Those who doubt Nkurunziza's legitimacy are “out of their minds”

A Case Study of the Burundian State’s Conflict Management
Abstract

The aim of this study is to examine what conflict management practices that was employed in Burundi by the state around the electoral crisis of 2015. This will be done by applying the Authoritarian Conflict Management Framework. The study is qualitative, desk and case study and the data has been analyzed according to the method abduction as redescription and recontextualization. The result of the study shows that the Burundian state has adopted several conflict management practices to control political opponents. The state presents itself as democratic and under attacked by "enemies of the state" and "terrorists" as they call the opponents in the official discourse on Twitter. This discourse occurs simultaneously as the state security forces are dehumanizing the opponents in compounds where the opponents are being ill-treated and tortured. Another result explains why the Burundian security forces are enjoying impunity despite their human rights violations against the opponents within the mentioned compound. Despite violent actions, the state has also turned to a practice that gave development initiatives to diaspora to engage in, in order to restrict the diasporas political influence.

A last main result question the long-lasting stability of the contemporary government of Burundi, as the neopatrimonialism system has not only provided stability, but also been a factor that triggered the 2015 political crisis.

Keywords: Burundi, Authoritarian regime, Conflict management
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Abstract

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1. Introduction

1.1 Research Topic, Research Problem, and Relevance

The Burundian state’s increasingly violent actions against its opponents have raised concerns if Burundi is on a path, yet again, to civil war or a possible genocide (Cliff 2017). To prevent potential conflict, The Burundi Power-sharing Agreement, was signed by the government and the main rebel group, which is now a political party called the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), in 2004 (Åshild & Becker 2008). The agreement ensured conflict prevention methods such as democratic elections and power-sharing to ensure political power-balance between the ethnic groups Tutsi and Hutu. However, recent literature shows how elections and power-sharing, among others, have been tools for the ruling party CNDD-FDD and its leader and president, Pierre Nkurunziza, to secure accesses to political power and state resources (Vandeginste 2015, Curtis 2013, Daley 2007, Brosig 2017, Alfieri 2016).

Researchers have addressed the political, economic and social outcomes of the peace agreement and the lead-up and consequences of the 2015 election. The sitting president ran again in 2015, despite it was against the constitution to run for a third term (Vandeginste 2015, Apuuli 2017). The country voted in 2018 for a constitution change, which extended the president to stay in power for seven years, instead of original five years. The president is expected to run next election too, which would allow him to hold power from 2005 to 2034 (New York Times 2018). The government has forcefully put down demonstrators, restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and assembly are continued, the security forces carry out unlawful killings, enforced disappearances and commit human rights violations such as torture and other ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and detention (Amnesty International 2018). The state has also reduced and dismissed United Nations’ (UN) institution’s presence in the country as well as denying UN to get access to information of the ongoing events in the country (Cliff 2018).

The state has taken violent measurements to hold on to its power, but what methods are used that are not based on violence? Previous literature has focused on the outcome of liberal conflict management that were implemented after the peace agreement and how it is operated
in the wrong direction, in favor for elites and the ruling party, rather for democracy and citizen participation (Vandeginste 2015, Curtis 2013, Daley 2007, Brosig 2017, Alfieri 2016). Therefore, the research problem is that there is no holistic understanding of conflict management practices that are being practiced by the Burundian state, in particular, the practices employed before and in the aftermath of the 2015 political crisis.

This study attempts to address what practices the state employees to stabilize the situation in their favor. This study does not declare that it is the authoritarian state’s right to rule simply because it holds the power, it seeks to bring light to the functions and structures of the present state of Burundi. It is relevant because, in line with Lewis et al. (2018) argument, cohesion and violence is not sufficient for a long-term strategy to manage conflict and must be accompanied by social, economic and political conflict management practices. By investigating it, it gives insight into the function of contemporary conflict prevention and management practices. These social, economic and political practices may also tell what social structures are being created by these practices in the country.

The choice to examine non-liberal methods of conflict management are in line with recent literature which has seen states actively seek responses to conflict that differs from liberal approaches to conflict. Some research argued that liberal methods, such as power-sharing, has not proven to solve structural issues which are its design to do (Soares de Oliveria 2011, Skene 2003, Smith 2014). An alternative perspective on conflict prevention and management is seen in “illiberal peacebuilding’ in Indonesia (Smith, 2014), ‘illiberal peace’ in Sri Lanka (Lewis, 2010) and ‘authoritarian peacebuilding’ in Angola (Soares de Oliveira, 2011). Lewis, Heathershaw & Megoran (2018, 490) have created a framework based on authoritarian practices which have been observed in recent literature. The framework is named Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM), it will be applied to this study’s case of Burundi. It is developed to understand the nature of authoritarianism in the country’s wartime or post-conflict order. ACM strives for “prevention, de-escalation, or termination of violent conflicts by having hegemonic control of public discourse, space, and economic resources” (Lewis et al. 2018, 490).

The creators of the framework argue that the shift in conflict management, from liberal practices to authoritarian ones, in post-conflict countries is a part of the global context in where western liberal ideology and democracy is being challenged by China and Russia who have increased their political and economic influence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It provides critical insight into non-liberal norms and policies and introduce new theoretical
basis for new thinking about the complexity of peace and peacebuilding in the 21st century (Lewis et al. 2018).

In the light of the changes of conflict management on a national level and its meaning on a global level, the ACM framework is conceptualizing three categories of practices to make sense of methods that are, in a majority, not undertaken with violence. If there is indeed a shift from liberal conflict management methods to authoritarian as the authors of the framework argue, (Lewis et al. 2018) what can an additional case of a state shown in terms of what practices are being used? What are other practices employed by the states that are not only based on coercion and violence? If states dismiss liberal conflict management, it is of relevance for peace and development studies to explore practices used by states because it will provide an understanding of contemporary state agendas’ on conflict management.

1.2 Research Objective
The research objective is to find out what authoritarian conflict management practices are in place to control conflict in Burundi, what general structures that can demonstrate these practices, and discover findings which can develop or refine the Authoritarian conflict Management framework.

1.3 Research Questions
I will answer the following research question to achieve the objective:

1. Do the state delegitimize the opponents in order to decrease opponent’s political influence?
2. Do the state regulate radio and television broadcasting to control information production?
3. Is the practice of encampment within the state of exception used to control political opponents?
4. Do the state repress the diaspora to control diaspora’s political influence?
5. Is a system of neopatrimonialism in place to give loyal elites state resources in exchange for support to ensure power stability?
1.4 Analytical Framework

The Authoritarian Conflict Management Framework is an alternative framework created by Lewis, Heathershaw, and Megoran (2018). It is alternative because it is derived from the liberal conflict management methods, such as negotiations and peacebuilding, to look at states that have increasingly resorted to authoritarian practices and state coercion to control uprising. The framework is based on authoritarian practices which have been observed in recent literature and it is developed to understand authoritarian conflict management as a form of wartime and post-conflict order in its own right (Lewis et al. 2018).

ACM’s main objection is not to achieve peace, but it concerns termination of armed violence, conflict prevention mechanisms, reconstruction processes, and governance within social, economic and political spheres (Lewis et al. 2018). To handle possible or ongoing conflict, some states use authoritarian conflict management practices. It is a broad framework which conceptualizes practices that have been seen in several states. The aim of the framework is to create a groundwork of modes of conflict management and conceptual framing of the ongoing academic and policy debate (Lewis et al. 2018).

The ACM framework is a robust one which is not intended to create a universal set of practices (Lewis et al. 2018). It brings up several different examples of practices and theories and concepts that explain them. To work with the framework, it has been essential to identify what structure the state aims to achieve in each category of discursive, spatial and political economic practices. What practices that the state can use to achieve their aim is selected to be explained and to interpret them in the case of Burundi.

1.5 Method

This is a qualitative desk and case study with constructivism as an ontological stance. Constructivism views social phenomenon as socially fabricated and in a process of change (Bryman 2016). This is in line with the selected method abduction as redescription or recontextualization. A result of an abductive study cannot be the ultimate truth, because social reality is fluctuating and can be different in a new context. Abduction aims at new insights to give meaning to an already known phenomenon (Danermark 2002).

In this study, the known phenomenon will be the practices conducted by states to control conflict. Abduction as redescription or recontextualization is a method that also highlights the importance to review the existing theoretical work (Danermark 2002). This permits the study to also review what the conflict management practices can say about the ACM framework.
1.6 Limitations, Delimitations and Ethical considerations

In terms of delimitations in this study, its focus on one case, the ruling party CNDD-FDD, and its President in Burundi and its actions during and after the 2015 election. The data on the methods will be of secondary sources, which limits this study to only investigate available sources. However, much research found by this study is peer-reviewed, conducted in the field in Burundi, and well connected to historical events that give a deep understanding of the country's present.

There are no ethical considerations in this study.

1.7 Structure of the thesis

The structure of this study will proceed as followed: the analytical framework will be explained by the practices identified; broadcast regulation, delegitimization, state of exception, encampment, diaspora, and neopatrimonialism. It will continue to present previous literature on frameworks or theories treating conflict management methods. This is followed by the methodology and the findings chapter. Lastly, these findings will be analyzed in the chapter of analysis and the study will end with a conclusion and recommendations for further research.
2. Analytical Framework

The Authoritarian Conflict Management Framework is an alternative framework created by Lewis, Heathershaw, and Megoran (2018). It is based on accounts of state responses to conflicts in Russia, Sri Lanka, China, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Turkey. It is alternative because it is derived from the liberal conflict management methods, such as negotiations and peacebuilding, to look at states that have increasingly resorted to authoritarian practices and state coercion to control uprising. The framework is based on authoritarian practices which have been observed in recent literature and it is developed to understand authoritarian conflict management as a form of wartime and post-conflict order in its own right (Lewis et al. 2018).

The ACM framework allows investigation in the concepts of hegemonic discourse, space and political economy in the case (Lewis et al. 2018). Violence is often central in these states, but a state cannot depend on sole violence to hold on to its power and create stability. Hence, the framework has divided authoritarian conflict management into three categories. Firstly, discourse (state propaganda, information control, and knowledge production); secondly, spatial politics (both military and civilian modes of controlling and shaping spaces); and thirdly, political economy (the hierarchical distribution of resources to produce particular political outcomes) (Lewis et al. 2018).

Each category holds various practices to manage conflict. This study has identified practices in discourse, spatial and political economy. These practices are selected because they address the key issues of the state’s conflict management. The method selected for this study, abduction as recontextualization or redescription allows identifying the practices and its general structure. The practices are observable, but the general structures cannot be directly observed. These structures require theories and concept to explain them (Danermark 2002). This study will look at the practices and the concepts and theories used to each practice which will explain the general structure.

This chapter will begin with discourse practices; delegitimization and broadcast regulation. This is followed by spatial practices; encampment within the state of exception, then spatial practices and political economic practices; state repression on diaspora, and end with political economic practices; patron-client relationships.
2.1 Discourse Practices

Discourse is a practice that constructs and constitutes social structures and gives it a meaning. Social structure entails social identities, social relationship as well as the knowledge and belief of a society (Fairclough 1993 see Dimitrakopoulou & Boukala 2018). A hegemonic discourse is achieved when a state’s ideas and narratives dominate society to the extent that other ideas about the political status quo cannot be expressed (Lewis et al. 2018). This dominated discourse is the general structure which can be seen by looking at the employed practices. This study does not intend to measure to what extent a hegemonic discourse is achieved, it is interested in what practices the state employ to create a state dominated discourse.

One of the two practices is broadcast regulation which is a mean to control the media and its information flow. The second one aims at a state’s attempts to delegitimize political opponents through media outlets in order to justify its own power status and its repressive behavior against the ones against them. This is to influence and impose the state’s own ideas on the society about opponents (Lewis et al. 2018). How this delegitimization takes its form can be reviewed through the process of delegitimization by Bar-Tal (2000). Both will be further explained.

**Broadcast Regulation**

A state tries to “coerce or repress alternative sources of information and interpretations of events and seek to control news dissemination and knowledge production” (Lewis et al. 2018, 493). The framework describes different methods, but not a specified strategy. To interpret the state’s control over the spread of news and obtaining of information, this study will look at broadcast regulation. Scholars have argued that regulation of broadcasting through television and radio is the most vital media-outlet to control by an authoritarian state. Radio and television have the most impact on public opinion and is therefore important for a state to control the information (Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart & Welzel 2009, Mosime 2015).

**Delegitimization**

Authoritarian regimes use these official discourse practices to delegitimize the armed opponent's objectives and existence. Successful delegitimization by the state of opponents justifies governmental policies and the state’s repressive, and perhaps violent, responses to opponents. As well as it limits the opponent's possible to gain political influence (Lewis et al. 2018). This study seeks to explore the state’s practices to create hegemonic discourse.
The process of delegitimization can evaluate the case’s hegemonic discourse because it analyzes the ingroup, in this case, the state, behavior which is the ACM framework focus. The framework discussed also a “deeper hegemonic control” which permeate the whole society into the households which turn state attitudes to private ones. However, it is beyond this study’s scope because it would be to evaluate the effect of the official discourse and would require to conduct interviews in Burundi to examine this, which would be the preferable way to find out what people are thinking in their own homes.

To evaluate this study’s case of hegemonic discourse and its practices it will look at Daniel Bar-Tal's process of delegitimization (1989, 2000). It will examine the state’s official discourse on opponents through four aspects of the process (not in a direct order): first, group comparison allows the ingroup to compare the outgroup to a negative group in society, like vandals, secondly, trait categorization is when referring negative characteristics of the outgroup, like aggressors. Third, by using political labels, the ingroup can create an association between the outgroup and an unacceptable political label in the society, for example, the label terrorists. Lastly, dehumanizing of the outgroup which labels the outgroup as inhuman, like savages. The process allows the ingroup to justify their harsh behavior towards the outgroup as well as keeping ingroup intact from influences and changes. In Lewis’ et al. (2018) framework, delegitimization contributes to undermining of political opponent’s legitimate grievances.

2.2 Spatial Practices

Space is a physical setting that is influenced, changed and dominated by political, economic, social and ideological objectives of actors (Lefebvre, Elden, Brenner 2009). Space is referred to a geographical location, a political space in where citizens can express and act on their opinions (Lewis et al. 2018). Authoritarian regimes perceive some spaces as a threat because it is where meetings and mobilization of support and training occur by opponents. Authoritarian states want therefore to close, penetrate or dominate these spaces (Lewis et al. 2018). The ACM frameworks argue that a state wants to create spaces of state of exceptions to separate political opponents and the rest of the population (Lewis et al. 2018). In a state of exception, the encampment is a practice that allows a state to suspend the rights the political opponents holds as citizens (Agamben 2008). This general structure can be read as a power structure to divide citizens into non-citizens and citizens. This will be further elaborated in the next paragraphs.
The State of exception and Encampment

The State of exception is referred to Giorgio Agamben’s approach which transcends from Carl Schmitt’ definition. State of exception is when a state respond to internal crises through suspension or diminishing of constitutional laws (Agamben 2008). In Schmitt’s view, suspension or regulation of law is only temporary and within a specific area. Agamben (2008) goes beyond that and argues that the state of exception becomes the rule and the new way to govern for a longer period. Security forces can always behave in a lawful manner in a state of exception because the law by the constitution has no legal significance. There is a distinction between the ones who operate the state of exception and the ones the power is being exercised over (Hagmann and Korf 2012, Agamben 2008).

To understand Agamben’s (1998) state of exception, one must know a natural life and the biolife. In the natural life, animal, men, and gods exist without laws and rules. Agamben (1998) perceives the biolife as the political form of natural life. People have rights that ground itself in a social contract between the state and the citizen. Citizens allow state monopoly on violence in exchange for the protection and safety of one’s life (Agamben 1998).

In modern societies, such as in the western democracies, sovereignty is passed down to people who are sovereign, hence, a state is made up by the sovereign people. The idea of sovereignty is that it gives equal rights to everyone. A social contract is created between a state and citizens. This contract ensures the citizens right to life and protection by the state to ensure individuals safety. However, in times of political crisis, the state can issue (officially or unofficially) a state of exception (Agamben 1998). In that mode, a state can decide who have rights and whose rights are suspended or diminished. If the state views a citizen’s rights, such as freedom of expression, as a threat, the state has the right to strip of citizen’s rights in the name of protection of the state. The state holds the power to decide what the state needs to be protected from to stay in its status quo (Agamben 1998).

When a state perceives a citizen as a threat, the state must take the citizen out from the biolife into the natural life in order to treat them in an unlawful manner. It is acceptable to act unlawfully in natural life because there are no laws in nature. In the biolife, a citizen cannot be punished because it holds rights. But in the natural life it can be punished (Agamben 1998). The encampment is, therefore, a strategy used by states to take citizens away from biolife. By taking citizens to specific space laws are not applicable in that specific space. A
state can behave in an unlawful manner, such as human rights violations, because the laws are not applicable in that space, such as in a camp. The state actors can therefore not be prosecuted. However, the law is still in force, simply not applicable (Agamben 1998).

In Agamben’s (2005) view, state of exception can be the new way to govern, it pervades all laws and becomes the rule.

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In Agamben’s (2005) view, state of exception can be the new way to govern, it pervades all laws and becomes the rule. For example, in Nazi Germany, through a state of exception, an establishment of a legal civil war allowed for the physical elimination of people who could not be integrated into the political system (Agamben 2005).

**Diaspora**

Spatial practices concern the threat posed by political opponents in the diaspora to the state (Lewis et al. 2018, 496). Diaspora is defined as “a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland (...)” (Shain & Barth 2003, 453).

Political opposition has opportunities outside the authoritarian state’s territory to organize, create and promote new discourses, and influence people to join (Lewis et al. 2018). Because of this opportunity, Lewis (2017) argues that it is logical for authoritarian states to deny this free space for opposition. Authoritarian want to contain their discourse within a sovereign territory and simultaneously must ensure that the domestic discourse is not challenged outside its territory by its citizens (Lewis 2015).
To tackle political opponents in the diaspora a state response is repression. State repression is mean to control space (Lewis 2015) which will be a focus here. Lewis (2017) expand the definition of repression, from “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state” to concern repression outside the territory as well. Repression can take its forms of using surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations, physical attacks, or politically motivated extradition requests. Authoritarian conflict management seeks to control the political space both within and outside its territory to ensure power monopoly (Lewis et al. 2018). Political space is referred to the opportunities and restrictions on citizenship struggles of national and social group’s issues, identities, interests, and activities (Gleiss 2017). The general structure that is produced by the practice state repression is a kind of power structure that diminish diasporas influence on the domestic politics.

2.3 Political Economic Practices

Neopatrimonialism

ACM modes in economic practices seek to ensure that loyal clientelist groups are the main beneficiaries of the economy (Lewis et al. 2018). The framework is referring to Hale’s (2015) theory of Patronal Politics to explain a political-economic order of ACM. It is a new set of ideas of patronage which sees patronal politics as a function of patronal states, rather than as a weakness and failure of the state (Hale 2015). However, it is a complex theory which cannot be justified in this study’s limited scope. To address the practice in ACM states, that loyal clientele groups are the main beneficiaries of financial flows, this will be conceptualized by looking at neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism is chosen because it is an occurring in a state of institutions of a modern state, as well as it entails informal relationships which are based on personal gain (Lewis 2012. This mix is viewed in ACM states as well because they are described as practicing illiberal methods in a liberal institutional setting (Lewis et al. 2018), so, therefore, this study assumes that neopatrimonialism would explain an ACM state better, for example then patrimonialism. Patrimonialism solely applies in states of absolute public power in the hands of one ruler (Haerpfer 2009). Patrimonialism can explain the general structure of informal rules and norms in formal state institutions.
Neopatrimonialism describes a system of institutions of the modern state, such as government ministries, a legislative body, that is combined with informal relations such as patron-client relationships. On the macro level, the regime is the patron who uses state resources such as money, government jobs or property, to give to clients in exchange for their loyalty to support the regime. If a client does not stay loyal, he or she risks losing what it gained by being loyal to the regime. Legal charges are can also be a consequence, which is easy to carry out because all in this system are likely to have broken laws earlier (Lewis 2012).

Neopatrimonial states can often be stable in short-to-medium terms. Conflicts between opponents and the regime can be solved without violence. The regime can buy the opponent off with state resources or threaten to cut off previous benefits (Lewis 2012). However, the stability of the state in a long term can be difficult to manage. The elites that are not clients and are therefore out of the system may be dissatisfied with the current state. When a large amount of the population are also experience lack of distribution of state resources and political repression, the masses can be mobilized by the elites to oppose the state (Lewis 2012).
3. Literature Review

This literature review will explain what conflict management and prevention frameworks, theories, and concepts that have been used to study Burundi before in order to explain why the Authoritarian Conflict Management framework will be applied here.

Smith (2014) use "hybrid political order" (Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan 2009) to analyze illiberal peacebuilding in Indonesia. Hybrid political order constitutes of both liberal democratic means such as rule of law and decentralization to distribute power, as well as illiberal methods such as patronage systems. Hybrid political order examines "how violence is minimized, peace is negotiated, and emergent states are built in highly contested environments" (Smith 2014, 1511).

Similar to the authoritarian conflict management framework created by Lewis et al. (2018), hybrid political order also views the states as what they actually function, not ought to be according to a liberal agenda. Corruption and violent conflict are understood as a core part of state function, as well as it highlights political and economic institutions as a mix of liberal democratic and authoritarian systems. However, what the ACM framework differs from the hybrid political order, is that ACM attempts to establish spaces between certain territories or people from the rest of the population. This space can be a state of exception where the state can commit illegal acts or the state can also create an official discourse delegitimizing certain people. The mode of governance is seeking specifically at controlling armed conflict and can be conducted by liberal democracies and illiberal ones (Lewis et al. 2018). While the ACM framework is not defining a type of governance that pursue its goal to control armed conflict, arguing that it can be any type, Soares de Oliveira (2011) do use the term illiberal to describe the reconstruction process in Angola. It looks at Angola's post-war reconstruction to examine the state autonomous recovery in a state-centric and macro-level mode. While his term of illiberal peacebuilding is similar to the methods of ACM, constructing a hegemonic order and the political economy is controlled by the elites, it is focused on the reconstruction process and what liberal methods that are not used. How the state is controlling violent conflict per se is not specifically brought up (Soares de Oliveira 2011).

ACM framework is the most appropriate tool to use on the case of Burundi because this study is intended to examine what the state is attempting to do to control opponents. It does not examine what governance type is in place, rather view Burundi in the mode to control
ongoing conflict. What these practices can tell about the structures the government is creating can be reviewed after the practices.
4. Methodology

The research problem is raised from the literature that has focused on what liberal conflict management mechanisms that were implemented after the peace agreement and its outcome (Vandeginste 2015, Curtis 2013, Daley 2007, Brosig 2017, Alfieri 2016). There is no holistic understanding of conflict management practices that the state is practicing to manage conflict. It is relevant because, in line with Lewis et al. (2018) argument, cohesion and violence is not sufficient for a long-term strategy to manage conflict and must be accompanied by social, economic and political conflict management practices. By investigating it, it gives an insight into the function of Burundi’s contemporary conflict prevention and management practices. This study will look at what general structures that can be seen of the practices. Burundi is the case of this study because case studies allow for research to be in-depth of an aspect or aspects in a time-frame to investigate its unrevealed causes (Eidlin 2010). It will be carried out as a desk study because it is based on only written research in order to give an initial understanding of several different conflict management practices by Burundi. In addition, some data, for example, the state’s discourse on Twitter, do not require a field study.

This study approaches the research problem with a qualitative case and desk study with a constructivist stance. The choice of this stance, and why it is a qualitative study, is explained in the first part of the chapter. It continues on the method abductive as redescription and recontextualization, which is followed by an outline of the data collection and ends with the limitations and delimitations of this study.

Ontological Position

The most fundamental differences between qualitative and quantitative research are that the latter is based on measurement and qualitative studies like this study aim to do, describe social reality as being changed and influenced by individuals in it. It is more to it, in particular regarding their differences in their epistemological and ontological foundations (Bryman 2016), which is this part will focus on.

Ontological orientation is not necessarily bound to qualitative study, yet, they are often correlated. In this study, it wants to find out what conflict management practices are being used by Burundi state. If this study took an ontological position with an objectivist stance, meaning it would view social phenomena as separate or exist independently from actor’s influence (Bryman 2016), it would oppose the ACM framework. Objectivism argues that, for
example, organizations restrain actors to conform to the set of rules (Bryman 2016).
Nevertheless, in cases of ACM, the states are disobeying or change structures and rules if it is
not in favor of the ability to maintain power (Lewis et al. 2019).

Constructionism, on the other hand, claims that social phenomena are created by actors and is
in a continuous process of change. People are constructing the social world with categories to
understand them. Categorize are socially fabricated (Bryman 2016), for example, state
opponents can be represented in a particular way in state media. From a constructionist stance, by studying conflict management practices it will give an insight into how the state is
trying to construct a social reality in the society according to their view.

**Abduction**

Abduction as redescription or recontextualization (Jensen 1995, see Danermark 2002) is used
in this study to observe, describe, interpret and explain the ACM framework within the state
of Burundi. The aim of redescription or recontextualization is to give a new meaning to an
already known phenomenon, in this case, the phenomenon is the practices. These insights
under interpretation are always fallible. It shows something that might be, it does not prove
anything (Habermas 1972, see Danermark 2002).

A phenomenon is observable events and general structures are cannot be directly observed.
These structures require theories and concept to explain them. They can be manifestations of
normative structures. A phenomenon can change from time to time, whereas general
structures are universal and do not change in social reality (Danermark 2002). This study has
decided to describe the ACM practices as the phenomenon. The ACM framework presents
authoritarian conflict management practices which are observable, and its general structure is
not.

Why abduction is to prefer instead of deductive or inductive is because discovering these
structures is not possible with them. This study is working with a framework to refine or
develop it, which is central to the abductive approach. It is important to not only see what the
framework can say about Burundi state’s conflict management but to also see what the case of
Burundi say about the framework (Danermark 2002).
Data Collection
The data presented in this desk study is carried out based on secondary sources written on Burundi. Because the data is secondary it is important to consider why the article, document or book was written and what the purpose of writing it was (George and Bennett, 2005). The data for the study has been gathered from news articles when presenting data on very recent events, such as the 2018 constitution change election or the Diaspora Week. Other data is from peer-reviewed articles, documents are from United Nation websites, and international organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for information of citizen's experiences of activities by the state. Older data from peer-reviewed articles is relevant when explaining and understanding Burundi today. For example, Daley & Popplewell (2016) explains that the peace agreement implemented liberal conflict mechanisms to prevent past ethnic-based conflict occur again, but these liberal mechanisms have been used by the ruling party to gain power, which has resulted in political tensions instead (yet, ethnic tensions still occurs, but to a lesser extent).

Limitations and Delimitations
Delimitations of this study are that it will only look at the case around the 2015 election. The sitting president ran again in 2015, despite it was against the constitution to run for a third term which is importance shift in Burundi.

The secondary sources that the findings on Burundi will be based on is a limitation because it determines the availability of data this study’s findings can be based on. An observed limitation on this desk study research is that due to the recent political crisis in Burundi, much research has not been made concerning the 2015 events, which is logical. Still, the study is on the contemporary state’s actions and this study requires quite new data. One example is concerning the diaspora. The most recent, and relevant for this study, paper of diaspora concerning this paper is a working paper by Turner and Brønden (2011) and is therefore not peer-reviewed. Nevertheless, it will be used as a source because the author Turner has peer-reviewed articles about the diaspora in Burundi (2008a, 2008b) and on African diaspora (2008, 2013), which speaks of earlier credibility, as well as during research, this study came across examples that supports Turner and Brønden (2011) research.

Another aspect is that the framework is entailing a Hale’s theory of Patronal Politics which are too complex for this study to be able to cover in this limited scope. The delimitation is therefore to choose a similar explanation; neopatrimonialism. This will make justice to the
aim of ACM modes in the economy which is to “to ensure that loyal clientelist groups are the main beneficiaries of financial flows” (Lewis et al. 2018, 498) and it will be clear and focused.
5 Findings

This chapter will outline the Burundian state’s actions against its political opponents in the context of this study’s research problem. The research problem is raised from the literature that has focused on what liberal conflict management mechanisms that were implemented after the peace agreement and its outcome (Vandeginste 2015, Curtis 2013, Daley 2007, Brosig 2017, Alfieri 2016). There is no holistic understanding of conflict management practices that the state is practicing to manage conflict. It is relevant because, in line with Lewis et al. (2018) argument, cohesion and violence is not sufficient for a long-term strategy to manage conflict and must be accompanied by social, economic and political conflict management practices. By investigating it, it gives an insight into the function of Burundi’s contemporary conflict prevention and management practices.

The findings are organized under each category of ACM practices, such as discourse practices and its practices delegitimization, broadcasting. This is to clarify what the data will be used for later in the analysis. Data has been found to be relevant for more than one category of practices.

The findings will begin with discourse practices; delegitimization and broadcasting, followed by spatial practices; the state of exception and encampment, continue on spatial and political economic practices; diaspora, and end with political economic practices; neopatrimonialism.

Discursive Practices

The findings of discourse practices are related to delegitimization and of regulation of broadcasting. The data relevant for delegitimization is from an article by Dimitrakopoulou and Boukala (2018) investigating the Burundian state’s use of Twitter and reports by Amnesty International (2015) about political opponent’s testimonies of state security actors. Data about the regulation of broadcasting is from articles about television and radio from Reporters Without Borders (2016, 2017, 2018) and Freedom House (2018). This section of discourse practices will begin with findings concerning delegitimization and are followed by broadcast regulation.

Delegitimization

Dimitrakopoulou and Boukala (2018) have made a study of the Twitter accounts by the Burundian presidency and the presidency spokesperson Willy Nyamitwe. During the election
period of 2015, social media was widely used through phones by Burundians. Since the
tweets were often in English, sometimes French and rarely in the local language Kirundi, the
authors of the study assume that the tweets were aimed to mainly influence the international
audience (Dimitrakopoulou and Boukala 2018). Yet, what is found is that the spokesperson
Nyamitwe uses Twitter as a platform to interact with Burundian activists and journalist who
question the legitimacy of the government. Most of them are in exile or residents in other
countries. Nyamitwe threatened journalists in tweets and call them "traitors".
(Dimitrakopoulou & Boukala 2018).

On the day before the 2015 election, Nyamitwe tweeted: (see Dimitrakopoulou & Boukala 2018)

Nothing can scare the voters. I am in the city center and can hear sporadic gunfire. Terrorist acts. (French in the original)

@TheBurundiNews Let’s say ‘Explosions heard in #Nyakabiga, stronghold of the insurgency. But nothing will stop #Burundi-ans #Pita2015. (English in the original)

#Nyakabiga terrorism continues. Young drug addicts shoot to intimidate voters. King’s Bwiza station is quiet#Pita2015. (French in the original)

Dimitrakopoulou and Boukala (2018) interpret the tweets as an attempt to "contribute to the
discursive opposition between the in-group of those citizens that vote, mainly supporters of
the President, and the out-group of the delinquent supporters of the opposition parties"
(Dimitrakopoulou & Boukala 2018, 137). Despite the tweets about violence on the election
day, the day after the election, Nyamitwe tweeted on 24 July 2015: ‘the presidential elections
took place with calmness and transparency’ (French in the original) ( Dimitrakopoulou &
Boukala 2018).

The other finding concerning the state’s discourse is from reports of Amnesty International
(2018). The Burundian National Police (PNB) and the National Intelligence Service (SNR)
are the state security actors. Witnesses told Amnesty International (2018) about their
experiences in an SNR compound and in an operational command center for the PNB called
Chez Ndadaye. Many people accused by SNR or PNB of being part of the opposition have
been taken there to be tortured and harassed. The security forces have called the people
arrested for “you the imbeciles”, “you the dogs”, “dogs of demonstrations”, “you the Tutsi”,

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and “you the Putschist” (Amnesty International 2018). A putschist refers to a person that does a putsch which is “a secretly plotted and suddenly executed attempt to overthrow a government” (Merriam Webster 2018).

These findings show Burundi state’s discourse on Twitter against the political opponents and the state security actors’ view on opponents. While parts of the state’s discourse are outspoken on Twitter, it takes another shape inside state compounds and center. The state uses other means to express their discourse, as seen in the next section of regulation of television and radio. This part also points out how the state limit Burundians freedom of expression.

**Broadcast Regulation**

Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution, but the 2013 media law restricts practices that express this freedom. The law requires journalists to meet particular educational and professional standards, forbid content related to national defense, security, public safety, and state currency. There is no private broadcasting that is operating, the public television and radio stations are owned by the government (Freedom House 2018).

The media landscape changed before and in the aftermath of the 2015 May election on constitutional change. In May, when the election campaign officially began, the National Council for Communication (CNC) announced a ban for six months on local broadcasting by the BBC and Voice of America. The CNC claimed that the channels were “breaching professional ethics” (Reporters Without Borders (RWB) 2018). Bans have also been announced in 2016 and 2017, as well as licenses, have been lifted to four broadcast media outlets (RWB 2016, RWB 2017). For example, in the radio program “Karadiridimba” (They Who Progress) by Radio Isanganiro, the Burundian diaspora expresses their views. It was suspended to operate for a month after a song with the reason: “a song that does not conform to media professionalism and democratic and ethical values” (RWB 2016). The song’s title in Kirundi means “human rights for journalists” (RWB 2016). Another reporter and his cameramen from Radio Isanganiro were briefly arrested and their recorded video material was seized after an attempt to cover a massacre of 26 residents in a village (RWB 2018). Earlier that year, the Radio Isanganiro reporter Jean-Claude Nshimirimana was accused of lying and trying to destabilize the country in his reporting of teachers that had been required to pay an additional tax to help fund the 2020 general elections (RWB 2018).
To conclude, Reporters Without Border (2018) present different measurement taken by the state to manage broadcasting, as well as their reason behind their actions, such as banning radio program because it is corresponding to democratic values. The next section of findings is on spatial practices which will present more information on practices deployed by the Burundian state.

Spatial Practices
Space is a physical setting that is influenced, changed and dominated by political, economic, social and ideological objectives of actors (Lefebvre, Elden, Brenner 2009, 171). These findings are obtained from Amnesty International (2015) about the already mentioned SNR compound and the operational command center for the PNB. Minor data is from Human Rights Watch (2015) and United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner OHCHR (2018) that has reported on the legal actions (or lack there off) taken by the state against crimes committed by their security forces.

State of exception and encampment is correlated and therefore are the findings presented under both of them.

State of Exception and Encampment
The Burundian National Police (PNB), the National Intelligence Service (SNR) and the ruling party’s youth militia Imbonerakure have been collaborating to harass, control, and intimidate anyone believed to be part of or related to the opposition. Torture and killings have been taken place on streets, and in particular in an SNR compound in Bujumbura and in an operational command center for the PNB called Chez Ndadaye. In the compound, detainees are forced to stay for several days, they have had no access to lawyers, been forced to sign documents, and a leading Burundian human rights organization named the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained People are no longer granted access. When some detainees have transferred to prison they have not been beaten and they have been able to receive a family visit. Released detainees have witnessed torture, inhumane and degrading treatment by the security personnel (Amnesty International 2015). The judiciary has covered up crimes and violations of human rights committed by PNB, SNR and the Imbonerakure and giving them impunity (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner OHCHR 2018). The Imbonerakure national president told Human Rights Watch (2015) that he did not know
about the allegations against Imbonerakure individuals but if an Imbonerakure acted illegal, that one should be punished because no one stands above the law.

These findings present violent state responses to political opponents. Yet, all the political opponents are not within reach to arrest, such as the Burundian diaspora. Next section will elaborate on the findings on this matter.

Spatial Practices

Diaspora

An ACM state aims to manage the threat the diaspora can pose to the state’s stability and legitimacy (Lewis et al. 2018). Turner and Brønden (2011) and de Bruyn and Wets’ (2006) research present this paper’s findings on the Burundian diaspora.

Turner and Brønden (2011) have observed the diaspora role shifting from the 1980s to be active in politics and armed resistance throughout the 1990 and in 2000 in development initiatives. The Burundian diaspora is complex and diverse due to the different reasons and time periods why they left Burundi to Europe and North America. Large parts of the diaspora are politically engaged which the contemporary Burundian state take into consideration because a hostile diaspora can create political instability. To respond to this, Burundi state focus on engaging diaspora into post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation processes (Turner & Brønden 2011). Turner and Brønden (2011) argue that explaining this process as a 'depoliticalization' or 'developmentazation' of the diaspora is too simple. They refer to empirical evidence that shows actors at home and in the diaspora want to engage in something that can make an impact on the issues in Burundi and it is not necessary within politics. Hence, it is important for the Burundian state to capture this will to avoid destabilizing effects and to take advantage of the diaspora’s engagement (Turner & Brønden 2011).

An example of this development initiative, between the state and diaspora, is the Burundi Diaspora Week in Bujumbura, Burundi. The event is “to strengthen social cohesion and unity” and includes cultural events and marketing of Burundian diaspora products and services. President Nkurunziza commented that “Burundians in the diaspora should be the ambassadors of Burundi and also take part in developing projects in the country,” and that
“we should consolidate the peace and stability we have” (Havyarimana 2005). The chairman Japhet Legentil of the association of Burundians in diaspora said: “not only to contribute in the peacebuilding process but the event also gives an opportunity to Burundians in the diaspora to witness the investment opportunities in the country” (Havyarimana 2005).

To end, the diaspora has taken several roles along the years and are currently very active in the development of Burundi, an initiative taken by themselves as well as a state initiative to coordinate an engagement.

**Political Economic Practices**

The last section of the findings chapter is about the political economic situation. The Freedom House (2018) provides information on the general political state structure and Van Acker (2015) article on the CNDD-FDD give insight on the political economic situation.

**Neopatrimonialism**

A president is elected by the people and together with two vice presidents and the Council of Ministers, they form the executive branch. The legislative branch is the National Assembly and the Senate. The state has political parties and elections (Freedom House 2018).

The ruling party CNDD-FDD holds most of the state power and resources because it has been able to build a top to a bottom system based on patron-client relations along its party structure. For Burundians, to be able to set up a private enterprise, be granted scholarship, or get employment in the public administration they must be part of this system (Van Acker 2015). The 2015 demonstrations are argued to not only be about the presidential term, but also because of protester's dissatisfaction with the lack of economic and social opportunities that the system has resulted in. The demonstration was called by civil society organizations and political opposition parties, but they were largely driven by the urban youth (Van Acker 2015).

To summarize this chapter’s findings, the spokesperson of the state of Burundi used Twitter to spread various negative terms to describe the political opponents while highlighting the Burundian elections as democratic and fair. The media law of 2013 restricts journalists to
express themselves according to the constitutional right of freedom of expression. Bans have also been announced in 2016 and 2017, as well as licenses, have been lifted to four broadcast media outlets. Aside from state responses on Twitter and broadcasting, violent action has been used as a mean against opponents. The state security forces are enjoying impunity while committing to human rights violations.

Additional findings are an example of a development initiative, between the state and diaspora was the Burundi Diaspora Week in Bujumbura, Burundi. The event was “to strengthen social cohesion and unity” and includes cultural events and marketing of Burundian diaspora products and services. The Burundian diaspora is politically engaged, but an engagement in their country's development has increased throughout the years. Data on diaspora funding to political parties have only shown a decrease in the fundings, no other information has been found.

Lastly, findings have shown that CNDD-FDD holds most of the state power and resources because it has been able to build a top to a bottom system based on patron-client relations along its party structure.
6. Analysis

Before this chapter begins with the analysis of the findings, it will provide an outline of this study’s research problem, research questions, and the method.

The research problem is raised from the literature that has focused on what liberal conflict management mechanisms that were implemented in Burundi after the Peace Agreement and its outcome (Vandeginste 2015, Curtis 2013, Daley 2007, Brosig 2017, Alfieri 2016). There is no holistic understanding of conflict management practices that the state is practicing managing conflict. It is relevant because, in line with Lewis et al. (2018) argument, cohesion and violence is not enough for a long-term strategy to manage conflict and must be accompanied by social, economic and political conflict management practices. By investigating it, it gives an insight into the function of Burundi’s contemporary conflict prevention and management practices as well as the function of the state-building process.

The five research questions are covering the practices identified in the ACM framework:

1. Do the state delegitimize the opponents in order to decrease opponent's political influence?
2. Do the state regulate radio and television broadcasting to control information production?
3. Is the practice of encampment within the state of exception used to control political opponents?
4. Do the state repress the diaspora to control diaspora’s political influence?
5. Is a system of neopatrimonialism in place to give loyal elites state resources in exchange for support to ensure power stability

To study conflict management practices in Burundi, the method abduction as redescription or recontextualization is used to observe, describe, interpret and explain the practices within the ACM framework in the case of Burundi. Redescription or recontextualization is mean to give a known phenomenon, in this study, a practice, a new meaning. These insights under interpretation are always fallible. It shows something that might be, it does not prove anything.

Each practice shows a general structure in the framework. The general structure has been identified with the help of a concept or a theory. These general structures are important because they are lasting in a society and do not change as easy as the practices. This analysis
seeks to answer the research questions by applying the practices in the state of Burundi. Since the general structures are assumed as a result of the practices, this analysis will pay attention to two things. (1) If the practices are employed by the Burundi state or if not, if they can be recontextualized or redescribed. (2) What general structures are produced by the practices in Burundi, regardless if the state uses the ACM practices or others.

The analysis is divided according to the practices for clarity. The analysis will end to summarize and see if there are connections between the conflict management practices in Burundi.

**Discursive Practices**
This first of the analysis section will answer the first two research questions; (1) How do the state delegitimize the opponents in order to decrease the opponent's political influence? (2) Do the state regulate radio and television broadcasting to control information production? It will also look at the two mentioned aspects: (1) If the practices are employed by the Burundi state or if not if they can be recontextualized or redescribed. (2) What general structures are produced by the practices in Burundi, regardless if the state uses the ACM practices or others. It will start with delegitimization and proceed with the broadcasting regulation.

**Delegitimization**
Authoritarian regimes use discourse practices to delegitimize the opponent's objectives and existence. The purpose to this is that successful delegitimization, by the state of opponents, justifies governmental policies and the state’s repressive, and perhaps violent, responses to opponents. As well as it limits the opponent's possibility to gain political influence. This study has identified state actor’s discourse on its political opponents. By looking at the discourse through the process of delegitimization, the findings show both an official and unofficial discourse. An official, in this case, means that it is an outspoken discourse through media outlets, aimed at the public knowledge, while the other discourse is unofficial because it also is delegitimizing but it is not expressed for the public to know, rather it is aimed directly at the political opponents that are under arrest.

The official one is through Twitter accounts by the President and presidency spokesperson Willy Nyamitwe. During the 2015 election, the tweets by Nyamitwe placed the voters and political opponents and demonstrators as oppose to each other. The process of delegitimization is applied as followed; the group comparison characterized in a way that presented the voters as fearless and dared to vote to stand up for democracy despite the
“criminals” on the streets demonstrating. On the same subject, but in other tweets, Nyamitwe called the opponents “young drug addicts” which is a trait categorization of the people. Other tweets, both by the President and the spokesperson, gave political labels such as “terrorists”, “enemies of the country”, and journalists as “traitors”.

This study finds dehumanization within the Burundian National Police (PNB) and the National Intelligence Service (SNR). What these state actors in the security forces had said is thus unofficial, because it is not through a media outlet. Security forces have called detained people “you the imbeciles”, “you the dogs” and “dogs of demonstrations”. They have also used group comparison by saying “you the Tutsi”, and political labels such as “you the Putschist”.

The practice of delegitimization of the ACM framework is employed by the state which answers the first research question.

The delegitimization discourse on opponents on Twitter and inside the security sector compound and center can be seen as a mean to create a general structure of power to place the state as the legitimized leader. It shows how the tweets and spoken words by the Burundian state actors are part of a process that excludes some citizens from the rest of the population. If one assumes that dehumanization is the worst categorization, because it makes a person less of a human being, the finding that dehumanization occurs in the compound and the center where detained people are ill-treated, it may show that the discourse created matters the most there, because it can do most harm on the opponents. As the ACM framework argues, delegitimization is made to justify violent actions against opponents.

**Broadcast Regulation**

Broadcasting in Burundi have been regulated through bans to operate and withdrawal of broadcasting licenses and the 2013 media law determine the content of the information. An ACM state needs to control the knowledge production and outlets in order to create a dominant discourse. The fact that all radio and television in Burundi are owned by the state is probably the most apparent restriction of information and answer the research question that the state regulates radio and television broadcasting to control the information production.

The findings highlight an outcome of the broadcast regulation that is in line with the state’s discourse. This can redescribe broadcast regulation as not only a mean to restrict broadcasting, but also to impose the state’s discourse on the citizens. Similar to the delegitimization process where the state used political labels such as “enemies of the country”
on political opponents, the state accused the Radio Isanganiro reporter Jean-Claude Nshimirimana to destabilize the country with his research. The discourse of the state’s stable democracy can also be seen when the state banned a radio program because did not meet the country’s democratic and ethnic values.

The state’s discourse practices of delegitimization and broadcast regulation can be read as the state’s attempt to portrait itself as a democratic and stable country under attack.

**Spatial Practices**

This part will answer the research questions; is the practice of encampment within the state of exception used to control political opponents? and; do the state repress the diaspora to control diaspora’s political influence? It will also look at the aspects: (1) If the practices are employed by the Burundi state or if not if they can be redescriptive or recontextualized. (2) What general structures are produced by the practices in Burundi, regardless if the state uses the ACM practices or others.

**State of Exception and Encampment**

The state’s security forces in Burundi are the Burundian National Police (PNB), the National Intelligence Service (SNR) and the CND-FDD young league: the Imbonerakure. All three actors are essential in the repression of political opponents. It is no official declared state of exception in Burundi, but several Burundian citizens’ rights have been diminished. To justify a government’s oppressive responses to political opponents, the state needs, according to Agamben (1998), to make opponents be perceived as a threat to the social order and the other citizens. Then the state can justify its violence on the opponents. In Burundi, the threat to the state is the political opponents and in order to make them subjects to unlawful behavior, the state has called opponents to be against the democracy. This could be perceived in the tweets that praised democracy and the will of Burundians to vote. The election was however surrounded by accusations of undemocratic processes by opponents and the government responded by calling the opponents “terrorists” and “young drug addicts” who ”shoot to intimidate voters” (Dimitrakopoulou and Boukala 2018, 137). In the logic of the state of exception, the Burundian state divided the citizens who vote to uphold the democracy and citizens who attempt to sabotage. The state and its citizens, therefore, need to be protected from the “terrorists”.
The Chez Ndadaye and the SNR compound can be viewed as zones of the space of exceptions because crimes are committed without judicial consequences. Space exists to allow the state to take citizens out of biolife into natural life, into the compound where laws are not applicable and PND or SNR cannot be prosecuted.

The practice of encampment within the state of exception is used in Burundi, as asked by the research question. It can explain the general structure that is created by this practice, a kind of power structure that divided citizens and non-citizens.

**Diaspora**

State repression is when a state aims at actual sanctions or threats of sanctions against a person or an organization. In this regard, the repression is to constrain diaspora’s political space and its ability to financially support domestic political opponents. In the case of Burundi, the diaspora has been a tool for development and reconstruction. This does not coincide with restrictions, surveillance or suppressing political activity which are responses brought up by the framework (Lewis et al. 2018). Even so, the Burundian state response does reflect the framework’s argument that states want to contain their discourse within the territory and simultaneously must ensure that the very same discourse is not challenged outside its territory. The state may be able to manage this by directing the diaspora to domestic development to limit diasporas incentives to have political influence.

The research question if the state represses the diaspora to control diaspora’s political influence can be answered as the state do seem to have practices to manage diasporas political influence, but it is through incentives to be part of the development of the country, not through repressive methods.

This practice is a new one and can therefore not be recontextualized, rather redescribed. Since the ACM framework intends to look on other practices then solely violent ones in order to control conflict, the Burundian state’s way to manage the diaspora is an addition to how an authoritarian state’s manage potential opponents, such as the diaspora, without violence. The general structure of this practice of giving development incentives to the diaspora may still be seen as a structure of power to restrict diaspora’s political influence.
Political Economic Practices

This last part will answer the question; is a system of neopatrimonialism in place to give loyal elites state resources in exchange for support to ensure power stability? It will look at the two mentioned aspects: (1) If the practices are employed by the Burundi state or if not if they can be redescriptive or recontextualized. (2) What general structures are produced by the practices in Burundi, regardless if the state uses the ACM practices or others.

Neopatrimonialism

The findings show that the state of Burundi entails executive and legislative branches, and elections and political parties as well as informal institutions of patron-client relationships along the party structure. The state of Burundi can, therefore, be a neo-patrimonial state because it holds this mix of formal and informal institutions.

The general structure of client-patron relationships and informal rules and norms in state institutions can be seen in the Burundian state as well. However, the state does not seem to be able to create complete stability and solve conflicts by buying off opponents. As Lewis (2017) argues in the description of neopatrimonial states, elites that are not satisfied with the system because they, for example, cannot reap the benefits of it, the elites can mobilize citizens to oppose the state. In Burundi, the 2015 elections demonstrations were organized by political parties. However, it was driven by urban youth who was dissatisfied with this system that prevented economic and social opportunities.

Summary

This last section will summarize the analysis to see if practices can be connected.

The process of delegitimization can be applied to Burundi. On Twitter, the state uses all component of the process of delegitimization besides dehumanization. That is being used in the security forces compound. This can show a double discourse by the state. It presents itself as democratic and being under attacked by enemies of the state and terrorists in the official discourse on Twitter, simultaneously as the state security forces are dehumanizing the opponents in compounds where the opponents are being ill-treated. This is significant because it shows two discourses of the state. One official aimed at the international sphere, and one unofficial aimed at the political opponents in order to quiet them.
Broadcast regulation is being practiced by the state. Findings correspond to the official discourse of Burundi in terms of restrictions on radio and television are enforced with the reason that the programs are not entailing democratic values.

Encampment within the state of exception is being practiced by the state. The Burundian security forces are enjoying impunity despite their human rights violations against the opponents within the compound. This can be explained by the theory of the state of exception because the compounds are spaces where the law is not applied and crimes can go unpunished. This unlawful behavior may also highlight the unofficial discourse which dehumanizes the opponents with justifies these actions.

The state does not practice repression on diaspora, rather it gave development initiatives to diaspora to engage in. This finding is significant because it shows another practice that is not a violent one but still may keep political influence by the diaspora in control.

Lastly, the Burundi state is a neo-patrimonial state which is structured to hold the President in power by loyal elites. However, stability has not been ensured through this system by all time, as the example of the 2015 election shows. This may pose the question on how much longer the state will be able to stay in power, as literature shows that neopatrimonialism can only ensure stability for a period of time.
7. Conclusion

The framework was initially through to be applied directly on Burundi state, but because it refers to several theories which cannot be elaborated here, the framework has served more as a guideline. This has enabled this study to look at practices deployed by the state, not seen from a liberal conflict management lens, as this study intended not to do. This study attempted to make a holistic understanding of the Burundi conflict management practices, which has to some extent been done. Further research may review what effects these practices have and which practices that do most harm on the citizens, in order to know what practices that need to be paid extra attention to by United Nations and the international actors interested in responding the increasingly authoritarian conflict management methods.
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