American Foreign Policy

- A Study of American Policy Decisions in Iraq to Promote Democracy
Abstract

The essay aims to analyze and understand the policy decisions taken by the Americans during their tenure as occupying force from 2003-2004. By understanding what policy was enacted it is possible to judge how it impacted things down the line. Using democratization theory, it becomes possible to categorize a large amount of policy during that time. Meaning there can be a large-scale analysis of the policies and judge if they pushed democracy forward in Iraq. The two research questions are how the US planned to turn Iraq into a democracy and if the policy covered all the five arenas of democratization. After analyzing the material through the five arenas, the two research questions are answered. The US planned for the wrong things and only in Iraq did their plan crystalize. It involved focusing on changes in society that benefitted democracy, but with a top down approach. The policies covered all five arenas of democratisation meaning they were widely applied and pushed democracy in Iraq. The US intended to turn Iraq into a democracy and the policy employed during their tenure supports that goal.

Keywords: Democratization, American Foreign Policy, Iraq, Five Arenas of Democratisation, Democracy

Abbreviations
The United States Department of State (DOS)
Task Force IV (TFIV)
United States Central Command (CENTCOM)
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)
Central Provisional Authority (CPA)
Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL)
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG)
non-governmental organizations (NGO)
Acknowledgement

To Jan, who inspires me
To Ylva, who never gave up on me
To Louise, who I’m proud of every day

Thank You
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1 Introduction

The US invasion of Iraq began on March 20th, 2003. Active combat operations ended May 1st and President George W Bush made his now infamous *Mission Accomplished* speech. In a couple of weeks Saddam Hussain was toppled and one of the worst dictatorships in the world had ended. However, the length of military operations was tiny compared to the actual post-war reconstruction. The military occupation of Iraq continued until 2011. According to Freedom House (2019) Iraq is not a liberal democracy. The grand ideals of bringing democracy to the Iraqi people had failed. They removed a tyrant, but it was harder to plant the seeds of democracy. There has been a lot of attention paid to the reasons Iraq did not become a democracy, or what blame lies on the Americans (Cornish 2004, Mitchell 2008, Cockburn 2006, Hitchens 2007, Pollack 2008). Some question if Iraq was ready as a country to transition so quickly. The Americans plan did not manifest the way they wanted.

In 2001 the general zeitgeist was one of neoliberalism and neo-conservatism in the American political sphere (Khong 2016: 316,317-318). Promoting democracy was the name of the game after the fallout the Berlin Wall. Capitalism had won and democracy was on the rise. The Third Wave of democracies was swelling and countries from all over were joining the Western powers. *The End of History and the Last Man* (2006) by Francis Fukuyama sums up the feeling at the time. When the US was challenged by Saddam for not the first time with his threat of nuclear weapons it was a perfect storm. The Gulf War had been the first real contact. 9/11 was the spark. Key administration officials were all sure of them being the good guy in the world. Standing by letting dictators act with impunity and having their people suffer was unacceptable (*State of the Union* 2002). Ideologically speaking it made sense to invade Iraq. The rest of the world and the UN were not of the same opinion. This general feeling of right and wrong fell apart quickly once they entered Iraq (Fallows 2004).

The plan, in short, was simple. Liberate Iraq, dispose of Saddam and the Baath party, and turn the country into a democracy. The agency in charge of crafting the entire plan was the Department of Defense (DOD) and Pentagon. The United States Department of State (DOS) was part of the planning but their suggestions fell on deaf ears. The DOD set up a multi-step plan
starting from the military invasion to post-conflict Iraq. Step IV, or Phase IV, would designate the plan for what to do after combat operations had ended (Perry 2015: 43-44). One military official on the ground in Iraq asked, “Where is our Phase 4 plan?” (Galloway 2004). Task Force IV (TFIV) was specifically responsible for drafting the reconstruction of Iraq from CENTCOM and the DOD. In January 2003 they arrived in Tampa to begin planning (Perry 2015: 44). At the same time the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) had been created to plan for post war Iraq by the DOD (Bensahel 2008: 53).

In the ten weeks TFIV existed they got barely anything done and their rapport fell on deaf ears due to the towering bureaucratic and administrative sniping going on. What they did manage was a ten-point plan that was adopted by the ORHA. TFIV was disbanded on March 19th and responsibility was transferred to ORHA (Perry 2015: 46). They took over planning and began work, now on the ground, to facilitate change in post-war Iraq. No concrete plan existed from the Administration and by this point the US was committed to Iraq. The ORHA was disbanded on May 12th when Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad and created the Central Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA had full authority and backing from the Bush administration and spoke with their voice. Some of the ORHA’s work was kept by the CPA but key parts of their policy that had begun to be crafted was ignored by the new organization. American planning for post-war Iraq had theoretical, practical, and administrative problems. That is why most policy was enacted by the CPA on the ground well after the invasion was finished. A troubling idea since the US was going at rebuilding a shattered nation on its own (Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Forced? 2003, Learning from Iraq 2013: 37-39).

This essay intends to figure out what the American foreign policy for promoting democracy and starting the democratisation process in Iraq was. To do so, the work of Linz and Stepan (1996) was used. They state that to successfully bring about democratisation, policy must be focused on five arenas. The arenas are; civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, and institutionalized democracy. Notably, all five arenas must be present in the process or there is a risk for failure. The American policy therefore will be viewed through this lens to find gaps in their efforts to bring about democracy. If there is a lack of policy in certain arenas, or lackluster decisions, it could be argued that this could explain the failed democratisation. The policy decisions that the US pushed are not the sole reason Iraq failed to become a democracy.
However, knowing what sort of role US policy had in shaping that failure is an important piece in the much larger puzzle.

Previous research on why Iraq failed have focused their attention on the security questions, or the issues Iraq had internally (Cornish 2004, Cockburn 2006, Dobbins 2015). The consensus has been that the US failed to win the peace with no help from launching an invasion without international support (Mitchell 2008, Sechser 2007). Bringing democracy was the rallying cry but it soon became questions of securitization, fighting terrorists, and the geopolitical game between the US and Iran (Diamond 2008, Pollack 2008, Ottaway 2015, Dodge 2007, Record 2008). All together they form the conclusion that the US failed in Iraq. They did not achieve their goal, and much has been written about it. Democratisation very rarely factored into those parameters.

What is missing in all of these is what the US policy was. Little to no word is spent analyzing what that specifically entailed. They were the occupational force with full governmental might for a whole year in Iraq and from previous research it barely gets a mention. If it is mentioned it is from a structural and bureaucratic angle where the issues that plagued American agencies are mentioned. This essay intends to find out what the US plan for Iraq was and what kind of foreign policy they crafted to achieve that goal. If the policy is not pushing democracy in Iraq forward then it is possible attribute the failures in Iraq to more than security questions. Democratisation is a process where each segment influences the other. If the US policy was good, complied with the literature on democratization, then we can put more weight on the assertion that other factors weighed more heavily. Without clearly understanding or analyzing the policy that dictated the first crucial year of Iraqi democracy the whole process is up for debate. That is where this essay intends to lend a hand and bring another piece of the puzzle to the conversation.

1.1 Aim and Research Questions

As the occupying force the US had unparalleled control of the process in Iraq. However, most research has focused on the US invasion through the lens of security. Or by judging it as illegitimate and unprepared for the realities on the ground. Little effort has been devoted to
understanding the actual policy the US employed. Or from which strategic plan they worked from. It is often noted that the US did not have a plan but that is a half-truth. That is why this essay focuses on the US policy. It had a key role in trying to bring democracy to Iraq. The facts are that American foreign policy was, regardless of other factors, central to understanding Iraq’s democratisation process.

The aim of this essay is to evaluate American Foreign policy in how it attempted to turn Iraq into a democracy. By creating a more comprehensive summary of their policy it is possible to further the understanding of the US’s role in shaping Iraq’s democracy. Democratisation and democracy promotion is the vehicle to achieve that summary and analysis. All told it covers the first moments of the soon 18-year-old conflict where the US had the power to truly create democratic change. And to understand where things went wrong or if the answer must be located elsewhere.

To do this, two research questions are posed:

1: How did the US plan to turn Iraq into a Democracy?

2: Did the foreign policy cover all five arenas of democratisation?

1.2 Disposition

The essay is comprised of seven chapters. The first chapter quickly introduces the topic as well as some historical background. It also brings up the research questions and aim of the essay. There is also a methodological overview where material, limitations are processed. Chapter two discusses the theories and literature that is relevant to the essay. As well as introducing the main analytical tool of the essay. Chapter three is the analysis of the material and goes over the empirical facts whilst applying the analysis model. Chapter four is a discussion of the results, tying back to the main theoretical material. Chapter five answers the two research questions. Chapter six is comprised of closing thoughts on the topic and a note about future research topics and reflection on the findings. Chapter seven contains the bibliography.
1.3 Methodological Framework

The essay is built around an analytical framework, the five arenas of democratisation, to answer two research questions. To do this, two main aspects are discussed in this chapter. One is scope. The original concept for the essay was too broad, and very tight and precise cuts were made on what to focus on and what to ignore. Another is the choice of material. The bulk of this essay’s material is the CPA’s list of orders and website which are the records of what policy decisions were made by the US in Iraq.

1.4 Method, Considerations, and Scope

Democratisation is a vast topic and covers all parts of society. To attempt to answer why Iraq is not a democracy requires foreign policy research, securitization, ethnic and the existence of a state discussions, security questions, not to mention an in-depth case study of Iraq’s internal factors. It would not be possible. Therefore, the question was what to cut from the essay. To make it manageable and keep its focus.

This essay focuses on a specific stretch of time, from roughly 2001 to 2004. Its focus is the policy documents produced by the CPA, as well as any other documents or information that informs the general plan by the Americans. To do so an analytical model was chosen, the five arenas of democratisation, to both inform and structure the analysis. Little to no attention was paid to internal factors in Iraq, or the greater geopolitical situation as things unfolded in the timeframe listed. The essay itself is not a case study, instead tries to describe and increase understanding of a facet of Iraq’s democratization. I will discuss the points raised briefly in this chapter.

The big consideration was choosing a more descriptive essay over a case study, or comparative study. The intention was always to analyze American foreign policy, to try and understand what they brought to Iraq's process. Doing so meant narrowing the scope. If a case study had been conducted it would have involved comparing two reference points. Meaning the focus shifts from describing and understanding the policy to comparing and analyzing its evolution.
A comparative study would have included another country as reference, like Japan post WWII. While possible it again removes the focus on US policy specifically towards Iraq and changes the nature of the essays design and questions (Esaiasson 2012: 101, 104). To answer the question posed in the introduction there needed to be focus. Broadening the scope and overcomplicating things only served to dilute the eventual answers.

The five arenas of democratisation offered a simple way of both structuring the essay and operationalization. Firstly, they create a clear way of structuring the policies. Each arena fits into the process. Meaning policy slots into an arena where possible and it becomes easy to then analyze each part separately. Each arena also comes with a description and itinerary of concepts that can be used to gauge the effectiveness of policy. Another reason is the simplicity of it. As this essay attempted to create a broad, overarching, description and analysis of American foreign policy there needed to be a tool that catered to that need. On the note of operationalization, they also do that themselves (Esaiasson 2012:137-139). The descriptions Linz & Stepan give encapsulate what each arena contains. It is a simple matter then of looking at relevant policy decisions and placing them in the arena that comes closest to it. Some policy does not fit and are discarded. Others fit multiple and show up in the analysis in multiple areas but with a different emphasis. It’s a judgement call but one guided by the design of each arena.

Policy can be more than documents, however. Another way to approach this question would have been to look at statements, utterances, and the way in which US officials talked about Iraq. This essay chose to focus its attention on the CPA and official reviews and documents of concrete actions taken. A discourse analysis or securitization analysis would have uncovered different facets of their plan and intent. However, this essay was not interested in normative values or the way in which the US tried to control the narrative. The short timeframe and competing narratives in Iraq’s early years would have found answers to questions this essay was not looking for.

On the topic of security and Iraq is the choice to not include internal factors or much historical context. The aim of the essay is to describe the plan and first phase decisions by the US. They comprise what are essentially the first step in any decision-making chain. First the idea of what should be done, then comes the implementation when the how question is answered, and finally looking at how things panned out. By choosing to focus solely on the first step the essay gained
clarity and avoided becoming unwieldy. Had the purpose included questions about Iraq, or how the US handled themselves in Iraq, a plethora of other theories and facts would have to have been introduced. The security question alone is vast and would need descriptions of Iraq’s situation in the country itself (Diamond 2004). Once again taking focus away from the core aim of the essay. By keeping historical context, security, and Iraq itself, out of the equation helped focus the essay. It is involved in various arenas but is never the focus. There has been much written about Iraq but little about what the US policy entailed. By focusing on that the essay can help bridge the gap of understanding of what failed in Iraq. It is not meant to answer the broad, overarching question of Iraq’s failed democratisation. Instead bring clarity to one part of the whole.

1.5 Material

Most of the material comes from the CPA’s website. It is an aggregate site for all the policy decisions made. Combined with a review by Congress and a summary by the RAND corporation the intent was to gather facts from official sources. As the essay focused on concrete policy decisions and what the plan was official documents were prudent to find first. Government websites and official documents form the core due to its relative impartial nature. The Administration’s own writings on the subject are also included. Very little, if any, Iraqi sources are used. This is because the essay is interested in American policy. If non-American sources are used it is because the source discusses or notes decisions by the CPA or American Administration.

The CPA documents are firsthand sources. The two summaries second or third hand. Barring the CPA or official Administration documents any other sources need to be taken with a grain of salt. Objectivity is hard to achieve, but the idea is to get close. This is by considering that all this happened almost two decades ago. It is a contested and difficult time in American history. Therefore, when evidence is found outside official documents simply stating policy, corroborating evidence should be found. When opinions are voiced in sources they should be
considered against the collected facts for truth. Objectivity is not possible, but a general attention to keeping the study empirical needs to be taken into consideration.

The main theoretical source is Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan’s book *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidations* (1996). Their work details the five arenas of democratisation as well as discussions regarding consolidating democracies. Other than that, various authors and information has been taken to flesh out the theoretical background of the work. From democracy promotion to defining democracy they are important in understanding the analysis. An attempt has been to try and find more than one source when possible.

## 2 Theoretical Framework and Background

### 2.1 Defining Democracy

The aim of the essay is to understand what the foreign policy of the US administration was by using democratisation theory to analyze their policy into manageable and analyzable parts. Their end goal was to make Iraq a democracy, or at least move it in that direction. Democratisation is a process from non-democratic regime to a democratic one so there must be a conversation about what democracy is (Silander 2005: 26). Otherwise it is not possible to know what the desired end goal looks like.

There are various interpretations and descriptions for what democracy is. One such description is that democracy as government by the people (Almond & Powell 1996:63) or rule by the people (Dahl 1989: 3). Beyond that the research quickly diverted into two general viewpoints. The minimalists and the maximalist’s approach (Silander 2005: 27). These are the electoral and liberal democracies concepts. Minimalists focus on the procedure of democracy. Form over substance and with a heavy emphasis on free and fair elections as the core of any successful democracy. Maximalists instead strive for substance over form. The focus is on liberal and the rights of the citizens living in a society. That norms and values heavily play into what makes a
democracy. Therefore, for this essay the maximalist approach is more fitting. As the analytical tool for this essay is one that touches upon all of society, rather than focus on only certain aspects (Schumpeter 1942, Whitehead 2002: 10, Linz & Stepan 1996: 3).

Continuing the discussion of what makes a liberal democracy there are a few considerations. Elections are only one part of the structure. A democracy is a sum of its parts and all of those must work in tandem. Of course, free and fair elections are still a cornerstone of liberal democracies, it just isn’t the end all be (Silander 2005: 28). If we only looked at elections, then we might run into the “election fallacy”. Where countries with serious human rights or civil rights issues conduct elections and thus are lumped into the democracy category (Schmitter & Karl 191: 78). Thus, there are more factors in society to consider for it to be a liberal democracy. Three core traits of a liberal democracy are high level of competition, participation and liberties. If a state does not contain all three, or has low values, then they could be classified as pseudo democracies, illiberal democracies, or semi democracies from the maximalist viewpoint (Diamond 2002: 23-25).

Dahl (1971) introduced a midway between minimalist and maximalist approaches with the term polyarchy. He formulates that competition and participation are key in democracies. Contestation refers to organized competition through free and fair elections, while participation is that every person is able to participate either as a voter or politician in the process. He sets out eight important elements that should be included in a democracy. They are freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl 1971: 3).

All this aims to create an understanding of what democratisation leads to. A more democratic regime or state, with norms and values dispersed throughout society. Liberal democracies contain the core concepts of electoral democracies but with a heavier focus on rights and liberties. It wants minority rights regardless of cultural, ethnic or religious belonging, multiple of channels for political expression beyond parties and elections, multiple of channels for political
expression beyond parties and elections. This list isn’t exhaustive but highlights what a truly liberal democracy could look like (Diamond 2003: 35-36).

Ultimately, democratic regimes exist on a spectrum. If certain areas contain authoritarian or undemocratic metric, then we can identify them and evaluate the whole. This spectrum of democracies is helpful in that evaluations do not become black and white. You can gauge progress and good policy in certain areas whilst also noting problematic aspects in another area. There are different types of regime types but in them are varying degrees of liberal aspects. Democratisation attempts to move a regime towards democracy. What that end goal looks like should contain aspects of liberal or electoral democracies, including rights and liberties of its citizens. If the policies and decisions in question move the country in that direction or introduce the concepts raised above, then we know it is moving in the right direction. Towards a goal that we now have a description of.

2.2 Democratisation Theory

Democratic progress in the 20’th century has been explained as waves of democratisation (Huntington 1991). The first wave of democratisation was the French and American revolution which ushered in arguably the first democracies. The second wave came as a direct consequence of World War II with the defeat of the fascist and totalitarian Axis powers. Finally, the third wave began in the middle 70’s and ended around 1995 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This trend has been viewed positively and seen as the inexorable advance of democratic values throughout modern history. Democratisation, in general, is the transition from undemocratic regimes towards a democratic one. Across the world countries transitioned and it launched scholars into researching how democratisation happened and what was involved in it (Silander 2004: 2-4).

Democratisation can be described as the process in which country goes from a non-democratic regime to a more democratic one. It implies political change in the direction of democracy. Research has been focused on this change through a normative lens of improving the conditions for democracy. Karvonen (1997: 3) describes it as “…political changes moving in democratic
directions”. This definition is too generalized, however, to be of use. Democratisation is a multi-layered process with a plethora of actors, influences, stages, with different regimes that the change stems from. Understanding democratisation is realizing that the process involves uncovering the nature of various regimes and understanding the different phases democratisation possess (Silander 2004: 5).

One way of looking at this process is via phases; liberalization, transition, and consolidation. This essay’s focus is on both the transition phase as well as the liberalization phase of democratisation (Silander 2004: 5-6). All will be covered but those two figures into the analysis more. As a soft rule, democracies do not transition overnight. Democratisation is a process countries and regimes go through to change their nature. Knowing what each phase entails broadens the understanding of what the process is.

Liberalization is when a regime begins loosening its otherwise iron grip. It can be accepting competition, either economically, politically or amongst the populace (Ibid 2004: 5, Dahl 1991: 6-7). Transition is when the governmental system has its first election and power is vested in a newly ratified government. It also involves a more systematic change in the entire system. This phase of democratisation though is most notable for the free and fair elections it promotes (Linz & Stepan 1996: 3).

Transition is the continuation of liberalization, opening for an electoral democracy. This phase is quite literal. It entails that it is during this that a regime goes from undemocratic to democratic. This phase includes the right to vote for competitive parties in free and fair elections where the rules surrounding the election are respected. Liberalization happens in a dictatorial system and consist of socioeconomic and political change. Transitions occur slightly afterwards by producing political change as the process moves it towards an electoral democracy. As discussed earlier, there are issues with an electoral democracy. However, that does not remove the fact that transition is an incredibly important part in the democratisation process. It is where the ambitions of the first phase are realized, when the regime shifts into something new. This is not the final step, but it is the turning point (Silander 2004: 6-7).

Consolidation is the final station in the democratisation process. The in between of transition and consolidation is the struggle to attain a consolidated democracy. Trials and tribulations, young
democracies struggle to avoid falling back into pseudo democracies. Avoiding those pitfalls, they create systems that respect political and human rights and liberties. Contain strong judicial systems and constitutional checks and balances on political and economic parts of society. This is the liberal democracy which infuses all of society with democratic norms. It is also the stage which progress is judged from. Knowing where you want to end up can give direction and warn about actions that seem to steer in an unwanted way.

All told those three constitute the general process of democratisation. Normally, countries start this process by themselves. External factors may apply but generally it starts from the inside. In certain cases, a country is put upon the path of democratisation through war, invasion, or other factors. Japan and Germany post WWI are examples of this. Where they, through the actions of external actors, skipped the liberalization phase due to external pressure. As the country itself has not gotten to the point of liberalization, or transition, by themselves the foreign actor becomes the catalyst. These phases occur naturally due to internal and external pressures over long or intense periods of time (Silander 2005: 61-62). The foreign actor takes on all these factors on to themselves and are in sole possession of the power to mold the transition as it occurs. This is difficult as the country might lack factors that are beneficial for liberalization (Linz & Stepan 1996: 24-26, Parekh 2010: 123). This is key when discussing the American way of conducting their policy. Their situation was different than normal democratisation processes, meaning it’s important to understand why it’s different. And why that matters.

While the country in question must accept that democracy is the only game in town is true, the question is who the actors are in all this. A country is more than its regime. As such there are a plethora of reasons a country fails to, or succeeds, in democratizing (Huntington 1991: 38). One factor could be the socioeconomic factor. A country that finds itself growing economically will have its people demand more. Higher median economy and education levels, the evolution of the middle class, these are factors that help build consolidated democracies and topple authoritarian regimes (Silander 2005: 61-63).

Democratisation is a process as well as a complicated understanding of the nature of democracy. It includes all aspects of society pushing towards, or against, the change of the regime. Liberalization removes the old, transition see’s the change, and then the struggle towards
consolidation. In all these three phases are variables that influence the process. Social, political, economic, legal, all these factors influence and dictate aspects of democratisation. Society is complex and there needs to be a way to create a general framework at looking a democracy in this process. Linz & Stepan (1996) did so in their book. What they created was a way to conceptualize what a consolidated democracy requires to exist and sustain itself. Meaning, there is a blueprint to follow towards consolidation during the democratisation process. By creating the five arenas they made it possible to gauge what said democracy needs in each area. They are civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, and institutionalized economy. Together they form a generalization about society. All told these five cannot exist without support from each other. They form a structure that supports a liberal, consolidated democracy. Would one part fail the rest weaken. A liberal democracy entails all parts of society contain the norms and values of a democracy. These arenas represent them and gives a way to judge policy and actions to see if they would harm, or help, the process in that direction.

2.3 Five Arenas of Democratisation

Linz and Stepan (1996) created five arenas to help analyze democratisation in a country. These five are expansive and can in this case be applied to American foreign policy to see where it focused its energy and if the choices made furthered what Linz and Stepan would say moves a country towards democracy. An important aspect is the focus as well on the transition from its former state to a democracy. The end goal is important but how countries get from authoritarianism, totalitarianism, etc., is as, if not more, important than examining how democratic they are at the end (Linz & Stepan 1996: 3)

The arenas represent areas of society that are required to be addressed if a consolidated democracy is to take form. Linz and Stepan recognize a new democracy recently emancipated from an authoritarian regime will struggle. Therefore, they note that this process takes time and that each arena is difficult. There can be a less consolidated democracy, for example, or a “well consolidated democracy”, but all changing over time. Graded on a curve, democracy is not one
or the other, it is a spectrum. The policies that guide a country towards consolidation should be graded on a scale as well. In this essay the American foreign policy is evaluated and analyzed in how they interact with the arenas. If the arenas can be found in their policy documents, it’s fair to say the US foreign policy at least had the substance of a successful transition. If, however, it is hard to find some of the arenas in the foreign policy documents then something went amiss and could explain why the country didn’t become a democracy. The idea being to judge what they were intending and planning to address versus how things were implemented or panned out.

Democratisation does not contain a blueprint for creating a democracy. To do so the US must affect and change society. All countries are different and require their own unique changes, but some aspects can be generalized. In their work Linz and Stepan (1996) mapped out five arenas they believed was core to the democratic transition. For this essay, as it is not a case study, the idea is to use these as guidelines. American foreign policy and the orders of the CPA are not explicitly keyed to any area of democratisation. What this framework gives us is a way to categorize the orders and policy documents into workable groups.

With the framework in place it’s simple to take the relevant documents and policy notes and place them in their respective arena. Some don’t fit into any of the five and can be discarded. One such topic is security, which Linz and Stepan say is important but it is not a feature of a consolidated democracy. The makeup of the state, security questions, and recent history would factor into a study like they did where each country is its own case study. For studying American foreign policy, it is more interesting to analyze what actions directly move things towards a greater transition to democracy.

A judgement call is made on whether a certain policy decisions fits into one or the other category. This is inevitable but in general the policies are keyed into one aspect of society. Some policy fit into multiple or affect other arenas. That is fine but must be taken into consideration when choosing what policy goes where, and not throw it away when it fits into multiple arenas. Thus, making extrapolating where the policies fit less of a judgement call and more connecting the dots (Esaiasson 2012: 136-138).
2.3.1 Civil Society

This refers to autonomous groups outside of government who organize and gather to articulate opinions, discuss values, advance their interests or simply to further some shared desire. Civil society includes a variety of such groups. From social movements like women’s rights or religious groups, to civic associations from all strata of society like lawyers, journalists and trade unions. On top of these are the non-organized groups, most people living in a society. They are critical in regime transitions as they are the ones who go out to protest, heckle politicians, express their opinions on specific issues, and challenge the regime by their voices and actions.

The civil society also decides the legitimacy of the regime as shown when they protest and the regime caves into their demands, showing the power dynamic change. The way most regimes tend to deal with civil society is crackdowns or firing upon their own people, like Tiananmen square. It is the civil society that decides if the state is legitimate if they allow this, the monopoly on violence a state enjoys is only legitimate if the people accept the state after all (Linz & Stepan 1996: 7-8).

2.3.2 Political Society

The arena in which the policy exercise legitimate rights to act and change the state and nation. Civil society overturns the regime, but it is the political society that will overtake the institutions and further the democratisation. This is why it is paramount the polity gains a normative positive view of the core institutions of democracy - political parties, electorates and elections, political leadership, inter party alliances, legislatures and process - the way which democracies organize itself and create the premise for checks and balances. Consolidation requires a high degree of acceptance and habituation of dealing with differences and conflict in the space designated for it with agreed upon rules. As well as being aware and responsive to civil society. Political society and civil society co exist, you cannot have one or the other, and if there is an imbalance the consolidated democracy faces problems of destabilization (Linz & Stepan 1996: 9-10).

2.3.3 Rule of Law
The previous arenas of a consolidated democracy all rest on a foundation of agreed upon rules and institutions. These must be respected at all costs for a consolidated democracy to function. Constitutionalism forms the backbone of any democracy where the rules are written and agreed upon, where it and not majority rule, is the final and ultimate arbiter. This sets the ground rules and protects various rights and laws from short term discontent. All bound up by clear hierarchies of laws, in turn interpreted by independent judiciaries, and a strong legal culture in civil society (Linz & Stepan 1996: 10).

### 2.3.4 State Bureaucracy

All regimes must be able to perform their function towards society and for this it needs a bureaucracy of some sort. The better constructed it is the better it can help it citizens by collecting taxes, enacting social programs, and all the myriad of things a state does. If the bureaucracy is dysfunctional the needs of the people will be exasperated due to the government's inability to properly address problems as it delegates down from the regime to the various agencies further down the chain. An issue for new democracies is the takeover the existing bureaucratic infrastructure. In post-Communist countries the state and bureaucracy was essentially one and the same, meaning when one disintegrated so did the other. Meaning the takeover of a state’s bureaucracy can be hampered if the previous residents had created less of a bureaucracy and more of a personalized institution to respond to their needs rather than the needs of the people. This was very true for Iraq where decades of Saddam’s rule had left the bureaucracy a mess of red tape, bloat, and corruption that was hard to fix or even start to address properly.

### 2.3.5 Economic Society

Like all the above this aspect functions best when coupled with the rest and all are in working order, complementing each other. Some ground rules exist for what makes up a good economic society. First is that no non-wartime consolidated democracy with a command economy has existed. Second, there has never been nor will probably ever be a consolidated democracy that is a pure market economy. The economic society therefore sits at a medium between the two extremes. Like political and social freedom, the economy works best when the state is there to
regulate but the market is free to grow, adjust, and innovate. Where civil society and the polity can both interact and exist in the marketplace without too much bureaucracy and red tape. While having strong rules and regulations backed up by institutions of the state to control the market so the few do not outpace the many. Essentially a balance must be met for the economy to serve everyone the best. If one side gets too much power, we begin to slide towards one of the two extremes and thus begin suffocating a pillar of a consolidated democracy. That isn’t to say it is objectively impossible the two extremes could exist in a future society. Simply put, we have no historical evidence of it in a modern nation state and thus it seems unlikely it is something to strive towards.

A note about this arena is its overlap with the state bureaucracy in terms of monetary or economic questions. Both deal with these questions but for this essay, this arena was invested with most policy regarding economic matters. The state bureaucracy is about handling taxes, setting up budgets, and dealing with such matters. However, that is in the context of managing it. Economic society has been ascribed policy in the analysis that details things as tax laws, funding and spending, as well as infrastructure. As these arena’s do not perfectly fit the policies in question, this arena was given policies that were more directly involving money. Whilst the state bureaucracy arena dealt with ministries of economic matters.

Table 1.1. The Five Major Arenas of a Modern Consolidated Democracy. Inter-related Principles and Mediating Fields (Linz & Stepan 1996: 14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Primary Organizing Principle</th>
<th>Necessary Support from other Arenas</th>
<th>Primary Mediation upon other Arenas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Freedom of association and communication</td>
<td>Rules of law which establishes legal guarantees. State apparatus to enforce rights of civil society to organize if these rights are</td>
<td>Interests and values of civil society are the major generators of political society. Civil society generates ideas and helps monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Constitutionalism</td>
<td>A legal culture with strong roots in civil society and respected by political society and the state apparatus.</td>
<td>Establishes a hierarchy of norms that make actions by, and upon, other arenas legitimate and predictable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Apparatus</td>
<td>Rational-legal bureaucratic norms</td>
<td>Normative support from civil society for rational-legal authority and its attendant monopoly of legitimate force. Monetary support levied by political society and produced and rendered by the state by a functioning economic society, which has produced a sufficient taxable surplus.</td>
<td>Imperative enforcement on civil, political, and economic societies of democratically sanctioned laws and procedures established by political society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic society</td>
<td>Institutionalized Market</td>
<td>Legal and regulatory framework produced by political society, respected by civil society, and enforced by the state apparatus.</td>
<td>Produces the indispensable surplus to allow the state to carry out its collective good functions and provides a material base for the pluralism and autonomy of civil and political societies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.4 Democracy Promotion as a Contributing Factor
Democracy promotion can be defined as an outside actor pressuring a country's internal factors towards democratic values and norms (Silander 2005: 83). The result can then be that a state becomes more democratic if pressured correctly (Whitehead 2001, Huntington 1991, Schmitter 2001). At its heart, democracy promotion is a foreign actor putting pressure on another actor to enact democratic changes in their country. The methods in which that is done is varied but the goal is always the same.

As time has gone on a core concept, the sovereignty of the state, has begun eroding. This complicated the way in which democracy promotion was thought of. As the Cold War ended the international relations field began seeing new actors cropping up. On top of that, the state is no longer sacrosanct and beyond reproach. Countries can pressure undemocratic countries much more, using more channels to do so, than before. Promoting democracy is straightforward in nature but has, over time, gained more parameters due to an increasing complex international state (McFaul 2004: 153-155, Silander 2005: 89, 91, 95 98, Parekh 2010: Grimm & Leininger 2011: 392).

The act itself can be done through different means. A modern example is the soft power version of democracy promotion is the European Union’s (EU) Neighborhood project (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011:898). This kind is the classical example of putting incentive’s for change. By putting pressure on countries, often done by more powerful countries, they can influence the democratic process. As noted earlier there are many reasons why. One that has become popular lately is the idea that democracy is universally good (Parekh 2010: 119). The EU, or other actors, assume democracy is the best governmental structure and by promoting their system they hope other countries will follow suit. This is followed by pressures like economic incentives or strategic alliances to name a few (Grimm & Leininger 2011: 393). They have garnered decent success with this and provides a counterexample of the other type that is to be discussed. Namely that of more direct influence.

Promoting democracy through military is simple. A, usually, democratic country invades a non-democratic country and begins the process of creating a new democracy. The two major examples are the successful democratisation of Japan and Germany post WWI. In short that is a
gross simplification if one wants to advocate for military style regime change and democracy promotion (Parekh 2010: 123). This kind of democracy promotion was very popular in the 90’s and early 00’s, a liberal zeitgeist of promoting democracy across the world. Generally involving the creation of ad hoc interim governments or transitional governments in anticipation for an election (Silander 2005: 97). This kind of democratic promotion creates problems if the conditions in the country are not primed for liberalization.

One of the key issues of involving oneself military and staying there as an occupying force trying to force a democratic transition is you become the target of ire. As the US in this case attempted to bring democracy, they got any and all pushback. Anything they implement or enforce can quickly turn sour due to negative feelings towards them as an occupying force. Leading to the support for democracy deteriorating not because a lack of interest, but because the promotor has become extremely unpopular (Silander 2005: 100). This is because the occupying force corrupts anything, they touch with their alien presence (Parekh 2010: 125). Meaning laws, institutions, or any policy decisions are questioned and lack support due to its origin. As far as promoting democracy goes there is no blueprint (Grimm & Leininger 2011: 392). What is clear is that by being occupier and government during transition creates more problems than it solves.

Lastly, there are some considerations the US need consider in this process. Promoting democracy is about selling an idea (Silander 2005: 92). This idea must then be transferred to the country. Abstractly there are two ways of selling this idea to the right part of society, top down/bottom up, or grassroots (Carothers 1999). The former focuses on influencing policy makers and institutions into accepting democratic norms and values. The latter tries to bolster and support civil society to bring about democratic change. The grassroots approach, however, only works if there is a civil society to bolster otherwise this avenue fails. For Iraq, the US was more focused on the top down approach as there was a weak civil society. But also, that the nature of their tenure and scope of their mission made any attempts at a bottom up promotion a farfetched idea.

Regardless of the methods certain aspects of democracy promotion should be universal. They are not focused on the how, as discussed above, but more general considerations when changing a countries government. Parekh (2010) puts it simply as having humility. Democracy is unique to each country and Western powers do not have all the answers nor are they always right. Sitting
back and advising, listening, and helping the process along after the dictator is gone is the best solution they could do. Iraq and its people will, and should, create a democracy in their own form. Imposing too many institutions, norms, and restrictions will only create possible resentment as they are foreign by design. The US’s responsibility is to promote democracy, not create democracy for the Iraqi people. Humility in the process lends legitimacy. Understanding this will help create support for the process if the Iraqi people feel they themselves are taking charge of their lives and country. Become the occupying force they hate and implementing institutions and norms they do not accept, or intervene too much in the process, and see the initial support evaporate (Parekh 2010: 127-128).

3. Analysis of American Foreign Policy

3.1 Civil Society

According to Bremer (Bremer 2006: 12) the President agreed early on about the length of operations. This contradicts what CETCOM and other military agencies assumed would be the length of the operation (Perry 2015: 38). He was concerned about the ability of Americans to properly build civilian support for a new government in time (Dobbins 2006: 43). Fostering values as well as civil society in general is no small feat. His concerns were heard but never reciprocated. Due to the military nature of the planning, little thought was placed on post war reconstruction (Diamond 2004: 36). It was put on hold and assumed to have found an answer when they needed it.

While there existed a general idea of what the US Administration wanted, transferring that to concrete policy was difficult (George W Bush 2003, National Security Strategy 2006: 2-3, Government Accountability Office 2006: 5). Before the CPA began its work on crafting concrete policy there had been little actual planning on this (Helton 2003). Civil society, and the future of Iraq’s demography, was largely left unexplored by the Department of Defense (Bensahel 2008:
41). The plan was to arrive and be treated as liberators, easily handing over power to a willing population (Diamond 2005: 9, *Learning from Iraq* 2013: 31). As such there was little planning done by the DOD, Pentagon, CSAT, or any of the major agencies. Most of the concrete planning and work was done by the CPA and ORHA on the ground. The work they did do, and their plans, were admirable but failed to manifest like they hoped (Dobbins 2006: 266).

As the agencies involved assumed to be hailed as liberators and did not intend to stay long the onus fell on the CPA (Government Accountability Office 2006:10). The ORHA had not gotten much done by the time Bremer arrived on the scene (Bensahel 2008: 68-70). The planning stagnated and faced similar issues of not having discussed these questions. Bremer’s plan for bringing Iraq’s civil society back online was extensive (Coalition Provisional Authority, Dobbins 2006: 265). It involved everything from building and funding school, education programs, to human rights (Dobbins 2006: 282). In general, the big push was to remove the oppressive nature of the old regime. Iraq had been a dictatorship and civil society was heavily oppressed (US State Department 1990-2000 *Human Rights Abuses Iraq*).

The broad sweep of CPA orders revolved around a few general areas. Opening the media landscape of Iraq as well as opening Iraq to the world (CPA Order 11, 7, 65). Reintroducing human rights as well as writing it into the new constitution (CPA Order 7 *Penal Code*, CPA Order 60 *Establishment of Ministry of Human Rights*). Lastly, the introduction of freedom of speech, assembly, to promote a more open and generous liberal climate (CPA Order 19 *Freedom of Assembly*). All combined the general framework aimed to establish a baseline for a thriving civil society.

While it seems this generally fits democratisation theory of not assuming one size fits all, and a humility towards the problem, the US was simply winging it. Judging by the policies implemented there was an understanding of what basic needs a liberal democracy requires. Choosing to enshrine them in the constitution also safeguards them from flippant governmental abuse (Dobbins 2006: 266-267). Regardless, the lack of planning for any of these orders is not conducive to good policy creation. Had more work been put into preparing the CPA for what Iraqi society looked like and done more than the bare minimum on the ground, more could have
been achieved. Instead the policy decisions tend towards the general, rather than ambitious or innovative. The work the CPA did was admirable with what they had to fall back on. They had a good plan and Bremer’s own assumption was that this was a multi-year project (*Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty* 2003, Dobbins 2006: 272). Unfortunately, there was never enough time so there was long term implementation or teaching of civil society of their new rights, or how to protect themselves against future government abuses (Dobbins 2006: 283-284).

One of the key legislations the CPA enacted was its work on liberalizing the media landscape (CPA Order 66 *Iraq Public Service Broadcasting*, CPA Order 11 *Licensing Telecommunications Services*). They created government institutions for directing it in the future, as well as writing up laws and regulations. Without free airways and a diverse selection of broadcasting stations a healthy democracy cannot flourish. This idea, at its core, is conducive to enabling a vibrant civil society who can organize, mobilize, and feel it is being heard. Silencing critics and controlling the flow of information is what tyrants and dictatorships do. They also note that it will be up to the new government to further this project, without going into specifics. Regardless if this was their strategy or just how things transpired, it does better the chances of the institution’s survival. Allowing the Iraqis to themselves decide on how their new media landscape and broadcasting rights should or should not entail.

The only downside, and criticism from democracy literature, is their choice of clamping down on certain broadcasts (CPA Order 14 *Prohibited Media Activity*). Speaking from a security standpoint, they banned broadcasts inciting violence, enflaming sectarian or ethnic tensions, as well as those who would promote the old regime. The CPA and American foreign policy had to toe the line of putting out fires and promoting sparks of free speech. They were stuck in a bind which they chose to clamp down rather than to let everyone have free reign. Making sure people think democracy is the only way forward requires you to promote that message. If groups begin spouting propaganda in the opposite direction you can either try to combat it with your own message or simply ban such speech. In the interest of securing a democracy in that first vital year when the US was the occupying forces, they chose stability over full blown freedom of speech.

Introducing human rights as a fundamental part of Iraqi society was pushed hard by the CPA. As well as promoting it in general it stood in stark contrast to the blatant abuses of human rights so common under Saddam’s regime. They ordered a specific Ministry to be created to work with
these questions (CPA Order 60 *Establishment of Ministry of Human Rights*). Freedom of speech and freedom of organization were enacted in hopes of fostering greater participation by the general society. All told the biggest changes occurred in government rather than directly amongst people. As there was little time before the US wanted to hand over power Bremer and the CPA worked top down. With hopes that the grassroots movements would use the doors they had opened for them (Dobbins 2006: 282).

The otherwise most significant change they enacted lay in helping to write in human rights in the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) (CPA: Governance). In this, Bremer and the CPA encapsulated the core tenants they wanted to imbue the Iraqi state with. As well as leaving behind tools for civil society to freely mobilize. Which the people did when the time for elections came. Over a hundred political parties emerged. Clearly, there was an appetite for change and a willingness to participate amongst the people. Due to the changes the CPA wrought they could partake in politics, as civil society and political society co-exist and cannot truly exist without the other.

The CPA had little planning to fall back on. Coupled with a short implementation period of roughly one year the policy focused on broad strokes. Thus, it quickly became an attempt at giving the Iraqi government as much material as possible. Hoping they would use it well later down the line. In helping to write the TAL which was a precursor to the Constitution the CPA did manage to force, for example, human rights, to figure in it. All this looks in hindsight, and even at the time, like they didn’t have a plan (Galloway 2004). Worse, the Bush administration intended to leave quickly went against what should have been needed.

In a running critique of American policy, the lack of concrete plans stymied any real, fundamental change (Bensahel 2015: 330). Neither the CPA, DOD, CETCOM, or even the Bush administration had set up an exit plan. They worked off assumptions that proved false and when the time came to implement policy it was all wrong. Bremer and the CPA did what they could and certainly their policy ideas are not bad. Removing the old oppressive system and liberalizing the country is exactly the remedy to decades of authoritarianism. Even the restrictions they placed were there to protect the weak democracy rather than curtail public debate. However, it comes back to this being a top down enforcement of regulations rather than from any grassroots.
The CPA did not have the funding nor time to go around Iraq and spend time taking note of what needed administrating. Instead they focused on the broad strokes and took decisions that fixed things in Baghdad. Trickle down democracy is a poor replacement from cementing and finding support amongst the population at large. Much of what they did was universally accepted as a baseline. The incredible police state that oppressed Iraqi’s had been removed by the time the CPA was done and the US occupation over. While it’s clear many wanted to do more (Bensahel 2008: 65) there just wasn’t enough time. Due to this problem all solutions were done in a centralized way. Their hope was these fundamental changes would eventually make themselves felt later down the line.

Comparing their accomplishments to the arena directly, there are a few things missing. Some have been mentioned during the analysis but it’s worth bringing them up. Knowing where the US specifically missed the mark is important to gauge the overall effectiveness of their policy. There were no specifics in the US policy regarding social movements, or civil groups. The two policies that restricted certain speech, as well as freedom of assembly, proved that the US did not completely trust the Iraqi society. The policy focused on bringing the spirit of what Linz & Stepan would argue constitutes the civil society. They gave Iraqi’s the ability, freedom, and onus to go out and protest, make themselves heard, and organize. While specifics could have been useful, say to encourage waning areas, the generalized approach did create a baseline acceptance for civil engagement.

3.2 Political Society

Compared to previous arena the CPA enacted very few Orders regarding political matters. American policy in Iraq focused more on the interactions between Iraqi society and American institutions. The plans for the future of Iraq’s political institutions and elections were, however, drafted before the CPA or ORHA existed. There were many exiled Iraqis in Washington who were part of the preparation phases of the invasion. Their advice was leaned on heavily and is blamed in part for the somewhat naïve plans for the American arrival (Bensahel 2008: 234). They were mined for information about the country and how to best proceed. Many of them later became voted into the Interim government, the Council of 25, due to their help in the planning
stages (Pollack 2006). The fact that the US airlifted in prominent Iraqi exiles to later give them positions of power was part of the plan. It did leave a sour taste in the mouth of local Iraqis (Ibid 2008: 161). No official plan existed for what to do with the political aspects in Iraq until the invasion was very much over (Dobbins 2006: 294).

Their general ideas revolved around Iraq being able to rebuild itself. The new government would be led by Iraqi’s Washington knew and favored (Ibid 2008: 160). Kurdish groups, whom the US had worked with during Operation Desert Storm and more, were also eager to participate in the new government. These kinds of assumptions should not give the impression the US was driven by any high-minded ideals. Minimizing turmoil was prioritized to let them get out of the country quickly. Placing American friendly exiled Iraqi’s in government positions would secure American interests in the country. All this is squarely focused on American interests in Iraq, not what’s best for Iraq.

When creating democracies your policies should focus on mending old grudges. Bringing people together especially when sectarian or ethnic tensions have a long and bloody history in said country. Especially considering what kind of individuals you’d want in positions of political power. For the US in Iraq their choice of who to favor, the Kurds and Shia, ultimately would scare and alienate the Sunni’s. Their strategy for bringing a new political era to Iraq ultimately boiled down to their own needs (Learning from Iraq 2013: 30). Building a new democracy does not happen overnight (Diamond 2005: 16-17). Their choice strategy also resembles imperialist tendencies of placing trusties or cronies in positions of power in a newly conquered territory.

As there was no initial US plan for how to bring together the widely different groups of Iraq, a plan had to be adopted late into the process (Ibid 2008: 162). Led by the ORHA the idea was to work together with emerging political leaders and Iraqi communities around the country to craft a way forward (Dobbins 2006: 38-39). A meeting called “big tent” meeting did just that. Iraqi leaders agreed upon a delegate system to vote on new emerging political decisions regarding the interim government to come. The plan guaranteed points like religious freedom, ethnic and minority rights, and that a plethora of factors need be respected by the future government. Most importantly was point 7 of the 13-point plan which read: “that Iraqis must choose their leaders
[and] not have them imposed from the outside” (Ibid 2008: 163). This plan written on April 15th was a perfect way to facilitate political coordination and trust. Iraqi’s could go over the decisions and vote on them, delegates in a federal style would convene and discuss the details. While no end date was announced the “big tent” meeting set the ORHA goal of creating an interim government that Iraqi’s could agree upon. Importantly, it would be hands off and let Iraqi political figures dictate the process whilst remaining as a guiding hand.

Hearing of this success the Bush administration reiterated its policy position of wanting to quickly transfer power to an Iraqi source. What they managed to do was set a rough timetable. By the end of May 2003, the intent was for a “transitional government” to be voted into existence. In the coming six months to two years a “provisional government” would be elected, each step giving more and more actual power over to the emerging political structure. All this would culminate in a national election that would officially end the occupation (Ibid 2008: 164, Hard Lessons 2009:83). This quick transition of power, with a clear timetable, and cementing support amongst Iraqi people through a delegate system was a sound strategy. It made sure the people would feel things were moving away from begin an occupied country. They would be allowed to vote for a new government quickly. Things were moving forward and always with the approval and with consent of Iraqi leaders. All this coincides with the Bush administrations concerns of staying too long in Iraq, since their plans did not involve becoming an occupying power (Dobbins 2009: 35-36). Arguably the two most important parts was the clear timetable and quick vote on an interim government. This is because if they did not quickly begin the political process Iraqi’s would start questioning their motives of leaving quickly. The first six months of any occupation is the most crucial (Hippel 2001: 200). This rapid movement on the political scene was very helpful in preserving the momentum whilst retaining legitimacy and trust amongst Iraqi’s (Lessons from Iraq 2013: 33-34).

On May 12 Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad and the CPA took over from the ORHA. He, as the leader of the CPA and with the full authority of the President, essentially pulled the rug out from the previous political process (Dobbins 2006: 273). He removed the timetable, changed the election process of the "transitional government", and a couple of days later upturned a cornerstone of Iraqi power structure (CPA Order 1 De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society). These
changes were greatly distressing for many leaders. Especially the Sunni’s who were hit hardest by Order 1. The greatest policy change was abandoning the ORHA’s plan for how to create the new governing body. Originally a vote was scheduled for the “transitional government” by June 3’d but Bremer vetoed it. They did not properly communicate these changes either. Coupled with the issues the CPA’s decision was counterproductive to the democratisation process (Hard Lessons 2009:98-100).

The CPA chose to elect an Interim Government, by fiat instead of the delegate system previously agreed upon. This wasn’t the “transitional government” but a sort of in between. Named the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) it was a generally well mixed group ethnically, tribally, and on gender (Bensahel 2008: 166). The decision was done with continuous discussions with Iraqi leaders but without a vote. Because of the lack of communication, or previous knowledge of key individuals, 16 individuals out of 25 members were either exiles or from the autonomous north. In general, the effects of this policy were bad. It was also created in such a way to govern like an imperialist occupational force. Its decisions were not rooted in any democratic vote by the population or its leaders. By uprooting the democratic principle, the CPA’s policy decisions ruined the otherwise solid democratic plan the ORHA had crafted only weeks before (Pollack 2006).

The CPA struggled with finding a way to create a government and find suitable individuals to fill it (Dobbins 2006: 45). They brought in help from the UN to facilitate things, so it did not get mired down more than it already had. The timetable was by 2004 to have a provisional government in place, replacing the IGC, and then in 2005 having national elections. As an organization it let the UN do the heavy lifting (Pollack & Pascual 2007: 9). The new governmental body, in coordination between relevant parties, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), was announced on June 1st, 2004. What is most important is that thanks to the UN, and considerable communication between relevant parties, the approval of the IIG was sky high. Religious leaders who previously denounced the IGC warmly welcomed the IIG (Ibid 2008: 175-176). The specifics of how it came into being aren’t as important as what it tells us of the failure of the CPA’s policy decisions. They created an agency with no regional support. Increasingly dictatorial they enacted policy that, however good it was, had no traction or trust amongst the people (Learning from Iraq 2013: 10). When the IIG launched it was with UN backing, removed
from US occupation stigma. It had been discussed and properly vetted and been made sure to stay as unpolitical as possible. Compared to the IGC, that was composed entirely of hand-picked individuals. Even worse it had been a majority of exiled Iraqi’s who already were not liked by the Iraqi population.

Two major pieces of legislation the CPA did, to their credit, help draft was helpful in moving Iraq towards democracy. One was the November 15 agreement previously mentioned (Global Policy Forum Agreement on Political Process). The other is the (TAL) which laid the foundation for the constitution written in 2005 (Global Policy Forum Law of Administration for the State of Iraq). The TAL especially was well done as it used the expertise of a group of scholars and academics chosen by the IGC to write. The documents made sure that Iraq had the potential become a truly liberal and free state. They incorporated the decisions of the 13-point charter drafted by the ORHA and Iraqi leaders in 2003. By involving the IGC, and later the interim government, the CPA managed to create lasting positive effects on Iraq. It cemented rights, restrictions on power, rules regarding the military, but most importantly gave the Iraqi people a draft constitution to call their own (Dobbins 2006: 289-291).

These two documents were the crowning achievement of the CPA. What it managed to do was set the guidelines for Iraq’s political future. Rampant abuse of power had been the cornerstone of Saddam’s rule. This document, and the people writing it, put into words the rules they would abide by. Political leaders are a tricky proposition. They hold the power of government an right after transition there is temptation in power. By dictating with everyone, the Iraqi leaders and political figures, the US could make sure everyone agreed on the basics of an electoral democracy at the lowest end. It is much harder to change a constitution and now the names and signature of many powerful Iraqi politicians was on it. Safeguarding the political future, both in the moment and future, was paramount and the CPA did manage to bring it to port.

Larry Diamonds piece Building Democracy After Conflict (2005) highlights the core problem the American policy had in Iraq. While theoretically the premise of American policy in Iraq was solid it was built poorly. They intended to leave and not occupy Iraq for long (Hard Lessons 2009: 96). Having exiled Iraqi’s quickly take over government with a people who supported the
removal of Saddam. Their original political agenda was based on this. The ORHA worked with Iraqi officials for a couple of weeks devising a strategy for creating a democratic forum for electing the new interim government. When things changed on the ground, the CPA replaced the ORHA, American policy did a 180 and instead dictated policy rather than communicate ideas. They created a governmental body that was not elected but appointed. It wasn’t until the Transitional Government was elected that Iraqi’s supported the government. This uncertainty in policy created confusion and alienated several Iraqi’s in that they did not know what was happening. This exasperated attempts at building local grassroots movements when the timetable was sped up and things did not have time to mature.

Had the US invited the UN to create a multi-national push towards democracy, transfer power in late 2003 rather than a year later, then Iraqi’s would have had more trust. Liberators quickly become occupiers and the US took too long in beginning the process of transitioning political power. Their policy did not have its roots in Iraqi political groups or figures, instead focusing on exiles whose loyalty was questionable in the eyes of the population. The stated goal of the US was to create a democratic government in Iraq. The policy instead turned the CPA into a colonial power who appointed political chiefs, vetoed decisions concerning the IGC. It became a process of top down authoritative decree’s with regards to Iraq’s political process moving forward. By the time the IIC was in place trust had been shattered and Iraqi’s had lived with a CPA that acted like a colonial power. Inviting and making the population feel part of the political process is core to democratisation. Missing that mark made all their other accomplishments dimmer.

### 3.3 Rule of Law

There wasn’t an independent judiciary under Saddam’s rule. This becomes clear when the CPA begins listing changes it conducted. Comparing the two the post-Saddam judicial system and laws resemble modern Western democracies. If the goal of the Bush administration was to remake Iraq into a democracy, then the judicial system needed serious change. No clear direction, however, was given by CENTCOM or any of the other planners on what to do (Bensahel 2008: 45).
An independent judiciary is core for any democracy. The US constitution heavily promoted the idea of separation of power. Allowing the branches of government to meddle with judicial matters is a dangerous prospect. Under Saddam it was abused (CPA Accomplishments 2003-2004: 19). While no clear direction was given this core tenant of democracy was the guiding light. The CPA wrote over 17 Orders specifically regarding the judicial system. Furthermore, this kind of push helps build trust. As Iraq was going through a regime change angry feelings of not being seen or represented could arise. Making sure there was a system in place to settle disputes is crucial (Dobbins 2006: 153).

When the CPA began reconstructing the old Ministry of Justice they did so in a generalized way. Two things stand out. One is that certain laws were targeted and remade by the CPA directly. Second was the focus on broad, judicial change. They were building institutions and the timeline for Iraq was measured in months if previous planning and Administration sources were to be believed. Institutions can outlive an occupation force. Once set into law the CPA could be confident their changes stood the test of time. The same goes for their changes in structure, judicial oversight, and generally how the Courts behaved. Once in place these institutional changes would be difficult to dismiss easily. All this fits the general modus operandi of the CPA and Bush administration in Iraq. Focus on institutional change and design and let the Iraqi’s deal with specifics (Dobbins 2006: 173-174).

Certain laws, as noted earlier, were specifically changed or created by the CPA. Four specifically targeted certain aspects of society. Problematic areas such as economic debt and issues arising after the invasion (CPA Order 4 Property Reconciliation Fund). One such issue was in regard to firearms (CPA Order 3 Weapons Control). It made it so only authorized personal or approved members of the Interim Government and CPA could carry weapons. There is no mention of it being rescinded, implying there was a concern the right to carry arms was a tad too insecure. Another issue that arose naturally was modifying the Penal Code (CPA Order 31 Modifications of Penal Code and Criminal Proceedings). It increased the punishment for larceny, kidnapping, rape and destroying vital infrastructure to life in jail. As well as allowing judges to put individuals under these suspicions in jail without bail awaiting a trial.
What these two laws show is that not only was the CPA crafting a legal future for Iraq. They were using it to deal with issues in their current time. Since there was no real plan for what to do with the judicial system so the CPA could mold things as they saw fit. Several laws came about to either combat issues of the old system, or to fix issues that were appearing in the intervening months. In a post war situation, there needs to be that consideration of both the future and present. People need to believe their judicial system is on their side, is impartial, and responds to their needs. If the population doesn’t believe in the laws, or its institutions, then social order crumbles. Luckily, the CPA wrote laws that tapped into this issue.

On the broader judicial transformation side, the aim became clear. To create a judicial platform that later Iraq government officials could work with. If the institutional design is sound, then there is a good chance it continues that path. One of the big things was making sure the new judicial system would be independent. They did this by implementing a Council of Judges that had been abolished in 1979 (CPA Accomplishments 2003-2004, CPA Order 35 Re-Establishment of the Council of Judges). It was abolished to make sure the Baath party had control of the third branch of government. The CPA was aware of this history. Their actions gave the new judges real legitimacy, making sure they were not pawns of the government (CPA Order 15 Establishment of the Judicial Review Board). The Ministry of Justice was no longer under direct control of the cabinet either (CPA Order 32 Legal Department of the Ministry of Justice). Ensuring its independence, as well as giving it important and powerful tools at its disposal.

The sins of the old regime were also dealt with. Iraq was infamous for its prisons and the US made sure to write some laws to change these practices (CPA Order 10 Management of Detention Facilities, CPA Order 98 Iraqi Ombudsman for Penal and Detention Matters). Whilst it did not solve all issues regarding these detention facilities, it was a step in the right direction (Hersh 2004). As many other instances of removing the old regime the CPA was clear they wanted Iraqi’s to realize the message America had come with. That American presence would usher in a new country that treated them fairly. Human rights were also put into actual law to further cement the direction of US actions (CPA Order 7 Penal Code). It disbanded old, defunct institutions that no longer fit into a democratic country (CPA Memorandum 3 Criminal
Procedures. This removal of the old legacy was very important to try and move the country forward (CPA Order 2 Dissolution of Entities with Annex A). Compared to the de-Baathification Order, the judicial system got reworked in a more inoffensive manner. It moved to remove the corrupt nature of the system. Heighten accessibility, remove governmental tampering, and generally try to create the best baseline it could.

The actions they took had a general theme. To create an independent judiciary that held liberal ideals and human rights close to heart. Vetting individuals who intended to become judges to avoid undue corruption and nepotism. Bremer and the CPA’s actions amounted to reworking the whole system. The US constitution and Bill of Rights was inspiration for what became the Iraqi equivalents (CPA Accomplishments 2003-2004: 21-22).

Due to the lack of planning the CPA worked on what made sense. They needed to reform the judicial system and many of their changes is reminiscent of the American system. But their actions should not be credited for being thought through. Instead they are simply well-crafted ideas the CPA and the Administration thought of at the time. As they did not have requisite plans the end results were very top down. While they did indeed work with lower courts and regional groups that was not the main thrust of their policy (CPA Order 58 Maysan and Muthanna Courts of Appeal). Contrary to other arenas a top down approach to change is not terrible in this arena. Working to replace the core of the old judiciary system will have clear affects down the line. Especially with the new vetting services and making sure corruption and nepotism are targets for the new vetting process. Their legacy is the TAL. In it was enshrined liberal values of a modern nation. Protecting the new rights and liberties granted to the Iraqi people.

There could have been more done to promote the rule of law. As the timetable wasn’t set until 2004 there wasn’t time to influence people around the country. Half of the law is in written documents and the courts. The rest are in the minds of the citizens who obey them. Had more time been available it would have been prudent to introduce more programs for Iraqi’s to learn about the new system of rights. As it where, due to the tight schedule and rapid change of plans compared to what some wanted, this is what they could do. Comprehensive reform was impossible with the time the Americans had. Despite this they managed to conduct a thorough
restructuring of the system itself. As well as introducing many new laws and rights into the system that had previously never been considered. While the citizens were not part of this process, they benefited from the top down approach regardless.

3.4 State Bureaucracy

Comparative to the other areas, there existed a modicum of planning for the future of post-war Iraqi infrastructure and governmental agencies. The CPA had it as a point to keep and improve infrastructure and keep governmental agencies running (Bensahel 2008: 104). Of course, that was in July, four months after the invasion. They intended to “restoring basic services to an acceptable standard”. The TFIV also noted that a key part of the post-combat planning was saving as much of the state infrastructure as possible. Precision guided munitions and minimal damage to Baghdad’s official buildings was paramount. Ensuring that as much as possible of the infrastructure in place, including personal, would be available.

The most comprehensive planning, that moved beyond bullet points, was done by the ORHA. Called the February Rock Drill it occurred on February 21st and 22nd 2003. It called together a vast group of agencies and their staff to discuss questions regarding the bureaucracy of Iraq. They paired exiled Iraqi’s with American officials to help staff the agencies in question. In a quiet impressive list it catalogued the main ministries and agencies of Iraq that would be governed by Americans after the war. This was to create some sense of what the reconstruction situation would look like. The quick removal of Saddam was going to leave a power vacuum. ORHA hoped to fill it with this (Ibid 2008: 59-60). While a good plan it crumbled when the ORHA arrived in Baghdad after delays that proved problematic. The issue is part of the post-war assessment that assumed governmental agencies infrastructure and personnel would be available (Pollack 2006). Quoting Garner: “What happened in Baghdad is not only did they take everything out of the buildings, but then they pulled out all the wiring out of the buildings, and they set it on fire.” Looting, not military collateral damage, did the most damage. ORHA and
other agencies did not properly plan for this. Their deployment was scattered so that the Rock Drill did not come into effect until after the ORHA dissolved into the CPA.

As noted earlier this plan was more extensive and showed that there was some thought behind what to do post Saddam. While it revealed issues that were not addressed eventually it showed a willingness to plan. Part of this reason was the military in their planning assumed to keep existing infrastructure functional. The ORHA echoed this sentiment, assuming alongside them that the main governmental infrastructure would be operational upon Phase IV. How much of the existing bureaucracy that could be salvaged is a key question in taking over from the old regime. Unfortunately, Saddam had built the system around himself. When he disappeared a core part of the system was gone. The US planned to counteract this problem but it’s clear they bungled the attempt by not coordinating between the ORHA and CPA.

The second part of the ORHA plan, and the American plan in general, was leaning heavily on the pro-American exiled Iraqi’s in Washington. They trained almost 5000 individuals for this task. Grouped up American officials with exiled Iraqi’s to pilot agencies after the takeover. While the implementation didn’t work out, the idea was sound. The US realized they had to quickly take over, as planned in the Rock Drill. Using local figures has always been useful in creating a good first impression. However, in the post analysis of this choice the US realized the information they had gotten wasn’t always correct. Not to mention they over anticipated the warm welcome they would get. As well as the vehemence many Iraqi’s felt towards the exiled Iraqi’s (Hard Lesson: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience 2009). There doesn’t seem to have been enough vetting and knowledge about the situation beforehand to properly judge if this was a good idea.

Regarding the CPA it’s most prominent effect on democratizing Iraq was CPA Order 1 De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society (2003) on May 16, days after Bremer’s arrival. This plan had been circulating vaguely in the agencies. The State Departments Future for Iraq project had noted the dangers of it. Bremer chose action over caution and enacted the order which he would be heavily criticized for. It wiped away the old regime from government. Removed high level officials, members of the armed forces, senior Political Members, and generally swept away the old regime. Not unlike in Germany by removing the Nazi party and all its allies or would be
sympathizers it was to ensure the old regime would not return. This idea was not without merit. However, taking a moment to consider the ramifications it is clear why this was a terrible decision. Hindsight makes it easier to spot the problems but even so there are reasons why this decision was problematic (The Future of Iraq Project 2002).

Iraq under Saddam’s rule the Sunni’s held the lion shares of important positions within society. This included high level ministry positions, generals and field marshals in the army, and so on. When Order 1 rolled in they were all stripped of everything. The Sunni’s were mortified and hurt that they were targeted like this. Not only that but by doing the sweep so broadly and without proper warning then a vast majority of qualified individuals left their offices. This made sense as Saddam had curated a regime that was centralized around his key cronies. By washing it all away in an afternoon there was little left to work with. It is unclear if the CPA had discussed the problems the ORHA had encountered in their failed attempt at reviving government institutions day to day running’s (Ibid 2008: 68). This kind of centralized government created around an ethnic group isn’t uncommon. However, it influences what kind of fallout will occur when removed. Bremer’s choice to act quickly to purge the old regime left the government understaffed and not able to function properly. It is possibly to see these events coming and plan accordingly. The US administration, in what has become a thread throughout this analysis, failed to plan for such an event (Lessons from Iraq 2013: 33).

One key objective was making sure things ran smoothly. The issues of Order 1 did not persist forever. Money and paying the employees were adjudicated later when the Development Fund for Iraq was created (CPA Order 2 Development Fund for Iraq). This fund handled more than just ministry and Iraqi governmental salaries. Although paying for personal was paramount and much of the funds the first year was transferred to keep the government apparatus working (Hard Lessons 2009: 169-170). Much of the CPA’s work regarding this was getting the various Ministries up to speed again (Dobbins 2006: 276). While conditions were bad and planning minimal, they achieved a decent amount (CPA Accomplishments 2003-2004). Arguably their biggest work was simply kept them staffed and attempts to try to channel new workers into government. The old system was byzantine levels of bureaucracy, red tape, and corruption. They
changed the ways hiring and salary was done to try and alleviate this problem (CPA Order 30 Reform of Salaries and Employment with Annex A).

In the list of orders quiet a lot involve the adjudication of various ministries. Creating new ones and readjusting the existing infrastructure. Much was left in shambles after Saddam left and the CPA was working uphill due to the poor planning of the DOD (Hard Lessons 2009: 10). Disregarding the problems of planning and unfair assumptions about the post-war situation, the CPA enacted a staggering amount of changes regarding the state bureaucracy. There were a wide range of orders directly target government oversight, the creation or administration of ministries, tax collection and fiscal policy, as well as purges of government from pro-regime individuals (CPA Orders 6, 18, 20, 24, 26, 27, 32, 33, 44, 49, 50, 55, 57, 60, 65, 67, 68, 73, 77). This is disregarding military related orders. A further dive into this is the CPA’s on reflections on its year in power CPA Accomplishments 2003-2004 (2004). Almost every agency was affected. Including the creation of several new ones. The CPA also implemented oversight positions and corruption review boards to try to prepare the new administration with the tools it needed (Dobbins 2006: 278). Slipping back into its old ways would be very simple and the CPA seemed to work hard to create a solid foundation.

The policies on display are extensive. Much was done to refurbish and create a whole new bureaucratic machine after Saddam’s removal. By number of policies this arena tops the list. It was unfortunate that they misjudged the situation going in and had to spend so much time cleaning up the mess the military planners had created. Much of the policy is about creating functional bureaucratic institutions. Even going so far as to ensure protection for whistleblowing, and an attempt at making sure the red tape and bloat of the former regime does not come back. This arena wants policy that creates a well-functioning bureaucracy, with good working norms, that benefit the running of the state (Bensahel 2015: 332). In so far that the US had time they managed to do a good job doing everything but cement norms. That, however, is something that takes longer and cannot be done entirely by governmental fiat.

3.5 Economic Society
The CPA had a written plan for the economic situation for Iraq. In short it sums up the goal of all the regulations, and the wishes of the administration, to create a free market economy in Iraq (CPA Economy Plan, (Dobbins 2006: 209-210). All their work tried to liberalize the markets of Iraq, open it up to the world (CPA Order 54 Trade Liberalization Policy. The hope being Iraq’s oil profits could, on its own, coupled with UN and non-governmental organizations (NGO) help (Rebuilding Iraq 2006: 14), finance much of the infrastructure that needed repairs. Compared to many other areas of democratisation the US worked with external actors like the UN to achieve their goals (CPA Order 36 Regulate Oil Distribution, 39 Foreign Investment, CPA Regulation 2 The Development Fund for Iraq).

A running trend throughout this essay has been the US administrations inability to plan for the post construction phase of the invasion. The economic side of things was no different (State Department Rebuilding Iraq, Hard Lessons 2009: 97). What guidance there had been was to create a free market economy. It would bolster American interests if Iraq came out the other side well off. A core idea was that any rebuilding of the country would be financed by oil funds (Hard Lessons 2009: 10). As so many other ideas the American planners had it was far from the truth. According to the State Department’s own calculations the oil production barely increased three years after the invasion (The State Department Rebuilding Iraq). Since the pre-war planning was derelict it was the CPA who pulled the heavy load (Government Accountability Office 2006: 13-14).

They wrote around 22 different Orders and Regulations regarding economics. A vast amount of them revolved around creating economic institutions, tax laws, foreign investment, dealing with inflation, and various economic difficulties arising in the post war situation (Dobbins 2006: 199-200, 213, Government Accountability Office 2006: 12). On top of that they invested a lot of money into the economic revitalization of the country. Billions of dollars were pumped into the country to get it back into shape (Bensahel 2008: 223-224, Hard Lessons 2009: 116, Smith 2013). NGO’s were contracted and the CPA created vast networks to try and get the otherwise plan like economic system into gear. They set up two main bodies to deal with the economic revitalization, the Development Fund for Iraq and the Program Review Board. (CPA Regulation
2 The Development Fund for Iraq, CPA Regulation 2/3 Program Review Board). On top of that they created an organization to deal with international funds, attempting to bring in foreign money and investments into the country (CPA Regulation 7 International Donor Assistance, CPA Order 39 Foreign Investment). US Aid (USAID) contributed both financial and practical help in funnelling money where it was needed most (Bensahel 2008: 222). Not only to big companies but also to local projects (Hard Lessons 2009: 120). The amount of work the CPA put into the economic questions was extensive.

Part of the policy was to make sure Iraq recovered. In short, the infrastructure of Iraq on all accounts was subpar after decades of neglect and years of sanctions (Bensahel 2008: 211-212). Therefore, a large chunk of investments was placed to refurbish them (Ibid 2008: 225-227, 228). Another part of the recovery was turning Iraq from a centrally controlled oil export country towards a more liberal free market (Dobbins 2006: 206). Opening the free market to competition involved trying to crowbar up state owned entities (CPA Order 89 Public Contracts, CPA Order 12 Trade Liberalization policy, CPA Order Regulation of Oil Distribution, CPA Order 45 Non-Governmental Organizations, Hard Lessons 2009: 134, Dobbins 2006: 224). These changes were in the grand vision of improving Iraq's economy. Neo-liberalism and capitalism had brought countries from poverty to riches and these changes were an attempt to do something similar (CPA Order 49 Tax Strategy 2004, 37 Tax Strategy 2004/2003, CPA Order 51 Suspension of Exclusive Agency Status, Dobbins 2006: 227, 225,233-234). Another problem Iraq had was its banking system, which was ancient, derelict and looted after the war (Hard Lessons 2009: 135-136, CPA Order 40 Bank Law). Upgrading it to run like a modern country took money and time but it was the best solution to try and modernize the system. This came in tandem with combating inflation, and another example of purging the old regimes memory, introducing a whole new currency (Hard Lessons 2009: 131, CPA Order 43 New Iraqi Dinar Banknotes, (Dobbins 2006: 200).

Regarding this area of democratisation, Linz and Stepan were brief and non-descript in describing what they meant. An economy is a pendulum where both ends are the extremes of economic thought. What they envision is for a country to democratize you must strike a balance between the two. In this case Iraq was at the extreme where everything was concentrated in
wealthy elites and planned by key individuals. What the US did was break that oligarchic system open and invite competition. If only looking at the decisions and policy, they pursued you could argue it was too market liberal. That it was simply slamming the pendulum back the other way. However, this needs to be taken into consideration where Iraq was. This was on the other extreme. Their policy moved the dial back towards the middle, but it was nowhere close to managing a complete reverse.

Their policy was a mix of neoliberal thought and damage control. Iraq’s economy was, put simply, in shambles (Dobbins 2006: 197). The CPA used the Development Fund for Iraq and its ilk to make sure government didn’t collapse. Same goes for the banking system which was hastily repaired and changed to facilitate any kind of economic recovery. Billions were pumped into infrastructure that had been underdeveloped by Saddam for decades. These decisions were done to make sure society survived the transition. Had better planning been conducted with more knowledge of the situation on the ground it could have been done with more forethought. As it was the US administration implemented policy as they were needed and found out. Compared to what should have happened. Namely that policy decisions, planned and crafted far in advance, would be implemented along a plan (Dobbins 2006: 202-203).

The day to day running of the country was saved due to good fiscal and economic policy decisions. They made sure the country had the possibility of prospering. Much of their policy revolved around the idea of opening the country’s economic system. It received pushback so it never became anything like the US system, but it was a start. There is a worry when democratizing a country that too much liberalization can destroy its prospects. Parekh (2010) put it nicely when she notes that the Western democratic nations have a free market economy. They did not start there but have built towards it. There is institutional and historic buildup. In new democratic countries that were previously centrally planned the transition can be jarring. If enough checks and balances are created the economy can instead turn into an oligarchy, where abuses of the system are left unchecked. The US did not put in many safeguards. They did, however, begin to remove the overbearing plan economic structure of the old regime.
4. Discussion

This essay intended to shed light on how the US planned to turn Iraq into a democracy. The five arenas of democratisation aimed to both lend structure to the essay while also acting as an analytical tool. After this analysis of the empirical material it’s possible to answer the question posed at the start, with help from the literature on the subject. In short, the US intended to turn Iraq into a democracy by toppling Saddam, be greeted as liberators, turn over power to US friendly Iraqis and Iraqi exiles, and leave with minimal effort, leaving a burgeoning democracy behind. When this did not manifest the plan had to change, but their intent of turning Iraqi into a democracy never changed.

Democratization is a long and complex process. Societies are complex and combined with human involvement they are unique for each individual country. That is why there can be no blueprint for democratisation. The US policy was crafted in Iraq but with little insight prior to their entrance. This disconnect is felt hardest in the political arena. By not knowing the place you are attempting to change you set yourself up for increased risk of failure. While it is possible to evaluate policy without touching on internal factors, it is always on your mind. Bremer and the CPA worked out these policies whilst in Iraq during great social, political, economic upheaval in society.

When trying to promote democracy you must know what you are aiming for. The US were clear they wanted a liberal democracy in Iraq and their policy reflected this. Much of it resembles American values. The main concern revolves around the vehicle of change, military occupation, and skipping the liberalization step. For the first part, democracy promotion is external pressure from a country towards another. By taking over militarily you risk the ire of the population if things do not go your way. Secondly, the fact that Iraq skipped the liberalization step should have set off warning bells. The US policy followed a trend of applying the mold of a liberal democracy on Iraq without making sure the filling was in place. Norms and values are what drive the democratic revolution or liberalization in the first place. Cutting corners like that worked in Japan, but there are more differences than similarities when comparing it with Iraq. The US hastened the country towards transition with little knowledge if the people were ready.
They did manage to create an electoral democracy in Iraq. An election was eventually held to create the Interim Government and later a national election. They, being the CPA, knew they had little time. In all the policy decisions they made it was clear they were working from the top down because it was the most effective way to enact change. For an electoral democracy that is perfectly reasonable. You create the system for democracy and hand it over to the people, intending to guide them from the outside as they learn to handle this new regime. Quiet a few Orders aimed to make sure the new regime did not slip back into its old ways. Without going deep into Iraqs internals it’s hard to know if those choices were enough. Simply looking at the policy decisions, however, shows an attention to both what a democracy requires structurally, and the fact that new democracies are vulnerable to relapse.

Iraq was not going to become a consolidated democracy. That term in relation to what the US orchestrated policy wise is the goal. Electoral democracies and the various pseudo types that exist was the likely end for Iraq when the US gave back power. It did not stop Bremer and the CPA from trying. They were hemmed in by American desires to install US friendly Iraqi’s and it showed in the trouble the political arena created. There were problems along the way and the way in which certain policies were written or composed did seem to be negative. In the way that it pushed too hard on a topic, Order 1, or that the US was keener on their own goals than Iraq’s, the IGC. All in all, the US policy by itself was decent and according to democratisation theory did not exhibit any glaring faults. It covered a broad swathe of society, enacted truly liberal reform in almost all of society, within the span of a year. Since Iraq has not evolved into the liberal democracy, they wanted it is fair to say the answer to why it failed can’t be found in the American foreign policy alone.

5. Conclusion

*How did the US plan to turn Iraq into a Democracy?*
A running theme has been that the US was not prepared, organized, or had in their possession a plan that covered the post war phase. While true, to say the US had no plan would not be accurate. The US administration planned to invade Iraq with much attention being paid to critical infrastructure, military objectives. They used exiled Iraqi intelligence and believed to have gotten a solid grasp of the situation. The plan, then, was to be hailed as liberators, a quick transition of power, very few boots on the ground, and a country that would quickly adopt a regime that suited the Americans. Unfortunately, the situation in Iraq did not conform to their assumptions, and there was no contingency plan. Bremer put it best in the quote where he notes that the US had a plan, they had just planned for the wrong thing.

When the original plan, as it existed, failed it was left up to the CPA to create a plan for American foreign policy. Democratisation was the name of the game so that was what needed to happen. They intended to turn Iraq into a modern, liberal democracy. This would have been helped if CENTCOM, TFIC, ORHA, or anyone before the CPA had done any useful preliminary work. The plan was never a document to be read and consulted in the end. This essay took CPA order, summaries of the various decisions and history of the occupation and compiled it into a general summary.

The US plan to bring democracy to Iraq focused on a wide array of different topics. Most notably was economic and bureaucratic changes to make sure the state did not collapse. Politically they intended to create a government that was US friendly, hence the inclusion of exiled Iraqi’s into the mix that caused a lot of headache. Their idea stemmed from introducing to Iraq factors that exist in many liberal democracies. Free speech, political parties, an election system, constitution, liberal economic structures, a bureaucracy built on good governance, all these factors were included in the American plan. It just did not have these when the US invaded Iraq. Instead, this is what the plan was after the CPA was done and all their efforts could be summarized after the fact. The plan was an evolving document.

*Did the foreign policy cover all five arenas of democratisation?*
The policy of the US administration through the CPA did contain decisions that figured into all the five arenas of democratisation. The quality of these decisions is up for discussion.

Due to the nature of the operations in Iraq the CPA’s policies in various arenas varied greatly. Economics and political society got a lot of attention. Civil society was the least approached arena. If anything, the civil policies they enacted, barring the introduction of human rights and liberties, was very much missing. Many aspects that Linz & Stepan bring up in their description is missing from the orders or the general discussion at the time. This is probably because changing norms in a society and building it up takes time. Something the US did not have nor was initially even willing to commit to.

The most comprehensive list of policy decisions can be found in the Rule of Law, State Bureaucracy, and the State Economy. By ranking them in amount of listed CPA orders. This is due to the simplicity of them. They are concrete changes attempting to create a foundation for a future democracy. The latter two also correlate to having written plans by the CPA, implying they were of priority for them. Rule of law, whilst extensive, is also easily discerned as being taken from American values and laws. As is seen in what was written into the TAL.

There are deficiencies in certain aspects, and certain decisions can, in hindsight, have been downright detrimental. The de-Ba’athification of Iraq and disbanding the army, coupled with mishandling the political situation served to create irreparable damage. They became occupiers instead of liberators and it harmed their success. Structurally and institutionally there was much done. It was easier to create new institutions, fund agencies, and set up funds than it was to include and invigorate the Iraqi populace to their cause.

American foreign policy in Iraq focused on what they could do and seemed to ignore that which they could not. Lots of effort was put into building up the new governmental structure as soon as possible, with an emphasis on Baghdad. The trickier questions of civil society, political leaders, and normative values were either drafted into law or seemingly ignored. They fumbled when it came to handling the Iraqis, but succeeded when it came to less nuanced questions such as taxes. Instead of trusting Iraq’s with power Bremer took sole possession of it and it irrevocably turned
many Iraqi’s, and leaders, off from American influence. Policy wise they did commit to changing all of society. They didn’t manage to do so perfectly but the results of the failed democratisation can’t be placed on American foreign policy being absent.

6. Closing Thoughts

This essay was written to help bring a better understanding of the Iraqi situation. After all this time the country is still floundering. By fleshing out the understanding of the policy enacted by one of the key actors in the process the hope was to bring more understanding to the situation. Democratisation is as complex as society and everything is interconnected. American policy is but one part of the greater puzzle.

For future research the hope is to use this essay as a benchmark. Asking why Iraq failed to become a democracy requires a lot of factors to be considered. From writing this essay it was clear that these policies interact with society. The reaction from Iraqi people, its institutions, and its culture was evident when researching. In the future I would like to write an essay that builds on this by looking at internal factors, in a case study perhaps, about Iraq as a country. Trying to understand why these policies failed now that we know what they were and what the plan was. There has been research done on the implementation strategy the US performed even though I feel a lot of the answers boil down to security. Which I again feel should be thought of as a cause of the internal factors of Iraq as a country. The security related issues are a symptom rather than the cause of the failed democratisation. That’s the follow up research I would enjoy pursuing.
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