Extremism which answers the first research question.
The second part of the findings chapter will answer the remaining three research question with the result of the interviews conducted for the study. Paragraphs are combined with citations from the interviews in order to get an understanding of the main findings and the citations underline the findings. The analysis chapter will present an analysis with the help of the two different approaches to radicalization; development/inclusion and security/exclusion. The last part, conclusion and recommendations, provides conclusions concerning what the thesis has found and recommended work for the for the municipalities in the future. Some of the recommendations are general and there are some recommendations directed to each of the municipalities as well. The thesis will end with a section about future research.
2. Theoretical approach

In the following section, the concepts of radicals, extremist and terrorist will be discussed. It is important to understand the difference between these concepts but also to get an understanding that dividing individuals into different categories can be a challenge. There will also be a discussion on preventative-strategies for radicals, extremists and terrorists and the relation between preventative-strategies for criminals and extremist. Furthermore, the conceptual framework will discuss the radicalization process, different reasons in radicalizing and the section will finish with explaining two options of leaving an extreme environment; disengagement and de-radicalization. The second part of the theoretical framework will present two approaches in how to deal with violent extremism and radicalization; development through inclusion versus security through exclusion.

2.1. Conceptual framework

While reading this section, it is important to remember that freedom of speech is a constituted right in Sweden and therefore everyone is free to have their own opinions. Having extreme opinions is, therefore, nothing that can be perceived as illegal (Regeringskansliet, 2018). Freedom of speech is important, especially in a democracy, because it contributes to the population’s right to information and the opportunity for everyone to create their own opinions. Therefore, as long as something is not illegal and can be criminalized, everyone is free to believe and think freely. However, as well as freedom of speech is a legal right and a need for a democracy to survive, there is a possibility for diversity within the society in a democracy when for example it comes to different political views, different cultures, norms or values as well as religion. It is often in situations like this, when diversity is at its largest, that small groups in a democratic society can thrive and gain support with their extreme opinions (Justitiedepartmentet, 2011; Regeringskansliet 2018b).

Individuals who engage in terrorism are often referred to as terrorists but becoming a terrorist is often a process that starts with extreme opinions. As shown in the picture below, Figure 1, the process leading from extreme values and opinions to using violence to display a political agenda is called radicalization. In the picture, the individual standing on the bridge and going towards violent extremism has started the radicalization process, which in the picture are referred to as the focus group and also the radicals (Goodwin, 2018).
As the picture shows, the individual who has an extreme opinion and is on the way to violent extremism is still in the framework of the democracy in Sweden and therefore is radicalization something that is not considered illegal (Goodwin, 2018).

2.1.2 Concepts of radicals, extremists, terrorists, and criminals

Since radicalization is described as a process, a radical is a person within the process (the individual on the bridge in Figure 1). Moving from extreme opinions towards extremism and violence is what the radical is going through. The radicalization process is very individual due to the level of dedication that the radical puts into it, and therefore these processes are ranging from a few weeks up to many years (Bhui et al, 2010, p. 6; Khosrokhavar, 2013, p. 286; Doojse et al, 2016, pp. 79-82; Skillicorn et al, 2015, p. 239).

Bhui et al (2012) argue that there is a difference between extremists and other criminals. As for criminals, they have a history of deprivation, poverty, and unemployment whereas, for extremists, studies have shown that they often come from the upper-middle class (p. 6). However, Sajoo (2016) argues that upper-middle-class representatives within the extremist environments are often more common in the Western and Muslim-majority countries due to the fact these individuals often have immigrated to a new country therefore and often have a sense of belonging to their country of origin more than to their current local setting (p. 32).
Furthermore, Bhui, et al. (2012) argues that radicals and extremists often have an employment and higher education but are in fact more likely to be migrants and of a slightly younger age than other criminals which is also what Sajoo (2016) describes. In addition, Mullins (2010) acknowledges one distinction between extremists and criminals: the fact that extremists often believe that they are representing a larger collective of groups, societies, and individuals.

While comparing gangs and terrorist groups, there is a huge difference in the motivational factors for the different groups (Decker et al, 2011). While criminal gangs often have their focus on the economic aspects and making a profit, this seems to lack in the terrorist groups. Terrorist groups have a more globalized approach and their motivation often is political with a desire to do it on a public display whereas for criminal gangs often avoid being in the public and also more organized than terrorist groups. It is also common for terrorist groups to focus on a specific type of crime whereas criminal gangs, often engage in many different types of criminal activities (pp. 157 – 158). Decker et al (2015) argue that one of the main differences between criminal gangs and terrorist groups is the ideological beliefs that surround terrorist groups. The discussion about globalization and the internet is also a factor that sets gangs and terrorist groups apart since the use of the internet has been more common for all organized crime groups. However, it is how they use the social channels that separate the groups. Whereas for criminal gangs, they often use the internet in order to show the representation of the gang and also display toughness. To the contrary, terrorist groups often use social channels to encourage membership, display a political agenda or encourage violence (p. 160).

Altier et al (2014) argue that one major difference between terrorist and criminals is the ability to disengage. As an extremist often has a strong belief in the organization's ideology, it takes a lot of courage and strength to abandon these types of groups. Therefore, it can sometimes be easier for an extremist to motivate themselves into staying in an extreme environment rather than leave (p. 652). Mullins (2010) however, argues that criminals and extremists are similar to each other and therefore, using established preventative-policies that are used on criminals, could be an option in the preventative-work. As preventative-strategies for criminals often focus on the youths, this is also the main target group when it comes to radicalization. Not only because of their younger age but also because of the fact that the social environments like social media and internet are growing more and more each day (p. 167).
2.1.3 Radicalization, radicalization processes and reasons for radicalization

Radicalization is a combination of adopting different types of extreme ideological beliefs, for example political, social or religious and having a mindset where the capacity of using violence to display these beliefs, is seen as positive (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p. 286; Doojse et al, 2016, pp. 79-82; Skillicorn et al, 2015, p. 239). Radicalization is a process that occurs in different phases and it can take a long period of time before a person has become fully radicalized (Doojse et al, 2016, pp 79-80; Schmid, 2013 p. 23). Doojse et al (2016) has identified three main phases an individual is going through in a radicalizations process: sensitivity, group membership, and action and these phases are divided into micro, meso and macro levels (pp. 81-82). Factors that can influence the radicalization process during these phases on the different levels will be described further in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Micro</th>
<th>Meso</th>
<th>Macro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sensitivity</strong></td>
<td>Factors within a person that will influence the process such as insignificance, loss of status, humiliation, personal failure, criminal activities, drug abuse, poor career prospects and personal uncertainty.</td>
<td>The social environment such as the relationships with friends and family, feeling of injustice (that the associated group has been treated unfairly).</td>
<td>Larger societal factors such as globalization, political, economic and cultural dominance in the country of origin, the reaction against the Western society (driving factor for radical Muslims).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group membership</strong></td>
<td>Starting as a marginal member and wants to show loyalty, starts to follow norms and values of the group.</td>
<td>Ties between the individual and the group are getting stronger with a combination of physical and psychological isolation from their original social environment.</td>
<td>The recognition of the group is perceiving the group efficacy. For example, the declaration made by the Islamic state in Syria and Iraq in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action</strong></td>
<td>The final phase, where the individual starts to use violence in combination with a personal factor that is essential, for example, a death of a friend or a relative.</td>
<td>The preparation in use of violence, usually declared by a videotape or testament since it is hard to withdrawal from the task then. Preparation includes stressing non-human aspects of the out-group, such as comparing them to vermin.</td>
<td>Appeals from outside actors, such as governments is a motivator.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2, Phases of the radicalization process (Doojse et al, 2016, pp. 81-83).
In excess, characteristics such as perceived injustice, infringement, and the social context are factors that are of importance in the process (Säkerhetspolisen, 2018a;b;c;d). Furthermore, individuals who engage in radicalization and extremism often seek excitement, solidarity but also search for personal significance, glory and social identity (Säkerhetspolisen, 2018; Sajoo, 2016, pp. 31-32), which terrorist groups can offer for these individuals. Even though it is not confirmed that every terrorist group has some sort of religious belief and motive, Sajoo (2016) argues that it is an advantage for the groups who have it because of the increasing social capital a religion brings to the group (pp. 31-32). However, Morris et al (2010) argues for the opposite and explain that ideology is not the primary motivating factor for individuals to seek participation in terrorist-groups. Instead, the adaption of ideology often comes right before joining the group or even after joining which points to that it is the social belonging and network that is the primary motivating factors for radicalization (p. 4). The radicalization process often involves a leader or a group that will recruit individuals to their community through information and education-sessions (Säkerhetspolisen, 2018). Something that has become more common is the use of social media and the internet as a recruit-base for these networks and groups (Sajoo, 2016, pp. 31-32). Some individuals can also be radicalized through other channels such as families, social communities or the solidarity in ideology within a group (Säkerhetspolisen, 2018).

2.1.4 Disengagement and De-radicalization

There are two ways of leaving a radical and/or terrorist-group (Doojse et al, 2016 pp. 79-82; Schmid, 2013, p. 29; Morris et al, 2010, p. 4):

1) Disengagement which is a process when an individual disengages from the group and rejects the violence and the cessation of terrorist activities. Disengagement is often involuntary. Example of disengagement can be when members marry, have children, get injured or realize that the lifestyle is not preferable. Disengagement is the more frequent way of leaving because of the fact that many radicals often don’t have the motivation, engagement, or level of commitment to abandon the ideology to the fullest and therefore only leaves the environment.
2) *De-radicalization* is a process in which the individual rejects and/or abandons the ideology of the radical group completely. De-radicalization is always voluntary, and it is always the individual’s own decision to de-radicalize due to the change of values, norms, and opinions. De-radicalization, as well as radicalization, is a process that occurs over a long period of time (Dooijse et al, 2016 pp. 79-82; Schmid, 2013, p. 29; Morris et al, 2010, p. 4).

In order to disengage or de-radicalize, an individual often experiences push and pull factors which can push radicals from a group or pull them towards a life outside the group. Push factors often include factors that are negative such as disappointment towards the group, failure to deliver what was promised, internal conflicts and the pressure of being associated with the group. Pull factors are often positive factors that occur outside of the organization such as a dream of a future with marriage, children and possible careers and the idea of total freedom and not being controlled (Morris et al, 2010, p. 4).

A challenge with disengagement and de-radicalization is the level of commitment that the individuals have within the groups (Morris et al, 2010). Every act becomes self-perpetuating for the individuals and as the individual has invested more and more into the group and the cost of leavening also increases. Furthermore, leaving the group and de-radicalize is often seen as threatening to the individual but it is also threatening for the group due to the level of engagement the individual had. The fear of leaving because of threats from the group, getting attacked and haunted by the group and the loss of protection is often much more intense than the desire to leave (p. 3-4). It is important to understand that the level of acceptance from the group in leaving is often different due to the reason for (Mullins, 2010). For example, if someone leaves due to a family situation, it can be seen as a loyal or a trustworthy thing amongst the group member and is treated with respect but leavening because of dissatisfaction trust issues towards the group, it can be seen as a betrayal. These individuals often disengage from the violence but engage in other ways to contribute to the group such as donating money, recruiting or spreading propaganda on for example the internet (p. 164). It is also more common that the ideological belief changes after leaving the organization, not during the process of leaving which result in that individuals believe that they will continue support the group after leaving and after leaving start to disengage and de-radicalize (Horgan & Altier, 2012; Morris et al, 2010).
Even though a majority of the radicals have some sort of strong belief in the group's ideology, it is far from everyone who will argue that ideology is the major part of the decision to join an extremist group. Therefore, it can be a comprehensive to use the terms disengagement and de-radicalization as they only way of leaving an extreme environment because of the focus on the ideology since there are those who do not believe in the ideology from the beginning (Horgan & Altier, 2012; Morris et al, 2010).

2.2 Approaches to dealing with radicalization

The conceptual framework discusses the different concepts that can be connected to radicalization and de-radicalization in order to get an understanding of what radicalization is; a process that occurs under periods of time, both joining a radical group and leaving one. However, the concept does not explain how to approach the subject of radicalization and how to deal with the different concepts of radicalization such as radicals, extremist, and terrorist. The following section will, therefore, discuss the theoretical approach of inclusion and exclusion, in order to analyze the processes and strategies that are used against radicalization and violent extremism. To connect the inclusion and exclusion to a social context, the security development nexus and biopolitics by Buur et al (2007) will be discussed in relation to the theoretical approach of inclusion and exclusion. The discussion will give two perspectives on responses to handle radicalization which is inspired by Buur et al (2007) and the combination of development through inclusion versus security through exclusion.

2.2.1 Inclusion and exclusion

The term social exclusion originates from France at the beginning of the 1970s where Renee Lenoir argued that one out of ten in France was an “exclu” which is a person who has a hard time adjusting to the mainstream society. The term started to develop with the post-war transition to urban society and the failure to integrate institutions within the society at that time (Davies, 2005; Rawal 2008, pp. 177-178). According to Davies (2005), Lenoir argued that the “exclu” where disconnected from the society in ways that went beyond socioeconomic features and argued that the exclusion were based on non-participation in politics, poor health and geographical isolation (p. 4).
As Lenior's definition focused on the non-participation part in the 1970s, other scholars in present time, argues that social exclusion can be defined as the process where an individual or group are excluded from participation within the society that they belong to (Rawal, 2008). For example, social exclusion can be a result of globalization and international immigration that can be observed today. Therefore, social exclusion is a discussion that goes beyond poverty, participation and different processes and can be seen as a more of a cumulative effect where many different circumstances can lead to social exclusion (pp. 163-164).

According to Searing (2004-5) and Rawal (2008) the root to social exclusion is poverty and deprivation because it is the poorest within the society who is the most vulnerable and live in the most exposed areas although the definition of social exclusion can be argued to differ within different societies (pp. 164-166). In using the concept of social exclusion, the identification of social problems becomes clearer and the material poverty becomes less important. It was not until the beginning of the 1990s that the term social exclusion emerged within institutions and governments. By using the term social exclusion instead of terms like underclass, the purpose was to create a more positive approach to the problem with the “exclu” and to work more inclusively (Searing, 2004-5).

In order to create a more inclusive environment and prevent exclusion, governments used strategies that were focusing on employment and active citizenship, while arguing that money, or the elimination of poverty, will make the “exclu” more included in the society (Searing, 2004-5). The debate on whether to implement social exclusion as a framework into public policies was heavily criticized because of the difficulty in defining the term and translate it into public policies (Davies, 2005, p. 7). The departments within the institution also criticized the term because of the difficulty in defining which department that had which responsibilities (Davies, 2005, p. 7; Searing, 2004-5). The discussion grew stronger because of the fact that it now became a “labeling” process in where the population living in poverty felt more ashamed and the result was than an even more marginalization occurred within the society (Davies, 2005, p. 7).

In order to prevent social exclusion, governments started to focus on how to get the socially excluded to be more socially included. The concept of social inclusion, therefore, emerges as a strategy for diversity and achieving social equality (Rawal, 2008, pp. 171-173; Besley & Peters, 2014, p. 109).
Social inclusion can be defined as the opposite of social exclusion and is often argued to be in relation to social exclusion because social inclusion will not work without social exclusion. Inclusion, therefore, focuses on the perceived feeling of incorporation and inclusion within a society, group, organization or family. Social inclusion can, therefore, be seen as a “common membership” where no one is denied access (Davies, 2005, p. 23). By using democratic beliefs as a part of the strategies to prevent social exclusion, a cohesion society would be possible. Although social inclusion was seen as a way of getting a more common society without exclusion, it was also a way of forcing people to adapt to a “mainstream society”, which can be perceived as invasive in an individual’s social life. As governments promoted equal opportunities and employment as a part of social inclusion, arguments about the fact that social inclusion also could lead to individuals seeking far away from the “mainstream” society to other groups, emerge, since individuals wanted to be able to control on which terms they were included (Davies, 2005, p. 23; Rawal, 2008; pp. 173-174). In this sense, social inclusion could produce social exclusion (Besley & Peters, 2014, p. 109). In addition, it is argued that the inclusive strategy is however important, especially for children. The strategies for social inclusion should, therefore, be focused on youths, preferable in education, where it can provide a foundation for where and what the social inclusion needs to focus on. The policy and strategies for prevention of social exclusion are important for youths in understanding the diversity in the society but also to engage in questions regarding social exclusion and how to include rather than exclude (ibid).

The importance of social inclusion rather than exclusion is related to the social development in the sense that excluded individuals often get excluded from things such as the labour market, civil societies, social arenas and also the probability of missing out on basic citizenship rights because of the excluded environment (Rawal, 2008, pp: 164-165). This affects the society and the social environment negatively in which the pace of the development of a society will decrease or even stand still in some societies over a period of time. Sometimes, social exclusion can be seen as a security measure in for example in post-conflict areas, in excluding (for example imprisonment) individuals who have been active in the conflict, in order to get security and structure (Buur et al, 2007). However, social inclusion focuses on trying to include the excluded into the social context (societies) in order to prevent that these individuals engage in excluded environments. It is important to create a relationship between the excluded and included since the development of a society will not move forward if the population tends to be diverse (Rawal, 2008, pp: 164-165).
For example, in a conflict some fight because they believe that they have the right opinion for the conflict, but some is forced to participate in conflicts due to different reasons which mean that at the end of a conflict, some of these individuals are not in need of imprisonment and can contribute to the development of the country in terms of knowledge, education, and employment. This illustrates that the line between inclusion and exclusion is very thin and that development and security are two concepts that are related to inclusion and exclusion. Therefore, the next section will discuss more in detail the security development nexus and how that is related to inclusion and exclusion (Rawal, 2008, pp: 164-165).

The concept of inclusion and exclusion is used in social science research, for example in analyzing security issues and explain development processes, as in this study. The next section will discuss the security development nexus together with the concept of biopolitics and then go into detail on the two approaches; development through inclusion and security through exclusion.

2.2.2 The Security Development Nexus and Biopolitics

The concerns of security have increased rapidly over the last century as people have become more aware of what is going on in the world, due to things such as the internet, migration, easier transportation around the world and the new media climate (Buur et al, 2007). Often, security is connected to development in the sense that underdevelopment within a country often leads to conflict and crime. In these climates, organized crime groups often have an easy way of operating undisturbed since there is no legal system that is working. Conflicts are also a large economic strain for a country, especially the underdeveloped one, which they have a hard time recovering from even when the conflicts are over. Therefore, development is seen as improving the security and stability within a society. Buur et al (2007) explain that there are arguments supporting that striving for a democratic government sometimes leads to more crime, alienation, and economic problems because of the level of freedom that has been given the population, instead of political, economic development and security. On the other hand, Buur et al (2007) explain that there are arguments supporting the claim that a democratic rule is good as long as the laws can be upheld but at the same time it gives criminals protection because of the justice system and the human rights approach. It can be argued that this is just a phase that occurs during the transaction time in moving towards a more developed country, for example implementing democracy (pp. 10-13;15-16;24-25).
Development is therefore often connected with security in the sense that security will provide a more effective development and that development is needed to strengthen the security. This will, therefore, imply that if a country is following the development curve, the crimes and alienation will decrease, and the security will increase (Buur et al, 2007, pp 10-13; 24-25). It is therefore common that, with arguments such as increased crime, alienation, economic problems and organized groups taking advantage of the post-war situation, that states often get trapped in a position of a biopolitical approach. Biopolitics is a combination of biology and politics in the sense that politics is becoming biological in which the society (state) is seen as a human body in where anything that can hurt the body is seen as a sickness and weakness but also as a threat (ibid). In biopolitics, the societies norms, rules and values are important for the well-being of the society and that things that will disturb, needs to be excluded. In securing the society from these types of threats the actions are often taken with the purpose to eliminate the threat in order for the state to keep the power (ibid, pp. 14-16). An example of this is the exclusion of people in Germany in World War II due to different characteristics that did not match the ideal human that Hitler advocated for as these people were seen as a threat in creating a specific ethnical population. Other perceived threats can, for example, be terrorism and radicalization, which is something that Sweden is facing right now.

In order to deal with threats, such as radicalization and terrorism there are different responses to these threats. One response is the inclusive one: development through inclusion, where the development and the importance of for example strengthen the democracy and include the threats into the society, is what is going to get the state more developed. The other one; security through exclusion, are the biopolitics response where excluding the threat to maintaining the security is of importance. These two types of responses will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
2.2.3 Development through inclusion

To approach conflicts and postwar-situations a state can respond with inclusiveness with the focus on development (Buur et al, 2007 pp. 15-16). While getting an understanding of the problem and how to move forward, the approach is to include the population together against the same goal, which for example can be a change to a democratic state. The same process can be implemented in a municipality in a case of radicalization and terrorism were the inclusion of potential radicals, rather than excluding them from the society, will create a stronger society. In using the approach of development through inclusion, a state has a more open view, with a human perspective and freedom as the main objective in the framework for democracy, such as for example Sweden. As Sweden’s national strategy focuses on inclusion together with the strength of democracy, the strategy focuses on foster the positive social environments such as the schools, civil society organizations as well as environments for individuals who want to leave extreme groups in order to make sure that the population is included as well as this also prevents alienation, crime and terrorism.

2.2.4 Security through exclusion

The concept of security is connected to development because, in order for development to occur, the social security and structure are of importance for the population in a sense that it is the population who essentially will be a large part of the development process (Buur et al, 2007, pp: 10-13; 24-25). The importance of the security for the specific individual has therefore increased as the countries from the wealthy part of the world perceived that they are in need of more protection and therefore increases the levels of security. In identifying threats and increasing the level of security, democratic exclusion has seemed to be increasing in policy- and decision-making within governments and the focus on keeping deviant behaviour excluded and “normal” behaviour included, has been prioritized. For example, in using imprisonment for people with deviant behaviours, such as terrorism to exclude them from society. The approach of exclusion for security focuses on the biopolitical perspective and the view of the state as a body that needs to be protected from diseases (threats). The argument is clear, the excluded are the ones who constitute a threat against the society and need to be away, for example by making different things illegal in order to prosecute the population that deviates to something illegal. This approach is an effective way of creating security, however, it can also create diversity in the society in terms of alienation of those who do not believe in the society (Buur et al, 2007, pp: 10-13; 24-25).
2.3 Theoretical framework in the thesis

As the importance of security has grown stronger in terms of potential threats against society and nations, the importance of strategies to approach these types of threats has become more important due to the level of security that the nation wants to provide for the population as well as the perceived security that the population needs. Potential threats can often be excluded as that approach is an easier way to deal with it if the threat is not amongst us we do not need to deal with it.

An exclusive approach can therefore, cause diversity in a society because of the decision of who will be excluded or not and that exclusion is not voluntary which result in individuals and groups getting excluded because of circumstances such as poverty and unemployment. However, in working with towards development with an inclusive approach in order to create a less exclusive environment and a more inclusive society, the process is more extended and complicated, but it will also create a more open climate that allows individuals to be a part of the development. To include the population in the development will also decrease the level of diversity and increase the cohesiveness both for the nation and the societies.

In using the two approaches, development through inclusion and security through exclusion, the purpose is to analyze how the national framework are approaching radicalization, violent extremism, and de-radicalization. The other part is to analyze which approach the municipalities are using and if they are using the same approach as the national framework are suggesting. The conceptual framework will be used in order to understand the difference between these groups of individuals in these specific extreme environments and to understand if the municipalities do that as well. The level of threat and perceived security is also going to be analyzed in order to understand the resources used and if that is in line with the development process of the municipalities.
3. Methodology

3.1. Research Method

The research method used is a qualitative approach which is often used in social research in understanding the social environment by the experiences of the participants (Bryman, 2016, pp. 375-377). The collection of information that was used is semi-structured interviews in order to get a more in-depth understanding of the topic (Bryman, 2016, p. 31). Since the topic of radicalization and violent extremism is sensitive to talk about due to the level of seriousness this topic brings together with the fact that it is a highly debated topic in Sweden at the moment, it was preferable to use semi-structured interviews because the approach to the subject would be more relaxed during the interviews both for the interviewer and the respondents. With help of an interview-guide, it was easy to stay consistent with the topic but also good in knowing that there would be space to open up for discussion.

The study is focusing on if and how the municipalities are implementing strategies for radicalization and de-radicalization were the theoretical understanding will come from the perspectives of the respondents, which is referred to as abductive reasoning (Bryman, 2016, pp. 23;62). The purpose with abductive reasoning is to get a deeper understanding of a specific case in order for the development of new ideas, structures, policies, and strategies (Danermark et al., 2002, pp. 89-95). In using abductive reasoning, it is the worldview of the respondents that is essential and presented and also what will be analyzed in the study (Bryman, 2016, p. 394). The abductive reasoning is therefore not aiming to understand what is true or false, rather than how things can be interpreted in different contexts and when these different topics get re-contextualized, what happens then? (Danermark et al., 2002, pp. 89-95). Re-contextualizing can be described as something that ”gives a new meaning to already known phenomena” (Danermark et al, 2002, p. 91) which this thesis does because terrorism is a known phenomenon and creating strategies to prevent terrorism is nothing new. However, the analytical frame in the thesis provides a view on how the phenomena are implemented at municipalities in Sweden since there are no studies on that part of the process.
3.2 Research design
The purpose with a case study design is to do a profound study of a specific object, such as an organization, community or a municipality, in order to get a more in-depth understanding and knowledge about a specific case. The objective of a case study is not to get a result that can be generalized but instead, gets a study that can be replicated and used for other similar cases. The thesis is using an exemplifying case, which is the municipalities, in order to understand how the national framework for radicalization and terrorism has been or is implemented at a local level (Bryman, 2016, pp. 60-64).

3.3 Sampling
The sample for the study is respondents working in different professional positions within the municipalities that deal with integration, security strategies and general prevention such as security-coordinators, prevention-workers, security-strategist and social workers. In order to get in contact with the employees within the municipalities, snowball-sampling was used. Snowball sampling is a method where contact is made with one specific individual, a key-person, within the case that is studied, that has the experience and knowledge which is relevant to the research question. Then, having that key-person to suggest others with experience and knowledge about the subject to participate and from them find others to interview and so on (Bryman, 2016). The size of the sample is often hard to decide before the sampling due to the number of participants that the key-person can generate. It is also a challenge to know how many of the persons that the key-informant has recommended who will participate due to different circumstances such as the sensitiveness of the subject, having time to do an interview or for the respondents to know what they can and can not say (pp. 415-416). For this study, a major challenge was that there were not that many people working with this question within the municipalities. Therefore, the sampling size for this study became quite small with only eight interviews, five from Municipality number 1 and three from Municipality number 2.
3.4 Collection of data

Contact with four different municipalities and the County Government (Länsstyrelse) were made through e-mail. Two of the municipalities didn’t want to participate in the study as well as the County Government. After contacting the municipalities, I got forwarded to the security coordinators within the two municipalities and from there the snowball sampling started. The initial contacts were managed via e-mail or telephone in deciding meeting time for the interview. All of the interviews were made in person.

The total sample was eight individuals, four from Municipality number 1 and three from Municipality number 2. One of the interviews where a police-officer and one of the interviews were made externally from the snowball samplings with a former employee. The interviews lasted about 35 to 75 minutes and were all done in Swedish. All of the interviews were recorded except for one interview since the respondent didn’t want to. Instead, notes were taken during the interview. Transcription was composed in Swedish due to the interview-language and the result was translated into English.

3.5 Limitations

The limitations of the study are the fact that several municipalities declined to participate. The study aimed to have at least three municipalities and four were contacted together with the County Government (Länsstyrelsen) but only two of the municipalities that were contacted agreed to participate. Another limitation was the number of individuals working with the subject in the municipality, since they were very few, which made the sampling quite small. The study is not generalizable as it is two case studies of two municipalities in the County of Kronoberg and this sample is not representative for all of the municipalities in Sweden.
3.6 Delimitations
The de-limitations are the choice of municipalities, which was based on availability and the resources that the study had in terms of location, time-frame, and transport. The decision to do the interviews in Swedish was conscious since it would be easier for me as the interviewer to have a natural conversation with the respondents since my native language is Swedish. Therefore, the transcriptions were also made in Swedish and quotes from the interviews have been translated into English in knowing that the quotes were not translated literally. This could have an effect on the result in terms of in the modification of the quotes which can be a case of a dangling modifier. However, all of the respondents were informed about this at the beginning of the interviews and all of the respondents agreed in getting their quotes translated into English.

3.7 Ethical considerations
The decision of keeping the municipalities anonyms where because of the fact that the municipalities did prefer it that way, so they would not feel that they were designated. Also, since the purpose of the study is to examine what strategies the municipalities use, if they use any, in the work with radicalization and de-radicalization, it was not necessary to reveal which municipalities that participated because it would not influence the material. Furthermore, in order to get the respondents to feel secure and open about the subject, they were also offered anonymity and they also got to decide whether to record the interviews or not. The study wants to examine how and what strategies the municipalities have, in the work with radicalization and de-radicalization, therefore, the names of the respondents are not important for the result.
4. Findings

This section, 4.1, will start by presenting a review of the National Strategy Against Violent Extremism (NSAVE), that has been presented by the National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism (NCAVE). The outline of the findings chapter will be presented in the same order as presented in the NSAVE in order for the structure to be easy to follow in the review of the strategy. The next sections, 4.2 and 4.3, will present the findings from the interviews. The result will be presented in different sub-question under each of the research questions.

4.1. How does the Swedish National framework for radicalization define the strategies, objectives, the perceived threats and the aggressors?

According to the strategy, actors on the local levels, such as municipalities and institutions, need to take more responsibility in the preventative work. The strategy explains that there are many ways for someone to get radicalized which do not always include an illegal action, which makes the preventative work very important. Previous preventative work against radicalization and violent extremism in Sweden has, according to the NSAVE, been focusing on security and repressive actions. However, the new strategy presented in 2016, is focusing on fostering democracy through education and information in order to reduce the attraction towards the extreme environments. As municipalities already are working with prevention for other major subjects such as crime and alienation, the NSAVE recommends that these tools are to be used in the work against violent extremism as well and recommends that the main responsibility is to be directed to the local levels, which is the municipalities (NSAVE 2016, pp. 6-8).

The NSAVE identifies radicalization as a process in which an individual or a group is developing extreme opinions and are willing to use violence to express these opinions, such as terrorism. The strategy identifies three main directions for the extreme environment: the extreme right-wing, Islamic extremism and the extreme left-wing and it is the right-wing extreme environment that is dominant in Sweden (NSAVE, 2016, pp. 7-8). However, according to NCT, it is the Islamic extreme that is the most threatening to Sweden as of today (NCT, 2018, pp. 2-4).
The main argument for the Islamic extreme threat is the fear of individuals who have been engaging in the war in Syria and are returning to Sweden because of the purpose of spreading ideologies, recruiting or doing attacks in Sweden, which also is a concern mentioned in the national strategy (NCT, 2018, pp. 2-4). The national strategy underlines the fact that within these environments, they often operate in groups, even though it has occurred individuals that operate alone, such as for example Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011 and the strategy also stresses that the individuals who operate alone often get radicalized over the internet where they get in contact with other radicals (NSAVE, 2016, pp. 7-8).

4.1.1 Strategies
The national strategy is explained as a unit consisting of three blocs building on each other; fostering democracy, prevention, and prohibition which can be seen in Figure 3. These three blocs are the dimensions of which the strategy is based on and they are all dependent on each other as blocs in a building. The different dimensions will be discussed in more detailed in the following sections.

4.1.1.2 Fostering democracy
The focus in this dimension is intervention, contribution, education, action-plans, and collaboration. The purpose is to strengthen the democratic society and the democratic values as well as understanding the democratic rights and responsibilities. The strategy also focuses on the importance of the school system because this has been identified as the one place where all of the youths are gendering and also where opinions often are expressed, which therefore is an environment where freedom of speech and the free debate needs to encourage in order to have an advocate democratic environment.
Furthermore, the strategy highlights the importance of inclusion by focusing on having a good collaborative environment between the school, the municipality and the civil society organizations such as different after-school activities in order to create secure and including environments for all citizens which can prevent polarization and extreme environments (NSAVE, 2016, p. 12).
4.1.1.3 Prevention

The dimension of prevention is focusing on active preventative-work such as interventions for groups and individuals who are in a risk environment of getting radicalized. The main purpose is to educate employees, such as teachers, social workers or leisure teachers, in understanding how to share information about this subject between each other and to create a secure line for information to travel when reporting about this within the municipality.

The focus directed at the social services departments within the municipalities is underlined as very important because it is the social services departments main responsibility to provide support and prevention in their everyday work. Therefore, education in the radicalization processes, prevention and how to provide support for radicals and also families, is one of the important parts of the preventative dimension. It is also important that the collaboration between the school, institutions, civil society organizations, and municipalities are working since these individuals often need help and support from all directions if they are in a radical process. The recommendation, which is direct towards the municipalities, is to assign a local security coordinator that can have an awareness of the current situation in the municipality and also coordinate the information-flow between the schools, institutions, municipalities and the civil society organizations (NSAVE, 2016, p. 15).

4.1.1.4 Prohibition

This dimension, which is on top of the bricks, is the one where actual action is taken towards individuals who are in an extreme violent environment or in a terrorist-group. The main work in this dimension is directed to the municipalities and the police, to provide support and help for the individuals who choose to leave and encouraging people who are in these environments to leave. The municipalities responsibility is to provide support to families of the extremist who then can provide support to the extremist because in many cases of leaving, the family has a major part in the decision-making. Often has a contact already been established in the preventative-dimension so the focus is to give support and help directed to the extremism such as different groups for leaving or a support line to call in need of advice.

If an extremist decides to leave, the support of families and friends amongst them, as well as support from municipalities and security from the police, are important, which again underlines the importance of collaboration (NSAVE, 2016, p. 16).
4.1.2 Levels
The NSAVE (2016) has divided the responsibility into two levels, local and national. The strategy also mentions the regional levels, which is the County Government (Länsstyrelse) but does not assign any specific responsibilities towards the regional level. In the following section, the responsibilities for the local and national levels will, therefore, be discussed, according to the NSAVE (2016).

4.1.2.1 Local Level
According to the strategy, the preventative-work for radicalization in each municipality has been deficient due to the inadequacy of the understanding about the subject but also because of the absence of instructions from the national level. However, it is the municipalities that have the fundamental responsibility when it comes to the prevention of radicalization and extremism according to the strategy. The reason for this is that it is mainly within social communities in the civil societies where the radicalization process begins. Therefore, it was a priority in recommending every municipality to assign a security-coordinator to work with this question in order to get an overview of the situations in each municipality and get the preventative-work for radicalization, established. The preventative-work is to focus on creating a strong relationship between the municipalities, institutions, the police, and the civil societies in order to create trust and security with an open climate so that the information-exchange will increase. In order to create an open climate, the strategy recommends the municipalities to create a civil consul where the municipality together with institutions, police and the civil society organizations can meet and have a dialogue about, amongst other things, these types of questions.

In addition to this, each municipality is also recommended to make an action-plan where the responsibility for the police, other institutions, and the municipality are defined. The action-plan should contain objectives and strategies in working with the violent extremism and a possible timeframe for different preventative-projects. It is recommended that the action-plans from each municipality can be shared and collaborated together with other municipalities which can be administrated on a regional level (in the counties). Therefore, it is argued that the County Government (Länsstyrelse) needs to take an active approach in supporting the local levels with for example providing networks and knowledge-exchange for these types of questions (NSAVE, 2016, pp. 19-20;23).
The purpose with the regional level is to create a collaboration between municipalities so that
the municipalities can create common strategies and policies together, such as an action-plan
(NSAVE, 2016, pp. 19-20;23).

4.1.2.2 National Level
On the national level, it is the NCAVE who has the main responsibility in continue supporting
institutions, municipalities and civil society organizations in their work and to be a sounding
board for uncertainties and questions. The coordinator is responsible for the national
awareness of the situation, which is important for the different municipalities to be updated on
the level of threat, having access to education and information for employees and to get
evaluations done to guideline their work (NSAVE, 2016, pp. 27-31). The NCAVE is part of
an expert-network on an international level and has the responsibility to be updated in the
research debate regarding radicalization and violent extremism in order to provide knowledge
to the regional and local levels. The coordinator also has the responsibility for strategies in
collaborating with institutions such as the health-care system and the correctional system, in
order of knowing when and what to report since these institutions often encounter radicals as
well in different situations (NSAVE, 2016, pp. 27-31).

The confidentiality of information-exchange between institutions in Sweden are limited and
the collaboration is of importance since it is one of the major strategies. However, the strategy
underlines that institutions and municipalities do not use the ways of communication that are
possible due to ignorance and insecurity about the law, which is something that needs to be
highlighted from the national level with the help of education and information to the local
levels. However, the strategy underlines that it is important for the actors on local level as
well, to make sure that the employees have the right knowledge and education so that the
information exchange can be as effective as possible, but this is an area where the NCAVE be
helpful (NSAVE, 2016, pp. 31-32).

Furthermore, the NCAVE put emphasis on the problem of internet and social media as
something that the national level needs to work with. Since many of the violent extremist
groups uses the internet to recruit today, the NCAVE suggests that a strategy in reducing
recruiting on the internet is to educate individuals in understanding how to be critical against
different sources and explaining the way propaganda-recruitment is working for example in
schools and workplaces.
However, there is no strategy for this at the moment, but the Swedish Government has given Totalförsvarets research institute the assignment to research this question in order to create a strategy (NSAVE, 2016, pp. 32-33).

4.1.3 Evaluation
The strategy mentions that there have been some evolutions done, however, there is not much information on how the evaluations have been done and why. It is the coordinator together with the municipalities that have the responsibility of performing the evaluations however no result is presented. The strategy explains that there have been actions taken where the evaluation showed that it was needed, however, it is not presented in the document. The strategy agrees that there is a need for more evaluations, on all levels, but there are no strategies presented in how to perform evaluations or who has the responsibility to do what (NSAVE, 2016, p. 33).

4.1.4 Summary – how does the National framework define strategies, objectives, the perceived threats and the aggressors?
The NSAVE defines the strategy as three dimensions; foster democracy, prevention, and prohibition. The strategy is composed of building blocks which can be seen in Figure 3 (p. 30). The foundation of these three bricks is foster, which focuses on strengthen the democracy and encourage freedom of speech. The second brick, prevention, focus on the prevention of the extreme environments so they do not attract new individuals and third brick, prohibition, focus on helping individuals who want to leave the extreme environments. Within these three dimensions, there are guidelines for what the municipality should focus on when it comes to the preventative-work with radicalization and extremism. The objectives with the NSAVE is to strengthen the democracy and get municipalities to take a more extensive responsibility when it comes to the work against violent extremism which is to be implemented with the help of the coordinator (NCAVE) and the national strategy (NSAVE). The strategy defines which responsibility that each of the levels has, national, regional and local, in working with the strategy and objectives.

The main responsibility for the question of radicalization is directed to the local levels in Sweden, the municipalities, institutions and local police and the recommendation is to assign a security-coordinator to work as a coordinator between institutions, municipality, the police and the civil society.
The national level has the responsibility to review and be updated on the research field in order to be supportive to the municipalities and also to evaluate the work that has been done, together with the municipalities. The strategy does not describe any specific perceived threats or aggressors but mentions the different environments that are most active in Sweden which is the right-wing environment, the Islamic extremes, and the left-wing environment.

4.2 How do the national strategies for de-radicalization translate into local implementation plans?

This section will be presented with subcategories that the respondents brought up in asking questions about strategies for de-radicalization at the local level. The findings will be presented as a statement of what the respondents have expressed. After various statements, there will sometimes be quotes as well, which is used to confirm the findings in order to increase the validity of the study. After the quotes, there will be a summary in order to explain the content of the quotes. All of the respondents identified two challenges when asking about the work of implementing local plans; the law of confidentiality and freedom of speech in relationship to democracy, which will be presented in this section. The respondents underlined the importance of knowing these challenges in order to explain why this subject is a challenge to work with.

4.2.1 What do the respondents know about The National Strategy Against Violent Extremism?

All of the respondents from Municipality 1 and 2 knew about the NSAVE but agree that they don’t use it in their everyday work. On respondent explains;

/../ “You are not so updated because you do not work on these issues daily (the NSAVE)” /../ (Interview 2).

However, all of the respondents from Municipality 1 and 2 explained that they understood the main recommendations of the strategy, such as collaboration between institutions, civil societies, and municipalities.

Municipality 2 explains that there is a collaboration within the County that has brought together municipalities, the police and other institutions such as Försäkringskassan and Arbetsförmedlingen, where they focus on questions such as for example alienation, where radicalization and extremism are included.
The respondents also mentioned that there is a collaboration network between all of the security-coordinators in the municipalities within the County, however, it is not that active at the moment (Interviews 2 and 3).

4.2.2 Do they have an action-plan?

4.2.2.1 Municipality 1

Municipality 1 has a local action-plan which, according to the respondents, were inspired by the NSAVE and they are now using the local action-plan as their main framework (Interviews 4, 5 and 8). The decision about a local action-plan was taken in December 2015 and approved in January 2017. The local plan has four primary objectives;

- The municipality is going to ensure that all citizens are given the opportunity for transparency and influence in the democratic process within the municipality. Both in terms of political processes and service-oriented work, aiming at protecting democracy.
- The municipality is going to work to prevent that violent extremism environment gets established in the municipality.
- The municipality shall focus on preventing individuals from getting into the risk-zone of radicalization and becoming extremes.
- Working actively with individuals that are in the risk-zone of becoming radicalized or are radicalized.

According to the action-plan, a project, directed by a control group, would be in progress during 2017 and these four objectives where to be addressed. The action-plan consists of four different sections; background, current local situation, preventative-work against violent extremism and directed interventions on the individual level. The action-plan is inspired by the NSAVE (2016) in terms of having the same background information and arguments about why the work is important. The action-plan also discusses the different types of extreme environments in Sweden that are presented in the national strategy.

The section about current local situation discusses the problem within the municipality and where the biggest threat is, which is stated to be the right-wing movement which has been most active in the municipality. However, recently it has been the Islamic extremism that has been getting more focus in the municipality due to the war in Syria.
The section about prevention has the same focus as the NSAVE (2016) which is to foster the democracy and the strategy for this is to “reinforce the work of all citizens' opportunities for transparency and influence in the democratic process within the municipality, both in terms of political processes and service-oriented work aimed at safeguarding democracy” as presented above.

When the NSAVE (2016) where published, the NCAVE arranged a seminar for the municipalities to attend to, in order to get educated and inform about the topic. Municipality 1 attended this seminar with three people from the municipality and one police officer, which also is the control group that is working with these questions within the municipality (Interviews 1, 4, 5 and 8). The police are working together with the municipality and they have a representative within the control group. The respondents describe the group of four as a team that is used as a sounding board for questions about radicalization and violent extremism. The NSAVE recommended that each municipality where to select a security-coordinator, which the municipality has done. One respondent, from the control group, were selected for the task and are working with it as part of the employment (Interviews 4, 5 and 8). The security coordinators main task is to be a coordinator between institutions and the control group and also to organize and structure the information-flow if these types of things happen. The security-coordinator operates with an overview in order to structure and organize information from a strategic perspective in the municipality. The respondents from Municipality 1 explain that the education and training they got at the seminar has been successful because of the network that has been created with other municipalities in Sweden. The municipalities use information-exchange with each other in order to develop strategies. The municipality’s action-plan has been inspired by other municipalities action-plans as well (Interviews 4, 5 and 8).

4.2.2.2 Municipality 2
Municipality 2 does not have an action-plan to share. A reason for this is that there has been an absence of prioritizing the question about radicalization and violent extremism within the municipality due to changes in the municipality’s management over the last years. One respondent explains:

/.../ “We are lacking in some areas and in some areas we are evolved in. There hasn’t been any direction from the management” /.../ (Interview 3)
The respondents express that other questions have been prioritized which has made the municipality very developed in other sections, but not with the question of radicalization. One of the respondents explain;

"It has not been at the top of the list so to speak. I feel like we need to have some structure, otherwise, everyone is doing differently. They (the management) may not have taken it seriously either, that the problem will affect us and so, but it does" (Interview 3).

The respondents from Municipality 2 do express the need for policies and strategies for radicalization and extremism and they have concerns about the fact that the management in the Municipality doesn’t take this question seriously which makes the municipality unprepared if it happens (Interviews 2, 3 and 6). The absence of who has the responsibility has also been confusing within the municipality. One respondent says;

"Neither of us are have this area as our main task. We believe that this issue belongs more at the municipality management level" (Interview 2)

However, one respondent underlined that every school has information on what to do if a case of radicalization occurs (Interview 6). One of the respondents explains that there is a group that consists of the police, the social services, field secretaries, recreation leaders, and teachers or representatives from the school, where they discuss the current situation about all things in the municipality such as crime, drugs and also extremism and radicalization. The purpose is to have an active collaboration so that every actor can be updated on the situation in the municipality if there should be any problems. Some things they discuss in this groups are supposed to be passed on to the crime-preventing consul in the municipality which is directed by the management (Interview 6). Furthermore, the respondents explain that the municipalities and social services have a close connection with the schools and civil society organization and that the collaboration around different types of incidents is good. All of the respondents from Municipality 2 believes that main focus for the municipality is to develop the collaboration, both within the municipality and with other institutions. The respondents express the need for the exchange of information to be more strategic and organized in order to work more systematically with the preventative-work. All of the respondents express the need for an action-plan and education for the employers within the municipality due to the preconceived apprehension about the subject that they have noticed.
4.2.3 How about the law of confidentiality?

Respondents from both Municipality 1 and 2 identify the challenge with the confidentiality law in Sweden which makes the information exchange and collaboration between institutions and municipalities limited. Two of the respondents explain:

/.../ A challenge is the confidentiality between the social services, the police and the municipality. It makes it difficult to share information /.../ (Interview 5)

/.../ “Then we also have a big problem with the confidentiality transfer from the police, what will we (the municipality) get back? We deliver something through the action plan, this flow chart, but what do we get back?” /.../ (Interview 7)

The respondents understand that the collaboration is important but sometimes feels frustrated that the information-flow get stuck in different sections, which makes it hard to collaborate. They all understand that this is a problem that needs to be addressed at a national level, however, the frustration emerges when the directives from the national level are restricted or non-existent. There has for example been some frustration towards the Swedish security police in the sense that they do not share information. The respondents say:

/.../ “Even though SÄPO or the police have known about it, I find it difficult to find out if something is happening. The information often travels backward and we often find out things through others, not the police or SÄPO” /.../ (Interview 3)

/.../ “Much of the information goes directly to SÄPO also, it does not even stay locally. /.../ These are national issues that the National Coordinator must address” /.../ (Interview 7)

The respondents also explain that they do not get any information from SÄPO, even though SÄPO often know much about situations at the local levels and this shows how the confidentiality is extreme. Some of the respondents also express that it is hard to get a good dialogue and build relationships with other institutions and the police due to the law. One respondent explains:

/.../ “. The police can always contact the social services /.../ Although social services cannot break the confidentiality” /.../ (Interview 8)
For example, if the municipality reports something to the police about radicalization, they do not get a response back on what the police has done with the information. At the same time, if the municipality suspects that a youth is in a radical process, they cannot express that concern to the police because if the youth is under 18, it is the parents who decide if the confidentiality can be broken or not (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7).

4.2.4 How about the freedom of speech and democracy?

All of the respondents from Municipality 1 and 2 express that one challenge with the national strategy is that we live in a democracy with the freedom of speech. Two respondents say:

/../ “Democracy and freedom of speech, this is the biggest challenge. /../ When we fail to respond to freedom of speech and democracy /../ in our own parliament /../ then we must understand, how difficult it is for our teachers out there to have these dialogues. Where is the limit for freedom of speech?” /../ (Interview 5)

/../ “We also have freedom of speech and we have freedom of opinion, the freedom to believe different things. But then is it a question about whether you cross the line or not, and where is this line? /../ (Interview 2)

Since everyone is allowed to their own opinion it is hard to know where to draw the line on what is considered illegal or not. One respondent believes that it is important in getting youths to tell their opinions since we live in a democratic society, but it is hard to know where to draw the line. The school is often heavily working on advocate everyone’s equal value, freedom of speech and equality but also that everyone has the right to their own opinion (Interview 5). One respondent agrees and argues that the freedom of speech makes it hard to work preventively since it is based on voluntary action from the individuals.

Another respondent expressed that it is difficult to educate democracy to people who have never experienced it before and that is a process that will take time and effort.

/../ ”It is very, very difficult to discuss these questions because they are so colored from home by someone else. Then we need to be careful not to cross the border /../ (Interview 6)
The respondent discusses that it is culture and religion that causes these extreme environments and that there is no point in trying to convince people of something because that’s when they will turn to the extreme. Therefore, the focus needs to be on information, education and in showing these types of groups every day how to live in a democracy, in order to get them to accept and understand it (Interview 6). Two of the respondents also expressed that since there are many different cultures in our society today in combination with the freedom of speech, makes it hard to put labels on what is opinions and what is radicalization (Interviews 2 and 6). The respondent argues;

/../ “But in slowly but surely make sure that they understand that we live in Sweden, here we have democracy and equality but this is okay. /../ You must therefore slowly but surely describe and explain how this works” /../
(Interview 6)

However, even if it is important to educate democracy, some of the respondents believe that because the freedom of speech, it is more important to accept and getting people to know that it is accepted, to have different cultures and that is what build a democratic society. Two respondents argue;

/../“ There is a need for a society that provides an openness for these people to maintain their cultures. And we can have a hard time how to handle this/../
(Interview 2)

/../”You must learn to accept and respect the community you live in. You have the right to your own opinion, but you cannot talk about it everywhere” /../
(Interview 6)

The respondents argue that it is of importance to include people in the society, however, it is of equal importance for them to want to be included and learn about the social rules as well.

Another challenge with democracy and freedom of speech that is a challenge is knowing the current local situation and deciding what is radical or not, since the changes in the social climate change rapidly (Interviews 4, 5 and 8). One respondent explains;
“If you get a person, how do you work with them? Because I mean, it is voluntary as long as you obviously do not break the law /.../ and once you find the people, it is impossible to force them. But it is easier with the young people because if you involve parents and express concern, you hopefully get the conversations going and a network with adults that engage” /.../ (Interview 4)

Two of the respondent expresses the challenge in finding the radicals is also to convince them to get help since the social service system is voluntary (Interviews 4 and 8). Many times, these individuals decline the help because it is a question about trust from the civil society against the municipality (Interview 8).

4.2.5 Summary – How do the national strategies for de-radicalization translate into local implementations plans?

Presented in this section is that both municipalities have local strategies for radicalization and violent extremism. However, Municipality 1 is more developed in the paperwork with the strategies such as having an action-plan and a security coordinator. However, Municipality 2 is working closely with the civil society organization and have currently a bottom-up approach where they hope that the information will go to the higher levels of the municipality in order to create an action-plan and to get a security coordinator. Furthermore, while asking about the NSAVE and how it translates into local implementation plans, all of the respondents from both municipalities expressed concerns about the law of confidentiality, freedom of speech and democracy. The respondents underlined that these two subjects make it a challenge in working with implementing strategies and policies because they fell that they are limited in a sense of what the actually can and cannot do. The main concern was the law of confidentiality, which makes the collaboration between institutions, municipalities, the police and SÄPO restricted and has resulted in that the different actors often have their own individual plans on how to handle the problem, instead of one for the whole region.
4.3. How do the municipalities implement policies and strategies on prevention of radicalization?

This section will start by explaining the strategies for prevention of radicalization, how the municipalities are implementing it and if they are working with de-radicalization. The preventative-work were similar in both municipalities and therefore will the findings be presented together for these questions. The respondents also identified some challenges in working with the prevention of radicalization and that will be presented as a question of challenges. The section will end with preventative-actions that have been taken from each of the municipalities.

4.3.1 Do you work with prevention for radicalization and how it is implemented?

Respondents from both municipalities explain that the main focus for the preventative-work is the youths within the municipalities because that is where the municipality has a right to, with support from the parents, to intervene and help at an early stage. The respondents know that there are adults who also are at risk of becoming radicalized, but since they are over 18, the help from the municipality is voluntary. However, both municipalities underline that the work with prevention of radicalization already started a few years ago. According to one respondent the question about radicalization was taken more seriously after the school massacre in the Swedish city Trollhättan in 2015, where a young man started to attack people in a high school;

"After Trollhättan, I think it was quite noticeable at the schools. We have, among other things, here in the hallway, a staff who keep track of who's coming into the school. /../ we'll have an overview of who's coming in and who's going out, we believe it is important” /../ (Interview 6).

After the attack, the school started to have employees in the corridors and at the entrance to the schools, to make sure that they knew who walked in and out which was considered a direct and active preventative-approach. However, all of the respondents from the municipalities explain that preventative-work has been done for many years within the municipalities, even though it hasn’t been under the name radicalization. Two respondent describes;
“The work with radicalization has been on the agenda for a couple of years, although it began with an incident, that we now realize is really work against radicalization, we did not call it that from the beginning” (Interview 3)

“It is not a new way of working, but we work systematically and family-oriented and it is usually the way forward” (Interview 8)

It was not until about a year ago, in combination with the action plan, that they started to talk specifically about preventative actions against radicalization and extremism. The strategies in preventing radicalization is not different from other preventative work that are used for example on criminals and alienated individuals (Interviews 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8). One respondent describes;

"You do not work differently with radicalization, we are using the same methods. Other municipalities may have people who are more specialized in the field, but then we need someone who can see directly that those who come in are radicalized. Categorization is, therefore, a difficulty in this matter” (Interview 4)

Often, the tendency of radicalization appears after the youth has been in contact with social services for a while for something else such as drug- or criminal-related questions, and therefore, the radicalization is hard to discover at first. Having someone specialized in the subject will therefore not be effective according to respondent 4 and that there is a need for more than one expert in one department since this problem can appear anywhere and anytime (Interviews 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8). One respondent argues for the importance of using the action-plan because of the useful information that it can contribute to and says:

“It (the action-plan) follows the law and the work we are going to do anyway, which is no new discovery. The department has an action plan that the social workers can bring up when they suspect that there is something that they suspects to be radical” (Interview 8)

The respondents explain that this is good for the social workers to have in case they are unsure but that they also sometimes contact him to get a second opinion (Interview 8).
4.3.1.1 How is the line of action?

Both municipalities have the same line of action when it comes to radicalization and explains that the approaches that they are using are the same strategies as they use on other youths with other problems such as crime, drugs, and alienation. One respondent explains;

"If it goes towards the extreme, we contact the parents together with the youth. But, are the parents redundant can it be a big process with a report to the social services, a police report if it is something is illegal and then an investigation will continue." (Interview 6)

If the employees, such as a teacher, within the municipalities suspects radicalization, the first line of contact is with the youth themselves to try and find out what is happening. This usually occurs in the school environment. If the youth doesn’t respond, contacting the parents are the next step, to inform them about what is happening and the consequences of the actions. Having the support of the parents, who are often not in line with the youth’s behavior, has shown to be positive because there is often another reason underlying the problem of radicalization, such as a bad well-being. One respondent says;

"We work family-oriented and systematically, which usually is the way forward anyway." (Interview 8)

If there are no illegal actions involved, only the fact that what has been done can be seen as apprehended and inappropriate, the next step is to file a concern to the social services. If, however, the action that has been done is illegal, a police report will be filed as well. When the social services get the report, a caseworker is assigned to investigate the case and then a treater is often assigned to start treatment with the individual and/or the family.

4.3.1.2 De-radicalization

The municipalities work a different with the treatment part. Municipality 1 works mostly family-oriented and Municipality 2 focus more on working with implementing norms and values for the individual. Both municipalities do however explain that they do not work with de-radicalization and de-radicalization programs as have been explained previously in the thesis.
The reason for this is because Sweden doesn’t have that kind of system where they use programs in order to change someone’s opinions, which is connected to democracy and the freedom of speech. One respondent says:

/.../ “I believe that it would be hard to have some sort of “standard-program” for these individuals. /.../ It takes approximately 20 years to change someone’s opinions /.../ What we can do is helping these individuals getting more healthy, physically and mentally, which will stop them from doing stupid things” /.../ (Interview 8).

However, Municipality 1 are focusing on prevention of radicalization and helping the individuals in leavening these environments by getting them treatment for all of the combine problems they might have, instead of trying to de-radicalize them (change their opinions) (Interview 8). Municipality 2 focus is on implementing new values and norms based on the democratic society together with their equality policy that they have been implementing in their work at the social services department for many years. The focus is to educate and spread information about equal values and opportunities for everyone and this is the focus of the treatment (Interview 2).

The municipalities also explain that they have not had any cases of returns of radicals, such as people from for example Daesh, and that the youths that they have been and are working with, often comes from the right-wing environment.

4.3.2 What are the challenges in implementing strategies and policies for radicalization?

All of the respondents from Municipality 1 and 2 believes that the major challenge for the municipalities is to find the individuals who are radicalized due to the fact that it is hard in getting people to share information about extremism. One respondent says;

/.../ “One of the biggest challenges I think is about making people want to talk. /.../ One see something, one hears something, but chooses not to talk about it, /.../ then, it does not come to the surface until it is gone a long time” /.../

(Interview 7)

All of the respondents argue that the reason for individuals not wanting to talk about the subject of radicalization, extremism, and terrorism, is that it can be scary. This often results in people looking the other way instead of dealing with it if they notice anything.
4.3.2.1 Municipality 1

Two of the respondent’s express concerns about knowing how much resources to put on the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. They say;

"We need to understand the seriousness of the question, definitely. But it is important to understand the size of the problem within the municipality in order to know how much resources you can put on it" (Interview 4)

"We need to know, does it exists? In order to know if resources need to be put on this question" (Interview 5)

As the situation is right now, the municipality has not had that many cases of radicalization and therefore it is a challenge to know how much resources, effort, education and information that needs to be centralized to this question. Some of the respondents also argue that the municipality is not facing the same level of problems as other municipalities do, such as for example Gothenburg and Orebro, which therefore also translates into the fact that they cannot put equal resources into the question (Interviews 4, 5 and 8). However, argues that there are too little resources put on this and is critical to the fact that the security coordinator within the municipality only has this a part of their employment.

The respondent argues that it would be preferable to have someone within the municipality working full-time with this in need of someone with a full overview and the collaboration would be improved as well. The respondents also underline the fact that a full-time security coordinator is important because of the collaboration between the different departments within the municipalities (Interview 7).

4.3.3 Preventive actions

Examples of preventive actions will be presented under this section. From Municipality 1 a flow chart, policies when applying for grants from the municipality and a preventive intervention by the police will be presented. From Municipality 2 the work with civil society organization will be described and presented.
4.3.3.1 The Flowchart

In identifying what to do when noticing something radical, Municipality 1 has, together with the police, developed a flowchart (Figure 4) which is an overview on where to turn if you believe that someone is becoming radical, see figure 4 (Interviews 1, 5, 7 and 8). The flow-chart was developed together with an education-project that Municipality 1 started in order to educate the employees in radicalization and violent extremism, to give guidelines and an overview of the subject (Interviews 1 and 5). The focus has been on dissemination and education in order for the employees to understand the difference between radicals, violent extremist and a terrorist. It has also been a focus within the municipality to educate the supervisors of every department in order for them to, later on, educate their employees in the question and also to get an understanding of the flow-chart (Interviews 1, 5 and 7).

4.3.3.2 Polices when applying for a grant from the municipality

Another preventative action that has been taken in Municipality 1 is that the municipality has changed the policies when applying for grants from the municipality to culture-events for different associations and organizations. In order to get a more overview and control over where the grants go, the municipality has now done a one-way source within one department, that control all of the applications for the whole municipality. The action was taken as a preventive action in combination with the reveal that grants from municipalities in Sweden had been approved to organizations who used the money for radical activates, such as training or sending it to fund terrorists and terrorist organizations (Interview 5).
4.3.3.3 Preventive work from the police

Another action that has been taken in Municipality 1 by the police, which was after the terrorist attack in Stockholm in March 2017, is getting drivers to not leave their keys in the vehicle while delivering goods. The police investigated if there was a problem with drivers leaving their keys in the vehicle while delivering goods and noticed that almost every driver left their trucks in idle while making deliveries. The police, therefore, reviewed the law to find out that it is illegal not to turn off the vehicle and take out the key while delivering goods. The police, together with the municipality, started an information campaign about this with the purpose to inform the drivers that it is an offense in doing so. The campaign has been working because according to the police, there have been random checks of the vehicles, and they have not found any keys that have been left with the vehicle on, yet (Interview 1).

4.3.3.4 Civil society

Municipality 2 has a strong collaboration with the civil society as they have a very close connection with many of the different organizations in the municipality such as for example the Chechen association and the Somali association. One respondent explains;

//.// “Quick information channels, open climate, and good cooperation. //.// And if there is any problem with any youth, then I can contact a chair of an organization and speak openly and discuss to him about any troubles //.// Often, the chairman knows more than I know about the family and if someone is going towards the extremes //.// (Interview 6).

The collaboration makes it easier for the municipality to discover and help youths that are in the risk-environment of things such as crime, alienation, and radicalization due to the social and open climate between the municipality and the organizations. The respondents explain that the communication lines are short and effective, and they often have direct contact with the chairmen in the organizations.

The civil society together with the municipality also has many different collective activities such as after-school sports or a group that provides education before the upcoming election this fall. One respondent explains;

//.// “Our preventive work, though, is not that we only have a lot of recreational activities, but it is actually helping children and young people to develop their study habits and so on. This is included in the entire package” //.// (Interview 2).
Together with the civil society organizations, the municipality is working on inclusion and getting people to be more activated. The municipality is also working for the importance of getting youths employment during the summer which is one of the projects in the preventative-work. Therefore, they have been able to offer every youth from 9th grade in junior high school up till second grade of high school, an employment during the summer holiday. Beyond that, the municipality also focuses on organizing actives for the youths on evenings and holidays because there are a lot of youths who don’t have anything to do, wondering the streets, and they are a target group when it comes to alienation, crime, and radicalization. Therefore, in order to connect these youths to some sort of activities, their chances of engaging in these types of environments will decrease. The municipality has also created a consul together with some of the civil society organizations that meet up once a year to discuss differences and uncertainties together with employees from the municipalities (Interviews 2, 3 and 6).

4.3.7 Summary – How do the municipalities implement policies and strategies on prevention of radicalization?

The implementation of strategies and policies for radicalization and violent extremism in the municipalities are based on strategies that are used in the preventative-work for similar subjects such as criminality and alienation. Both municipalities are working similarly to these strategies and the line of action that is taken when someone is suspected to be radical. Neither of the municipalities is using de-radicalization as a strategy. However, the municipalities have different approaches in their treatment strategies.

Municipality 1 is focusing on a family-oriented perspective whereas Municipality 2 is focusing on implementation of norms and values in understanding the democratic society. The respondents agree that there are some challenges in implementing strategies and policies such as getting people to feel secure enough to talk about radicalization.

Municipality 1 express concerns in knowing how much recourses to assign to this subject due to the uncertainty of how comprehensive the problem actually is. Both municipalities have taken some effective actions in the preventative work. Municipality 1 has constructed a flow-chart for the information-flow, restricted the process of applying for grants and controlled that drivers do not leave their keys in their vehicles while delivering goods. Municipality 2 has continued their work with civil society organizations in order to have an open climate and keeping the information-line short.
Municipality 2 has also been able to offer youth employment during the summer, which is a preventive action in getting youths to be more active during the summer and prevents them from engaging in the risk environments.

4.4 How do the municipalities evaluate their work on de-radicalization?

All of the respondents from the municipalities explained that there has been no evaluation done on the preventative-work of radicalization. They all explain that it is too soon to do so since the work started about a year ago and that the NSAVE (2016) were presented only 2 years ago. Due to the law of confidentiality, all of the respondents from the municipality argue that it is hard to evaluate and keep statistics but are agreeing on that some sort of evaluations needs to be done, however, it will be a priority for the future.

Municipality 1 finished their education for the managers within the municipality a few months ago and are now going into a new challenge which is the implementation of the flow-chart together with information about the subject (Interview 5). One respondent from Municipality 1 says that there was a discussion about having evaluations after the one-year project (action-plan), which stretched throughout the year 2017 (Interview 7). Some of the respondents from Municipality 1 are positive to more evaluations in order to get more developed in the preventative-work and also to get an understanding if what they are focusing on is successful (Interview 4 and 8). Municipality 1 are positive about the flow-chart and although it is new they can see that it is working. For example, the municipality has seen an increase in information reported as a result of the flow-chart and that information is now coming to the right person within the municipality more quickly than before (Interviews 4, 5, 7 and 8). However, the police can use statistics in order to review their work. The police within the municipality have seen an increase in the information-flow as well since the flow-chart were presented. The police use other statistics such as reports on SoL 14 (the law of someone seeking help from social services) and if the racial agitation charge has increased or decreased (Interview 1).

Municipality 2 explains that they have started to define key-persons to work with radicalization and violent extremism within the municipality and started to get these key-persons updated on the subject. However, the respondent argues that the municipality has been lacking in the education of employees and that the municipality needs a flow-chart so that everyone knows what to do in case a radicalization occurs.
One respondent within Municipality 2 says that there are no specific goals with the preventative-work on radicalization and it is, therefore, hard to measure a result but believe that the equality policy within the social service is a good start in the policy-making. One respondent discusses that the subject and the specific work is very new, which makes it hard to measure at the moment. Therefore, the work is mostly based on previous knowledge, humbleness, and positive thinking.

One respondent from Municipality 2 has however seen a change in the society over the last years when it comes to groups that have radical, religious beliefs and says;

//.// “We have noticed that this has begun to loosen the youngsters, especially girls, who may start to mark to their parents at home if they don’t want it like this. That they do not want to marry what their parents decide for them. It is a majority of girls who come and talks about this with us because they trust us”//.// (Interview 6)

The respondent argues that there are more and more young girls and women who have started to opposite against arrange marriage and that many of these young girls start to trust teachers and other employees at school to talk about these things. Many girls also start to understand their rights in a democratic society like Sweden and that arrange marriage is not okay.

4.4.1 Has the work on an actual case been evaluated

Both municipalities explain that they don’t have had any “real” cases of radicalization and therefore can’t argue if different strategies were working or not. However, one respondent explains;

//.// A high school teacher called and said that there was someone who designed a flag here similar to the ISIS-flag. This was before we used this word (radicalization) at all, but at that level, we also intervened and made up with the police how we do when we encounter such a thing. //.// (Interview 3)

The respondent did not agree that this was a case of radicalization but underlined that they handle it well anyway. All of the respondents argue that often it is not a case of radicalization but usually a case of youths that are acting rebellious. Therefore, the action has not been evaluated because it is classified as similar to other acts that youths can do such as scribbling and vandalism.
4.4.2 Is radicalization a threat to the municipality and the society?
This section is divided by the respondent’s opinion in the question, not which municipality they work in due to the nature of the question.

4.4.2.1 Radicalization is not a threat
Four of the respondents from the municipalities do not believe that violent extremism and radicalization is a threat against the society or the municipalities because the municipalities are too small, and our democratic society is strong (Interviews 2, 3, 5 and 8). Two of the respondents says;

// "I don’t know what someone would gain from detonating something here"
// (Interview 8).

// As long as there is confidence in a democratic system in the society and that democracy works, it will always be stronger” /../ (Interview 2)

The strength of the democracy will also result in that these groups that are extreme will stay small because they will not get any space to grow and influence people. One respondent continues;

// These are still smaller groups of people // that are the extremes // but they will not get sympathy. // Sweden has a pretty good foundation and it will not let them have any influence. // (Interview 2)

One of the respondents recognize that there are a fear and concern in the society and that could produce attacks but argues that the prevailing social climate with gang violence, alienation amongst youths, attitude changes and a more global view, is a much bigger threat than radicalization (Interviews 5). One respondent would not agree that radicalization or violent extremism is a threat, however, the respondent does believe that there is work to do because of the many school shootings that occur today all over the world. The respondent says;

// The hate against the school when you graduate and have the experience of being treated in a very bad way. I think that is what you see at all school shootings // It is often common for “regular” boys and girls to go to the extreme. But the threat, it is hard for me to answer that question. Of course, we'll need to keep an eye on it, I think so” // (Interview 6)
The respondent is concerned with the young individuals who put their frustration for something, towards the school and it ends up in school shootings. The respondent also expresses concern for that the radicalization often occurs on the internet where it is hard to capture (Interview 6).

**4.4.2.2 Radicalization is a threat**

Three of the respondents from the municipalities and the police do believe that radicalization and violent extremism is a threat (Interviews 1, 4 and 7). One respondent says;

> /../ “Yes, I see it as a threat. Radicalization is a type of alienation with individuals who don’t want to be a part of the society /../ Of course, it is a threat since it is a problem for the society with people who don’t want to live by the norms and rules of the society” /../ (Interview 4)

The respondent argues that radicalization is a part of the alienation in the society, which also is seen a threat. Furthermore, one of the respondents does not think that radicalization is a specific threat the specific Municipalities in Sweden but that the influence that Daseh have to manage to create over the last years can cause trouble for all the countries in the world, and therefore it is hard to understand why Sweden should be spared.

The respondent explains;

> /../ Why should a municipality like ours be spared? /../ There have been attacks in smaller cities in Germany for example, why should Sweden be any different?” /../ (Interview 7)

Also, the respondents underline that it is an election year in Sweden this year, which makes many extreme groups more active and visible for demonstrations and spreading propaganda. This can, therefore, be an opportunity for the extreme groups to make statements and attacks, to put pressure on the government. The respondents explain that both municipalities have had an overrepresentation of the right-wing movement but that this can be perceived that way since the right-wing environment are more visible than others. Some of the respondents, therefore, believes that it could be that the Islamic extremes also are operating in the municipalities but as they often keep to themselves, that is something that is unknown (Interviews 1, 4 and 7). One respondent argues;
“If there is a strong player, there is also a strong opponent” (Interview 7)

Which indicates that if there is a strong right-wing movement, there are often opponents. Whether they are Islamic or from the left-wing environment, is hard to say but the respondent is certain that the municipalities have more extreme groups than they know about.

4.4.3 Summary - How do the municipalities evaluate their work on de-radicalization?

The answer to this question is consistent, neither of the municipalities has done any evaluations, yet. Municipality 1 are planning to do it even though it is not right now since the work only has been active since the approval of the action-plan in January 2017. Municipality 2 are focusing on getting the actual work going in constructing strategies and policies but are waiting on the high-level management in the Municipality to be more structured, and therefore an evaluation is not their main concern right now. The police, however, are doing continuous evaluations, using statistics, but that information is confidential, and they are not likely to be shared with the municipalities. There have been cases of radicalization within the municipalities but not so many, as the respondents would say. Therefore, there have not been any evaluations and follow-ups on these cases, but the respondents believe that it would be desirable to have evaluations of case studies as well.

Four of the respondents do not believe that radicalization is a threat towards the society or municipalities and three of the respondent do. The main argument for the fact that radicalization and violent extremism is not a threat is the strength of the democratic society and that the municipalities are too small to be targeted. However, the other three respondents believe that radicalization is a threat because of the alienation that follows, that it is an election year in Sweden and also because they believe that some of the groups are operating in silence which makes them hard to discover. Their respondents also believe that as the right-wing movement will start to show, due to the election and their desire to be visible, their opponents will come forward as well.
5. Analysis

The analysis will be based on and presented in three parts; the NSAVE, Municipality 1 and Municipality 2. Part one, the strategy, will address the answer to the first research question. Part two and three, the Municipalities, will be analyzed according to the remaining research questions. The analysis uses the two presented responses on radicalization, from the theoretical framework in the thesis, development/inclusion and security/exclusion. Development through inclusion focuses on the inclusiveness in the society in order to achieve development, which indicates that the population needs to be included and feel included in order for the society to move forward. Other states use the approach of security through exclusion, which focus on protecting the state from things that can be seen as a security risk, such as radicalization. In excluding these individuals, the security-level and the perceived security will increase, and the level of threat will decrease (Davies, 2005; Rawal 2008; Buur et al, 2007).

5.1 The National Strategy Against Violent Extremism

The national framework is focusing on dividing the strategy into three dimensions which are fostering democracy, prevention, and prohibition. The strategy argues that in order to create a society without radicalization and violent extremism, it is of importance to strengthen democracy. The strategy is presented as blocs that build on each other where fostering democracy is the foundation that is needed to create preventative-strategies. The strategy includes that the actors on local levels take the main responsibility in the work against extremism, which is the municipalities, institutions, civil society and the local police. In reviewing and analyzing the strategy the focus on development through inclusion is dominate in the sense that the strategy always wants to prevent and include individuals as a part of the development of the country instead of excluding radicals from the society. However, as the term goes from radical to extremist or terrorist, it is a legal concern and then it is the police who has the responsibility which is also where the strategy is shifting from inclusion to exclusion, to imprisonment individuals that engage in terrorism.

It can, therefore, be argued that the NSAVE main strategy is to first approach radicalization and violent extremism with inclusion and when inclusion is less successful, exclusion is an option.
For example, including everyone in the democratic society, prevent radicalization in offering other environments that youths can go to instead of these extreme environments. The NSAVE is not descriptive in the sense of how the municipalities are to create policies or strategies. The recommendations in the strategy are abstract and general, such as the recommendation of an action-plan and a security coordinator. Therefore, it is hard for the municipalities to interpret and follow the strategy because there are no specific instructions in it and it is also only a recommendation for the municipalities. While analyzing the strategy it is understandable that the focus on inclusion and development are the main goal and that this is what the NCAVE wants the municipalities to continue with and include the work on radicalization into their other preventative-work on criminality and alienation.

However, as there are no concrete guidelines, it is confusing, and the framework can essentially be interpreted differently which results in different strategies for different municipalities and institutions that operate in the same region. It is therefore questionable how the municipalities are going to manage these questions on their own if there are no strategies or guidelines from the national level. The analysis of the material concludes that the material is basic knowledge that is more of an overview of the problem rather than actions to be taken. The NSAVE is based on only Swedish sources of information and the strategy is more of an information manual than a strategy. The question is why the strategy is not more developed and why sources and resources from the international debate are missing? Wanting to work with inclusion and development in using democracy and prevention as the main strategy, the NCAVE present a strategy based on only the perception of Swedish sources which makes the apprehension that the strategy, in reality, is more exclusive than can be precepted and that exclusion and security can be an underlying approach. The information is, as presented, confusing, which makes the work hard for the municipalities as well.

5.2 Municipality 1
Municipality 1 is focusing on development through inclusion in their approach on radicalization and violent extremism. As the preventative-work of alienation and criminality is an ongoing strategy and has been for many years, the work with radicalization and de-radicalization falls under this category as well. The municipality is following the NSAVEs recommendations for creating an action-plan has an assigned security coordinator.
However, the municipality has taken some direct preventative actions against radicalization. One is the flow-chart, to divided and direct where information needs to be transferred so that it will reach the right person in the municipality. The municipality has also started to collaborate between departments in making sure that grants from the municipality go to civil society organizations with the right qualifications. The other preventive action that was conducted was a collaboration between the municipality and the police in order to stop drivers from leaving their keys in the vehicle. All of these actions are examples of an inclusive approach where the municipality and the police are working towards including employees with the flow-chart, departments with the collaboration between the grants-department and the security-department and also by the municipality and the police in order to inform and letting drivers understand that they should not leave the key in the vehicle. It is a dominate inclusive approach in order to move forward in the development and trying to work on including instead of excluding. However, the police have the approach of exclusion in terms of imprisonment which is an alternative if someone does something illegal. However, all of the respondents argue that the focus is always to include and to work with individuals that are in need of help, in getting them to feel better and engaging in better environments. This approach is the same as for youths in criminality and alienation.

However, the municipality is working with a top-down inspired approach which indicates that decisions are made at the management-level and then implemented at the bottom-level of the society. Using a top-down approach is beneficial when it comes to control and concentration of different strategies for a specific topic, such as radicalization because it provides clarity. However, using a top-down approach can sometimes generate that the top-level are focusing on inclusion a development but it can be perceived as exclusion for security in a sense strategies and policies may not always be favourable in practice but good in theory which indicates that the top-level wants to exclude the problem instead of including, even if inclusion is the approach from the beginning. It is therefore important, as the national strategy also underlines, that the municipalities have a good relationship with the civil society and the organization operation in the municipality because this is where they discoveries first often occur. To work with inclusion and development it is not just to work with including individuals and groups into society, it is also important, for the development process, that these individuals feel that they have an influence of their inclusion-processes into the society and for the development in the future. This creates a commitment from the population.
5.3 Municipality 2

Municipality 2 is focusing on the relationship with the civil society organizations because that is already strong, and the municipality is, therefore, using the civil society as a support in their daily work. As Municipality 2 has had some problems at the management-level, they do not have any strategies such as an action-plan or a security coordinator at the moment, but the respondents are positive towards that a security coordinator is to be assigned soon. The municipality is also using an inclusive approach in striving towards development in working with the implementation of the democratic society and the equality policy within the social services department. The municipality has taken one active approach as a part of the preventative-strategy and that is to have a close relationship with the civil society organization in the municipality with for example councils for the organizations and after school activates for the youths. Inclusion is approached from both directions, the inclusion of the civil society organizations in the democratic society and inclusion with the youths and the organizations in activities, which also result in a society that will develop together with their population.

However, it is critical that there are limited individuals working with the question and that the municipality does not have a coordinator yet. Even though the NSAVE is a recommendation, from what the respondents have explained, there are cases of radicalization and violent extremism and the respondents are expressing the need for a better structure such as a flow-chart as the Municipality 1 has developed. The municipality is at the moment using a bottom-up-approach in which the respondents express that the information-flow is traveling up to the top-level which can be an advantage for the coordinator that will be assigned in the municipality in the future, because there are already strategies and different approaches that the bottom-level is using, however, it is not written down and approved. The opportunity to collaborate with the civil society, social services and the schools in the municipality is therefore positive and it is also favourable for the municipality to get inspired by other municipalities in the region which indicates that the coordinator will have a good start.

The municipality is not using exclusion and thinks of radicalization as a security threat, however, exclusion is an approach that is used when nothing else is working, which is a report to the police in a worst-case scenario. In order for the management-level to avoid the approach of exclusion through, it is important to continue working closely with the civil society.
6. Conclusions and recommendations

Working with radicalization and violent extremism is important, especially in Sweden. As presented in the introduction, many countries are affected by terrorism and the number has increased in Europe due to various circumstances such as an easy access to the continent but also the malice towards the western society by other terrorist groups. Therefore, it is not certain that Sweden will be spared, even though Sweden has been rather spared in the past. After the terrorist attack in Stockholm in 2017, the question of terrorism has been of importance and the national strategy that is examined in this study is from 2016, which is something that needs to be taken into account while reading the review. The critical perspective of the NSAVE is, however, still accountable in a sense that it is basic and general with no concrete options or strategies, which would have been preferable since the responsibility is mainly at the local levels and some responsibility is put on the regional levels. The way that the NSAVE is presented makes it more of an information-manual than a strategy and to get municipalities to work with the question, there need to be guidelines and a good structure, because this subject is complex, partly because of the democratic society and freedom of speech. The municipalities that have been a part of the study are working on the question, only with different approaches. However, all of the respondents had some part in the process and the preventative-work which indicates that it is of importance for the municipalities. As some municipalities and the County Government did not want to participate in the study, the question arises if they are working with the question or not and if they do not work with the question, why is that? It would have been interesting to know.

The following section will present some recommendations and thoughts, both in general and some recommendations directed towards the specific municipalities. Since this is a case study, the purpose has not been to generalize the result but more of an overview in order to get an understanding of what is actually done in the question of radicalization and violent extremism. The section will be divided into conclusion where two categories are presented and further there will be some recommendations to each municipality and also recommendations for future research.
6.1 Regional level

The pressure on the regional level needs to be more excessive since the NSAVE clearly states that the regional level has a responsibility to get the municipalities to collaborate. For example, Municipality 1 has a perfect flow-chart and Municipality 2 is asking for a flow-chart. Why do not share the flow-chart between the municipalities in the County?

Furthermore, Municipality 2 have a strong relationship with the civil society organizations and are working closely with them, which is something that Municipality 1 can get more developed in. This is only two examples where these two municipalities can help each other in a sense that the work can become more effective. It is, therefore, more critical for the regional level to engage and for the municipalities to request more support from the regional level in order to create strategies and policies that are common for all the municipalities. A collaboration over the County would create a strong foundation if a terrorist attack would occur or in case of radicalization but also regarding questions such as criminality and alienation since the municipalities are using these strategies for radicalization and violent extremism as well. It would be a good start to create unity with strategies that are coherent.

6.2 Right expertise at the right place and time

All of the respondents from both municipalities have other responsibilities besides working against radicalization and violent extremism. This makes the focus for this specific problem a challenge for the profession working with this since they do not know how much time and effort that needs to be prioritized for the specific problem or even, as some respondents express if there is a problem? It would, therefore, be preferable for the municipalities to have more people concentrated on specific tasks with the right expertise, instead of on one person working with many different task and topics. For example, radicalization, alienation, and criminality is behavioural science which a social scientist would have the expertise to work with while other tasks such as general emergency alert- the question would be preferable to someone who is more strategic and logical. These subjects go together in terms of a terrorist attack, however, strategies and policies need to create and implemented with the population in order for them to work, which is for example close to the civil society. Therefore, to have a group, such as Municipality 1 has, but with a full-time security coordinator that could create lines and communication between different professions and expertise would give a better structure and the work would be more effective.
Therefore, having different expertise-representatives in a group at a regional level could also create a good network in terms of creating common strategies and policies.

6.3 Municipality 1
As the Municipality has a good structure and a flow-chart I believe that this could be shared with other municipalities that are struggling, both Municipality 2 but also the others in the County. As the municipality is in need of strengthening their connection with the civil society, it is of importance to learn from other municipalities as well. Therefore, putting pressure on a regional level would be preferable for Municipality 1. The respondents expressed concerns in knowing how much resources to use in the question and having a network in the county as a sounding board, the resources in the municipality do not have to excessive. The municipality has made good progress in their work with radicalization and violent extremism and I believe that this needs to be shared with other municipalities in order to help and influence the other municipalities. However, having a full-time security-coordinator that can coordinate as well as find the right expertise for the subject, would be preferable.

6.4 Municipality 2
The work in Municipality 2 is as presented a bottom-up approach with a close relationship to the civil society, which is also recommended by the NSAVE. However, the municipality is in need of an action-plan and a security coordinator on full time to coordinate expertise towards this subject. Furthermore, the municipality cannot be afraid of asking other municipalities for help and inspiration. As there is no strategy, and all of the respondents answer that there is a need for one, it would be preferable to ask other municipalities for ideas so that they do not have to start from zero to do this. The findings show that the municipalities are working identical and that it would, therefore, be a good way for the municipality to develop their own action-plan. Municipality 2, as well as Municipality 1, needs to concentrate their work more on different professions in order to get a more directed work. The security coordinator, therefore, needs this as their main task together with people with an expertise to create strategies that work in this area.
6.5 Future research

One recommendation for future research is to do a study on what is needed in order to develop strategies further on the local levels and this is something that the national level can contribute with. The study needs to examine all of the municipalities in Sweden in order to know what the municipalities need. It would also be preferable for the national level to develop the national strategy to be more detailed in favour for the municipalities and also to underline the responsibility that the regional levels have. The strategy would be more argumentative if there were more research and cases brought in from other counties in order for the regional and local levels use as references in their preventative-work as well instead of as it is right now when everyone is doing their own strategies in each corner. The collaboration part of the national strategy is the main argument, but the national level needs to create requisites for the regional level as well as the municipalities, to create strategies together.
References


Goodwin, Scott; Kommunpolis, Växjö 2018. Lecture about radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism.


### Appendix 1 – Interviews

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Appendix 2 – Interview guide

How do the national strategies for de-radicalization translate into local implementation-plans?

- Hur länge har kommunen/polisen arbetat aktivt med ämnet radikalisering?
- Hur ser samarbetet mellan kommunen/polisen ut när det kommer till radikalisering?
- Vad är den största utmaningen med radikaliserings denna kommunen?
- Vad har kommunen/polisen för strategier/policys för radikaliserings?
- Hur förhåller sig kommunen/polisen till de nationella rekommendationer som finns?
  o Har de läst de nationella riktlinjerna och diskuterat dem?
  o Om ja, vad var resultatet av diskussionen?
- Har kommunen en handlingsplan för radikaliserings?
  o Om ja, hur ser den handlingsplanen ut?
  o Om nej, arbetar ni för att utveckla en handlingsplan?
- Vad är viktigt för kommunen att tänka på i arbete med radikaliserings?
- Vad prioriterar man inom kommunen/polisen i arbetet?
- Är det något som utmärker sig i just denna kommunen när det kommer till radikaliserings?
- Hur arbetar ni med prevention mot radikaliserings (det vill säga, de-radicalization)?
  o Vem har hand om vad?
  o Vad har ni för inriktning/mål med arbetet?
  o Vem arbetar med av-radikaliserings?
- Har ni haft några fall av radikaliserings som ni vill dela med er av? (Exempel)
- Anser kommunen/polisen att radikaliseringsen är ett hot mot kommunen?
  o Om ja, tror du det kommer det att öka i framtiden?
  o Om nej, varför inte?

How do the municipalities evaluate their work on de-radicalization?

- Hur vet man att arbetet fungerar?
- Görs det utvärderingar och uppföljningar?
  o Hur ofta sker det?
  o När sker utvärderingarna?
- Hur följer upp det man utvärderat?
- Görs det ändringar i policys efter hand?
  o Är handlingsplanen ett så kallat ”levande dokument”?
- Hur tror ni att era prevention-metoder mot radikaliserings fungerar?
  o Varför är era preventionsstrategier framgångsrika?
- Har ni några exempel på policys som utvecklats och fungerat?
- Har ni några exempel på policys som utvecklats och inte fungerat?