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GENOCIDE IN NORTHWESTERN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A SOCIOLOGICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANS AND AGAINST HUMANITY DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to reach a new understanding of genocide in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina during and after the Bosnian War (1992–1995). The analytical basis is a literature review of various studies from the domains of war sociology, social epistemology, and critical pedagogy. The analysis is based on the perspectives of the genocide in Bosnia as a process that began in northwestern and eastern Bosnia in 1992 and ended in Srebrenica in 1995 (in the Prijedor Municipality in northwestern Bosnia alone, more than 3000 civilians were killed in 1992). Even after mass crimes directed against the very idea of humanity – and after genocide – it is necessary to work on a pedagogy of notions focused on the politics of reconciliation and the politics of emancipation of the oppressed and disenfranchised. Therefore, it is important for the culture of peace and the politics of reconciliation to spread and promote the considerable theoretical experiences of critical pedagogy in education. We need a peaceful orientational knowledge that provides the basis for new identity politics to evolve, politics that respect the right to be different and the right to bravely distance ourselves from criminal identity politics.

Key terms

pedagogy, sociology, education, denial of genocide, war violence, interpersonal interaction, collective identity, narrative, peace potential, cosmopolitan education

INTRODUCTION

The starting point of this article is the war in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995)¹. During the war, to drive away Bosniaks and Croats from northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian army and police forces carried out mass executions and persecutions, used systematic rape, and opened concentration camps. Civilians were the direct target of these war operations (Basic, 2015a, b, c; 2017; 2018; Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A; Case No.: IT-99-36-T). For example, in the Prijedor Municipality in northwestern Bosnia alone, the number of Bosniaks and Croats killed during the summer of 1992 was more than 3000 (including more than 200 women and 100 children), while almost half of the pre-war population in the Prijedor Municipality (more than 40,000 Bosniaks and Croats) was displaced (Basic, 2015a, b, c; 2017; 2018; Cekic, 2009; Patria, 2000; Tabeau, 2009; Tokača, 2013; Wesselingh & Vaulering, 2005).

The war started in Prijedor and Ljubija at the end of the spring of 1992, when the Serbian soldiers and police forces took over the municipality offices without any armed resistance. Several villages in that area (e.g., Hambarine, Briševo, and Biščani) were shelled by Serbian artillery, while media disseminated propaganda of “Muslim and Croatian war crimes against Serbs” in order to spread panic (Basic, 2015a, b, c; 2017; 2018; Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A; Case No.: IT-99-36-T). The inhabitants of these villages were unarmed and sought refuge in the mountains and valleys around Ljubija. Serbian soldiers and police officers caught a large number of refugees. Some of them were immediately killed in forests, and others were transported to Ljubija, where they were beaten on the main square or in the local football field. In the end, they were executed at the football field or in other locations near Ljubija (Basic, 2018; Case No.: IT-97-24-T).

The new war order in Prijedor and Ljubija normalized the existence of concentration camps in society. For example, in the Omarska and Kerterm camps, about 6000 to 7000 Bosniaks and Croats (including 37 women) were kept in terrible conditions in the summer of 1992. Hundreds of them died from hunger and abuse. Hundreds more were transported to various locations and shot dead (Basic, 2015a, b; 2017; 2018; Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A; Case No.: IT-99-36-T).

The participants in the interview (Basic, 2017; 2018), who were detained in the camps, have told stories of how the camp detainees died in large numbers because of food scarcity, diseases, beatings, and planned executions. Firearms were rarely used; instead the guards used batons, baseball bats, or knives. According to the interviewees, all prisoners lost between 20 to 40 kg of body mass, so much weight they could barely stand and move around. The general atmosphere and the ritualized violence in camps made the detainees apathetic, and sometimes it seemed as if they were waiting for death to end their suffering (Basic, 2015a, b).

This study is based on sociological and pedagogical analysis of the phenomenon of genocide as a process (Bećirević, 2009; Fein, 1979, 1993; Bischooping, 2004; Darder, 2011; Schneider, 2014; Bentrovato, 2017; Lybeck, 2018), which in the case of Bosnia began in the eastern and north-

1 This text has been in some parts published earlier in Swedish in the article “Definitioner av våld i överlevandes berättelser efter kriget i Bosnien” (Basic, 2015c) and in English in the article “Definitions of Violence: Narratives of Survivors from the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Basic, 2018).

western areas in 1992, continued during the war, and culminated in Srebrenica in 1995. Based on a sociological and pedagogical perspective, genocide in Bosnia is ongoing with a systematic denial that it happened by politicians in the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska (Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Medić, 2013; Mahmutćehajić, 2018).

Genocide because of war violence and the post-war denial of genocide form the primary focus of this paper. Previous studies of the violence that occurred during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not sufficient for such an analysis because they show a one-sided image of the phenomenon of war violence and its participants – the perpetrators and the victims of violence – developing the image of the phenomenon of war violence in the analyses of town sieges and shelling, and of the killings, rapes, and displacement of civilians, both adults and children (Bougarel, Helms, & Duijzings, 2007; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). The examples of the perpetrators of violence are presented via the images of soldiers and police officers who killed, raped, and displaced civilian inhabitants. Among the examples of the victims of violence, we often see the images of killed, raped, and displaced adult and underage civilians (Bougarel et al., 2007; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). Researchers have discovered the importance of post-war stories (Bougarel et al., 2007; Stover & Weinstein, 2004) but have not paid attention to violence as a product of usual human interactions (Blumer, 1969/1986; Garfinkel, 1967/1984; Riessman, 2008).

The need for studies of the relationship among war violence, genocide, and the denial of genocide has never been as clear as today – after the many decades of Serbs denying mass crimes and the denial of the genocide carried out by the Serbian army and police forces in the war against the civilian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. In this paper, we analyze several aspects of the war against the Bosnian–Herzegovinian civilian, secular, multi-cultural, and multi-ethnic society and aspects of the post-war period. The main parts of this paper focus on war violence and genocide (1992–1995) and the Greater Serbian denial of the genocide (from 1995 to 2018), and on the relationship among genocide, the victims, the perpetrators of war violence, and need of peaceful orientational knowledge focused on the politics of reconciliation and the politics of emancipation of the oppressed and disenfranchised.

GENOCIDE AND DENIAL OF GENOCIDE AS INTERPERSONAL INTERACTION

Collins (2008) projects an image that violence is hard to follow through. In a normal violence-free social existence, individuals act much too peacefully and helpfully with others to engage in violence. Individuals gladly engage in verbal conflicts, but they are not portrayed as violently as one would presume. Collins argues that stories about violence almost always tend to be more violent than the situation they describe. He argues that all interaction – even violent interaction – is bound to a situation, context, and positional relations among the actors (Collins, 2004). In addition, he argues that the actors in the interaction produce and reproduce the inferior and the superior (dominant) actors. Often, the inferior and the superior are appointed in the narrative process, which contributes to the construction of a specific situation – even a violent situation (Collins, 2004, 2008).

Presser (2013) paints a diversified image of social reality, especially in a war situation, where an act seen as righteous by one side is the worst atrocity for the other. The split logic of a diversified reality is produced and reproduced, *inter alia*, through stories. These stories produce and reproduce dominant actors in these violent situations, actors who acquire a sort of permission

to hurt the inferior actor. In an interesting way, Presser highlights how the dominant actors define themselves as being so powerless that they could not avoid hurting the inferiors. The dominant actors are not only given a permission from the society to use violence but also seem to have been caught in a violence-interactive web without a way out.

Presser (2013) writes that Tutsis in Rwanda, prior to and during the genocide in 1994, were called “cockroaches” and “dogs” and that Jews in Nazi Germany were called “rats.” Disparaging those who are the target of a violent attack means that an object of lesser complexity than the perpetrator is created, which confirms the justification of the violence (cf. Katz, 1988; the term “righteous slaughter”). Presser notes that dominant perpetrators of violence are often under the influence of stories that are produced, reproduced, and distributed throughout the society. She argues that the new social order that emerges in a society during a war results in the de-humanization of those subjected to violence. It is also common that the use of violence is normalized into everyday interaction, thus becoming the prevailing norm in a war society.

The Holocaust during the Second World War was in many cases very efficient and industrialized; the usual goal was to kill from afar, impersonally, although those who held the power in concentrations camps were also involved in very personal and sadistic acts (Bauman, 1991; Browning, 1992; Megargee, 2013a, b). Is there interaction between action and power in war-time, and is a certain amount of motivation and energy necessary for violence (i.e., do those in positions of leadership need a smaller amount of energy because of the factors that placed them in the position to begin with)? The stories and formulations of the participants of this study do not emphasize a distant, evil, and/or powerful leader who motivates the masses (perhaps to some extent with a symbolic diminishing of the ethnic target) or gives orders. Instead, the leaders of violence in these stories are former neighbors, colleagues, and others known to the victims, in contrast to the violence that occurred during the Holocaust.

Also in contrast to the Holocaust, when the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is discussed, violence is regarded as an *individualized use of violence* because the perpetrators were most often acquainted with the victims. As noted, stories reveal that firearms were seldom used and that baseball bats or knives were used instead. These features could be compared with the examples of violence in Rwanda, as in a study by Hatzfeld (2005), where the violence was more similar (perhaps even “crueler”) to the violence that occurs in the descriptions analyzed by Basic (2017, 2018), in contrast to the typical examples of industrialized extermination during the Second World War.

The participants in these studies often describe the perpetrators as persons who enjoyed humiliating, beating, killing, and hurting others in different ways. This characterization differs from Collins’ view (2008) that soldiers are not at their most competent when *violence occurs up close* and that individuals aspire to solidarity and agreement. One of the explanations for such acts committed by soldiers is the pressure they experience during war to show courage in close combat, with the aim to overpower the other, the enemy. During war, enemies are the target of violence; they must be exposed to violence and neutralized. Police forces and soldiers in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina were not close to any battlefronts; therefore, civilians were assigned the roles of enemies. By using force against the civilians, soldiers proved their supremacy over the enemy even when the enemy was abstract, unarmed, and harmless (Case

No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A; Greve & Bergsmo, 1994; Medić, 2013). Another explanation could be found in the widespread militarization and emotional build-up that occurred before the war with demonization of the enemy. People most probably became more brutal because of that process.

Interpersonal interactions that cause violence continue even after the end of a violent situation. In fact, memories of the perpetrators and the victims of war violence do not exist solely as a verbal creation in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. The stories of violent situations have their own lives after war and continue to be important both to individuals and to the social life. Individuals who were driven out of northwestern Bosnia during the war in the 1990s belong, from a legal perspective, to the recognized category of the victims of war violence. They have lived through a war against humanity, including most of various violent crimes (Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T.; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A; Greve & Bergsmo, 1994; Medić, 2013). A number of perpetrators were convicted at the Hague Tribunal and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the War Crimes Chamber (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2018; ICTY, 2018a, b). Criminal offences committed in Prijedor and Ljubija qualify as genocide based on the charges against former Serbian leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT).

To examine the processing of experienced or described violent situations in an environment arising from a series of violent events during a war, the analysis must be carried out simultaneously at the institutional and individual levels. In the entity of Republika Srpska, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which Prijedor and Ljubija belong administratively, the institutions deny the genocide. Such a perception of the wartime becomes the central subject of the post-war analyses of the phenomena of war violence, victimization, and reconciliation (cf. Bećirević's /2009, 2010/; Medić's /2013/ and Mahmutćehajić's /2018/ analysis of the denial of the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina). The existence of Republika Srpska is based on the genocide committed in Prijedor, Ljubija, and many other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the denial of systematic violent acts committed during the war by the political elite, which was ascertained at the Hague Tribunal and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the War Crimes Chamber, and which daily influences the Bosnian population through media.

GENOCIDE – THROUGH HISTORY UNTIL BOSNIA, AND AFTERWARDS

Kuper (1971, 1981) argues that in modern times, genocide occurs as three types: (1) colonial genocide, (2) genocide as an incidental consequence of a more general and greater violation of political and social rights, and (3) genocide where mass killings, on an ethnic, national, religious, or racial basis, almost become state policies.

Colonial genocide began to be carried out in the 15th century when Europeans and (later) North Americans established their dominance throughout the world. However, one can most assuredly *not* say that the whole conflict between the West and the rest of the world is genocide. Nevertheless, during the widespread and complex process of European expansion, there were *individual cases* of genocide, like those committed against the Native Americans in California in the 1840s and the Aborigines in Tasmania and Queensland (Australia). Sometimes these acts were committed by immigrants without an explicit authorization by their states, but it must be pointed out that the states rarely intervened in time to prevent or stop these mass crimes

(Kuper, 1971, 1981; Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Fein, 1979, 1993; Bischooping, 2004; Darder, 2011; Schneider, 2014; Bentrovato, 2017; Lybeck, 2018).

When discussing the communist (socialist) regimes of the 20th century, especially, genocide occurred at the edges of the great processes of forced social changes. In the Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia, repressions and murders were mostly directed against political opponents and social classes such as land owners, aristocracy, wealthy peasants, capitalists, and the middle class, all by their nature considered hostile to the goals of socialism. Notwithstanding the cruelty of these measures, according to the United Nations' definition, they cannot be considered genocide. However, a certain number of communist states carried out deportations and killings of targeted ethnic and national groups, as happened to the Chechens and the Tatars in the Soviet Union in the 1940s and the Muslim Chams (an ethnic group in rural areas in Cambodia) and the Vietnamese in Cambodia. In these cases, the communist regimes treated national and ethnic groups – and even social classes – on a “racial basis” because all the members of the group, regardless of what an individual did, were viewed as an enemy of the state. These groups usually refused to renounce their religious beliefs and traditions or were involved in small crafts, trade, or industries that were forbidden in communist regimes. In all cases, the murder of ethnic, national, religious, or racial groups presented a relatively small part of the general oppression and brutal acts of the state (Kuper, 1971, 1981; Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Fein, 1979, 1993; Bischooping, 2004; Darder, 2011; Schneider, 2014; Bentrovato, 2017; Lybeck, 2018).

Large-scale genocide occurs when racism or extreme nationalism become principles that govern a state. The most famous (but not the only) examples, claims Kuper (1971, 1981), are those committed by the Ottomans under the Young Turks and by Nazi Germany. In all of these cases, the state had promised their followers unlimited happiness and progress in the future when the allegedly hostile group was finally removed. At the same time, the moderate members of the ruling group who did not approve of genocide were also murdered. Genocide is always accompanied by violations of other human rights.

The Genocide Convention was latent for almost 40 years (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948). Its creators planned to establish an international criminal court that would prosecute and (as they believed) deter other perpetrators, but with the Cold War, all possibility of its establishment was ruled out. The international community did nothing, and even sometimes actively encouraged genocide or acts bordering on genocide in places such as Sri Lanka, East Timor, and Guatemala, and indeed in Bosnia and Herzegovina by imposing an arms embargo - which made it more difficult for the genocide victims to defend themselves (Denich, 1994; Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Denich, 1994; Malešević, 2011; Medić, 2013; Mahmutćehajić, 2018). In the 1990s, the United Nations and other great powers had even ignored the organized and systematic so-called “ethnic cleansing” of the non-Serbian population – that is, the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina – and the indications of genocide in Rwanda, and reluctantly involved themselves in actions that brought Bosnian Muslims into even greater danger in former Yugoslavia. Large public protests and especially the fears that this genocide's acts could largely endanger the international order finally compelled the United Nations and the United States of America to take action. The UN's security council established two special tribunals for the prosecution of war criminals and the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and for the genocides committed in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Both tribunals condemned genocide and significantly expanded the scope of the human rights law by prosecuting rape

cases as “crimes against humanity.” By the end of the decade, most of the states had signed the treaty to establish the International Criminal Court, finally fulfilling some hopes from the plans of the 1940s. The International Criminal Court and its role in prosecuting war criminals is significant not only for legal experts and theoreticians of international law but also for social science researchers who are not jurists. From the perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this role could also be crucial in a globally significant context of the need for justice and in the context of the search for an answer to the question of which values will rule the 21st century (Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Fein, 1979, 1993; Bischooping, 2004; Darder, 2011; Schneider, 2014; Bentrovato, 2017; Lybeck, 2018).

In the 21st century, it is possible to discuss the unsubdued excess of violence and the “fluid fear” of new violence. This excess of violence, viewed from the Bosnian–Herzegovinian perspective, could be interpreted as a global scarcity of justice – and as an uncertain search for answers to the hardest questions that can be asked after *genocide* (Denich, 1994; Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Denich, 1994; Malešević, 2011; Medić, 2013; Mahmutćehajić, 2018). If we consistently understand the meaning of what we call *crimes against humanity*, then clearly, *genocide* also connotes such a form of violence that surpasses local and regional frameworks with its universal meaning. For this reason, studies of this very complex social phenomenon require the greatest possible scientific responsibility.

The historic experience of genocide and the Holocaust demonstrates that genocide results from affirmation of a special system of interactions among its perpetrators, designated in the literature by the generic name of ‘fascism’, even though it encompasses a wide range of ideas and movements including Nazism, national socialism, far-right extremism, extreme nationalism, and, in more recent times, *neo-fascism*. Most genocide experts agree that *ideology* has the most significant role in the processes of preparing for genocide, and that ideology, and what makes it possible, should be seen as a significant causal force. Almost all historic, sociological and pedagogical studies of the crimes of genocide indicate the crucial significance of some sort of communal and unique ideology (Denich, 1994; Des Forges, 1995; Bischooping, 2004; Waldorf, 2009; Schwarzmantel, 2009; Kalanj, 2010; Darder, 2011; Malešević, 2011; Bellamy, 2012; Marinković & Ristić, 2013; Ravlić, 2013; Schneider, 2014; Sanín, & Wood, 2014; Vudli, 2015; Brehm, 2015; Nussio, 2017; Bentrovato, 2017; Basic 2017, 2018; Lybeck, 2018). The genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown how such an ideology is revitalized and how in the new social conditions it can mobilize a large number of followers ready to commit the most atrocious crimes against “the other” (Denich, 1994; Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Denich, 1994; Malešević, 2011; Medić, 2013; Mahmutćehajić, 2018). Močnik (1998/1999) correctly argues that the end of the Second World War was just a military victory. Only fascist states and their armies were defeated. Fascism as a historical practice, political method, ideological network, and a pattern of thought was not crushed. Fascism has survived and is now returning, even where it was defeated.

The experience of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the inadequate sanctioning of perpetrators (and deniers) of genocide call for caution and constant re-examination of social conditions that make something like that possible (Denich, 1994; Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Denich, 1994; Medić, 2013; Mahmutćehajić, 2018). The precedent of what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the perpetrator was recognized but not sanctioned, encourages followers of extreme ideologies to new forms of extremism and violence, where genocide towards

others cannot be excluded in advance. The indications for such an attitude are visible in the statements of the European right and the neo-fascists, who in an ideological sense look up to the Serbian extremists who carried out the last genocide over Bosniaks in the war against the civilian population of the secular Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

GENOCIDE AND THE SOCIETY OF RISK

The cases of genocide in modern times occur in war conditions or during great state upheavals, when old rules stop applying, when circumstances that lead to instability increase feelings of insecurity and inspire a vision of changes, and finally when the opportunity is created to remove internal social divisions and create a prosperous harmonious future (Denich, 1994; Des Forges, 1995; Waldorf, 2009; Schwarzmantel, 2009; Kalanj, 2010; Malešević, 2011; Bellamy, 2012; Marinković & Ristić, 2013; Ravlić, 2013; Sanín, & Wood, 2014; Vudli, 2015; Brehm, 2015; Nussio, 2017). The Great War – which only later came to be called the First World War – was a significant turning point because it created a culture of killing and revealed what highly organized states could accomplish (McCarthy, 1996). Already in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, especially during the Balkan Wars, the Balkan Peninsula was “ethnically cleansed” of the local Muslim population that constituted 52% of the population in the 19th century.

McCarthy (1996) claims that the Balkan Wars are among the greatest human tragedies because about 27 percent of Balkan Muslims perished in various ways, while a third found sanctuary in Anatolia, Turkey. The Jews in Nazi Germany experienced the greatest ever discrimination in the 1930s, but the Nazis started the Holocaust only in the conditions of all-out war. Simultaneously with the advance of an information society and *cyberculture*, various processes of controlling and manipulating people and their social existence arose. Social mechanisms of control, surveillance, and management can result in violence, conflicts, destruction, and mass crimes that distort the linear concepts of modern history as continuous progress and development of human society. The surveillance of the society over individuals takes place not only through consciousness or ideology but also in the body and with bodies. For a capitalist society, biopolitics is that which is the most important, somatic, and physical (Hardt & Negri, 2001, 2011). In a sense, history is investigated only from a forensic perspective that can give useful information during judicial proceedings (Buden, 2012).

Faced with the task of redefining basic notions while considering the concrete social problems of the first and second decades of the 21st century, sociologists have introduced new distinctions and notions such as “first modernity,” “second modernity,” and “reflexive modernity.” Instead of non-critically imitating the favorite slogans of new economy, which claims we live in the “society of knowledge” (Hindess, 1995; Weber et al., 2011; Guile & Livingstone, 2012; Broome, 2014; Couldry & Hepp, 2016; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019) a few years ago, Ulrich Beck (1992) introduced the disturbing paradigm of a “global risk society.” Living in a global risk society means living with unmastered non-knowledge (*Nichtwissen*), that is, more precisely, in the simultaneity of threats and non-knowledge, and the consequent political, social, and moral paradoxes and dilemmas. The story of a “society of knowledge” is a euphemism of the first modernity. The global risk society is a society of non-knowledge in a very precise sense. In comparison to premodernity, it cannot be overcome with more and better knowledge, with more and better science, but is, on the contrary, a *product* of more and better science. To live,

therefore, in a milieu of non-knowledge means to search for unknown answers to questions no one can clearly formulate (Beck, 1992). The new global risks, among which we can also count risks from various *neo-fascist* and *genocide practices*, cannot be placed within the frameworks of national states, and they cannot be adequately analyzed by starting with the epistemological preconceptions of methodological nationalism.

Beck rightly calls “methodological nationalism” the non-critical equivocation of society with a national state (Beck, 2005). Because of the symbolic and political dominance of methodological nationalism and ethnonationalist ideologies, in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian environment, there are still strongly expressed reductionist tendencies that to a significant degree preclude comprehensive cognizance of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian post-war reality in a global context. The symbolic construct of the difference between “us” and “them,” which can be based on even the most insignificant characteristics, can result not only in discrimination but also in the most monstrous forms of violence such as *genocide*. At the most general level, one can say that *genocide*, as a global civilizational – or anti-civilizational – phenomenon represents the peak of *violence* against the very *idea of humanity*. After the Second World War, all legal documents that speak of the universal human and citizen (of the world) rights were derived precisely from this humanistically understood and interpreted idea of humanity.

GENOCIDE – COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND NARRATIVES

The division by ethnicity in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred because of the revival of the same erroneous logic that led to war against the civilian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vlaisavljević, 2007, 2009, 2012). Vlaisavljević (2012: 16-17) states that we cannot know anything important about the state politics of a region unless we perceive its connection to war. All ruling politics in and around Bosnia that occurred from the 1990s to today are the politics of collective identity. These politics, which were created during the war and after its end, base their interpretation of social and cultural reality, their narration of history, and their future programs on the experience of large battles and mass casualties from the last war. Vlaisavljević (2012: 17) believes that we should take seriously the fact that after every Balkan war, the basic patterns of culture, politics, and society – and thus collective identity – change.

We should contrast the ethnic and religious fundamentalisms (which are again dangerously proliferating in the years, appearing under the various forms of neo-fascism, the Chetnik movement, the Ustasha movement, and Islamism) with citizen, peaceful, cosmopolitan, project, creative, and civilian identities (Costa-Pinto & Kallis, 2014). The identities before genocide and after genocide cannot remain the same. Within the wider Bosnian–Herzegovinian environment, one must learn about and understand the project identities that are established by acknowledging genocide among those who are close to the perpetrators, and insist on other forms of citizen activism, above all insisting on the culture of peace and on punishing war criminals (Costa-Pinto & Kallis, 2014). However, it is also necessary to simultaneously and urgently work in various fields to aspire to emancipation and to exiting the circle of violence by insisting that competent institutions punish the criminal groups that have since the 1990s continuously or discontinuously participated in robbing the working class, the public goods of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, and other former Yugoslav republics and territories.

Vlaisavljević (2012: 19) believes that the existence of three ethnic nations in Bosnia and Her-

zegovina implies three great narratives in force and in circulation in public opinion. In the relentlessly told and retold war stories, the history of this country indicates that the three ethnic groups have three different versions of history. Because there cannot be three different truths but only one historic truth (related, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the genocide committed by the Serbian army and police forces) the question arises of the influence of narratives on the current social, political, and security situation in Bosnia. If today's generation in Republika Srpska is compelled to keep the martial "us" from the times of slaughter and rapes of civilians, then the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina symbolically has not ended and will not end until the full extinction of its Bosnian population.

GENOCIDE AND IDEOLOGY

The time and space we occupy and every moment of time that approaches us from an unpredictable future seem to leave us with no chance, in the name of safe and available knowledge, to call for a clear (unambiguous, transparent) distinction of the states of peace and war that we indicate by these classic designations. The past is not private property: it is not an exclusive property of history as the 'science of the past', just like the future is not the property of futurology or private property of private companies that deal in risk management or deposit insurance. We may have entered a new dark age of dogma, an age of new totalitarianism, an age without precedent in the history of human society. For totalitarianism to act in what remains of it, something is required that determines the substituting structures of the ideology, such as political religions in the case of Islamism as jihadism, the renewal of neo-fascist movements because of the crisis of sovereignty of the nation-state in Europe, and immigration as the main problem of the 21st century. It is necessary for terrorism and absolute control to fully unite in a global state of emergency (Denich, 1994; Des Forges, 1995; Sim, 2004; Waldorf, 2009; Schwarzmantel, 2009; Kalanj, 2010; Malešević, 2011; Bellamy, 2012; Marinković & Ristić, 2013; Ravlić, 2013; Sanín, & Wood, 2014; Vudli, 2015; Brehm, 2015; Paić, 2016; Nussio, 2017). How can all of these different vocabularies be reconciled? Is that even possible?

Marinković and Ristić (2013: 26) argue that even though the debate about ideology has lasted more than 200 years, the notion and the debate were unjustly denied a specialization, a discipline, and a wider and clearer theoretical and methodological framework. It appears that for now, one of the most acceptable reasons that the notion of ideology is disciplinarily, theoretically, and methodologically marginalized and vague is the marginalization of the very sociology of knowledge. Moreover, it can appear that in our chaotic, post-normal, and "emerging society" – a society that is very difficult to precisely label – in this "global" or "post-global society" that is being born or is disintegrating in front of our very eyes, depending on the theoretical position of the researcher, the main reason for the marginalization of the studies of ideology lies in the non-existence of transdisciplinary critical studies of the ideology of the new economy of knowledge, that, by the way, flirts with market fundamentalism, conservatism, and neo-fascism.

We could only, perhaps, oppose ideology if we could clearly and unambiguously deconstruct the language, the narrative structure, of the new economy of knowledge about safety and of the entire managerial (new) speech of "improving," "advancing," and "accelerating," that is, about the alleged assurance of the quality of life at a time when it appears that life, in many

parts of the world, has either become too cheap or appears purposeless for too long (Vlaisavljević, 2007, 2009, 2012).

Ideology could perhaps be opposed only by those rare individuals who are not involved in the political games behind the scenes and in the manipulations related to the fight for power (Schwarzmantel, 2009; Waldorf, 2009; Kalanj, 2010; Marinković & Ristić, 2013; Ravlić, 2013; Sanín, & Wood, 2014; Vudli, 2015; Nussio, 2017). All “warring parties” (the victim and the perpetrator) and the so-called “international observers” (although the meaning of these terms in the second decade of the 21st century is neither stable nor homogeneous) should have confidence in such individuals, if they exist. For this reason, war, in the discursive and actual forms it appears today, is difficult to explain and understand, not only to people who did not experience it but also to philosophers and sociologists and those who have spent the entire time (of the duration of an actual war) “at the scene,” in the field, where the war occurred (Katz, 1988; Collins, 2008; Žižek, 2008; Presser, 2013). The problem, however, is also that war does not occur just by itself, as a “clear” continuum of war that originates as the very event of war and takes place the entire time in an evident manner, thus demarcating and separating itself from the state of peace (the peace that existed before the start of the war and the state of peace that ensued after its ending).

GENOCIDE – SOCIETY AFTER ITS END

The sociology of the post-societal era studies a *society after its end*, the social contexts of the erosion of a society in history. Or, to be more precise, since the syntagm of society after its end contains an evident contradiction, the sociology of the post-societal era analyzes and critically studies *social contexts* where preceding social principles are undermined and replaced with other elements and relationships. A society cannot be established without any previous remnants and in perpetuity. However, to say that a society has no foundations does not mean that all concepts of social foundations are necessarily erroneous (Fukuyama, 1992; Beck 1992; Huntington, 2002; Beck, 2005). We are not talking about a complete absence of foundations but the weakening of their ontological status. Therefore, in the methodological and analytical sense, one should differentiate post-foundationalism from anti-foundationalism. Only the second one rejects the society’s foundations. According to one interpretation, where there is a society, there are *zones*; however, such a statement deepens the inherited aporia between a *society after its end* – a society that disappears but not without trace, not without remnants – and the *social sphere*, which remains masked with cultural discourse in post-modernism that sweeps over the entire sphere of a *society after its end*, together with the *social sphere* (Fukuyama, 1992; Beck 1992; Huntington, 2002; Beck, 2005).

What is the difference, then, between a society, or a society after its end, and a social sphere? The social issue (concerning care) is definitely not one of the many political, cultural, economic, or moral issues we encounter during the second decade of the 21st century. On the contrary, it is constituted at the society. In accordance to how one responds to it, it impacts a society by constructing, sharing, or even disintegrating it (Fukuyama, 1992; Beck 1992; Huntington, 2002; Beck, 2005). The social issue concerns more than the quality of life in a society or an idea that life is made more safe, stable, meaningful, bearable, “human,” dignified, and fair for its members. Essentially, the issue is what makes people members of a certain society, that is, social beings (Malešević, 2011).

The war against the Bosnian–Herzegovinian civilian population, the concentration camps for civilians, genocide, and the denial of genocide – these are not notions of a local geo-epistemology that arises in certain illuminating Bosnian, esoteric, and enclosed spaces of knowledge and experiences of the world. The said phenomena are global phenomena. They are deeply related to globalization and the defeat of the ideology of globalism (Hindess, 1995; Weber et al., 2011; Guile & Livingstone, 2012; Broome, 2014; Couldry & Hepp, 2016; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). They are related to the ideas of creating a world without boundaries and to the ideas of creating a global world of knowledge and information (Calhoun & Wieviorka, 2017).

The experience of war is never only a material experience of destruction, killing, and dying; it is always more than that. It is never reliably clear where the signs and portents of war catastrophes originate. But it is clear that there is no war without a sign, a language, an ideology. The war against Bosnia was conceived, led, and continued after 1995 under the idea that the *coexistence of peoples is not possible*. The ideology of a so-called “humane resettlement of population,” of ethnic cleansing and the practice of genocide, was conceived in the heads of humans (Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Denich, 1994; Malešević, 2011; Medić, 2013; Mahmutćehajić, 2018).

The spectral reality of anti-Bosnian ideologies, politics, and practices consists of the fact that such ideologies, politics, and practices are trying to be formulated with an obscure language and obscure political narratives, in which the key words are “entities,” “portents,” “vital interests,” and similar terms (Vlaisavljević, 2007, 2009, 2012). The language itself, the vocabulary, can become infected, impregnated, and hegemonized with violence. Žižek (2008) argues that language is infected with violence under the influence of contingent “pathologic” conditions that inverse the internal logic of symbolical communication.

Vlaisavljević (2012: 205) believes there is no clear national identity without racial and ethnical cleansing. A sign of the perpetual symbolic and actual war is the situation that has lasted from 1995 in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian semiotic, narrative, psychopolitical, and ethnomathematic environment, when human beings could once and for all be classified, sorted, presented, self-presented, and so on according to absolute “clear,” beyond human, and beyond language criteria; when humans could be designated, differentiated, and recognized and could communicate not according to the criteria of conduct that arise from their particularities and individualities but according to a certain collective *a priori* criteria of differentiation that would be established based on preceding codes and signs that we could, conditionally, call “portents.” “Portents” are not signs but something different, something unclear, mystical, and seductive. Only in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina is the practice for political parties to be called “parties with national portent.” Such a practice does not lead to optimism or hope that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is the potential for a post-national, civilian establishment of a state and a society. The “portents” are, first and foremost, political, ideological, and identity mystifications. They are linguistically produced and reproduced illusions (delusions, appearances). Their use in political narratives has the goal to explicitly (or covertly) build on the normalization of the *pathological forms of the political representations of citizens* to rule people, things, and resources (Vlaisavljević, 2007, 2009, 2012). The “portents” are *excesses of purism*. They are the least post-modern (“post-normal”) remnants of the collective nostalgia for the lost “source,” the remnants of the pseudological and the pre-modern. It is with the help of the *seductive purism of “portents” that illiterate folk* dream in vain of a “racial,” “ethnic,” “national,” and “religious” purity. In the post-war Bosnian–Herzegovinian ethnoclerical Nazi politics of the representation

of the collective identities of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “portents” function as rhetorical, political, logical, and identity tricks. These tricks enable the Bosnian–Herzegovinian politicians and tycoons to deprive people (individuals) of their capacity for thought and of their ability to perceive clearly, to “immunize” (amputate) against their ability to exercise their freedom of choice, to deprive them of their power to creatively interpret the world.

Therefore, “portents” cannot function as *rational communication signs* which would make a dialogue between human beings possible. On the contrary, “portents” can function only as “ghostly,” “spectral” signs of *pathological identity politics*, that is, as “signs” of deliberately created collective deaths – genocide – the symptoms of “the death of man” as a *collective subject* and the carrier of universal human dignity.

GENOCIDE AS A PEDAGOGICAL CHALLENGE

Naming essential social problems in the post-genocide society, problems that individuals and communities face in the field, must not turn into a vacuous verbalism that arises from a position of power; true dialogue always implies a certain kind of humility. Paulo Freire (1968, 1992) believes in the possibility of the humanization of society and assumes the possibility of a contextual but historically conditioned dialogic learning and the exchange of education and political ideas with others. The essence of communication is openness and readiness to compromise, while faith in people is the precondition for the exchange of words during the communication process of an interactive designation of reality. Interpersonal communication is the foundation of the process of the creative emancipation of the oppressed. People can be classified in various ways: based on their class, ethnicity, gender, social role (for example, the role of a victim or a criminal), or otherwise. To name a social reality – to use the right term to describe it – already means to Freire to transform the society. In that sense, the communication of those who collectively construct and reconstruct the society should not be an act of arrogance (Bischoping, 2004; Darder, 2011, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010; Schneider, 2014; Bentrovato, 2017; Lybeck, 2018).

Freire (1968, 1992) believes that communication indicates faith in people and a hope that a more humane world is nonetheless possible. The humanization of society suggests a community of equal individuals who debate and can think for themselves during a dialogue with others, and as part of a social community (Bischoping, 2004; Darder, 2011, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010; Schneider, 2014; Bentrovato, 2017; Lybeck, 2018). We believe that in this lies the hope for a culture of peace in a post-genocide society (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). An individual, as a member of a people, always has the freedom to self-distance from a crime committed in the name of an entire people the individual (completely accidentally) belongs to; they could not choose to be born or not as a member of this or that people. The ideas by Friere are significant in the context of the communication struggle against the deniers of genocide, as can be observed in the many decades of media and political denial of genocide, constantly employed by almost all politicians in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian entity called Republika Srpska (Bećirević, 2009, 2010; Medić, 2013; Mahmutćehajić, 2018).

It appears that education for peace in the 21st century is possible only as a critically and self-critically colored dialogic and emancipatory education that assumes the possibility of institutionalizing an optimistic version of citizenship (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). The education for

peace implies faith in the possibility of the existence of individuals who belong to different peoples, nations, cultures, and religions – although the meaning of these categories should not be equated, as is often done by an irresponsible media and its superficial journalists. The education for peace, as is needed today, should respect the various historical traditions of education, and especially the sociological and pedagogical traditions of critical thinking about education that show that fertile dialogue and an exchange of the various experiences of globalization and transition are not only possible but also are indisputably necessary. The critical education for peace should respect the painful experience of the war against the Bosnian–Herzegovinian civilian population, led in the name of an anti-civilizational idea that the coexistence of differently categorized human beings is in reality not possible (Delić, 2017). On the contrary, Bosnia and Herzegovina and its peoples have continued to coexist even after the genocide. The painful war and post-war experiences of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian people indicate that people should never lose hope in the possibility of building together a better and a more humane society.

The anguish of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian experience of life in the conceptions of others that are essentially anti-Bosnian implies, however, the possibility of communication and the possibility of creating peaceful views of the world. The endeavors to deny the genocide and deny Bosnia and Bosnianhood were based on the claims of the impossibility of their being ethically generalized, clearly presentable, and understandable. Therefore, during the past two decades, both the voluntary and the involuntary expulsion of Bosnians from their identity and homes have taken place (Mahmutćehajić, 2018). The global promise of globalization, which had in the name of a free market proffered happiness for all, was also betrayed (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). Today, we are again in the midst of a Cold War with intermingling of the dictatorships of great dictators and the transparent and seductive dictatorships of large corporations. These corporations skillfully hide their power to oppress human desire and to create a consumer identity for Western youth behind the false idea of a “free market,” a great lie for little children (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). Nevertheless, the existing concepts of education in a global consumer society that dominate the contemporary globalized educational institutions and their research practices are based on the neo-liberal ideology that aims to self-legitimize with the help of empty logic about the omnipotence of the market, that transforms people into just consumers and thus dehumanizes them and deprives them of their essence that could make them into something more (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). The global society of spectacle – based on the hyperconsumer race for all sorts of sensual pleasures in the 20th century – during the past few decades is becoming an even more global society of a constant chain of “emergency states,” as states that normalize violence. Thus, our society, which is hard to label, is finally becoming a global society of fear of violence, the source of which often stays hidden, while formal education frequently does not even raise questions about how it is possible to live in the 21st century in such a world full of violence, oppression, fences, walls, and restrictions (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019).

Freire calls these restrictive situations “borderline situations,” situations that are only at first glance an undefeatable restriction and are to be approached as challenges (and not seen as insurmountable obstacles). After overcoming such challenges, we can in theory free ourselves and achieve transcendence. Human acts of the true humanization of reality (that refuse to passively accept all that appears to be given as permanent or as an unchangeable social structure) can overcome such situations, and we can call them “borderline acts.” Borderline acts

are possible only with a critical view of the world and with hope and trust in people (Freire & Macedo, 2002), in addition to considering reflective action in relation to concrete social reality. Once overcome, borderline situations reveal new situations and challenges that lead to new borderline acts. Humans as creatures of practice transform society and create history, becoming historico-social beings.

GENOCIDE, PEACE POTENTIAL, AND COSMOPOLITAN IDEAS OF EDUCATION

War and mass deaths of a large number of people that have led to genocide over an entire people – such as the genocide over Bosnian Bosniaks in the war against the Bosnian–Herzegovinian multicultural society, which lasted from 1992 until 1995 – have incited the need for the construction of peaceful *emancipatory identity politics* and the need for a *new pedagogy of emancipation* of a large number of oppressed and disenfranchised people who are difficult to unambiguously name (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). A series of conceptual difficulties concerning certain obvious paradoxes contained in the politics of collective representation of citizens after genocide can be related to these processes. For example, a large number of the Serbian people were forced to carry the weight of the crimes committed by the Serbian army and police forces.

The dominant *politics of collective representation* of a people that have led to genocide cannot remain the same after the genocide is committed. That is why we need new education politics and new politics of peaceful socioeconomic development, based on the new emancipatory pedagogies of the oppressed (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). This specifically means that the *Great Serbian identity politics* – in the neo-fascist politics of the 1990s based on the anti-civilizational idea that “Serbs cannot live with other nations” – should be changed. It is possible to express it differently. Considering the internationally confirmed fact of the genocide against Bosniaks committed in the name of the Serbian people as a non-differentiated collective, Serbs should reflexively and critically work on deradicalizing their own politics of collective representation, and in that way free themselves, in the name of humanity and in the name of the right to be different, from the anti-educational militaristic and mythomaniac politics of oppressors, who have pushed them into a fratricidal war against their neighbors: primarily against Muslim Bosnian Bosniaks and Catholic Bosnian Croats. This Great Serbian identity politics, based on the idea that Serbs have a “God-given right” to slaughter their neighbors, should be changed (pacified), primarily by Bosnian Serbs who currently live in the genocide entity of Republika Srpska. At the same time, such a criminal politics of education and a representation of a collective identity that is founded on the Chetnik ideology should be deconstructed from within and by the citizens of Serbia; Serbia was at an international level declared responsible for genocide, yet this finding has not prevented the Serbian army and police forces from committing genocide against Bosniaks. This simultaneously means that Serbs should, from a normative viewpoint and starting with a new *critical pedagogy* (Freire, 1968, 1992; Freire & Macedo, 2002; Bischooping, 2004; Darder, 2011, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010; Schneider, 2014; Bentrovato, 2017; Lybeck, 2018), educate themselves for peace and for coexistence with other peoples and nations and thus finally emancipate themselves from the predatory, transnational, cross-border politics of collective identity that have led to genocide.

Serbs are held responsible for the genocide that occurred, although it is clear that the blame can-

not be collective. There are no non-genocide and genocide peoples. *However*, there is always a latent possibility that in certain circumstances, a social group carries out genocide against another social group. Add to it the possibility of an alliance of the two social groups that deny the plural singularity of Bosnians and Herzegovinians – and in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these are the official politics of its neighboring states (primarily Serbia and Croatia) – and that they join forces with propaganda and a special war against the Bosnian interpretation of social reality, then the complexity of the construction of future identity politics and future politics of differences in the Bosnian–Herzegovinian environment can appear even more bewildering. It is especially so if one has not lived during the past decades where this occurs, i.e., in Bosnia and Herzegovina. New wars in the Bosnian environment should definitely be prevented with dialogic and rational means and with the help of acquired knowledge from the culture of peace, considering also potential emancipatory pedagogies of the oppressed and the disenfranchised (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). So that systematic reoccurrence of war violence does not transpire again in the future, international criminal courts exist to determine the responsibility of individuals and groups who have carried out genocide or mass crimes against humanity. Such convictions act as warnings that mass crimes and mass violations of human rights should not happen. The genocide committed in the heart of Europe during the last decade of the 20th century and mass crimes carried out in the name of the Serbian or any other people represent an important red line. At the end of the second decade of the 21st century, they are a sign that Serbs should finally and peacefully change their perspective with the help of a new critical pedagogy and together with their neighbors, Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians. This change in moral outlook is possible only with the aid of an honest dialogue that aims to educate for peace – that is, with the help of *logos*, and not the help of a necrophilic insistence on *neo-fascist ideology* and a myth that Serbs *cannot coexist with other nations* (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019).

The *peace potential of the cosmopolitan idea of education of the sense and the meaning of coexistence*, is therefore as important in the long term for the *culture of peace* as the legitimization of universal human values such as freedom, love, solidarity, awareness, humility, critical thinking, faith in humanity, and the hope that human society can become more humane and a better place to live.

GENOCIDE IN NORTHWESTERN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – A SOCIOLOGICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL ANALYSIS

Bosnia and its civilian population were exposed to mass killings, mass deportations, and forced resettlement of the population. The foundations of this experience of war, both today and in 1992, were the ideology and mythology of a *racial, ethnic, religious, and lingual purity* and can be considered valuable for establishing a *culture of peace* and a *culture of non-violence* at a planetary level. A thesis presented by Vlasisavljević (2012: 31) claims that small ethnic groups today have great cultural bodies, as they have internalized great empires. With this philosophical thesis, one can understand the collective pathology of the Bosnian people. This pathology is evident in the fact that the dogmatized and indoctrinated Bosnians of different ethnic origins have shown their propensity to differentiate amongst themselves as much as possible, disregarding mutual similarities and the fact that they have for centuries lived with each other, and not just beside each other. According to one interpretation, this is occurring because *post-war*

Bosnian identities have been formed according to the wishes of former intelligence elites who have become the rulers of reigning ethnic politics and the rulers of ethnic business. Based on that logic, which makes sense to certain parties but not to others, Bosnian Serbs try to show themselves as being as similar as possible to Russians, Bosnian Muslims as similar as possible to Middle East or Far East Muslims (depending on the trend, and on what is more “profitable”), and certain Bosnian Catholics as even greater Catholics than the Pope himself.

The sociological experience of war is the experience of a sociologist who, based on “participant observation” rigorously analyses and compares the “construction of social reality” in wartime, and the construction of social reality in peacetime, that is, during the period before and after the war. This experience is valuable precisely because the sociologist pays attention to how the meaning of the plural “us” is changed from the inside, gradually, and almost imperceptibly, but with far-reaching consequences.

During a longer time period marked with war (or wars), only those who have a long memory and a relatively objective perspective can clearly and precisely analyze the profound changes of the meaning of notions such as “us” and “them” and “ours” and “theirs.” Maybe only unbiased scientists who observe the reality from the Moon would be able to keep a sufficient distance (non-ideological surveillance) from the ways of establishing discursive and real mechanisms of dominance (or of the resistance to this dominance) that lead to war conflict at a certain point in history.

War is one of the most unreal and mysterious phenomena of human existence. War is a real collective violence involving attempts to fully normalize, justify, and rationalize the killing of people, with reason and logic. Thus, war can appear completely unreal to many people, who cannot believe that something like war is even possible. War is unreal because there is no clear cognizance of what war really is and is not. It is not clear at what moment and in what location war begins, when and where it ends, which is why all classic wars before 11 September 2001 are most profoundly associated with the logic of space and time as well as with language, discourse, narratives, myths, legends, and ideologies. Ideologies are hard to counteract today. We can protest against a classic war, go on a hunger strike, even self-incinerate to, for example, warn of the pointlessness of mutual killing that is “normalized” or legitimized during war. Therefore, the issue of the relationship between science and ideologies in the 21st century has probably become as important as the issue of differentiating between the state of war and the state of peace.

The reason is precisely because differentiation is, in the time and space we live, becoming more and more unclear and opaque. It often leaves us without adequate instruments of determining and measuring differences between peace and war.

Malešević (2010) views war as, among others, a *material event* that includes organized physical destruction, killing, and dying. However, war does not just occur by itself. It is first born in the heads of “smart” individuals, in the heads of ideologists, professors, and academicians; it forms and intensifies in the “empty” heads of football fans, and in the heads of their leaders, and thus becomes real and almost as normal as differentiating into “ours” and “theirs.”

Interpersonal interaction and social development (and society regression) evolve as a constant process of transformation within which a series of situations is perceived. They are not static or closed elements that determine humans, but their parts intertwine in a dynamic of process

continuity. The preconceptions of love, hopes, values, and challenges of a certain social reality, and obstacles that prevent the full humanization of people, should be the subject of studies and analyses. Social reality is never isolated or static but is always in dialectic interaction with its opposites. As the incongruity of interactions and situations deepens to a state when the loss of their dynamic is a real threat, the result is irrationality and the transformation of social reality into myths (Freire, 1968, 1992; Freire & Macedo, 2002; Bischooping, 2004; Darder, 2011, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010; Schneider, 2014; Benvato, 2017; Lybeck, 2018).

These views of Freire and sociologically colored views sound as if they have been written during our twisted and difficult-to-label time – the time of media, warmongering, and biopolitical normalization of “hybrid wars,” the time of denying genocides even in the face of such legal evidence as the organized killing of thousands of civilians in zones without any direct military operations in 1992. However, this situation is also becoming a matter with its own antithesis. In such a situation, the irrationality that creates myths becomes itself a fundamental matter. Its antithesis, the critical and dynamical view of the world, aims to reveal reality, unmask myths and their origins, and finally achieve humanity’s task – the permanent transformation of reality for the benefit of truth and the liberation of people.

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