Post Conflict National reconciliation in Somalia

Bachelor thesis

on

Peace and Development Studies

(20HT-2FU33E)

Author: Mohamed Abdi Elmi

Tutor: Jonas Ewald

Examiner: Susanne Alldén

(Växjö, Sweden)
ABSTRACT

This study sets out the understanding of the type of reconciliation approach used in Somalia, the participating leaders’ understanding, attitudes and actions towards the reconciliation as well as the role of civil society involved in the reconciliation in Somalia. The study used a qualitative abductive desk research methodology. The results based on secondary data drawn from the literature while the analysis has been used on John Paul Lederach’s reconciliation approaches pyramid. The main findings explain that one level approach of reconciliation has been employed in Somalia, the former leaders’ understanding, attitudes and actions have contributed to deepen the conflict, while the current leader's understanding, attitudes and actions seems to help promote national reconciliation in the country and the civil society role has been gradually mounting as the country has been under post conflict peacebuilding.

The study identified three main issue are among the determinants of the reconciliation failure in Somalia firstly Somali protracted conflict would not have resisted if for example, the UN and international community had learned from the successful pragmatic reconciliations in the country. Secondly, it was also noted that as long as the supremacy of the clan politics continued, the role of civil society especially women would be compromised. And finally, the risk of reconciliation is greater in the involvement of the unscrupulous leaders.

Keywords: Somalia, Reconciliation, Peacebuilding, State-Building, Power-Sharing
Somalia map
# Table of contents

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 5
   1.1 Research problem ............................................................................................... 5
   1.2 Research objective and research questions ...................................................... 6
   1.3 Research relevance ........................................................................................... 7
   1.4 Thesis outline .................................................................................................... 8

2 Literature review ....................................................................................................... 8
   2.1 Previous national reconciliation in Somalia since 1991-2007 ....................... 10
   2.2 Civil society roles in Previous national reconciliations ................................. 14
   2.3 Current national and state leaders’ prospects of reconciliation ..................... 18
   2.4 Civil society current role in national reconciliation efforts ........................... 19

3 Theoretical and Analytical frameworks ................................................................... 20
   3.1 Lederach’s pyramid as an analytical tool ......................................................... 20

4 Methodological frameworks ...................................................................................... 21
   4.1 Hybrid of text and context analysis ................................................................. 21
   4.2 Limitations and delimitations ........................................................................... 21

5 Background .............................................................................................................. 22
   5.1 Overview of conflict of Somalia actors and drivers of conflict ....................... 22
   5.2 Patterns of conflict in Somalia .......................................................................... 23
   5.3 Current conflict context ..................................................................................... 25
5.3.1 Al-Shabaab, ISIS violent insurgents in Somalia

5.3.2 Disagreement between the federal government and federal member states

5.3.3 Somaliland secession and Somalia refusal

6 Findings

7 Analysis

7.1 Analysis of the findings for the leaders’ understanding, attitudes and actions on past national reconciliation

7.2 Analysis on civil societies role of participation and implementation of the past national and state level reconciliations

8 Conclusion and suggestion for further research

9 References

Appendix 1
1.0 Introduction

Post conflict peacebuilding is one of the most crucial elements for a war-torn country to reunite among all the warring groups, reconstruct the country and deter the country from returning to the conflict that paralysed the country’s political stability and development growth. One of the most essential components for the post conflict peacebuilding is, the national reconciliation process which aims to heal the grievances and wounds of the victims, the perpetrators and the civil war rivalries as well as to establish mechanisms ensuring community coherence and coexistence built through conciliation process of truthful and justice elements (Brouneus, 2003).

David Bloomfield presenting the concept of reconciliation and its elements states that reconciliation after fierce confrontation is the extensive, broad and deep intersocietal relationship-building process whose integral elements contain justice, truth, healing and reparations. And describes these elements; (1) as they are the building blocks of reconciliation; (2) therefore, they have ability to operate in one other in parallel harmonisation towards the similar way; (3) are primarily interdependent and complimentary;(4) together contribute to the overall relationship-building process required for progress towards the (“perhaps idealistic”) aim of a reconciled society (Bloomfield 2006)

1.1 Research problem

Throughout the last three decades, Somalia has been suffering an extending civil war (The network 2019). These conflicts were caused by several factors including the political, economic and land conflicts between various actors extending from the clans competing to obtain power to manage the scarce resource of the country (Elmi and Barise, 2006). There was also a rise of violent extremism like Al Shabab triggered by the weakness of the government. Devastating natural disasters of floods and droughts partook the increase of starvation and internal displacements occurring in the country. These issues caused the destruction of the country’s institutions, existing structures, and the trust in the government. The Somalia prolonged conflict impaired the social cohesion and the unity of the Somali people and left the country to be one of the most underdeveloped and fierce countries in Africa (The network, 2019).
During the absence of the central government in Somalia, various reconciliation conferences were held outside the country with the purpose to restore the state but unfortunately it was not succeeded to convey peace and stability in the country. These conferences have mostly been attentive towards state building by engaging merely politicians and militia leaders from the warring clans. These issues reduced the success of initiating peace as it was exclusively focused on certain actors rather than inclusive national social reconciliation (Keating & Waldman. 2018). Nevertheless, in the last fifteen years the country has been obtaining a level of stability while reconstructing its institutions and economy. In 2007 a national reconciliation conference was held in Mogadishu, the capital city of the country, was the first effort to address national level social reconciliation but it was not succeeded due to the violent conflicts that existed in Mogadishu. Subsequently, several state-building conferences have been held in Mogadishu (The Network, 2019).

Since the collapse of the central government of Somalia fifteen peace reconciliation conferences were conducted aimed at building central government and most of them were held outside of Somalia while one was held inside Somalia, all these peace conferences failed to convene peace in the country because all these reconciliation conferences were focusing political agreements like power sharing and agreeing state building process rather than addressing the problems (grievances and interests) brought Somalia to its fraction dilemmas. Any government including the current did not invest meaningful efforts in reconciliation for the Somali people while the need for the reconciliation of Somalia people still is an outstanding issue which needs to be addressed to halt the conflicts in the country. Truth and justice broad based reconciliation is neglected to address in Somalia while it is a requirement for the Somali people (Gundel 2018).

1.2 Research objective and questions

1.2.1 Objectives

The research objective is to study the Somali reconciliation initiatives literature by assessing the understanding, attitudes and actions of the government leaders, opposition groups and the strategic policy and official statements towards the national reconciliation as well as, evaluating its inclusivity through studying the extent of the civil society actor’s involvement in the national reconciliation initiative process.
1.2.2 Questions

The research will employ the following questions to find the information needed from the available literature and data written on the Somali national reconciliation.

1. What kind of reconciliation approach has been used in Somalia?

2. What was/is the understanding of the national reconciliation by the government and political opposition?

3. What was/is the international community’s and neighbouring countries’ role in this approach?

4. To what extent do the civil society actors were/are involved in the national reconciliation initiatives?

1.3 Research relevance

Currently, the Somalia country is struggling to get out of multifaceted conflict ranging from the constitutional crises between the federal government and the federal member states, the Puntland and Somaliland conflict based on the disputed regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, scattered inter-clan clashes in south central Somalia and the Somaliland’s demand for secession conflict from Somalia as well as the terrorist affiliated insurgents known as violent Al-Shabaab conflict that is against the restoration of peace and stability in the country. (HRW Somalia country events report 2019)

As the result of those above-mentioned challenges and coming from subsequent repercussions from the ousted savagely tyrannous military regime and civil war aftermath placed the country in a situation where the prerequisite of the reconciliation is most demanding. Consequently, recurrent conflicts in the country make obvious and more relevant that Somalia country need for peacebuilding through a national social reconciliation process since the national social reconciliation is pre-neglected opportunity and is one of the sustainable peace attainment strategies for the post conflict countries which also worked some parts of Somalia like Puntland (federal member state of Somalia) therefore it is an appropriate prospect that can work also the Somali people as a whole (Öberg 2020).

So, this research aims to fill a gab in the literature which has been overlooked in the previous researches on the topic specially to study the government and oppositions understanding attitudes and actions and the extent of the civil society role towards the past national reconciliation as well as the type of
reconciliation used in Somalia to contribute to the finding of an effective reconciliation approach to Somalia.

1.4 Thesis outline

This study encompasses eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction that outlines the purpose of the research, its relevance to the area of peace and development studies as well as depicts the type of methodological and analytical instruments used to realise the execution of this research. Chapter two establishes the literature review of the research through discussing the previous research about the reconciliation efforts in Somalia. Its approaches, results and implications. Chapter three presents the theoretical and analytical framework used to analyse the findings of this research. Which is Lederach’s pyramid that classifies the actors and stakeholders of reconciliation in three levels which are top down, middle range and grass roots levels, this pyramid discusses the approaches of the reconciliations and its consequences while each level has its own consequences and results. Chapter four presents methodological framework, selection of the text and context analyses methods as well as the delimitations and limitations of the research. Chapter five presents background information of the selected country conflict case, drivers and actors in Somalia since the collapse of the Somali central government to the current federal government of Somalia. Chapter six outlines the findings of the research. Chapter seven is the analysis chapter which splits the data into sub chapters of the government leaders and opposition and civil society sections that facilitate the answers to the research questions by using the text and context analysis techniques as presented in the methodology section. Chapter eight is the conclusion chapter and if possible, suggestions for the need of further research. And the last but not the least is the eighth chapter that presents the references of the data resources.

2.0 Literature review

There is an enormous quantity of literature concerning on post conflict peacebuilding to deter countries from returning to the past conflict and violence, among this vast literature is reconciliation literature which various scholars and authors have written on different researches with different opinions on
how, what and when the reconciliation initiative is appropriate to start or end and what initiatives are considered as reconciliation or not. Besides that, the idea of reconciliation locates the first priority in the post conflict generation particularly the peace campaigners deem the reconciliation as being an essential requirement for durable peace (Fischer, 2011). The literature review concerns both the general concept of reconciliation literature and the particular previous reconciliation researches’ literature on the studying case country of Somali.

2.1 Overview of general concept of reconciliation literature review

In general authors of reconciliation discipline have different views and definitions on whether the reconciliation is a process or an end goal of a peacebuilding agenda or as well whether the approach of national reconciliation develops from top down or bottom-up approaches. However, all the authors agree the reconciliation as a crucial component in post conflict peacebuilding efforts which contributes in the attainment of the durable peace for the reconciling societies (Brounéus, 2003). Reconciliation deals with different levels as Lerches states “Reconciliation is currently applied on a variety of levels, from small encounter groups, to high profile truth commissions to Presidential apologies for past wrong” (Lerche 2000) The difference on the authors’ opinion on it is resulted by the different cultures, traditions, professions, backgrounds, geographical landscapes of both the societies in the conflict and the authors researching it. Among the authors researching reconciliation fields are world renowned authors, academic professionals, and international peace institutes researchers and university academic researchers. Hence there is a vast literature to use for this topic in general including the following literature.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) handbook on reconciliation after violence conflict acknowledges the complexity of the term reconciliation and that there is little agreement on its definition and that is because reconciliation is both a goal-something to achieve and a process as means to achieve that goal. IDEA defined a reconciliation as a broad-based inclusive process for every one not only for ones who suffered directly and those
who perpetrated the woe. The process involves coming to terms with an imperfect reality which demands changes in our attitude, our aspirations, our emotions and feelings perhaps even our beliefs. Such profound change is a vast and often painful challenge, and cannot be rushed or imposed. (IDEA hand book, 2003).

Lederach theory proposes that reconciliation contains at least four critical elements when treating modern conflicts and rebuilding the relationship of broken societies. It contains four components of truth, justice, mercy and peace, he defines reconciliation as a fundamental element containing a focus and a locus. The focus means to give concentration on the relational aspects of the conflict while the locus is the intersect position of the divided society or in other words the focus and the locus are the societal space and place. Lederach argues that focus aims at the relationship building between the past rivals and considers both the root cause and the long-time solution for the conflict hence the relationship is emphasised to be the central code of the conflict reconciliation. The locus is the place where conflicting groups formulate the shocks of the past and it is where brings together the rivalry groups to discuss truth, forgiveness, justice and peace (Lederach 1997).

2.2 Previous national reconciliations in Somalia since 1991-2007

Approximately, twenty years of Somali absolute state collapse, the international community has been trying to build peace and re-establish operational government in Somalia. In the search for peace and stability, numerous reconciliation initiatives were held engaging the key leadership of the conflicting groups and were held mostly outside of Somalia. International community proposing a state centric rather than peacebuilding approach. Nevertheless, this top-down reconciliation process has not produced any tangible results (Keating & Waldman, 2018).

Joakim Gundel, is a political scientist with twenty years of research and analysis experience in Somalia. He was one of the UN Monitoring Group experts and now leads Katuni consultancy that focuses on different issues including the building peace and accountable government in Somalia. He argues that Somalia protracted conflict needs a bottom-up reconciliation which he thinks will underpin Somalia state building and will end up the disagreement on the constitution. He emphasises that reconciliation is very vital for Somalis and if not attained, the Somalia peace and stability is unlikely to be sustainable. He states that the former peace process did cover reconciliation but stressed power sharing schemes
instead they would focus on reconciliation and that is why conflict and violence continue in Somalia’s regions and in the capital city as well. This case illustrates that there is a vital need for reconciliation. And that there are still grievances and disagreements that have been existing for a long time and still need to be resolved. He suggests that Somalia needs a reconciliation and the approach of that reconciliation to be bottom-up Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodologies to discover the grievances and the moralities for their solutions (Gundel 2018).

Almost more than fifteen main national and many numbers of local regional and clan reconciliation conferences mostly of the national ones held outside of Somalia. The neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti while some local ones were held in the country all these peace and reconciliation efforts were aiming to restore peace by focusing the representatives of warring groups and former civilian politicians. These efforts were supported by the international community and the United nations but since these efforts were lacking the basic elements of reconciliation like truth and justice for the victims and perpetrators and the overall ownership of reconciliation and instead focusing on political and economic interests of the warring groups rather than to address the real grievance and interests of the Somalis. These conferences ended up without a functioning government and reconciliation (Mukhtar 2007). In the pursuit for sustainable peace in Somalia the key performers have been foreign actors who received a lot of advice from the warring individuals involved in the Somali conflict, with low participation of public Somali citizens. The continuous financing and operation of AMISOM in Somalia contrasting to improving Somali security forces have rendered a dependence which has encountered recurrent extension of AMISOM mandate without a clear exit strategy. This has hindered both lasting peace and political stability in Somalia (Maruf 2017). However, the Eldoret/Mbagathi reconciliation Process finally achieved in forming a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, substituting the Transitional National Government (TNG) (Menkhaus 2006). Although, the Eldoret/Mbagathi process focused on a peaceful reconciliation process, with the parliament approval of the TFG charter; the element of power sharing at the cost of sustainable peace was characterized as the result of the process. This is evidenced by the major power-sharing deal that comprised the building of the presidential palace, the office of the prime minister and three vice prime ministers (Ibrahim & Sekou 2017).

Ken Menkhaus states that Communal confidence in the series of the Somali reconciliations have generally been low and the legitimacy of the agreements and the proclaimed governments were
also lower additionally, the successive failures of reconciliation since 1991 reduced the public confidence in the peace process and reconciliations. Numerous issues have contributed to this status quo. These factors include reduction of reconciliation importance to state building. Most Somali national reconciliations process was weakened by the allocation of political positions in a proposed transitional government with tiny or no willingness to reach a genuine reconciliation or challenge conflict issues. External mediators have also promoted this challenge justifying that they were under pressure to produce an agreement therefore allowed power sharing arrangement to replace for reconciliation. The other issue which similarly contributed to the misjudgement of the reconciliation is lack of local ownership many times Somalis have criticised that reconciliation process have been imposed on Somalia by external actors who urge their perceived solutions and sometimes their own interests. Somalis have doubts in the process of reconciliation and have little ownership of the process since they were always held outside of the country (Menkhaus 2011)

In relation to the Mark Bradbury one censure labelled at international sponsored peace reconciliation is without Somali ownership, since they were externally planned, conducted and financed by external actors. While the domestic reconciliations were Somali led processes, therefore had logic of ownership, more assurance and the citizens finance from their own resources. The authority of the local agreements originates from the acceptability of the leadership, the inclusiveness of the process, the use of the customary law and the consent decision making process (Bradbury 2008)

According to Samatar. Ahmed I and Samatar Abdi I. the biggest ailment that ever-plagued Somali society is lack of righteous leadership. It is now well known that even the most gifted opportunities for reconciliation and resettlement (e.g. Arta) emerged from “hapless leadership”, that was unsuccessful to reach an effective reached time, that the appointed time has come. In the next round, then, the requirements of public leadership, especially at the highest levels, should at least emphasize the following: visionary thinking, energy, competence, and, above all, a pre-existing record of ownership. When combined and used hard, this kind of combination should calm down the spread but hate and shock anyone who is loud, tribal enough, and corrupt enough to trust himself (and so far,) on stage. middle. A transparent general system should be central to the classification of each goal. However, the structure of government and leadership in part reflects the sympathy of the people and the nature of the people (Samatar Ahmed. & Samatar Abdi. 2008)
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Signifies that it is agreed on the practicality and sustainability of domestically driven peacebuilding processes. National and international initiatives are universally seen as counterproductive if not definitely originated in homegrown initiatives. Most of the internationally sponsored conferences Somalia has seen since 1991 were held outside of the country, mainly in the neighbouring countries Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Yemen and millions of dollars were spent. All these internationally supported peace processes were controlled by some of the neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. These interventions in the reconciliation conferences resulted in the neighbouring countries manipulating the selection process of the participants including parliament members who would later select the president. Somalis have suffered the art and the result of these internationally sponsored state building processes and the transitional governments they produced, as top-down solutions not based on the will of the Somalis and thus without general patronage (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2015).

It is crucial and worth to mention that successful endured reconciliation processes in Somalia like in Somaliland and Puntland similar to the clan internal reconciliation initiatives in south central Somalia, have been Somali owned, led and financed with limited external assistance (Keating & Waldman. 2018). Community led peacebuilding initiatives have resulted in the formation of stable regional administrations such as Somaliland and Puntland and others. Traditional leaders of the above societies have succeeded in creating a degree of stability and clan based administrative system, equated with the 14 national reconciliation efforts held from 1991 in the outside of Somalia and have been less successful (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2015).

As presented above several political reconciliations targeting only the top-level leaders (government, opposition and clan leaders) were held in Somalia but not yet held Somali national inclusive and integrating all (the top level, middle range levels. and the grassroots level). However, it was conducted at some national reconciliation conferences engaging some civil society representatives. Therefore, all the reconciliations were lacking the Somalis ownership and were not targeting the real issues of conflict actors. They were all top-down reconciliation approaches which rarely targeted the grievances of the Somalis apart from the Somaliland and Puntland state conference built the Somaliland secessionist government and Puntland as a federal member state of Somali who created peace and stability in their respective territories. This research studies on the viability of the national reconciliation engaging both medal range and top-level leaders to
investigate top leaders’ understanding and activities towards Somalia reconciliation and middle range leaders’ participation in the reconciliation. like civil society organizations, associations and networks like private sector leaders and local non-governmental organizations including youth and women marginalized groups representatives and other community associations. (Eriksson. 2013)

2.3 Civil society roles in Previous national reconciliations

The concept of civil society came from various origins. In the contemporary arena several political philosophers have contributed to the discourse and definition of civil society (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). Among the key scholars are John Lock (1632-1704) who first considered that civil society is a distinct entity from the state. People form a community that peoples’ social life is developed within the community while the state has nothing to do with this formula. The definition of the term of civil society is elastic with different meanings to the different users due to divergent views on the civil society’s composition and operational aspect (Abdi and Madut 2019)

Thania Paffenholz describes civil society as it is commonly stated, the arena of voluntary, joint actions of an institutional nature around shared interests, objectives and principles that are different from those of the state, family and market. Civil society comprises an immense and varied set of voluntary organizations, it contains nonstate actors and associations that are not morally ambitious towards private or economic interests which are separately organised, naturally show civic virtue and interact in the public sphere. (Paffenholz 2010)

According to Sida “civil society is an arena, separate from the state, the market and the individual household, in which people organise themselves and act together to promote their common interests” (Sida 2007) as well as the UN defines civil society as the “third sector” of society, along with government and business. It contains civil society organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The UN realizes the significance of collaborating with civil society entities as civil society helps the UN to advance the UN ideals and helps support its work. (UN).

In fact, civil society has different meanings extending from its scope and operations for its employers and the context it is functioning. However, we consider it in this paper as it is a neutral voluntary non-political entity and non-business-oriented body comprising different communal or individuals at the
same time having shared objectives and willing to hold the state accountable upon both domestic and international laws. In the armed conflict and post conflict period civil society is expected to participate in the diminishing or transforming the conflict as well as contributing to sustainable peace, based on this view, citizens, civil society actors are considered as crucial potential actors in disabling prevailing conflict, factionalism and organized violence (Paffenholz & Spurk 2006).

The civil society emergence in Somalia is debatable and has different histories but there are three most notable arguments which are: the first is that Somalia civil society was established in the early 1940 in the British and Italy colonies, some groups were gathering and making unions like students’, women’s, elders’ groups for the purpose of seeking Somali independence. The view argues that the Somali civil society was formed to oust the colony from the country and build a nation with a democratic system. The second view is that after the military coup in 1969, the military government permitted only the state- backed and state-owned civil society to exist and work in the country. However, after the total collapse of the government 1991 and subsequent civil war, civil society filled the vacuum to take a lion’s share to seek out peace and service delivery in Somalia which the civil society currently continue (Hared 2020)

In the case of Somalia, the civil society participation in the previous reconciliation attempts was insignificant, the reconciliation conferences were mostly held outside of Somalia and emphasized heavily on state-building rather than social reconciliation therefore the Somali civil society were rarely engaged and had lite or zero influence to previous reconciliations. The waring functions were exclusively pertaining to the reconciliation while the international community saw them as legitimate representatives of the Somalia clans and society, the external mediators were giving them recognition to negotiations in the peace conference as the key actors of the Somalia peace and state restoration. During the first decade of the Somali conflict over a dozen peace reconciliation conferences were held out of Somalia and none of them was succeeded as well as none of them engaged civil society. One of the key causes of their failure was lacking civil society participation and the grass roots recognitions as well as the legitimacy for representation of the self-styled warlords (Menkhaus, Sheikh, et al. 2009). The reconciliation conferences’ outcome was not implemented and peace was getting distant. The most influential peace conference of the previous dozen Somali reconciliation in terms of the eminent space established to the civil society for their nation’s destiny was the Arta peace process. Even though civic groups were involved in the earlier peace processes such as Addis Ababa in 1993 the Arta reconciliation conference provided the civil society for the first opportunity ever given to them to
execute a significant role as decision makers. Nonetheless the non-traditional actors in the Arta peace conference met challenges of over representation too, since none of the women’s groups, religious groups, and the civil society at large had a decided plan for representation and partaking let alone a combined shared programme for determining the Somali conflict. Owing to that fact, they tended to dissolve to clan loyalty, accepting the weaknesses of clannism (Menkhaus, Sheikh, et al. 2009)

In Somalia, the peace reconciliations continue an elite negotiating scenario mainly engaging men. Undeniably there are some of the planners abhor disregarding women’s role in reconciliation, yet unofficially uncertainty the importance of women’s inclusion, thinking that men constitute and lead the warring parties and therefore have the means to make peace (Gardner 2018). Judith Ganrdner suggests her research with Life and Peace Institute on understanding the roles of men and women that Somali females are engaged in intra-and inter- clan conflict in several various means, including funding, organising, logistics, intelligence and participating in battles. Their roles are associated with the clan relationship as well as the specific clan situation. She states that kinship and clan are commonly dominated for elite interests. Nevertheless, women have executed activities to eliminate conflict. For instance, in Kismayo, women have operated for peace via various ways, counting in influencing, organisation and arranging protests or advocacy and lopping. In her research findings she highlights the importance of women’s full and significant participation in peacebuilding. Women across Somalia had worked hard in mobilising others in their domestic communities and beyond to advance peace. For instance, in 1994 women kept Mudug peace from destroying; in 1993 women in Bosaso freely demonstrated to improve stable peace, that led to the establishment of a peace enforcement police force. Women peace activists in Somalia had been the forefront of initiatives to mobilise combatants and to approach peacebuilding and human right needs. However Somali women are absent in decision making process and they are not represented in any of the formal and non-formal institutions of decision making whether at the village, district, regional and national levels (Gardner &El Bushra. 2004).

Abdirahman Abdullahi highlights that thirteen attempted reconciliations of the Somalia since 1991 to date was emphasizing clan conflict resolution and were stressing on the top-down reconciliation approach on state-building, he argues that the biggest obstacle for Somalia to find sustainable peace is to end the anarchy resulted by the statelessness by rearranging civil society. Rearranging means to him to mobilize the community into three categories. First to reorganize civil society consisting of the registered modern and traditional Islamic organizations, distinguishing clan elders and recording the Somali customary law. Secondly, reconsidering and reordering state and federal governments
Abdullahi thinks if this is done it will alter the elite conflict to unite the political elite. In doing so it facilitates them to work on the ground of shared legal and cultural frameworks. Simultaneously, promoting modern civil society organizations facilitates to strengthen social unity. Abdullahi claims that the Somalia conflict needs to be redefined and leaving from the singular “state versus clan” model by employing a more inclusive “state versus society” model. He mentions that Somalia reconciliation requires to discard the singular conception of modernity and replace it with a concept that combines many modernities and leave the two extreme models of westernization and indigenization of the state. He points out that failure of the above models is obvious in the Somalia experience during the postcolonial state system and the adoption of the 4.5 clan power sharing formula. (Abdullahi 2018)

He argues that comprehensive reconciliation needs the establishment of three distinct spaces in Somalia. (1) establishing traditional space that consists of clans, clan elders and traditional Islamic scholars, (2) civil society space for professional organizations, Islamic movements and other non-state institutions and actors and (3) political space: for political parties and the apparatus of the state. He recommends that these three spaces to be in place and must be demarcated so as to none of them occupies the space of the other (Abdullahi 2018)

The aptitude to obtain access to public opinion and interest to get appropriate methods to input ideas into state-building is tough in Somalia. The government was always unwilling to reach and involve civil society in high level political negotiations, the role of civil society, particularly the organized NGOS, professionals and commercial networks was hard to apprehend public views and advocate for their inclusion in the decision-making process. The role of civil society in peacebuilding and state-building processes in Somalia has been restricted strictly as the result of the country's volatility and continuing conflicts. Among the challenges that civil society faced were insecurity, the socio-political situation-based on clannism and the Civil Society internal capacity obstacles as well as without a strong and united structures between civil society entities (Interpeace & CRD 2012).
2.4 Current national and state leaders’ prospects of reconciliation

The provisional constitution of the federal republic of Somalia stipulates the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission accommodating traditional elders and leaders, members of the Federal Parliament, respected members of civil society, judges and security personnel (Somalia constitution 2012) which is yet to be established. The current government established a ministry of Interior, federalism and reconciliation in June 2017. President of The Federal Republic of Somalia, Mohamed Farmajo expressed in his forward statement of the book War and Peace in Somalia when he was commending the work of the United Nations on the research on Somalia’s protracted conflict, He said that There will not be effective support from the international community to help Somalis find peace unless there is sincere dedication among Somali leaders to terminate violence and resolve divergences through peaceful and inclusive dialogue, the time for Somalis to reconcile has come and so it needs to strengthen Somalis collectives’ agreements and stave off whatever can bring setbacks to Somali peoples and their government. The president stated, "My Government is committed to this agenda and to restoring hope to Somalis, including by crafting a national reconciliation plan to which all stakeholders can contribute" (Keating & Waldman 2018).

Somalia’s federal government deputy prime minister restated his government’s dedication to unite Somalis in attaining a durable peace and stability, he mentioned that Somalia requires political and religious reconciliation which have remained subtle due to the conflict when he was opening five days reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, the aim of that conference was to map out the establishment of a reconciliation strategy and is organized by the ministry of interior, federal affairs and reconciliation and funded by the US agency for international development as well as facilitated by the UN and UNDP (UNDP Somalia 2017).

The place of the current Somali government with respect to negotiated settlement is intentionally ambiguous. even though the president Farmajo openly presented readiness for dialogue with ALshabaab “including leaders” with a two months period of amnesty and a simultaneous declaration of war against them. (Keating & Waldman 2018)
2.5 Civil society current role in national efforts participation in the existing government

The establishment of the federal government of Somalia and the official end of the transitional government of Somalia has attracted new international support for Somalia. This change has expanded the role of civil society and offered a widened opportunity. Some civil society consultations with some of the civil society representatives participated in the dialogue that resulted the signing of the Somali compact, though it was not apparent the extent to which wider issues were systematically addressed or consulted or the feedback mechanism was active within civil society (Interpeace & CRD 2012). The Brussels conference communiqué and the compact text of the New Deal of Somalia underscored civil society involvement in the implementation priorities set out. Effective civil society engagement in the New Deal mechanisms including the high-level partnership forum and peace-building and state-building working groups necessitates greater efforts from civil society through coordination to prepare their inputs and agree on their representatives. Due to the civil society engagement, essential progress in the representation of the marginalized groups were realized (EU 2017-2020). Several achievements were accomplished, for example, in Somaliland a 25% quota was included in the parliament and the elected representatives age was lowered in an amendment of the electoral law as well as child protection and people with the disability’s acts were enacted. All these achievements were the fruits of the civil society's meaningful engagement in the new deal programs and the improved environments of the governments. These efforts brought about 40% youth elected in the 2012 Somaliland local councils’ election. There have been regional civil society platforms consisting of various broad based networks including youth networks, women umbrellas, professional associations including layers, and media houses. These platforms cover regional zones respectively. (EU 2017-2020). Puntland Nonstate Actors Association (PUNSAAA) Is the largest civil society and nonstate actors’ associations hub exists and represents in Puntland, (Saferworld.org) Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum (SONSAF) Is the Somaliland civil society platform that contains above mentioned civil society segments(sonsaf.org). The Somalia South Central Nonstate Actors Association (SOSCENSA) which operates across south and central Somalia and comprises a range of civil society networks, associations and umbrellas as similar as the other two platforms of PUNSAAA and SONSAF. (Saferworld.org) These three platforms are heavily supported by EU with the aim of ensuring that civil society is able to speak with a united voice so as to strengthen their participation in peace and state building processes at local, regional and national levels, in an EU funded program called strengthening civil society platform to unify the civil
society voice and representation for their respective regional civil society in the political decision-making process. (EU 2017-2020)

3.0 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The national reconciliation definitions and concepts have been discussed in the literature review section in various ways and that can be understood in different ways however the research will use the Lederaches’ theory of building peace and will base its analysis about the three levels of peacebuilding actors pyramid for the post conflict peacebuilding reconciliations. Reconciliation in the sense of Lederach (1997: 27) is “a place, the point of encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet” and as “an encounter which suggests that space for the acknowledging of the past and envisioning of the future is the necessary ingredient for reframing the present.” Lederach categorises the approaches of reconciliation into three different classes: the top-down level, the middle range level and the grass roots level each one of them has a potential and visible importance in the past conflict and therefore has to be part of the peacebuilding reconciliation efforts. Hence the research will use this Lederachs’ pyramid as an analytical framework. The focus will be given to the two top levels of the pyramid, the top down and the middle range levels (Lederach 1997). structured questions have been asked to the available literature on Somalia national reconciliation to know the understanding of the top-level leaders and the participation of the “middle range” level in the reconciliation. In the analysis of the findings the leaderach’s pyramid will be employed as an analytical tool and theory of reconciliation (Lederach 1997)

4.0 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS

The Research is based on an extensive qualitative abductive desk methodology to review and analyse the Somali government already written documents concerning national reconciliation as well as the other literature materials relating to the reconciliation in general and in particularly on Somalia including but not limited in the previous research reports, articles, Somalia national reconciliation constitution and official statements of the government leaders, oppositions and civil society networks
involvement and position papers. The research will use the text and context analysis methods to analyse the findings of the above-mentioned materials on the reconciliation in Somalia. The research is reviewing exclusively on the secondary data on reconciliation literature in general and specifically on Somalia. It will study comprehensively on the collected documents and other material on the issue. Therefore, it is qualitative desk research as well as it is an abductive since it is using Ledearach’s theory of reconciliation as the theory lens throughout the research.

4.1 Delimitations

This study is exclusively delimitating to desk study, to interview the secondary data available on the subject. Due to the Corona pandemic risk travel restrictions, yet the research would have been better to conduct as field research however, the research misses the interactions of the real informants of the researching topic on the knowledge and understanding of the inclusivity of Somalis in the reconciliation initiatives in Somalia.

4.2 Limitations

There is a linguistic limitation because the research is solely focusing only the English written documents since most researches done in Somalia are written in English. It might miss the little Somali written versions and this could be liable for limitations. It is also fair to mention that the research is conducted in my national country which means that I am knowledgeable and informed on the conflict and the studied topic situation. But that doesn’t contribute to it being biased but conversely it is an added value to the research because it has drawn near my understanding of the literature logically. Having in mind that, I have been impartial and made it transparent by avoiding assimilating to my personal views while I ensured it to be solely based on the previous researches’ literature and other secondary data displayed in the reference section.

5.0 Background

5.1 Overview of Somalia conflict Actors and drivers
Since the collapse of the Somali central government and the subsequent civil war eruption between the Somali clans and sub-clans, Somalia has been experiencing a dynamic of violent conflict, national crimes and lacking a functioning government combined with natural disasters like floods, famine caused by droughts and cyclones happening in the country (Eklöw and Krampe 2019). The last cyclone happened on the 23 November 2020 in the duration of writing this thesis and affected nearly 70,000 people while eight people died and 15,000 people were displaced in the eastern coast of Somalia (OCHA 2020).

Root causes of Somalia’s conflict are deep rooted in the colonial period before the independence of Somalia. Somalia as the most of the other African nations placed in the European colony in the 19th century. The European partition of Africa, divided Somalia into five territories namely Italian Somaliland, now the southern Somalia, British Somaliland currently the self-proclaimed Somaliland, French Somaliland currently Djibouti, the Ogaden region occupied by Menelik of Ethiopia which later became a portion of the Ethiopian territory and the Northern Frontier District which eventually formed section of Kenya’s crown colony. In 1960 British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland took their independence from Britain and Italy respectively and established together the Republic of Somalia (Derso 2009).

1969. Military coup led by Siad Barre held the country and governed the country from 1969-1991 until he was overthrown by the clan factions in 1991. During the Barre’s regime he fought with Ethiopia to return the Ogaden region from Ethiopia in a war continued 1977-1978 and ended unsuccessful. This was one of consequences of the colonial causes of Somalia, the other colonial cause of the problem is that Somaliland is demanding succession from Somalia based on the colonial artificial borders in the British and Italian Somaliland borders (Derso 2009). After the ousting of the Siad Barre civil war erupted in the country, clan based factional civil war started to contest for government power as well as the management of the scarce economic resources in the country, chaos, anarchy and total collapse of the government institutions followed. Utilizing the collapse of the Somalia central government the north western region self-announced the independent republic of Somaliland. The primary actors of conflict from 1991 to date are the clans and sub-clans, Islamic insurgent groups including currently outstanding Al Shabaab and ISIS factions in Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, the federal government of Somalia, the Somali diaspora communities as well as the interest groups like the business groups who exploited the resources of the country during the absence of the functional government who are
not keen with the instigation of a functional government due to their conflict of interest in the taxes enforcement with the strong government (Derso 2009).

The fundamental driving issues of the conflict in Somalia included the struggle of the power, battle to manage the scarce resource and clan politics of 4.5 power sharing structure which facilitates conflicts among the clans competing the power, grievance caused by the former repressive military regime and minority clans marginalization, land accessibility and management in the fertile and urbanising areas as well as the water and irrigation disputes in the rural areas and economic interests of some of the businessmen who for instance benefit the security needs by trading in arms as well as offers domestic and international security services (Bryld 2019).

5.2 Patterns of conflict in Somali

Somalis’ protracted conflict has been going through various trends since the collapse of the central government. It was not wedged to one crise which could have one instinct solution and that is what made the Somali conflict to be protracted in three decades and resisted all the tried remedies. Menkhaus sorted the Somali crisis into three different catastrophes which are State collapse, Armed conflict and Lawlessness. He describes the state collapse of Somalia as it is the most insincere and exclusive feature of the Somali crisis. Owing that there has been a total collapse of the central government period (1991-2000) which Somalia has been undergoing without a central government and there happened the deadliest civil wars and the most absurd displacement in the country. During this period there have been many unsuccessful attempts aimed to rebuild the central government for Somalia including the USA mission of restoring hope in Somalia and following the UN mission aiming to rebuild the state for the country. The latest attempt in the decade period was the most hopeful one that was held in Arta Djibouti in August 2000 and formed the transitional national government (TNG). The TNG became dysfunctional to execute its responsibilities in its lowest level, it was dimly recognised externally and there were strong internal oppositions against TNG. Therefore, it finally became irrelevant and dysfunctional existing body (Menkhaus 2003). Some of its contributing failure were that the warlords did not recognise it, Puntland state of Somalia was against it and the business people in Mogadishu did not want to collaborate with a government which takes them over their manipulated resources in Mogadishu. in contrary to that there were view good
things achieved in this period which were the establishment of self-proclaimed Somaliland and regional autonomous of Puntland (Menkhaus 2003).

Second pattern of the Somali catastrophe Menkhaus mentioned was the **protracted armed conflict** for the period of 2000-2010. This period instinct difference was that the civil war expanded bigger territory than the previous patten period but less damaging according to the initial years of the previous period (Menkhaus 2003). This year many grave conflicts happened throughout the Gedo region to Puntland causing casualty levels that reversed the country to a new civil war (Bryd 2007). It was noted that these conflicts were activated for various reasons including the political strategy affiliated with the IGAD sponsored peace talks in October of this year. These efforts created more tensions in southern Somalia than any time since 1995 (Menkhaus 2003). The hope of regional states in Somalia ceased in 2000 when the Arta peace process started to establish a national government in 2000 (Menkhaus 2003). Transitional government was established in 2001 and collapsed within two years, a new transitional federal government was formed in Kenya in 2004 and as soon as this government moved to Somalia it has met squabbling and faced an extending network of local Islamic courts who did not consider it as Somalia government. Islamic courts captured large territory in south Somalia and began to attack the government during these clashes with warlords a lot of casualties happened. In late 2006 government forces getting hand with Ethiopian troops began an aggressive attack against the Islamic courts which resulted hundreds of deaths and in early 2007 Ethiopian troops had captured Mogadishu and tried to push the Islamic courts out of Mogadishu but fighting continued in Mogadishu and Islamic courts begun to shell long distance mortar attacks on Ethiopian areas that resulted many casualties of the civilians and made the year of 2007 to the deadliest year of the major armed conflict in Somalia, this year is cited as it is the year of the Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu and the rise of the Al-Shabaab. However, the security situation continued to worse in 2008 and Al-Shabaab grew and persisted up to now through various power trends. (UCDP, 2007)

**The lawlessness and criminality** are the third predicament that Menkhaus stated as a durable stereotype linked to Somalia’s protracted state collapse as well as it is what he called ‘Mad Max’ chaos of young armed gunmen using war vehicles and terrifying the Somalis. Somalia has been lacking law enforcement since the collapse of the central government. Lacking of central government and law and order shaped circumstances that can be beneficial to devious delinquency such as rape and looting. However, Somalis have managed this even in a situation without central government and armed conflict there has been informal institutions of governance which ensured rule of law and
personal security where high level of legal conducts and personal security were created and upheld by either the clans’ customary law (*Xeer*) which enforces giving blood payments (*Diya*) for injuries committed and in some cases the application of Islamic law by local Sharia courts. There were also inadequate but important situations for customary law to positively continue order. This was giving the authority and responsibilities back to the clans’ elders by allowing them to settle all disputes among the people in their respective areas. Secondly it was the establishment of the bumpy proportion within local clan groupings. Similar to the armed conflict, lawlessness in Somalia has altered considerably over the course of the conflict of 1990. Menkhaus mentions that these crimes are committed by many of the higher political and business leaders who are convened for peace conferences by the international community. Misuse of fatal foreign aid and communal fierceness for short sighted political determinations, misuse of aid funds, taking big portions of land forcefully, export of illegal charcoal and participation in piracy activities as well as kidnapping of the international NGO and UN agencies personnel in south of Somalia particularly in Mogadishu. These lawlessness and criminal activities have been shrinking but still could be available in the areas dominated by Al-Shabaab (Menkhaus 2003).

5.3 Current conflict context

Current Somalia conflict is ranging from the discord between the federal government and the federal member states, the battle against the Alshabaab and ISIS branch in Somalia and the interstate conflict between Somaliland and Puntland as well as the Somaliland secession demand conflict with the federal government of Somalia. These are the outstanding current major conflicts in Somalia.

5.3.1 Al-Shabaab and ISIS the violent insurgents in Somalia

Al-Shabaab has been and is currently the biggest enemy and the most terrorising insurgent group for the people of Somalia and the government in particular where in general it is an international terrorist group which is a threat to the overall east African region’ peace, stability and development. It uses violence to endanger the country’s political progress and threatens the safety and wellbeing of all Somalis (Keating and Waldman 2018). Al-Shabaab is Al-Qaida affiliated terrorist insurgent group
emerged officially in 2008 after the Ethiopian invasion in Somalia as the strongest militant group eager to devastate the federal government of Somalia and its allies. It has clear objectives which are to withdraw foreign peacekeeping forces and the international community from the country and rule the country in sharia law. Al-Shabaab carries indiscriminate attacks of hit and run, improvised explosives, suicide explosions to the government workers, AMISON peacekeeping camps as well as the innocent citizens including women and children (Wise 2011). It is not willing to have peace negotiations with the federal government of Somalia unless the country is ruled in Sharia law and the foreigner troops withdraw from the country. Certainly Al-Shabaab has said many times that it would not negotiate with the government when the current president Farmajo opened an opportunity to negotiate with them. Immediately after his talks, Al-Shabaab spokesperson declined the offer through media statements (Keating and Waldman 2018). Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS) was founded in 2005 by a former Al-Shabaab member called Abdulqadir Mumin who was part of the faction of the Al-Shabaab in Puntland and deserted from Al-Qaida division and vowed loyalty to Abubakar Al-Baqdadi and the Islamic State. Immediately after ISIS branch in Somalia declared itself, a battle broke out between ISIS and Al-Shabaab, Islamic State started temptation and adapting Al-Shabaab members. Al-Shabaab reacted violently against ISIS members as well as its own members who were compassionate to ISIS. ISIS menace came to consciousness when it invaded the Qandala city port in Bari region, Puntland army forces ousted ISIS from the city. Since then, ISIS has been carrying out assassinations in Puntland and became the most discernible ISIS branch in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has attacked several times with ISIS branch in south Somalia and killed several of its leaders including Bashiir Abu Numan but it reported that only once Mumun’s ISIS wing in eastern Somalia clashed with Al-shabaab though they are distance and Al-Shabaab is weak in the east and strong in the west while ISIS is vice versa. They are rivalries to each other at the same time they both are the principal enemies for the peace and stability of Somalia (Warner and Weiss 2017).

5.3.2 Disagreement between the federal government and federal member states

Since Somalia adopted the federalism governance system in 2012, there has been recurrent disputes and discords between the federal government and the federal member states. This discord has been based on political power sharing, resources and international aid funds fair distribution which the provisional federal constitutions doesn’t make clear. Presently Somalia is in the pre-electoral period political tensions between the federal government, federal member states and the presidential candidate oppositions (ICG 2020).
In September this year the federal government and the federal member states agreed a political agreement on the election process to be indirect voting which the bicameral parliament members will be selected by clan leaders and delegates in indirect voting process that counts 101 persons of clan delegates to vote for each of the lower parliament member candidate while the upper house members will be selected by the clan leaders and approved by the state presidents in December 2020. The bicameral parliament members will later vote for the president in February 2021. Although this agreement is in place the tensions remain to continue due to the divergence visions and lack of trust between the federal member states and the federal government based on previous poor relations on power and resource sharing between the federal government and federal member states. This poor relation has been deteriorating since the president Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” came to office and tightened the political control over the states for instance the forceful replacement of some of the state’ leadership. This eventually affected the mutual collaboration on the national issues that require both state and federal governments to cooperate like security arrangements, completion of provisional constitution, holding one person one vote election and carrying out national social reconciliation which are all pending for the next government agenda (ICG 2020).

5.3.3 Somaliland secession and Somalia refusal

Somaliland being the former British north west Somaliland colony united with the Italian south Somaliland protectorate and together they formed Somali republic government in 1960 after their independence from the respective colonies. The union enjoyed being Somali republic's civilian government until the non-bloody military coup led by Mohamed Siad Barre took the rule of the country 1969. Siyad Barre ruled the country for 21 years. During the military regime era there were mass violations of human rights including but not limited executions, collective punishment and arbitrary arrest, most of these defilements were raised up in the 1980s with the increase of armed conflicts between armed clan factions and the military regime. The situation was deteriorating a time after time the regime committed grave human rights violations. The most notable ones are the execution of Islamic scholars, the destruction of water catchment and wells for the denial of water to the north east inhabitants belonging subclan to the Colonel Abdullahi Yuusuf the leader for the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the mass killings and displacement of the civilian caused by the regime reprisal and air pumping for the Somali National Movement (SNM) faction in 1988. In
1991 the military dictator was overthrown by clan-based factions and a brutal civil war was broke out (Keating and Waldman 2018). SNM took the control of the northern west regions fully and declared independence of the republic of Somaliland on May 1991 basing their decision of secession on the grievances and repressions executed by the ousted military regime. although it has not been recognized yet by the UN and other continental and regional organizations. It has been enjoying peace and stability and insulated itself from the conflict of Somalia. The reconciliation and reconstruction endeavours in Somaliland were internally led and joined with traditional and political leadership. That is what resulted in the post conflict peace building in Somaliland to be durable and fascinating stability in the region. Various violent confrontations based on disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag happened between Puntland and Somaliland where each one claims the ownership of the Sool and Sanaag regions on different bases. Somaliland claims these regions according to the British Somaliland borders demarcations while Puntland’s claim is based on kinship and argue these regions are inhabited by subclans of Harti who co-established Puntland and argues that Puntland territory is contained the territories inhabited by its citizens of Harti clan (Mesfin 2009) for more than twenty years there has not been political relationship between Somalia and Somaliland as a result of the self-announced Somaliland leaders have been seen a political dialogue with Somalia is unfeasible due to many factors including the political instability of Somalia. Nevertheless, series of quiet dialogues were going on a low level. However, the first official dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia was begun in 2012 and was hosted by the UK in London. The conference realized the importance of the international community support for building good relationships between the parties. Subsequent dialogue conferences were held in UAE, Dubai, Turkey, most of these meetings were aimed to build the confidence of the two sides but the Ankara conference was fruitful and parts addressed important issues like security cooperation and agreed a joint airspace management and acknowledged the importance of having further talks but unfortunately the parts’ talks discontinued when Somaliland declared in march 2015 that it would not be resuming to Ankara talks with Somalia. the talks got stack and there is no any progress reported so far (Keating and Waldman 2018).

6.0 Findings chapter

6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents briefly the findings of the case study as it describes the main findings of the Somali national reconciliation peacebuilding process patterns, taking into account the approach of the reconciliation process, the understanding, attitudes and actions of the participating leaders and civil society’s role in the process since the collapse of the Somali central government to 2007 as the year of last national reconciliation conference as the previous pattern of national reconciliation processes attempts. As well as it depicts the understanding, attitudes and actions of the current leaders towards post conflict national social reconciliation process and the current role of the civil society actors according to the previous pattern. The findings provide an opportunity to understand the reasons behind the endurance of Somali conflict as well as facilitate in the analysis section.

6.2 Approaches of national reconciliation employed in Somalia

There are various types of reconciliation approaches to build durable peace depending on the context and the type of conflict for example if it is intrastate or interstate conflict. It influences the type of the reconciliation that is suitable to be used to solve it. Lederach categorises the approaches of reconciliation into three different classes: the top-down level, the middle range level and the grass roots level while each one of them has a potential and visible importance in post conflict peacebuilding reconciliation initiatives. Since this case study deals with intrastate protracted conflict, and wanted to know the type of reconciliation approach used in Somalia. Therefore, the studied literature has been asked a question of what kind of reconciliation approach has been used in Somalia?

The denominators of various studied researches show that Somalia has been used in two distinct approaches which are top-down approach and bottom-up approach. The top-down approach was the dominant approach used for all more than a dozen national reconciliation processes held outside of Somalia while the bottom-up reconciliation approach was locally employed in the establishment of the secessionist Somaliland and Puntland as a federal member state of Somalia and some inter clan conflicts.

6.2.1 Top-down national reconciliation in Somalia.
Regarding the Lederache’s reconciliation approaches pyramid, the top-down approach level has political leaders, military leaders and religious leaders, it is where the cease fire is negotiated and initial accords are agreed, view people attend in the top-down reconciliation process but often they have the legitimacy of representation of some sort of society it is always need to descend the accords and work to implement them (Maiese 2003). As noted from the literature review, there have been almost fourteen national reconciliations held outside of Somalia. All these reconciliations employed a top-down reconciliation approach by engaging only the warring parties, faction leaders and views of the former civic politicians. These reconciliation conferences were aimed to rebuild the collapsed state instead of addressing the root causes of the conflict. As the studied previous reconciliation researches agree in Somalia. The shared denominator of all the researchers have written on this issue is that more than dozen top-down reconciliation approaches were applied since the collapse of the central government of Somalia to 2007 (Menkaus, K. et. al 2009). As stated by Gundel 2018, Mukhtar 2007 and other researchers that all the international sponsored Somali reconciliations were top-down reconciliation approaches and the issues discussed were power sharing arrangement and political positions. The two most represented national reconciliations were the Art reconciliation conference which accommodated the most civil society actors opposing all the other reconciliation conferences, including clan leaders, women, youth and notable Somali people which formed transitional national government TNG which finally ended dysfunctional and irrelevant government (Menkhaus 2003). And the Eldoret/Embagathi reconciliation conference that engaged clan leaders to select the 275-clan based parliament members. Yet the Eldoret/Embogati conference was dominated by clan power sharing features. According to the Dag Hammarskjöld foundation the initiatives of the conferences were dictated by the external actors and controlled by the neighbouring countries particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. The top-down approach reconciliation process was funded and managed by the international community and neighbouring countries.

Gundel argues that this top-down approach perpetuated the conflict and violence to remain protracted in Somalia. The table in the appendix 1 shows major national conferences, participants and the sponsored partner. All the attendants were self and faction representatives bargaining for political positions to gain power to manipulate the scarce resources. However, this research identified that all the national reconciliations for Somalia employed a top-down national reconciliation approach that engaged self-representative faction leaders and politicians.
6.2.2 Local/state level reconciliations in Somalia.

According to the Lederach’s reconciliation approach pyramid there are two levels other than the above discussed top-down level. These are the middle range level and the grassroots level which contains the middle level leaders such as civil society leaders including the NGOs, business sector leaders and the social service providers leaders such education and health institutions’ leaders. While the grass roots level encompasses people engaged deeply the local communities like community-based organizations, IDP leaders, refugee camps leaders. These are the bottom level leaders who represent the common people, those usually suffer the biggest portion of the conflict and struggle to get food, water, security because they are the ones who hurt the most in the conflict. The middle range level has tangible connections with the grass roots level leaders as well as they are likely to be known by the top-level leaders (Maiese 2003).

The study generated that an exclusive bottom-up approach of reconciliation was used in the two peaceful and stable territories of Somaliland and Puntland in Somalia respectively. These two communities utilized to mobilize their traditional community leaders, former politicians, faction leaders, women and youth representatives together in a reconciliation conferences aimed to primarily reconcile among the conflicted clans in their respective territories and then address agreeing the formation of governance structure in their respective territories.

According to Dag Hammarskjöld foundation, Community led peacebuilding initiatives have resulted in the formation of stable regional administrations such as Somaliland and Puntland and clan conflicts also. Traditional leaders of the above societies have succeeded in creating a degree of stability and clan based administrative system, equated with the 14 national reconciliation efforts held from 1991 in the outside of Somalia and have been less successful (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2015). As well as Keating and Waldman emphasise that successful endured reconciliation process took place in Somaliland and Puntland territories and some intra-clan reconciliation in south Somalia. These reconciliation initiatives have been Somali owned, led and financed with limited external support (Keating & Waldman. 2018). In addition to that Mark Bradbury, States that the authority of the local agreements originates from the acceptability of the leadership, the inclusiveness of the process, the use of the customary law and the consent decision making process (Bradbury 2008). Hence the findings demonstrate that a bottom-up traditional
reconciliation approach used in Somaliland and Puntland has been successful and brought relative peace and stability in the said territories.

6.2.3 Leaders’ understanding, attitudes and actions towards the previous national reconciliation processes 1990-2007.

This section tries to present the understanding, attitudes and actions of the participating leaders in the previous reconciliations held since the collapse of the Somalia central government to 2007. As discussed in the background chapter after the oust of the Barre, the country went in bloody civil war that costed the lives of many innocent people including women and children. There were clan faction leaders contending to seize power and scarce economic resources or had grievances and therefore were going to revenge for their repressed leaders’ clans such as the military regime leaders. (Menkhaus & Hassan et.al 2008) Menkhaus cited that UN secretary General, in his August 16, 1999 report to the security council, he pointed out that the Somalia conflict in that time did not concern about religious and ethnic divide or disagreement over economic “rather…it was divided on clan positions with each clan was horrible of the invasion of others. He mentioned that the UN secretary general proceeded that “the important missing element is trust. Lack of trust, there can be no peace or security in Somalia and no central government can be re-established” (Menkhaus & Hassan et.al 2008) Menkhaus argues that these disbelieving failures of the past, and citizens suspicion of recurrent political processes that encompass the involvement of offenders, radicals, warlords, clannism and unqualified and unlawful participants must take into account in any new peace and national reconciliation initiatives (Menkhaus & Hassan et.al 2008). Allocating of political positions in an anticipated provisional government with tiny or no willingness to reach a genuine reconciliation or face the conflict issues was among the factors weakened the national reconciliation processes (Menkhaus 2017).

According to Samatar. Ahmed I and Samatar Abdi I the biggest ailment that ever-plagued Somali society is lack of righteous leadership, they also mentioned that the emerged leaders were “hapless leadership” that was unsuccessful even to utilize the gotten opportunities like Arta. (Samatar Ahmed & Samatar Abdi 2008).

Menkhause and Hassan pointed as the lessons learnt from unsuccessful mediation involvements in Somalia that some of the Somali individuals or groups deliberately opposed any and all peace
agreements and initiatives to restore the government most of them were controlling personal interests or clan interests and they were fearful of dismissal of their self-interests if government returns (Menkhaus & Hassan et.al 2008). Henceforth regarding the interviews of the above writers, the understanding of the participating leaders in the previous reconciliation on the price of reconciliation was weak according to their personal or tribal interests? Their attitude was hapless and without courage to compromise for the best interest of the public and long-time future. They were attending the reconciliation conferences to promote their particular or tribal interests. They had a clannism view of point; due to the persistence of the disagreements and lack of the compromise it indicates that there was a win or loss attitude among the participating leaders. Among their actions were human rights violations, killing innocent citizens and looting of the public buildings as generated from the literature and the background information of the case study. In addition to that they spoiled the reconciliation accords they did see it opposing their interest. Cruelty attitude based on selfishness was found in their actions also. Thus, the understandings, attitudes and actions of the participating leaders were part of the determinants that contributed to the longevity and the deterioration of the conflict. Therefore, the study identified the participating leaders' understanding of peace and reconciliation was low, they were not willing to restore peace and re-establish state, while their attitudes were either to succeed in power or spoil it and exploit the country in war, as well as their actions were human rights violations because they sought power by force. It is one of the most important factors involved in the persistence for the Somali conflict. Finally, the understanding, attitudes and actions of the previous leaders were deconstructive, resilient and favoured preservatives, spoiled and unwilling to spare for the benefit of the country and the well-being of the people.

6.2.4 Current national leaders’ understanding, attitudes and actions on reconciliation.

The position of the current leaders towards national social reconciliations is clearly optimistic and ambitious in terms of the paperwork, speeches and statements by the president and his cabinet and on the establishment of a ministry of interior, federalism and reconciliation as elaborated in the background and literature review information but in the absence of important elements of reconciliation, such as establishing constitutional national truth and reconciliation commission which 44% of the respondents of the prospects for sustainable peace research recommended in Somalia. The political disagreement between the leaders of the federal
government and the federal member states, as well as the unsuccessful battle against terrorist insurgents. It is not a sign for progress towards national reconciliation efforts, but instead it is politically stuck with a month left from the current outgoing government term (Keating & Waldman2018). The president has officially apologised Somaliland on the mayhems committed by former military regime under Said barre rule (Africannews.com2020). Hence the current leaders understand, attitudes and actions seem to be optimistic, ambitious and willing to promote national reconciliation for the country.

6.3 The role of the international community and neighbouring countries in the approach to national reconciliation conferences.

United Nations, international community, regional and continental actors played mediation and negotiation roles to bring together warring groups to reconcile their divergences, the international community supported the neighbouring countries to accommodate the Somali reconciliation meetings, UN together with international community, regional organizations and continental organizations such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union collaborated on investing financially and technically on series of peace reconciliations intended to restore peace and establish state in Somalia hosted by neighbouring countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and other African countries like Egypt. For the accommodating and facilitating actors and their roles (see appendix 1). Most of these reconciliations were sponsored by the UN and international community. On one hand Somalia could not survive and come to where it is today without the past and current support of the UN and international community and neighbouring countries because they have inserted technical and financial and military investment to come where it is today, on the other hand The UN and international community have been influencing and advocating building a state-centric government rather than peacebuilding approach. Though, this top-down reconciliation approach has not been effective in Somalia (Keating & Waldman. 2018). The international community and neighbouring countries had effective agenda setting for the reconciliations and had influenced the clan-based power sharing of (4.5) and federalism governance system in Somalia (Menkhaus 2017).
6.4 Civil society’s role in the past and present national reconciliation initiatives

The study generated that civil society participation in the previous reconciliation attempts was irrelevant, the reconciliation conferences were mostly held outside of Somalia and emphasized heavily on state-building rather than social reconciliation therefore the Somali civil society were rarely engaged and had few or zero influence to previous reconciliations. The waring functions were exclusively pertaining to the reconciliation while the international community saw them as legitimate representatives of the Somali clans and society, the external mediators were giving them a recognition to negotiations in the peace conferences as the key actors of the Somalia peace and state restoration (Menkhaus, Sheikh, et al. 2009).

Currently, the civil society participation in the national efforts for peace and state building is expanded and better than the previous civil societies involvement in the former reconciliations. Now there are active and more vibrant civil society actors running universities, research institutes and civil societies platforms like PUNSAA, SONSAF, SOCCENSA and others established for unifying civil societies’ voices and advocating to include in the decision-making process and national agendas. However, supremacy of clan politics even within the civic sector led to slow formation of issue-based civil society associations and networks as well as weakened the representation, legitimacy in participation of the decision-making process. (EU 2017-2020). Nevertheless, the democratization process increased civic education and enabled civil society to struggle to gain influence through advocacy and lobbying in the decision-making process.

7.0 Analysis chapter

The analysis and discussions will be based on the John Paul Lederache’s analytical pyramid approaches of reconciliation explained in chapter three In line with Lederache’s reconciliation theory that emphasizes a long-time reconciliation process that enables the inclusion of all actors in the conflict. The focus will be on the participating leaders’ understanding, attitudes and actions towards reconciliation as well as the role of the civil society in past reconciliations. This will provide us comprehensive understanding about the answers for the research questions. The analysis will use text and context techniques to examine the findings of the research questions.
7.1 Approaches of national reconciliation used in Somalia

As described in the findings chapter, the denominators of various studied researches in the literature review showed that Somalia has been used in two distinct approaches which are top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approach was the dominant approach used for all more than a dozen national reconciliation processes held outside of Somalia, while the bottom-up reconciliation approach was locally employed in the establishment of the secessionist Somaliland and Puntland as a federal member state of Somalia and some inter clan conflicts. According to Lederach reconciliation contains variety of levels from interpersonal, from intercommunal, to high structured institutions such truth commissions to presidential excuses for the previous mistakes (Lederach 2000). Generally, there is neither agreed definition nor approach too. Hence some people claim that the top-down approach is better while other people argue the bottom-up approach is more effective. However, each group has its interpretations. But since both approaches were tested in the case study country (Somalia) as presented in the findings. We discuss view questions to know how both methods initiated in Somalia, who has chosen which? and why it was chosen? and finally what impact each method left the country.

7.1.1 Top-down national reconciliation in Somalia

Generally, the concept of top-down reconciliation initiative is about building state centric institutions such as truth commissions, legal processes and reforms, national reparation programmes, public apologies. Such institutions can only arise where there is a legitimate state which can realize the implementation of the above institution’s programs (Bloomfield 2006). This is often an internationally driven peace-building approach which has been frequently used in the United Nations post conflict peacebuilding interventions. According to Lederache’s reconciliation approaches pyramid, the top level of the pyramid contains political leaders, military leaders and religious leaders, it is where the cease fire is negotiated and initial peace accords are agreed, view people attend in the top-down reconciliation process but often they have the legitimacy of representation for some sort of society it is always need to descend the accords and work together to implement them. As Keating and Waldman 2018, wrote that Almost two decades of Somali state absolute collapse, the UN and international community have been trying to build peace and re-establish government, in so doing they have done a dozen top-down peacebuilding reconciliation conferences outside Somalia. These conferences have

[Image]
engaged clan warring faction leaders and view former civic politicians but these conferences have not reached any tangible results. As well, Gundel 2018 also argues that one of the reasons for these conferences failure is that the conferences did cover reconciliation but stressed power sharing arrangements instead, they would focus on reconciliation among society and that resulted the conflict to continue in Somalia. Nevertheless, (Bloomfield 2006) claims power sharing arrangements are possible where there is at least a weak government which can negotiate with oppositions. In contrast the case of Somali has not been even a representative body for Somalia government in the above-mentioned top-down conferences led by the UN and international community. Consequently (Gundel 2018) advises that Somalia requires national social reconciliations that uses Bottom-up participatory action research methodologies to discover the grievances and the moralities for the solutions. However, Mukhtar 2007 pointed out that the internationally supported conferences for Somali were lacking basic elements of reconciliation such as justice and community ownership and consequently ended up without producing a functioning government. In addition to, (Maruf 2017, Menkhaus 2011 and Bradbury 2008) seconded also the above argument. in contrary, (Samatar Ahmed & Samatar Abdi 2008), think that the biggest ailment that ever-plagued Somali society is lack of righteous leadership. However, the UN and international community sponsored more than a dozen top-down reconciliations that finished less successful. These conferences were externally planned, financed and millions of dollars were spent by the UN and international community. Thus, their legitimacy and community ownership were very limited. On the other hand, perpetual conduction of the top-down series of national conferences have been going on, UN and international community have been maintaining failure after failure, in the meantime there were two exclusively local grand reconciliation conferences held in northern Somalia. Both have successfully reconciled the respective communities of Somaliland and Puntland and finally produced peaceful and stable administrations. Hence it seems that the UN and international community have been thinking this externally imposed top down is a panacea that will resolve the Somalia conflict too.

7.1.2 Local/state level reconciliations in Somalia.

The Local reconciliation initiatives work in broad based community level, aspiring to resolve a conflict between two or more communities or cultural groups, this type of reconciliation involves mostly members of the society that do not have significantly authorised political power (Bloomfield 2006). According to the Lederache’s reconciliation approach pyramid the middle range and the grassroots level comprise civil society leaders including the NGOs, business sector
leaders and education and health leaders. And people engaged deeply the local communities like community-based organizations, IDP leaders, refugee camps leaders. The bottom level leaders represent the common people, those usually suffer the biggest portion of the conflict and struggle to get fundamental rights because they are the ones who hurt the most in the conflict. The middle range level has tangible connections with the grass roots level leaders as well as they are likely to be known by the top-level leaders. As generated in the findings there has been two bottom-up grand reconciliations held in Somaliland and Puntland respectively. Thus, it is crucial to state that these two main reconciliation initiatives were locally owned, led and financed with less external support as (Keating & Waldman. 2018) states these reconciliations engaged broadly both traditional and political leaders as well as CSOs and this is why the reconciliations resulted the formation of local administrations with relative peace and stability in their respective territories, this broad and various actors’ involvement resulted public confidence on the outcome as well as the reconciliations gained great legitimacy. Similarly, (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2015). Supported the notion that Community led peacebuilding initiatives have resulted in the formation of stable regional administrations such as Somaliland and Puntland and others. Traditional leaders of the above societies have succeeded in creating a degree of stability and clan based administrative system, equated with the 14 national reconciliation efforts held from 1991 in the outside of Somalia and have been less successful. However, this does not mean that Somaliland and Puntland are utopia locations in war-torn country but rather highlight that both Somaliland and Puntland have succeeded reconciliations in their divided societies and reached certain peace and stability despite the ownership dispute between Somaliland and Puntland concerning Sool, Sanaag and Cayn remains unresolved. In spite of protracted conflict in the country where there are potential peace violations towards each territory, both Somaliland and Puntland remained relatively peaceful.

7.2.1 Past leaders’ understanding, attitudes and actions towards reconciliation 1990-2007

The understanding, attitudes and actions of the participating leaders in the previous reconciliations held since the collapse of the Somali central government to 2007. As discussed in the background chapter, after the oust of the Barre, the country went in bloody civil war that costed the lives of many innocent people including women and children. There were clan faction leaders contending to seize power and scarce economic resources or had grievances and therefore were going to revenge for their repressed leaders’ clans such as the military regime leaders. (Menkhaus & Hassan et.al 2008). The
The biggest problem happened was that the UN and international community recognized these human right violators to become the fundamental negotiators for the state and peace building national reconciliations. What could be expected when the human right violators negotiate peace? Perhaps it is no peace as happened in Somalia. As indicated, the (appendix, table 1) almost the interlocutors of all the reconciliation conferences were faction leaders whose viewpoint was to block all peace interest opposing their clan interests, similarly Menkhause and Hassan pointed as the lessons learnt from unsuccessful mediation involvements in Somalia is that some of the Somali individuals or groups deliberately opposed any and all peace agreements and initiatives to restore the government most of them were controlling personal interests or clan interests and they were fearful of dismissal of their self-interests if government returns (Menkhaus & Hassan et.al 2008). This notion indicates that the understanding of the participating leaders was low and were unwilling state revival as well as it shows that they were not ambitious to spare for the interest of the suffering people and the future betterment of the country. According to Samatar, Ahmed I and Samatar Abdi I the biggest ailment that ever-plagued Somali society is lack of righteous leadership, they emphasised that the emerged leaders were “hapless leadership” that was unsuccessful even to utilize the gotten opportunities like Arta. (Samatar Ahmed, & Samatar Abdi. 2008) The persistence of the disagreements and lacking of compromised outcome from series of reconciliation conferences that costed millions of dollars marks that there was a win or loss attitude among the participating leaders. Above all, the lessons learnt from this case is to be cautious when using the unpragmatic top-down approach of reconciliation because it might risk the reconciliation to be manipulated by a small group of political elites especially when the recipient is in total state of collapse such as Somalia and there is no principle negotiating agent for the state.

7.2.2 Present national leaders’ understanding attitudes and actions towards reconciliation

The position of the current leaders towards national social reconciliations is clearly optimistic and ambitious in terms of the paperwork, speeches and statements by the president and his cabinet and on the establishment of a ministry of interior, federalism and reconciliation. In addition, On the 13th February 2020 the president officially apologised for the first time in thirty years for the atrocities under former military regime (Africanews.com2020). Nevertheless, regarding the absence of important elements of reconciliation, such as establishing constitutional national truth and reconciliation commission which 44% of the respondents of the prospects for sustainable peace research recommended in Somalia. The political disagreement between the leaders of the federal government and the federal member states, as well as the unsuccessful battle against terrorist...
insurgents. It is not a sign for progress towards national reconciliation efforts, but instead it is politically stuck with a month left from the current outgoing government term (Keating & Waldman, 2018). However, according to the presidential apology, the formation of the reconciliation ministry, elections preparations and the positive rhetoric statements on peace, it seems that the current leaders are committed to promote reconciliation in the country.

7.3 The role of the international community and neighbouring countries in the approach to national reconciliation conferences.

UN and international community have been playing active role in the mediation and negotiation between the conflicting groups in Somalia. As mentioned several positions in this paper, they had worked to bring together warring groups to reconcile their divergences, the UN and international community supported the neighbouring countries to accommodate the Somali reconciliation conferences, UN together with international community, regional organizations and continental organizations such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union collaborated on investing financially and technically on series of peace reconciliations intended to restore peace and establish state in Somalia hosted by neighbouring countries. For the accommodating and facilitating actors and their roles (see appendix 1). Most of these reconciliations were sponsored by the UN and international community. In addition, the UN and international community had been also playing humanitarian assistance role in Somalia, they have supported in the areas of health, education, water and sanitations which without them, Somalia could not come through harsh eras. These humanitarian roles have contributed indirectly to the peace attainment. It is obvious that Somalia could not survive and come to where it is today without the past and current support of the UN, international community and neighbouring countries because they have inserted technical, financial and military investment to come where it is today, on the other hand The UN and international community have been influencing and advocating building a state-centric government for their choice rather than peacebuilding approach which engages all the conflicts and civil society. Though, this top-down reconciliation approach has not been effective in Somalia (Keating & Waldman, 2018). The international community and neighbouring countries had effective agenda setting for the reconciliations and had influenced the clan-based power sharing of (4.5) and federalism governance system in Somalia (Menkhaus 2017).
UN and international community recognized the warlords to lead the state building reconciliation conferences while they ignored the role of the middle range actors let alone the grass roots leaders this resulted the country to protract three decades conflict without social reconciliation.

7.4 Civil society’s role in the past and present national reconciliation initiatives.

The study suggested that civil society’s role in the previous reconciliation initiatives was insignificant, the reconciliation conferences were mostly held outside of Somalia and emphasized heavily on state-building rather than social reconciliation. Therefore, the Somali civil society were rarely engaged and had small or zero influence to previous reconciliations. The waring functions were exclusively pertaining to the reconciliation while the international community saw them as legitimate representatives of the Somali clans and society, the external mediators were giving them a recognition to negotiations in the peace conference as the key actors of the Somalia peace and state restoration (Menkhaus, Sheikh, et al. 2009). However, 1993 peace agreement contained a necessity for civil society to travel throughout the country and raise on awareness agreement among population (Thania 2010) though civil society had not have visible role in decision making process on peacebuilding yet they have been active in in peace awareness raisings particularly the organized NGOs.

Currently, the civil society participation in the national efforts for peace and state building is expanded according to previous civil societies role in the former reconciliations because the establishment of the federal government of Somalia and the official end of the transitional government of Somalia has attracted new international support for Somalia. This change has expanded the role of civil society and offered a widened opportunity. Some civil society representatives participated in high level dialogue for example signing of the Somali New Deal compact (Interpeace & CRD 2012). There are active and more vibrant civil society actors running universities, research institutes and civil societies platforms like PUNSA, SONSAF, SOCCENSA and others established for unifying civil societies’ voices and advocating to include in the decision-making process and national agendas. However, supremacy of clan politics even within the civic sector led to slow formation of issue-based civil society associations and networks as well as weakened the representation, legitimacy in participation of the decision-making process. (EU 2017-2020). Nevertheless, the international community support for civil society in the participation of state and peace building programs such as democratization process increased civic education and enabled civil society to struggle to gain influence through advocacy and lobbying in the decision-making process. In addition to that the current provisional constitution allows free
associations, freedom of expression and the right of political participation therefore having utilized this entitlement has also expanded the role of civil society. The role of civil society in political and decision-making process influence will remain ambiguity unless the country transforms to democracy multiparty system.

8.0 Chapter

Conclusion
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the study findings concerning the kind of reconciliation approach was used in Somalia, participating leaders’ understanding, attitudes and actions towards the reconciliation conferences, the international community and neighbouring countries role, as well as the civil society role in the past and present reconciliation initiatives in Somalia. The conclusions are presented in line with the purpose of the study and in response to the research questions. The research has emphasised four answers to come to accomplish the result.

Almost the literature consulted in the research (Menkaus, K. et. al 2009, (Gundel 2018, Mukhtar 2007, Menkhaus 2003 and Dag Hammarskjöld foundation) and others have presented that Somalia has been employed two diverse approaches of reconciliation; top down and bottom-up approaches. However, the top-down approach was internationally driven state centric reconciliation approach which has ended less successful and have evidenced to be the bad case study top-down reconciliation. These attempts demonstrated bad example to the insignificance of imposed reconciliation initiatives. Almost more than a dozen (see the appendix table 1) top-down reconciliations sponsored by the UN and international community have continued disdain varied efforts to end them. In contrary, the bottom-up reconciliation approach resulted relative peace, stable politics and clan-based administrations. In other words, bottom-up approaches successfully reconciled the communities in their territories and formed Somaliland the secessionist self-styled government and Puntland state as member of the federal government of Somalia.

In relation to the second question the study found that the understanding, attitudes and the actions of the past leaders have contributed to the protraction of the conflict since the study demonstrated that first of all leaders were the faction leaders whose point of view was personal and clan-based interests, secondly their attitudes were win or loss principle. Consequently, they have failed to compromise among them as well as the study found that these leaders were those committed human rights violation
against minority clans and Somali population. Hence the study presents that they were reluctant to state revival on account of they were controlling personal and clan interests and were fearful of their dismissal if government revives. On the other hand, the study understood, according to the presidential apology, the formation of the reconciliation ministry, elections preparations and the positive rhetoric speeches on peace, it concludes that it seems the current leaders are committed to promote reconciliation in the country.

The UN and international community as well as the neighbouring countries have played a vital role in peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia their role is indispensable for Somalis. Particularly in the peacebuilding area. UN and international community have invested financially and technically in the attempts of restoring peace and reconstructing the country. However, the UN and international community undermined intentionally the role of the traditional leaders, and civil society in the previous reconciliations and have rarely succeeded to utilize the lessons learnt from the successful bottom-up reconciliations in Somaliland and Puntland. The UN and international community have played roles as mediators, arbiters, negotiators as well the investors of the peace and state- building reconciliation initiatives.

The role of civil society in peace and state building has been gradually expanding in parallel with the country’s progress due to varied factors including the establishment of the federal system, civil rights guaranteed in the provisional constitution, the UN and international civil society support for strengthening civil society capacity to increase their position in decision making process and to be able to hold the government accountable as well as the inception of the weak newly born democracy and good governance in the country. Based on these and other numerous factors there are active and more vibrant civil society including the zonal platforms such as SONSAF, PUNSAA and SOCCENSA. These platforms are engaged activities like Advocacy, monitoring, peacebuilding and promoting human rights, democracy and good governance in Somalia. However, the civil society is progressing there is a predominant challenge which is (supremacy of clan politics) and if not overcome the civil society role could remain ambiguous.

The study concludes by emphasising that the Somali protracted conflict would not have resisted if for example, the UN and international community had learned from the successful pragmatic reconciliations in the country. It was also noted that as long as the supremacy of the clan politics continued, the role of civil society especially women would be compromised. And that the risk of reconciliation is greater in the involvement of the unscrupulous leaders.
Finally, this study result is so case dependent and can not be generalised but can be applicable to the similar contexts showing the same features of conflict.

9.0 References


Africannews (2020). Somali Prez admits ´dark chapter` in Somaliland under Siad Barre Available at: Somali prez admits 'dark chapter' in Somaliland under Siad Barre | Africanews [Retrieved 02 January 2020]


Available at

[Retrieved 26 December 2020]


[Retrieved 16th November 2020]

Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/03056249908704367

[Retrieved 25th November 2020]

Available at:
https://www.sida.se/contentassets/1396a7eb4f934e6b88e491e665cf57c1/eva2019_5_62214en.pdf

[Retrieved 24th November 2020]


[Retrieved 16th November 2020]

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (2015). Development dialogue. *Inclusive peace building: recognized but not realized*
Available at:

Available at: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/105908/P198.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/105908/P198.pdf) [Retrieved 8 November 2020]


Available at: [Climate-related security risks and peacebuilding in Somali (sipri.org)](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/105908/P198.pdf) [Retrieved 8 November 2020]


Available at: [https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-governance-civilsociety/searchgroup?text=SOMALIA%20EU%20COUNTRY%20ROADMAP%20FOR%20ENGAGEMENT%20WITH%20CIVIL%20SOCIETY%202015%20%E2%80%93%202012](https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-governance-civilsociety/searchgroup?text=SOMALIA%20EU%20COUNTRY%20ROADMAP%20FOR%20ENGAGEMENT%20WITH%20CIVIL%20SOCIETY%202015%20%E2%80%93%202012)

Available at: https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/fischer_tj_and_rec_handbook.pdf


Available at: https://www.ijrhss.org/papers/v7-i6/2.pdf


Available at: Peace Building Initiative - History
Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/somalia

Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41301-018-0153-x

Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b163-staving-violence-around-somalias-elections


Available at: https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012_08_28_SomSC_Pillars_Of_Peace_ENG.pdf


[Retrieved 2nd November 2020]


Available at: https://gsdrc.org/document-library/building-peace-sustainable-reconciliation-in-divided-societies/

[Retrieved 1st October 2020]


Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41852878.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A791bfdbd725440a4a95612e8b2ea9094

[Retrieved 119 December 2020]

Maiese, Michelle (2003). Levels of action (Lederach’s pyramid)

Available at: Levels of Action (Lederach's Pyramid) | Beyond Intractability

[Retrieved 27 December 2020]

Maruf, Harun (2017). AMISOM marks 10 years in Somalia, to everyone’s regret. VOA, 6 March,

Available at: https://www.voanews.com/africa/amisom-marks-10-years-somalia-everyones-regret

[Retrieved 26 December 2020]

Available at: Governance without Government in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping (jstor.org)

[Retrieved 26 December 2020]


[Retrieved 19 December 2020]


Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2003.9659774

[Retrieved 24th November 2020]


Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/27342/632040WP00WD R0009B0Somalia00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1

[Retrieved 13 October 2020]

Mesfin, Berouk. 2009. ISS (Institute for Security Studies) the political development of Somaliland and its conflict with Puntland. Available at: P200.pdf (africaportal.org)

[Retrieved 6th November 2020]

Mukhtar, Mohamed, Haji (2007). Somali Reconciliation Conferences: the unbeaten track

Available at: https://books.google.se/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ScxEDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA123&dq=somali+reconciliation&ots=p-5sQ4mJcm&sig=dMlcym8JU57n3njVH9hrsZHUFUc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=somali%20reconciliation&f=false [Retrieved 12 October 2020]

Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cyclone%20Gati%20flash%20update%201-final.pdf

[Retrieved 24th November 2020]


Available at: http://www.eurospanbookstore.com/media/pdf/extracts/9781588266729.pdf

[Retrieved 17 December 2020]


Available at: http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/822561468142505821/pdf/378130Peacebuilding0WP3601PUBLIC.pdf

[Retrieved 17 December 2020]

Saferworld. Partner Profile. PUNSAA. Puntland Non-State actor’s Association

Available at: Partner profile: PUNSAA - Saferworld [Retrieved 23 December 2020]


Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=bildhaan

[Retrieved 25 December 2020]

Sida (2007). Policy. Sida’s Support to Civil Society in Development Cooperation
SONSAF. Somaliland Nonstate Actors Forum. Who we are?

Available at: SONSafe | About Us

[Retrieved 23 December 2020]


Available at: https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/moving-forward-national-reconciliation-framework-approved-by-the-federal-government-of-somalia/

[Retrieved 22nd November 2020]

UCDP. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2007). UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program. [online]

Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/749


Available at: Civil Society | United Nations

[Retrieved 16 December 2020]


Available at:

[Retrieved 24 December 2020]

Available at: [CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss10.pdf (usma.edu)](CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss10.pdf)

[Retrieved 3rd November 2020]


Available at: [Al Shabaab (csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com)](Al Shabaab)

[Retrieved 2nd November 2020]

---

Appendix 1

Somali national reconciliation since the collapse of the central government 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>Facilitator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti I</td>
<td>5–11 June 1991</td>
<td>SSDF, SPM, USC, SAMO, SNU, SDM</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Government of Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Number of Factions</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Approaching Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation</td>
<td>January 1993</td>
<td>15 Factions</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis conference on National reconciliation</td>
<td>March 1993</td>
<td>15 factions</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National salvation (Sodare)</td>
<td>November 1996-</td>
<td>26 factions</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo conference</td>
<td>November 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Government of Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hussein Aideed’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia national conference Arta</td>
<td>May-August 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Government of Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali national reconciliation conference (Eldoret/ Mbagathi)</td>
<td>2002 – 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>IGAD/government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings with directed towards peace deals between limited numbers of parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Mediators</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi informal</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>May 1997</td>
<td>Hussein Aideed and Osman Atto</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakuru talks</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nakuru</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>TFG ICU</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Arab league</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>TFG, ARS- Djibouti</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in the above table was taken from the book of A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988 (Menkaus, K. et. al 2009).