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POST-GENOCIDE SOCIETY, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND PEDAGOGY OF LIFELONG LEARNING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to analyse: 1) the negative/dark sides of social capital in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian post-genocide society that emerged because of decades of symbolic and real war and post-war violence against the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and 2) the possibility of social development in the direction of a positive/lighter side of social capital, in the sense of legitimising progressive politics of social development based on the following foundations: a) learning peace, coexistence, and reconciliation; b) acknowledgment that genocide was carried out during the war and actively denied after the war; c) condemnation of genocide (both during the war and the post-war period); and d) active work to recognise the status of and obtain
compensation for the victims of the genocide (at the social, organisational/institutional, and individual levels).

**Keywords**: actor, coexistence learning, destruction, education, field, habitus, peace learning, reconciliation learning

**Introduction**

Sociological and pedagogical analyses of the phenomenon of genocide as a process are the basis of this study (Bećirević 2009; Fein 1979; Fein 1993; Darder 2011; Schneider 2014; Bentrovato 2017; Lybeck 2018). The genocide started in eastern and northwestern Bosnia–Herzegovina in 1992 with the attack from Serbian police and armed forces against Bosnian civilians. It continued with a chain of war crimes during the war, manifesting and culminating in Srebrenica in 1995 (Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17; Case No.: 3 St 20/96). From a sociological and pedagogical perspective, the genocide still continues with a complete denial of politicians and the media from the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska that it had ever happened (Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010).

Information from the United Nations and wide-ranging documentation created throughout post-war trials show how Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, supported by Serbia and Croatia individually, attempted to take control of different parts of Bosnia by driving Bosniaks away from these areas. These publications construct the background, beginning, expansion, and scope of the war and its fierceness in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Strategies for removing

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1 This text has been in some parts published earlier in Bosnian in the book ‘Socijalni kapital i socioekonomski razvoj Bosne i Hercegovine’ (Delić, Šaric & Sadadinović 2018) and in English in the article ‘Definitions of Violence: Narratives of Survivors from the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Basic, 2018).
Bosniaks from these parts included looting of property and systematic destruction of religious and cultural monuments linked to Bosniak identity, culture, and religion, individual executions, organised mass murder, systematic organised rapes, unorganised rapes, assault with deadly outcomes, physical and mental harassment and degradation of civilians, gross and violent assault, concentration camps, and forced fights. With these tactics, Serbian and Croatian soldiers and police made civilians the direct target of their violence to drive Bosniaks away (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Cleiren & Tijssen 1994; Bassiouni 1994; Greve & Bergsmo 1994; Case No.: IT-04-74; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17; Case No.: 3 St 20/96; see also ICTY 2019a; ICTY 2019b; Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019). Especially violent were the Serbian soldiers and police, coordinated and organised with media, political leaders in the Serb Democratic Party, and religious authorities in their work to violently displace Bosniaks, Croats, Romani, Jews, and other ethnic groups from the various geographical areas that Serbian interests had overtaken (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Cleiren & Tijssen 1994; Bassiouni 1994; Greve & Bergsmo 1994; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17; Case No.: 3 St 20/96). In multiple cases, particularly in the beginning of the war in 1992, Serbian soldiers and police lacked other organised militaries or police groups to fight, leaving civilian Bosniaks, Croats, Romani, Jews, and other non-Serbian ethnicities as their only target. In some instances, Serbs who did not participate in the campaign or who openly criticised it were on the receiving end of the violence directed by Serbian soldiers and police (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Cleiren & Tijssen 1994; Bassiouni 1994; Greve & Bergsmo 1994; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88;
The most disadvantaged geographical and geopolitical position was that of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in comparison to the other republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was heavily isolated during the war (1992–1995). This isolation was a major issue because the Bosnian–Herzegovinian borders were not managed by legal republic authorities, and the conflict in Croatia that started earlier made it more difficult to supply the Bosnian population with food and logistic materials (Case No.: IT-04-74; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17; Case No.: 3 St 20/96). The international arms embargo in turn made it easier to execute genocide in the field because of the lack of defences available to the victims of the aggression.

A few officers of Republika Sprska’s and politicians were prosecuted for specific crimes committed during the genocide against the Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the war from 1992 to 1995 (Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17; Case No.: 3 St 20/96). These prosecutions were the first in Europe since the Second World War in which a court confirmed commission of genocide in a European territory, after a series of organised war crimes and attempt to conceal them.

Institutions of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina deny the genocide (Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010). This perception of a period of war becomes a crucial subject of post-war analyses of the phenomena of war violence, victimization, reconciliation, and genocide. The genocide committed in Foča, Višegrad, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and many other towns in
Bosnia and Herzegovina made room for the existence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For that reason, it is essential to analyse the denial of the systematic violent acts committed during the war by the political elite. These are the acts ascertained at the Hague Tribunal, in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the War Crimes Chamber, and that daily influence the Bosnian population through media (ICTY 2019a; ICTY 2019b; Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019; Basic 2018).

This paper aims to analyse: 1) the negative/dark sides of social capital in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian post-genocide society that emerged because of decades of symbolic and real war, and post-war violence against the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and 2) the possibility of social development in the direction of a positive/lighter side of social capital, in the sense of legitimising progressive politics of social development based on the following foundations: a) learning peace, coexistence, and reconciliation; b) acknowledgment that genocide was carried out during the war and actively denied after the war; c) condemnation of genocide (both during the war and in the post-war period); and d) active work to recognise the status of and obtain compensation for victims of the genocide (at the social, organisational/institutional, and individual levels).

The ambition of this analysis is not to postulate solutions to difficult challenges in Bosnian post-genocide society but rather to discuss the various sociological and pedagogical phenomena that are examined in the analysed literature.

**Capital, the field, and habitus**

According to Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1992a,b), society consists of a number of fields where agents take up different positions based on the rules to which they adhere. The rules here refer to types of capital – economic, cultural, and social capital, and symbolic capital – which together gives the agents frameworks in which to act (see below concerning different types of capital). There is a hierarchy, both within a field and between fields. The fields are
demarcated social rooms where relations between positions are fixed; they exist between positions automatically and anticipate positions being filled by agents. The new post-genocide society that was formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war created and re-created various fields and new and old positions in which new norms applied compared to the pre-war society (Basic 2018). The positions that existed in the field were often taken up by warlords and war profiteers, and rival groups competed for the available resources. The competition for resources was reinforced by the long-standing ethnic tension, which in turn was heightened by the competition (Basic 2015a; Basic 2015b).

In addition to capital and the field, the third key concept of Bourdieu’s theory of social economic dynamics is habitus. This concept does not exist physically in the world but comprises attitudes, positions, opinions, and values and is realised through concrete practices. Habitus is defined as an ‘attribute of social actors’ (individuals, groups, institutions) that contain ‘structured and structuring structures’ (Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1992a,b; Moore 2008).

Habitus, as defined by Bourdieu, is the natural state of the agent. Bourdieu writes that habitus is social and malleable as a form of individual identity. Your habitus can change as you move or make another change to your life (Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1992a,b). Agents in Bosnian post-genocide society have gone through several fundamental changes to their habitus during and after the war. This, combined with an intense societal debate about genocide in connection with post-war trials, political statements, and media reporting, is most likely contributing to a special development of both the habitus of the individual and of society as a whole after the war.

Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1992a,b) approached the phenomenon of capital by considering the need to critically examine the deepest logic of the functioning of contemporary societies. This examination includes a critical evaluation of the total cognitive scope of modernistic conceptions of ‘development’. He breaks down the idea of capital as a unique, simple, and economic phenomenon and
differentiates its types: economic (money and material objects), symbolic (prestige, authority, status), cultural (high value patterns of taste and consumption), and social (establishing social connections that can be activated as needed). Bourdieu criticised a one-sided understanding of social capital as a purely economic phenomenon and pointed out the function of various fields where economic, socio-political, and cultural capital is active, in a generalised fight led in the social world’s domain of domination and subordination (Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1992a,b; Petrov 2015).

Hence, different types of capital can change into other types of capital, in line with rules in accordance with the given historical context and the field where the fight takes place. To make possible the ‘conversion’ of one capital into another, capital is interpreted as an entity existing in separate forms (Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1992a,b; Petrov 2015). Cultural capital can be objectified (when recognised in material assets such as artworks, books, museums, galleries, laboratories, and similar). It is also, however, embodied in the concrete physicality and cognizance of individuals – i.e., in their physical competencies (such as body language, posture, intonation, and choices that determine a lifestyle) – and can be institutionalised (and then recognised in the values produced by institutions such as diplomas) (Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1992a,b; Petrov 2015).

Social capital is a variable relational phenomenon associated with the positive qualities of social interactions that facilitate collective action. A single definition of this phenomenon does not exist, and a host of definitions and approaches has been cited and used to conceal the dark sides of social capital (Garcia 2010). This obfuscation has substantially complicated not only the methodology of measuring social capital but also the instrumental attempts to politically apply this concept in a positive sense so that citizens could benefit from it. Neo-liberal economists often have excessively emphasised the positive aspects of social capital. However, to soften the negative social consequences of
the new-economy conversion of society into a ‘market society’ requires pointing out that social capital in the post-genocide Bosnian society can and often does show a dark and destructive power. The social consequences of this dark side can be so pronounced that in certain exceptional conditions such as war, genocide, post-war robberies, liquidations, and institutional normalisation of identitary and organised crime, they can completely erase the positive dimension of social capital. This dimension of social capital needs to be considered when analysing social and educational phenomena in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Coleman (1990) differentiates between social and human capital. Along with skills and knowledge, a certain part of human capital lies in the ability to cooperate, which is important for not only economic life but also all other societal spheres. The ability to cooperate depends on how much communities respect norms and values and how much the interests of larger groups dominate individual interests in these communities. From these common values is born trust that, according to Coleman, has a great and measurable economic value. The problem of ‘measuring negative dimensions of social capital’ during the past few years has become a burning security problem for transitional countries such as Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, where interest alliances between economic and political classes have obscured recognition of the dark sides of social capital (García 2010) as a central problem of ‘crony’ capitalism. It appears that the dark side of social capital is necessary for the ‘successful’ functioning of crony state capitalism.

Social capital is a relational phenomenon for Coleman. It is defined by its function and is built into a social structure as a public benefit, while human capital is oriented towards private benefits (Coleman 1990). The structure of relationships can help establish obligations between social actors, create a social atmosphere based on trust, open or expand information channels, and impose norms and sanctions for certain kinds of behaviours (Coleman 1988). Social structure becomes social capital when actors are efficiently used to realise their
own interests (Coleman 1990). Social capital is defined by its functions. It is not an individual entity but a multitude of various entities with two common characteristics – all comprise certain aspects of social structure and enable certain actions by actors, whether individual or affiliated. Social capital has important functions that include defining norms and creating effective sanctions, creating obligations and expectations, ensuring organisational frameworks, facilitating involvement in local communities, improving relationships with families, friends, and neighbours, and improving business relationships and contacts.

**Genocide and social capital**

Is the concept of social capital, with its principal categories of ‘trust’ and ‘cooperation’, even categorically, analytically, and epistemically appropriate for the analysis of a post-genocide society such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the genocide and joint criminal enterprise carried out against Bosnian–Herzegovinian civilians? Scientific research into the socioeconomic development of states where genocide was committed is not well-developed, with the exception of several studies on Rwanda. The ‘concept of social capital’ and ‘genocide’ belong to different ontological levels. The ‘concept of social capital’ is not a cognitive tool for the self-description of humankind’s attitude towards itself (McDoom 2014). Therefore, the concept of social capital cannot be elevated to the same ontological, normative, and axiological plane where people are determined in relation to themselves, now or in the future. The concept of social capital is an interpretative means of understanding social relationships that on a conceptual level reconcile or at least try to reconcile the economic and social spheres, on a level of understanding the positive results of positive elementary cooperation, necessary for business. The concept of social capital belongs to a lower level of technical and operative tools for implementing socioeconomic politics of development. This concept, in the socio-epistemological, international legal, and ontological senses, is not adequate for
an analysis of the socioeconomic development of societies exposed to systemic and mass crimes – crimes against humanity (McDoom 2014).

The Dayton structuring of Bosnia and Herzegovina has largely rendered the accurate perception of the meaning of trust and reciprocity norms impossible in the entire antinomic framework that functions as a ‘framework without a framework’ in reality. The primary reason is that it structurally deteriorates, nominally privileges, and strategically strengthens on a formal (institutional) plane the cross-border understood ‘monolithic ethnic identities’ (Haller 2006), while simultaneously disregarding, minimalizing, and even erasing the possibility of establishing individualised civil identities in the pluralism of their citizen, emancipatory, and project identities and humanistic potential. The problem, therefore, is that these citizen, individual, and project identities that are strategically being contested are the prerequisite for the possibility of developing a state and a society and for the development of any kind of creative, economic or political initiative or innovation that could bring benefit to all. Project, self-creative, and free identities are an essential precondition for the existence of a sustainable economic and entrepreneurial culture. And it is precisely the entrepreneurial culture and the existence of an adequate business ambience that are being treated as the most important foundation of sustainable development and survival (Haller 2006).

Appadurai (2006) believes that transforming ethnicity into a nation is often the foundation for the appearance of predatory identities, prone to demand the extinction of other collectives/identities for their own interests. Predatory identities are almost always majority interests, based on the demands of an endangered majority and expressed in its name. In actuality, these are most often the demands of a cultural majority that wishes to exclusively or completely identify with an identity of a nation. Sometimes they are expressed as demands of a religious majority – Hindu, Christian, Jewish, or Muslim – and sometimes as demands of linguistic, racial, or other majorities in a society.
Symbolic violence presents a very specific, and at times entirely invisible, form of violence (Zizek 2009). A lot of what is related to the disclosure of the ‘dark sides of social capital’ (García 2010) can become evident if attention is paid to different, more or less concealed or open, forms of symbolic violence that are (so as to precede it) associated with real violence. We speak of violence that can have, and most often has, many various forms in language itself and in its effects on the descriptions of individuals in society or constructions of social reality (McLaren & Jaramillo 2010; McLaren 1996; Darder 2012; Fischman & McLaren 2005). However, most of these forms are labelled with a linguistically constructed dominance. These are strategies of imposing an allegedly coherent symbolical order from which, only afterwards, arises the possibility of the realisation, action, and the reproduction of a dominating ideology. In this sense, it is appropriate to critique the notion of ‘maintaining’ or ‘creating’ the so-called ethnically (or religiously) ‘pure’ cultures, regions, and areas.

**Genocide, economy, and social capital**

In certain reinterpretations of the phenomenon of social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the importance of an institutionally mediated symbolic violence (Zizek 2009) that penetrates the ‘rational’ way of naming is strategically not mentioned. It is very important to explain and understand the internal and external boundaries of social and economic space where these processes, directed against people, actually take place. The character and scope of this symbolic violence is not perceived because all that is evident occurs in keeping with the principle of transitional ‘normalisation of the abnormal’ (Beck 2005), in education theories and practices, and in institutional management strategies of economy, society, and politics. What is called ‘social’ has been emptied of this content, so that people appear to be superfluous and society unsustainable.

The chaotisation of the true meaning of economic categories and the weakness of the practices of labelling socioeconomic space cannot be concealed.
Also unconcealable is the direct institutional work on the destruction of the remaining substrate of Bosnian–Herzegovinian social capital, as part of the norms of trusting the same institutions (Kurtović 2015; Kurtović & Hromadžić 2017). Normalising the decades of political chaotisation of the Bosnian post-genocide society favours the perverted economic and trans-economic politics of false development that has turned against Bosnia and Herzegovina and its people. Opponents of Bosnianism wish to prove that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, and people living in it are just not possible.

The economic crisis of a society and a state and its consequences do not happen in a vacuum. In post-genocide Bosnian society, we can also speak in this context of an institutional, moral, and orientational crisis of Bosnian–Herzegovinian businesses and the entire economy (Kurtović 2015; Kurtović & Hromadžić 2017). Consequences are always revealed and become evident in social reality, i.e., in a certain social, cultural, and political context. During the past 24 years, the Bosnian post-genocide society, state, and economy were literally, violently destroyed for the most part, so that certain analysts called the end consequences of the realised destruction of social capital a ‘sociocide’ (Doubt 2003). If the goal is to be objective, not a single scientific analysis of social capital can avoid, erase, or destroy research into the causes and consequences of what occurred in Bosnia during and after the war. It is impossible to understand the causes, background preconceptions, ideologies, perverted logic, and consequences of genocide without an analysis of the connection between symbolic and real violence committed against the mixed population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The deeper causes and consequences of the destruction of social capital, in the case of the Bosnian post-genocide society, cannot be adequately researched, analysed, or understood without a qualitative socio-pedagogical reproduction of symbolic and real violence. The failure of economic transition during the past 24 years has deeper social, economic, and pedagogical roots.
Destruction of social capital in a post-genocide society

The destruction of social capital in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred first because of the symbolic contesting of the idea of a Bosnian–Herzegovinian multicultural society; it occurred because of the programmatic denial of the very idea of coexistence. This destruction represents the most dramatic example of symbolic and civilisational violence. Symbolic violence happens at a deep socio-pedagogical level of linguistics, i.e., labelling systems used to designate people and things; first and foremost, in the field, it happens with using the very terms that describe the collective experience and the identity of a variable social and existential reality. The strategic erasure of the term ‘Bosnian’ from Bosnian towns, villages, settlements, and even entire regions cannot be analysed or understood without mentioning the findings and results of social and multicultural epistemology (as social pathology), the foundation of all qualitative research of social capital (Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1992a,b).

Therefore, to erase and destroy from reality the Bosnian–Herzegovinian social capital and the trust between peoples, it was necessary to first carry out at the highest academic level the performative act of symbolic violence against values that originate from the idea of human society’s diversity (Zizek 2009): thus strategically erasing names, adjectives, attributes, prefixes, signs, and even all portents (that indicate or could indicate) of something common, supranational, uniting, and multicultural, and deny all that is contained in the very denominations and determinants ‘Bosnian’ and ‘Bosnian–Herzegovinian’. The logic of denying the right to name a mother tongue, called the Bosnian language, contains the entire complexity of understanding and not understanding the sense and meaning of social capital in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian economic and socio-pedagogical, social, cultural, political, ideological, and often aggressive environment.
The vicious cycle that emerges in the complex network of relationships among social capital, civil society, ethnic politics, liberal democracy, enterprising culture, private initiative, and the lack of corporate and social responsibility – the chronic deficit of responsibility for the common good – is the basic referential framework where it is possible to research the socioeconomic condition of local and regional, mutually oriented, Bosnian communities within the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Dark sides of social capital in a post-genocide society**

The ‘dark sides of social capital’ (García 2010) are still active on the political scene in the Bosnian environment. Meanwhile, we know little to nothing about the internal mechanisms or background of their activity, besides the fact that certain actors from the 1990s are still active in 2019. Because of the imposed Dayton framework, Bosnian-Herzegovinian society was limited when it comes to the possibility of institutionalising reflexive research that would, in the projections of future socioeconomic development, start with a concrete sociological and pedagogical situation. We are aware that decades of active search for the origin of the true meaning of ‘social capital’ often had the function of politically legitimising the social use of only a certain version of this term. Many other dimensions have remained more or less disregarded. This strange, often perverted, exchange between (1) the production of ‘academic theories’ on social capital and (2) the tendency to use this term for public political purposes has still not been recognised as an issue worth researching. The reason for this discursive short-sightedness can be found in the fact that soon after the Second World War, social sciences in the United States and Europe not only reached the critical point of understanding most of the modernising, progressive, and enlightening categories but also encountered a crisis of self-understanding their own social position and role in the ‘global society of knowledge and skills’ (Kaldor 2013; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016). This position was suddenly
transformed into a postmodern consumerist society of the spectacle and of the media and technoscience simulation of reality. The transformation took place mostly during philosophical discussions between the different variants of Marxism and post-structuralism in France, and cultural postmodernism in the United States and Italy. These discussions related to the interpretative possibilities of legitimising (socially scientific) objectivism and to the possibility of legitimising the demand for truth outside the terminology of the new economy of knowledge (Kaldor 2013; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016).

A question therefore arises of whether the terms taken from the positivistically conceptualised social capital can adequately explain the depravity of destroying the Bosnian–Herzegovinian society and state. We claim that it is not possible to do so easily. Because the principle of ‘institutional segregation’ is incorporated into the very structure of the Dayton Accords, when it comes to the question of how long this process can last, decades of anti-Bosnian politics and the practices of destroying the Bosnian–Herzegovinian society and state remain an enigma. Such politics do not allow for the admission that the pre-war Bosnian–Herzegovinian society was completely ethnically intermixed. The projects of advocating and applying the idea that ‘coexistence is not possible’ were already in the 1990s based on *symbolic violence* that, by its very logic, led to the crime of genocide. Trust and reconciliation are represented by the ‘black boxes’ incorporated into the Dayton institutions.

What was presumed by *trust* and *unity*? This question reappears with each institutional, cognitive, and structural analysis of social capital in the post-genocide Bosnian–Herzegovinian society. We would first have to reply to a series of questions about what constitutes the Bosnian–Herzegovinian socio-ontological and hermeneutic circle of interconnected questions and answers (Vladutescu 2018). Thus, to answer the question of within which terminology framework we talk of *trust*, we must first answer the question of within which terminology framework we talk of *unity*. It should be obvious that if we deny the
idea of coexistence, we deny the Bosnian–Herzegovinian unity. And if we deny the Bosnian–Herzegovinian unity, we also a priori deny trust, i.e., the possibility of building trust. If trust is a constituent part of positively defined social capital that, by its very definition, contributes to the wealth and well-being of a social community, it follows that by denying trust in coexistence, we consciously or unconsciously support the logic of the ‘dark sides of social capital’ and undermine the social community itself.

According to current historical insights, the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not committed because of a lack of Bosnian trust in the idea of coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary: Symbolic violence, rhetoric, and media aggression against the Bosnian–Herzegovinian civil society and perverse fundamentalist attacks on it and its historical and cultural diversity have proceeded from words to actions not because an abstract principle of trust was lacking but because of the Bosnian – and seemingly naïve – ‘excess’ of trust in the idea of coexistence. This mysterious excess that cannot be understood and the historical Bosnian openness towards the other in a specific anti-Bosnian environment seem to be precisely what functioned simultaneously as both a hindrance and an opportunity for the violent destruction of Bosnianism and the creation of ethnically pure territories. Only after the previously described logic of anti-Bosnianism, as a unified and collective transformation of symbolic violence into real violence, is it possible to clear the path towards the new and emancipatory politics of understanding the idea of unity and the new and true politics of the socioeconomic development of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society and economy, offering expanded and alternative interpretations of social capital. Social capital is not always positive. The savage destruction of Bosnian–Herzegovinian civilian society and culture says a lot about the potential of the negative, about the dark sides of social capital.
**Pedagogy of lifelong learning**

Philip Candy (1991) states that learning takes place in many different situations and contexts, within and outside of normal education, and that individuals undergo lifelong learning. Learning takes place in the communication with other persons in a communication process. Lifelong learning includes both techniques for real-world implementation and specific motivations, rationalisations, driving forces, arguments, and attitudes toward a specific type of action (Cross 1992; Jarvis 2004; Field 2006).

Célestin Freinet (1976) highlights the importance of cooperation in carrying out various shared work-related projects and interpersonal interaction when it comes to a person’s learning, as well as the formation of relationships characterised by companionship. Freinet’s pedagogical thoughts come from the idea of ‘the exploring attempt’, meaning that the individual learns through exploring reality, interacting, making mistakes, and trying again, until interpersonal interaction (learning) is achieved (Freinet 1976; Acker 2007).

The individual’s education frequently takes place in groups with personal and close relationships among the group members. The specific motivations, driving forces, arguments, attitudes, and rationalisations toward some actions are educated based on a definition of a situation as useful or harmful to the individual in question. The rational person chooses to act on and debate for a certain position if the definitions that favour the action and argument outweigh the definitions that do not. A person’s associations with others and groups with these definitions can vary with respect to duration, frequency, intensity, and prioritisations. It is important that the individual, through a series of lifelong learning, creates and re-creates opportunities for change on the communal and individual levels. However, the same interactive dynamic also allows for the chaining of a person’s thinking to old patterns, where previous actions and arguments receive confirmation and status as unchangeable social phenomena (Candy 1991; Cross 1992; Jarvis 2004; Field 2006).
Individuals in their learning need to be active; learning cannot be forced on others through an authority in a given context (e.g., a police officer, teacher, politician, or journalist) writing, saying, or asserting something. Learning varies based on the specific context of how the knowledge is to be obtained (context such as organisations, classrooms, society, and politics) and the individual person’s conditions and needs. Allowing individuals in a society to be active in their learning will create a sense of responsibility for their own learning and the learning of those around them (e.g., relatives, members of their organisation, pupils, friends). Over time, the cooperating dynamics of relational interactions will lead to improved engagement both within and outside of the specific context. Relationships between authorities in the context and individuals (who are learning something) should be characterised by equality, Freinet says. He claims that it is the authority’s responsibility to assist an individual in systematising all the knowledge that they acquire by exploring the world around them, meaning that the authority should act more like a supervisor (Freinet 1967; Acker 2007). In post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina, development has resulted in a widespread lack of authoritative superiors who could lead the country away from war and towards stable peace. Instead, through jingoistic rhetoric, the authoritative supervisors are going in the opposite direction, igniting and reigniting conflicts between ethnic categories and denigrating victims of the war by repetitively repeating that Serbian police and soldiers have not carried out any genocide.

In a post-genocide society, the process that leads to learning, through an individual’s association with post-war behavioural patterns, involves the same mechanisms of other types of learning. This process applies to Bosnian post-genocide society as well. An important component is schooling in pre- and post-genocide Bosnia in learning processes during life; everything else that happens throughout life also has a great impact on a person and their perception and society.
It is important to note in this context the individual’s approach to and perception regarding past, present, and future. In this context, Bosnian post-genocide and post-war society and the formation and reformation of personal identity during and after the war can be linked to the genocide and the importance of current genocide denial. It also can be associated with the importance of a shared desire for a better life, which we can assume that most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have. Lifelong learning takes place through various situations, and what may have once been relevant in the past can still affect our present and future.

Freinet notes that good planning and organisation are crucial in a context for learning to take place, characterised by comradeship to allow for interpersonal relationships. He emphasises interpersonal cooperation when carrying out shared work projects as an important tool for creating and re-creating democratic values. What teaches people to take responsibility for their actions and for society is the learning process, for example, by having democratic values influence the individual and their learning environment (Freinet 1976; Acker 2007). There is a lack of planned and institutionally supported activities in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would promote the building, re-creation, and repair of interpersonal relations that were interrupted by the war. Among people across ethnic boundaries, there is some cooperation, but this interaction normally stems from individuals outside of the existing institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Basic (2015a, 2015b) notes that post-war reconciliation, forgiveness, and coexistence require a steady flow of activities in a post-war society on both the individual and institutional levels.

Crucial to lifelong learning is identity formation, which takes place in the interaction between individuals and groups of individuals in a cultural context. Mead (1934/2015) assumes that the self is a foundational construct for the formation of a person’s identity. At birth, the self does not exist and is developed through a person’s experiences and relationships to others. Two basic form are
the basis of Mead’s explanation of the self: reflexivity and role-taking. Only when the child can react to symbols such as language will reflexivity begin. In this way, the individual shows an ability to use objects that signify themselves or others. Later in life, the person’s reflexivity grows as they learn to signify objects of all types, such as people in various groups, opinions, ideas, motivations, attitudes, arguments, driving forces, and rationalisations. This means, according to Mead, that the individual takes on the role of the objects in addition to the role of a human, even if we know that objects do not possess consciousness and instead merely exist. The second basic concept regarding the self, role-taking, begins early in life. From all the people a child spends time with, from parents to passing visitors, the child gains perspectives on the self. Prior to the establishment of the self, being someone else is a process that shapes the child’s perception of themselves through two stages, the game stage and the play stage. Mead believes that the self-gains its uniform nature when it is formed as an object based on the significant other’s point of view. Over time, individuals meet more people whose roles they need to take on and who offer them acknowledgement. At this point, it could be said we are talking about an individual/personal identity. To be acknowledged in our identities is to be acknowledged in our roles, and vice versa. Throughout a lifetime, people in a society play a number of different roles for different audiences on a daily basis, causing the self to be shaped and modified in each individual social situation where a person is acting (von Wright 2000). Individual lifelong learning takes place on a spectrum between organised learning (formal education) and casual learning (informal learning). In the interaction between individuals, the learning takes place, and communication is one of its most important elements.

Paulo Freire (1968, 1992) believes that interaction through dialogue implies faith in people and a hope that a more humane society is still possible. The humanisation of interpersonal relationships suggests a social community of equal individuals who debate and can critically reflect on themselves,
interactions with others, and the social community itself (McLaren & Jaramillo 2010; McLaren 1996; Darder 2012; Fischman & McLaren 2005). In a post-genocide society, naming important social issues should not turn into an empty verbalism from which a position of power arises; true dialogue always implies a certain kind of humility and a readiness to concede. The aim is that a series of interactions leads the dialogue participants to a compromise. The possibility of the humanisation of society is what Freire (1968, 1992) believes in; he assumes the possibility of a contextual but historically conditioned dialogic learning and the exchange of political ideas and education with others.

Openness and readiness to compromise is the essence of dialogue. Faith in people, on the other hand, is the precondition for the exchange of words during dialogic processes of interactive labelling of categories in society. People can be classified variously during interpersonal dialogue: based on their gender, class, ethnicity, social role (e.g., the role of a victim or a criminal), or in any other way. Describing a social reality means to Freire to transform the society if you can use the right term. In that way, those who collectively construct and reconstruct the society should not have dialogue that is an act of arrogance (McLaren & Jaramillo 2010; McLaren 1996; Darder 2012; Fischman & McLaren 2005).

Through communication with others via media reporting and in the same context, individuals in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina receive the informal learning that is an important part of lifelong learning. Each person’s self is shaped as an object and given its uniform character based on the significant other’s point of view. Through media reporting and by interacting with other individuals, each person receives acknowledgement of their roles or loses their identity through lack of it. In war-time and post-war time, one example of a lack of acknowledgement relates to the victims of genocide, who most likely experience a loss of identity through persistent denial by representatives of the Republika Srpska that any genocide took place.
In the Bosnian post-genocide society, interpersonal communication takes place through language, symbols, and actions that are also symbolic. For the action to be classified as symbolic, it must mean something to the person carrying it out. Seeing the world from the perspective of others is what role-taking means. Individuals in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina act by taking on the role of the other in order to manage post-war situations. Symbols develop cultural community. Mead (1934/2015) states that those who live in the same society understand each other, are capable of interacting, and have agreed on what the symbols signify. Symbols will form the foundation for society’s continuing existence and development. The interactive dynamic differs with regard to definitions of social objects in Bosnian post-genocide society. Natural, shared goals that could lead to a shared culture and shared perspective are not present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Habermas (1986) states that communication that claims to be intelligible to everyone involved must meet certain requirements. For example, the participants in the communication must be contained within a normative framework that all participants have approved. Participants must go through certain fundamental agreements and produce good conditions for shared understandings for communication to be successful. In post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina, politicians, individuals, and journalists do not appear to have the same normative framework or interests, so accounts of the genocide during the war are interpreted differently after the war. The fundamental agreements that would have helped facilitate post-war dialogue and that produce good conditions for shared interpretations were not established after the war. Instead, embers that have lingered since the end of the war in 1995 are constantly kindled and rekindled.

Post-genocide society, social capital, and pedagogy of lifelong learning
The aim of the paper was to analyse (1) the negative/dark sides of social capital in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian post-genocide society that emerged because of decades of symbolic and real war, and post-war violence against the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and (2) the possibility of social development in the direction of a positive/lighter side of social capital, in the sense of legitimising progressive politics of social development based on the following foundations: a) *learning* peace, coexistence, and reconciliation; b) *acknowledgment* that genocide was carried out during the war and actively denied after the war; c) *condemnation* of genocide (both during the war and the post-war period); and d) *active work* to recognise the status of and obtain compensation for the victims of the genocide (at the social, organisational/institutional, and individual levels).

The dark sides of social capital in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian environment can be analysed by unmasking the internal logic and politics of the common-interest association of economic and political oligarchies to achieve their own particular interests. The new-media chaotisation of social reality, grey economy, and essentialist politics of presentation and representation of collective identities act based on the matrix of normalising results of ethnically pure territories that were violently created during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic politics have for decades been focused on ethnic and clerical homogenisation and mobilisation, which is precisely why they reproduce the neoliberal ideology of spreading the politics of fear, playing the card of more or less visible identitary violence, while in reality they produce social poverty, depopulation, and mistrust of politics and politicians. Neoliberal globalisation has reached a critical point, and there are already diagnoses that we live in a ‘post-democratic society’. The paradigm of a post-democratic society means that the time has come to trust the distrust. In this way, the possibilities of legitimising the progressive politics of development are made more difficult, even as the
positively understood social capital was supposed to contribute as a positive instrument of neoliberal ideology.

Social capital should be analysed considering the newly emerging movements. It has become clear that during decades of transition, business and political classes have entered into strategic alliances based on selfish interests, disregarding the public good and the interests of citizens. With these alliances, they have made their cooperation easier. Networks of cooperation and reciprocity norms are fully developed. The trade of interests and influences has replaced the non-existent social order. The ‘dark sides of social capital’ have been triggered. Transactional costs have been reduced to a minimum. The political and economic class have united into a new class. This class could be labelled with the terms ‘plutocracy’ (the rule of wealth) and ‘kleptocracy’ (the normalisation of robbery), but not much is achieved by doing so. The growing economic asymmetry between the wealthy and the mass of the precariat has never been larger. The critics of transition believe that most of the population is currently in greater economic poverty than during socialism. However, the possibility of a scientific comparison of the socioeconomic situation in socialism and the present crony capitalism has also been reduced to a minimum. The ‘syndrome of egalitarianism’ is still widespread, and the lack of awareness about the irreplaceable developmental significance of education, entrepreneurial culture, and rural development remains evident. What is lacking is the prompting of the positive sides of social capital, oriented towards the strengthening of social cohesion at the level of state community. The deficient distribution of rights, resources, and responsibilities encourages feelings of growing injustice and mistrust of institutions that have promised to protect the public welfare. The positive side of social capital, theoretically speaking, could be expressed by the existing negative sides if all crime, both identitary and economic, were adequately sanctioned.
Society in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a society that fears violence, with foundations that often remain hidden in formal education with its foundations in war classifications. With the genocidal past of the entity Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina in mind, how can the population of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina live in the 21st century in the heart of Europe, in a state where criminals are revered as heroes and where the war ideology of genocide pervades and is still reproduced in the political, media, and interpersonal discourse (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija 2019)? The regressing social development is what Freire (1968, 1992) analyses, i.e., the situations in society that are at first glance thought to be insurmountable limitations for progress towards economic prosperity, peace, equality, the rule of law, and similar values inspired by democracy. With the aim of social progress, one must approach these insurmountable limitations as challenges, Freire believes, and not consider them undefeatable obstacles. Thus, as a social factor, an individual can free the subjugated identity and initiate societal changes that could lead to prosperity and stable peace (Freire & Macedo 2002). Only with a critical view of the situation, and with hope and faith in people, are these processes made possible.

REFERENCES


