POST-GENOCIDE SOCIETY AND PEDAGOGY: ANALYSIS OF BOSNIAN–HERZEGOVINIAN POST-WAR SOCIETY

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyse institutionalised paralogisms, social and economic inequalities, and frustrating consequences arising from decades of symbolic and real war and post-war violence against the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The historic background of this paper is the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), as presented in the reports of the United Nations and documents produced during international and national trials concerning war crimes. The analytical basis is a literature review of various studies from the domains of social epistemology, war sociology, sociology of knowledge, criminology, and pedagogy of emancipation and lifelong learning. Immanent antinomies, contradictions, and political, legal, and criminal perpetually
institutionalise and reproduce the identity references to war vocabulary. For this reason, creation of publicly responsible programs is necessary to evaluate the prescriptive impact of the domination of cultural and identity differences between peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The genocide of Bosnian Bosniaks in the war against the Bosnian–Herzegovinian multicultural society urges the creation of a completely different description, prescription, logic of naming, and explanation strategy to achieve transitional change. The article criticized globalisation as a form of new colonisation and natural-science quantitative emphasis. In the spirit of the analysed scientific literature, future scientific analyses should focus on the criminal, social, economic, ecological, anti-educational, sociopathological, and anomic consequences of the (catastrophic) impact of decades of symbolic and real war and post-war violence against the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Keywords:** sociology, education, criminology, cultural production of differences, logic of naming differences, pedagogy of work, enquiry-based learning, cooperative learning, democratic self-government, lifelong learning, pedagogy of emancipation

**Introduction**

The greatest cynical act of our times is reducing the genocide against Bosniaks, an organised plan of the Great Serbian Nazi hegemonism, to the prosecution of individual criminals in international and national courts (Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17; Case No.: 3 St 20/96). It represents a previously undocumented
swindle of an entire people and infringement on the rights of a state. Reducing the crime of genocide to individual criminal acts such as sniper killings of citizens, shelling cities, raping women, slaughtering civilians, beating people to death, starving them, forcing out entire populations, mass murdering civilians, burning property, demolishing buildings, and similar violations, completely obscures the scale of the genocide against Bosniaks. It especially conceals the fact that it started the destruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Delić 2016). Individuals cannot carry out the crime of genocide; only states and organised military and police forces can, through an institutionalised legal and political system. Genocide humiliates victims and deceives them into believing that the purported laws will be upheld and justice will be met. Meanwhile, the act of genocide – by the entity Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) – remains untouched by law, justice, and sanctions. The crime against the victims, committed in the heart of Europe, remains unpunished. The expression ‘ethnic cleansing’ is hypocritically introduced in areas where Bosniaks were eradicated, regions where they lived for centuries, as if they were simply ‘dirty objects’ (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994) that have been cleaned. How can a normal state be rebuilt, and how can the result of the genocide project, implemented as the entity Republika Srpska in the post-war discourse, be sanctioned?

This study is based on sociological, criminological and pedagogical analyses of the phenomenon of genocide as a process (Bećirević 2009; Fein 1979; Fein 1993; Bischoping 2004; Darder 2011; Schneider 2014; Bentrovato 2017; Lybeck 2018). For Bosnia and Herzegovina, this process started in eastern and northwestern

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1 This text has already been published in parts: in Bosnian in the conference proceedings, ‘International scientific conference. Establishment of a modern legal system’ (Delić, 2014), in Swedish in the article ‘Definitioner av våld i överlevandes berättelser efter kriget i Bosniern’ (Basic, 2015c), and in English in the article, ‘Definitions of Violence: Narratives of Survivors from the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Basic, 2018).
Bosnia in 1992 with an attack by Serbian police and armed forces against Bosnian civilians. It continued with a series of war crimes during the war, manifesting and culminating in Srebrenica in 1995. With the analytical starting point in the sociological, criminological and pedagogical perspective, the genocide in Bosnia continues with a systemic denial of politicians and the media from the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska that it had ever occurred (Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010; Medić 2013; Mahmutčehajić 2018; Basic 2018; Basic & Delić 2019; Basic & Delić 2018; Basic & Delić 2024).

The backdrop of this article is the dilemma over whether post-war Bosnian post-genocide society developed in the direction of a global society of knowledge or a society where non-knowledge is deliberately spread (Dirlik 1994; Hindess 1995; Willke 2007; Cetina 2007; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Kaldor 2013; Baker 2014; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). If the analysts who argue that Bosnian post-genocide society is hurtling towards a society of catastrophes are correct, what should one do? The responses to these questions depend not only on the approach to empirical reality but also on categories (labelling systems) used in this interpretation. The only thing that truly turns out to be new is a form of social reengineering that strives to exterminate the few remnants of a system of practices that have still not merged with the violent discursive ancestor (or the ‘politics of truth’) of the global economy of knowledge (Basic, Delić & Sofradzija 2019).

Paths that could lead towards the possible alternative pluralist future of Bosnia and Herzegovina currently seem almost inconceivable. An uncertain fate awaits the social epistemology criticisms of the economy of knowledge, progress, and development – a development that increasingly aims to be implemented in the field of human and corporate rights, and in the logic of limited liability companies. To doubt ‘development’, for example, means in practice to proclaim
oneself sick; today, there is no greater heresy than the opinion that ‘undeveloped’
countries should not mechanically follow the path of developed countries, often
at the expense of the undeveloped countries. These concepts constitute a value
scale that is in its essence a part of the imperialistic logic. It is spread as a
paradigm that colonised countries, just by having been colonised, are culturally
inferior to colonising forces. In turn, the superiority of these forces in material
accomplishments, morality, and intellectual capabilities confirms their right to
dominate in both the spiritual and material domains. The dogma of development
states that no reasonable person could wish to remain undeveloped, although
everything points in the other direction. However, even this focus on the coloniser
is probably not the most horrible feature of the story of development (Lal & Nandi
2012; Delić 2008; Delić 2009; Delić 2016).

**War in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina borders the Republic of Serbia and the
Republic of Croatia. The proximity of these two countries’ borders, whose
territories surround the largest part of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian territory
(Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Bassiouni 1994), should be considered when we ask
how it is possible to use the identity label ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’ so often without any
additional state and territory specification (see below the section, *Genocide –
after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina*).

The population census of 31 March 1991 lists 4,354,911 inhabitants in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Of those, 1,902,869 inhabitants (43.7%) were Bosnian
Bosniaks; 1,364,363 (31.4%) were Bosnian Serbs; 752,068 (17.3%) were
Bosnian Croats; and 7.7% were the members of Romani, Jews, Yugoslavs, and
other ethnic groups who were, in accordance with the classification principles of the Bosnian population, labelled as the category ‘other’ (Bassiouni och Manikas 1994; Bassiouni 1994). The very label ‘other’ is in its essence discriminatory for Bosnians who came from mixed marriages; in some Bosnian towns, this group made up 33% of the population and were considered to belong to this category. Bosnians were a majority in 45 municipalities (relative in 13, absolute in 31) and Serbs in 34 municipalities (relative in 5, absolute in 29), while Croats were a majority in 20 municipalities (relative in 6, absolute in 14). At the first free elections in November 1990, the so-called anti-communist coalition won, consisting of the Party of Democratic Action, the Serb Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic Union (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Bassiouni 1994).

Reports from the United Nations and comprehensive documentation produced during post-war trials paint a picture of the background, start, development, and scope of the war and violence during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These documents show how Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, backed by Serbia and Croatia, respectively, attempted to take control of various parts of Bosnia by driving Bosniaks away from these areas. Techniques for removing Bosniaks from these areas included organised mass murder, individual executions, systematic organised rapes, unorganised rapes, assault with deadly outcomes, gross and violent assault, physical and mental harassment and degradation of civilians, concentration camps, forced flight, looting of property, and systematic destruction of religious and cultural monuments linked to Bosniak identity, culture, and religion. Serbian and Croatian soldiers and police made civilians the direct target of their violence to drive away Bosniaks (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Cleiren & Tijssen 1994; Bassiouni 1994; Greve & Bergsmo 1994; Case No.: IT-95-14/2; Case No.: IT-00-39 & 40/1; Case No.: IT-95-14; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-02-59; Case No.: IT-98-32/1; Case No.: IT-00-39; Case
Serbian soldiers and police were especially violent and organised and coordinated with political leaders in the Serb Democratic Party, media, and religious authorities in their work to violently displace Bosniaks, Croats, Romani, Jews, and other ethnic groups from the various geographical areas over which they took control (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Cleiren & Tijssen 1994; Bassiouni 1994; Greve & Bergsmo 1994; Case No.: IT-00-39 & 40/1; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-02-59; Case No.: IT-98-32/1; Case No.: IT-00-39; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24; Case No.: IT-98-30/1; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-99-36; Case No.: IT-94-1; Case No.: IT-96-23 & 23/1; Case No.: X-KRŽ-05/161). In several cases, especially at the start of the war in 1992, Serbian soldiers and police lacked organised military or police forces to fight, so that civilian Bosniaks, Croats, Romani, Jews, and other non-Serbian ethnicities became their only targets. In several cases, Serbian soldiers and police directed their violence against other Serbs who did not participate in the campaign and who dared to openly criticise it (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Cleiren & Tijssen 1994; Bassiouni 1994; Greve & Bergsmo 1994; Case No.: IT-00-39 & 40/1; Case No.: IT-02-59; Case No.: IT-98-32/1; Case No.: IT-00-39; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24; Case No.: IT-98-30/1; Case No.: IT-99-36; Case No.: IT-94-1; Case No.: IT-96-23 & 23/1; Case No.: X-KRŽ-05/161).

Considering its context, the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina was an independence war. At its beginning, the Yugoslav People’s Army was on one side, as the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the
other side were proponents of the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Yugoslavs, Romani, Jews, and all others who were not labelled according to ethnic categories), led by a republican government elected in free elections, who legitimised their demands for independence in an independence referendum. Later conflicts between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council culminated in 1993. The military and political actions of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, which took the side of the aggressors from Serbia with its majority Bosnian population, have made the war and the consequences of the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina quite complicated (Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: IT-04-74; Case No.: IT-00-39; Case No.: IT-95-14; Case No.: IT-95-14/2; Case No.: IT-00-39 & 40/1; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17). The complexity of this war had a great impact on the processes of democratic transition and the consolidation of the state and society even after the Dayton Accords in 1995.

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the most disadvantaged geographical and geopolitical position compared to the other republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During the war (1992–1995), the region was doubly isolated. The Bosnian–Herzegovinian borders were not under the supervision of legal republic authorities, while the conflict that had started earlier in Croatia also made supplying the Bosnian population with food and logistic materials more difficult (Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: IT-04-74; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-00-39; Case No.: IT-95-14; Case No.: IT-95-14/2; Case No.: IT-00-39 & 40/1; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17). The international arms embargo made it harder for the
state victim of the aggression to defend itself and easier to carry out genocide in the field. When it comes to law, a few politicians and officers of Republika Srpska’s army were prosecuted for the genocide against the Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war from 1992 to 1995 (Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17). These prosecutions represent the first time in European history since the Second World War that genocide was committed on the continent and legally proven in court, after a series of organised war crimes and attempts to conceal them.

**Genocide – after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The Bosnian–Herzegovinian society and state, after the end of armed aggression (i.e., after the Dayton Accords of 1995–2023), have a complex institutional structure: entities, districts, and a High Representative (essentially, no one knows who the High Representative represents). This institutional structure is conducive for the destruction rather than the construction of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian state and society (Duraković 2010). From 1995 until 2023, anti-Bosnian politics of identity and politics of citizen representation have been present. Genocide as a process (Fein 1979; Fein 1993; Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010; Medić 2013; Mahmutčehajić 2018; Basic 2018; Basic & Delić 2019; Basic & Delić 2018; Basic & Delić 2024) continues and is produced and reproduced through the adoption of new forms discernible in political and media discourse and interpersonal interactions.

In the entity of Republika Srpska and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, institutions deny that genocide occurred (Bećirević 2009; Bećirević
2010; Medić 2013; Mahmutéehajíć 2018; Basic 2018; Basic & Delić 2019; Basic & Delić 2018; Basic & Delić 2023). Such a perception of wartime becomes the central subject of post-war analyses of the phenomena of war violence, genocide, victimization, and reconciliation. The existence of Republika Srpska is based on the genocide committed in Foča, Višegrad, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and many other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse the denial of systemic violent acts committed during the war by the political elite, which was ascertained at the Hague Tribunal and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the War Crimes Chamber, and which daily influences the Bosnian population via the media (ICTY 2023a; ICTY 2023b; Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023).

The identities of a collective before and after genocide cannot remain the same, and thus do not do so (Fein 1979; Fein 1993). The question then arises: How is it possible that even after genocide, as the most severe crime against humanity, anti-Bosnian politics of identity and anti-Bosnian politics of citizen representation are still active in the Bosnian environment? As we have explained previously (Basic, Delić, & Sofradzija 2019; Basic & Delić 2019; Basic & Delić 2018; Basic & Delić 2024), the symbolic and ideological background of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina – led with the aim of implementing a neo-fascist program of violent destruction of trust as a key idea of a widely popularised concept of social relations – has been evident ever since the 1990s. The same ideological matrix was discernible in the fact that the war against Bosnian–Herzegovinian civilians was led to prove that the ‘coexistence’ of differently classified people and groups is not possible. That this ideological matrix has thrived from 1995 to today is paradoxical but reflects decades of programmatic and systematic insistence by certain groups on the anti-civilisational idea that coexistence in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not possible (Basic, Delić, & Sofradzija 2019; Basic & Delić 2019; Basic & Delić 2018; Basic & Delić 2024).

The crimes of genocide represent crimes against the idea of humanity. The idea of humanity represents the epistemologic foundation of all international documents that speak of universal human rights (Fein 1979; Fein 1993). Therefore, post-genocidal Bosnia–Herzegovina has a trans-European and global significance.

A warning of the danger to the very idea of humanity exists in the crimes against Bosnia – against Bosnian–Herzegovinian civilians who were slaughtered, raped, shelled, and sniper-killed during the siege of Sarajevo, and burnt alive, beaten to death, and shot, in both an organised and unorganised manner (Bassiouni & Manikas 1994; Cleiren & Tijssen 1994; Bassiouni 1994; Greve & Bergsmo 1994; Case No.: IT-95-14/2; Case No.: IT-00-39 & 40/1; Case No.: IT-95-14; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-02-59; Case No.: IT-98-32/1; Case No.: IT-00-39; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: IT-04-74; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-97-24; Case No.: IT-98-30/1; Case No.: IT-99-36; Case No.: IT-94-1; Case No.: IT-96-23 & 23/1; Case No.: X-KRŽ-05/161; see also ICTY 2023a; ICTY 2023b; Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023).

In the Bosnian–Herzegovinian environment, the decade of the 1990s already was witness to loudly asserted anti-Bosnian, ‘great state’, hegemonic, and neo-fascist politics of identity, founded on symbolic violence and the denial of the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian people to exist. This symbolic, political, media, and in many ways representative violence resulted in the darkest forms of crime: violations of human rights and genocide (Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG:
The problem is that the post-genocide situation has interfered with outlining a scientific framework to allow for objective analysis of the socioeconomic development of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian society and state. To achieve this framing would have required prior work on the reconceptualization (that is, reconstruction) of the meaning of identity terminology. Before it could be reflexively and critically ‘deconstructed’, however, this terminology was released into the social semiosphere through the media and political normalisation of the public use of homogeneous bipolar contradictions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, i.e., ‘ours’ and ‘yours’, (Denich 1994; Vlaisavljević 2007; Vlaisavljević 2009; Malešević 2011; Vlaisavljević 2012).

The character of the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina has already been fabricated at the levels of terminological, political, and media construction of reality. This creation has been performed as though the actors wish to lessen, through incorrect use of identity terminology, the responsibility of the regimes in Serbia and Croatia for the politics of violent resettlement of civilians. In other words, they employ an erroneous use and application of politics of the collective representation of citizens to achieve the dream of a pure culture, pure nation, pure religion, and pure language, as if these could ever exist in reality. This great obsession with ‘purity’ was the basis of the logic and the politics of erasure of Bosnians, the Bosnian people, and the Bosnian identity labels during and after the ethnic cleansing (Vlaisavljević 2007; Vlaisavljević 2009; Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010; Malešević 2011; Vlaisavljević 2012; Medić 2013; Mahmutćebehajić 2018).

The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Basic 2015a; Basic 2015b; Delić & Basic 2024) are not alone in being involved in the creation (construction) of post-
war reality. The first issue is that this institutional structure (state structure) is already nominally, categorically, terminologically, and symbolically discriminatory – and actually anti-Bosnian. Below are several examples of the aggression and typical presentation of reality in the media in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (see, for example: Starmo 2016; Dnevnik 2017; Net 2017; Blic 2017; Dnevno 2018; Faktor 2018; Republika 2018):

1. The anti-Bosnian attitude is discernible in the political and public activities of the anti-Bosnian politics of citizen representation (presentation). Most of the media in the surrounding territories use (apparently on purpose) incorrect terminology that is in its essence anti-Bosnian – i.e., anti-state – and thus violent.

2. An example of this incorrect use of terms and terminology is the lack of distinction between the adjectives srpski (Serb) and srbijanski (Serbian) in the diplomatic discourse of the neighbouring state of Serbia. In the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Croatia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when reporting on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, the media use the adjective srpski, as in “srpski ministar vanjskih poslova”. In actuality, they should use the adjective srbijanski to precisely label the diplomatic function of the Republic of Serbia, which borders Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Drina River.

3. If in diplomatic communication the adjectives srpski and srbijanski are used as synonyms or not differentiated at all, it is accordingly established that such discourse is not limited (by a state) to explicit state borders of a certain state. Rather, with an act of symbolic discursive violence – i.e., performative violence – the term srpski is used to encompassed and unite under a single label and category all Serbs who live in other states.
4. This example shows that the Great Serbian (*velikosrpski, velikosrbijanki*)
hegemonic and territorially expansionist project still persists in 2023. This
project thrives even after international convictions for genocide crimes
committed during the war against the Bosnian–Herzegovinian state and
its civilian population by the politicians and armed forces of Bosnian
Serbs, with the aid of politicians and armed forces from Serbia (Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: S 1 K 014264 13 Krž; Case No.: IT-05-88; Case No.: X-KRŽ-07/386; Case No.: 2 BvR 1290/99; Case No.: BayObLG: 17; Case No.: 3 St 20/96).

5. In other words, the media make erroneous and false reports and thus
dangerously fabricate social, political, and geopolitical facts. With the
adjective *srpski* (and not *srbijanski*), the media apply an anti-Bosnian
construction of reality and do not respect or acknowledge the borders
between the two states. In other words, the media do not acknowledge or
else they wilfully obscure the territorial boundary at the Drina River as
the border between the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The language itself already erases these borders, which are
symbolically eradicated anew each time the possessive adjective *srpski* is
used instead of the adjective *srbijanski*. This usage is a constant in the
media construction of reality and occurs daily.

6. The usage is also a constant in the political constructions of the reality of
certain politics and is before all related to the anti-Bosnian politics of the
Bosnian entity Republika Srpska.

7. The politicians in Republika Srpska have for years claimed that the
Bosnian–Herzegovinian entity, designated as Republika Srpska in the
Dayton Accords of 1995, is in fact a state (Bečirević 2009; Bečirević
2010; Medić 2013; Delić 2016; Mahmutéeha jić 2018; Basic 2018; Basic & Delić 2019; Basic & Delić 2018; Basic & Delić 2024).

8. Similar examples of the anti-Bosnian politics of naming and of citizen representation in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina can be observed, followed, and diagnosed even in relation to the politics of representing (presenting) Bosnian Croats in the politics of the three parties who have HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – Croatian Democratic Party) in their name.

Even though this organisation of state and society is already discriminatory at the level of the politics of naming and of representation, and thus is humiliating for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is normalised.

**Grey economy**

The advance of western technoscience, and especially the military industry, is confirmation that materialistic human civilisation indeed has great potential for both further development and great destructive power. With the help of new technologies and a fascinatingly developed industry of entertainment, these possibilities can easily be observed even in the destructive potential of video games. Even in games for children, competitive violence is imitated or simulated as the most important social contact, bringing enormous financial profit to post-modern creators and promoters of this fascinating but monstrous industry (Dirlik 1994; Hindess 1995; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Kaldor 2013; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). The state and the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were exposed to years of *radical war violence*, as observed in the crime of genocide committed two decades ago, do not deserve to be subjected to permanent transitional violence or humiliating treatment or punishment. They
also do not deserve to be subjected to networked and well-run privatisation crimes, for which not a single key figure has to date been indicted or convicted (Miller 2008; Lai 2016; Delić 2017). Yet that is precisely what is perpetually happening to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As things currently are, the Bosnian–Herzegovinian post-war experience shows that during a period of transition from a socialist consensus economics to a market economy and parliamentary democracy, a special kind of economy develops – the grey economy (Nordstrom, 2007; Duffield, 2001; Delić, 2017). Similarly, based on the analysis of United Nations reports (UNODC 2013; UNODC 2015) and Centre for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (CSS 2015; CSS 2016; CSS 2017; CSS 2018), the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are witness to an intensive proliferation of various forms of crime in society and to a series of political and judicial scandals. Based on this status, Bosnia and Herzegovina have been absolutely undeservedly transformed into a twilight zone, a quasi-state where law, justice, and human dignity are undermined to shame reason, morals, and kindness.

With the privatisation dogma at the end of the 20th century, and after the strengthening of liberalisation and deregulation, the world has come under the rule of *imperial economic formation*. The new economy of knowledge has imposed itself as an absolute discursive order, the new fundamental ontology of the 21st century. It is not possible to discuss the world, life, man, nature, society, state, globalisation, quality, and sustainability without this order’s vocabulary. There is no order or regime of knowledge outside the vocabulary of the new economy of knowledge – this new cognitive matrix, the fundamental ontology for the creation of a new global society of knowledge. The national state is represented more and more as exceeded and unnecessary, and its citizens as redundant – an unnecessary weight that impedes the development of new
cognitive capitalism and that contributes to the development of global society of knowledge, and new colonisation projects. The disappearance of immediacy and the naturally rooted forms of life occurs because of the ever-growing influence of strategic alliances between movable capital and new and once again primordial identities (Hindess 1995; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Basic, Delić, & Sofradzija 2019).

The reduction or vulgarisation of the human collective identity to an ethnic, clerical, and new-capitalist identity occurs when the person becomes a stakeholder, consumer, and client and stops being a creative human being who can engage reflectively and critically but instead becomes a symptom of the global crisis of value orientations (Vlaisavljević 2007; Vlaisavljević 2009; Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010; Malešević 2011; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Vlaisavljević 2012; Medić 2013; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Mahmutčehajić 2018; Basic, Delić, & Sofradzija 2019). Furthermore, the vulgarisation of the meaning of time, space, and the environment is the first symptom of the symbolic violence of the global economic order of knowledge and information. Globalisation is, probably, a euphemism for aggressive capitalism and the colonisation of society (Dirlik 1994; Hindess 1995; Willke 2007; Cetina 2007; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Kaldor 2013; Baker 2014; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). Socialist regimes of knowledge have been declared dangerous ideologies, while the global society of knowledge is rarely spoken of as an ideology, even when the fact that it is one is known (Schwarzmantel 2009; Sanín & Wood 2014; Vudli 2015; Nussio 2017). Certain persons have (still) not recognised that we live in the age of the return of the great narrative (Vlaisavljević 2007; Vlaisavljević 2009; Vlaisavljević 2012), in the age of the radical violence of the new economy of knowledge (Hindess 1995; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012;
Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Basic, Delić, & Sofradzija 2019). This economy has enormous ideological power and influence over the politics and logic of naming people and things. With the aid of a self-proclaimed monopoly on the only objective and value-neutral distinction of knowledge from non-knowledge, it successfully rules over all other less pretentious forms of knowledge and experience (Dirlik 1994; Hindess 1995; Willke 2007; Cetina 2007; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Kaldor 2013; Baker 2014; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). We mean that this scientism is some form of the shift to quantifying everything „objectively“.

**Collapse of the politics of representation**

It is possible to speak of the expertly constructed *collapse of the meaning of the political representation of citizens* using an example of anti-Bosnian obstruction of the normal functioning of post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina. This collapse makes it impossible to easily understand and discuss the natural and universal basis of the coexistence of people and communities (Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010; Medić 2013; Mahmutčehajić 2018; Basic 2018; Basic & Delić 2019; Basic & Delić 2018; Basic & Delić 2024). Contrary to the thesis that we live in a global society of knowledge, certain researchers of globalisation and glocalisation prove that we live in a world of an *expert spreading of non-knowledge* (Dirlik 1994; Hindess 1995; Willke 2007; Cetina 2007; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Kaldor 2013; Baker 2014; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija, 2019). There is, therefore, a danger of falling into new precarious dogmas that could lead to global and regional conflicts.
The term ‘law’ is today used so easily in different contexts that authors on different sides find various arguments to declare law an *ideology* (Schwarzmantel 2009; Sanín & Wood 2014; Vudli 2015; Nussio 2017). Consider the past interpretation controversies, antinomies, paradoxes, and dilemmas related to the understanding of the meaning of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNODC 2013; UNODC 2015; CSS 2015; CSS 2016; CSS 2017; CSS 2018). It can be easily agreed that what is called ‘law’ is never self-understandable beforehand, regardless of what is labelled with this pretentious and seductive word (that causes tens of millions of freshmen students to sigh, imagining how they will one day, after acquiring a sufficient amount of credits at their university, become successful businessmen or lawyers who dispense justice). Add that the discourse of human rights is always in some way related not only to the culture of human rights but also to other different politics, logics, practices, and strategies of managing global changes (Foucault 1991; Foucault 1994; Foucault 1998; Foucault 2003; Foucault 2005; Foucault 2010). Indeed, in the case of post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is related to various politics of transition from socialism into a society/state of the rule of law. Given that, certainly a series of more difficult questions could arise from insisting on the critical re-evaluation of the *narrative structure* of different political interpretations of the legal vocabulary of post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina, or on the re-evaluation and determination of a precise *meaning* of individual syntagmas that are daily being spoken and repeated by Bosnian politicians, particularly for the purpose of political marketing, to emotionally sway voters. However, sometimes the questions are more important than the answers, especially if they are critical or self-critical. It is necessary to ask questions that could lead to an even more complex and demanding analysis than is common for the social sciences of sociology, criminology, and pedagogy.
**Pedagogy of emancipation and post-genocide society**

The French pedagogue Célestin Freinet (1976) emphasises the importance of interpersonal interaction and cooperation in carrying out various shared work-related projects when it comes to a person’s learning and the creation of relationships characterised by comradeship. Freinet’s pedagogical ideas stem from the idea of ‘the exploring attempt’, meaning that the individual learns through interacting, exploring reality, making mistakes, and trying again until interpersonal interaction (learning) is achieved (Freinet 1976; Acker 2007).

Freinet states that individuals need to be active in their learning; learning cannot be forced on someone through an authority in a given context (e.g., a teacher, police officer, journalist, or politician) simply saying, writing, or postulating something. How knowledge is to be obtained varies based on the specific context (for example, classrooms, organisations, politics, society) and the individual’s needs and conditions. Allowing the people in a society to be active in their learning will create in them a personal sense of responsibility for their learning and that of the people around them (e.g., pupils, relatives, members of an organisation, friends). The interactive dynamics of interpersonal interactions will, over time, lead to improved engagement both within and outside of the specific context. Freinet believes that relationships between the authorities within the context and the individuals who are learning something should be characterised by equality. Freinet claims that the authority’s responsibility is to help an individual systematise all the knowledge that they acquire by exploring the world around them, so that the authority should act more like a supervisor (Freinet 1967; Acker 2007). The development in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina has resulted in a widespread lack of authoritative supervisors or actors who could lead
the country away from war and towards stable peace. Instead, authoritative supervisors are moving in the opposite direction by using jingoistic rhetoric, igniting and reigniting conflicts between ethnic categories, and denigrating victims of the war by constantly repeating that Serbian police and soldiers have not carried out any genocide.

Freinet also notes that good planning and organisation within a given context is crucial for learning to occur and to allow for interpersonal relationships characterised by comradeship. He also emphasises interpersonal cooperation in shared work projects as an important tool for creating and re-creating democratic values. The learning process teaches people to take responsibility for their actions and for society, for example, by having democratic values influence the individual and their learning environment (Freinet 1976; Acker 2007). In post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina, planned and institutionally supported activities are lacking that would promote the building, re-creation, and repair of interpersonal relations that the war interrupted. People do cooperate somewhat across ethnic boundaries, but this cooperation normally stems from individuals outside of the existing institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Basic (2015a, 2015b) and Delić & Basic (2024) notes that post-war reconciliation, forgiveness, and coexistence require a steady flow of activities in a post-war society on both the individual and institutional levels.

The Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire (1968, 1992) believes that interpersonal interaction through verbal and written forms of dialogue implies faith in people and a hope that a more humane society is still possible. The humanisation of interpersonal relationships suggests a social community of equal individuals who debate and can critically reflect on themselves, interactions with others, and the social community itself (Basic & Delić 2018; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija 2019; McLaren & Jaramillo 2010; McLaren 1996; Darder 2012; Fischman & McLaren
In a post-genocide society, naming important social issues should not turn into an empty verbalism that arises from a position of power; true dialogue always implies a certain kind of humility and a readiness to concede with the aim that a series of interactions leads the dialogue participants to a compromise. Freire (1968, 1992) believes in the possibility of the humanisation of society and assumes the possibility of a contextual but historically conditioned dialogic learning and the exchange of education and political ideas with others. The essence of dialogue is openness and readiness to compromise, while faith in people is the precondition for the exchange of words during dialogic processes of interactive labelling of categories in society. During interpersonal dialogue, people can be classified variously based on their class, ethnicity, gender, social role (for example, victim or criminal), or in some other way. To Freire, using the right term to describe a social reality already means transforming the society. In that sense, the dialogue of those who collectively construct and reconstruct the society should not be an act of arrogance (Basic & Delić 2018; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija 2019; McLaren & Jaramillo 2010; McLaren 1996; Darder 2012; Fischman & McLaren 2005).

The post-genocide Bosnian–Herzegovinian society has become a society that fears violence. The sources of that violence often remain concealed in formal education that has its foundations in war classifications. Considering the genocidal past of the entity Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the question arises of how it is possible that the population of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina lives in the 21st century in the heart of Europe in a state where criminals are revered as heroes and the war ideology of genocide pervades and is still reproduced in political, media, and interpersonal discourse (Močnik 1998/1999; Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010; Medić 2013; Ravlić, 2013; Costa-Pinto & Kallis, 2014; Vudli, 2015; Mahmutćehajić 2018). Freire (1968, 1992)
analyses regressing social development, those situations in society that are at first glance thought to be insurmountable limitations for progress towards peace, economic prosperity, the rule of law, equality, and similar values inspired by democracy. Freire believes that with the aim of social progress, one must approach these limitations as challenges and not consider them insurmountable. Thus, an individual as a social factor can free their subjugated identity and initiate changes in society that could lead to prosperity and stable peace. These processes are possible only with a critical view of the situation and with hope and faith in people (Freire & Macedo 2002; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija 2019; Basic & Delić 2018).

**Pedagogy of lifelong learning and post-genocide society**

Philip Candy (1991) states that individuals undergo lifelong learning and that learning takes place in many different situations and contexts, within and outside of normal education. Learning takes place in the interaction with other persons in a communication process. Lifelong learning includes techniques for practical implementation and specific motivations, arguments, driving forces, rationalisations, and attitudes about a specific type of action (Cross 1992; Jarvis 2004; Field 2006).

It is important to note here that a person’s learning often takes place in groups, with close and personal relationships between the group members. The specific motivations, arguments, driving forces, rationalisations, and attitudes towards certain actions are learned based on a definition of a situation as beneficial or detrimental to the individual in question. The rational person chooses to act on and argue for a certain position if the definitions that favour the action and argument outweigh the definitions that do not. An individual’s associations with
other people and groups with these definitions can vary and differ with frequency, duration, prioritisations, and intensity. Here, it is important that the person, through a chain of learning that stretches throughout their life, creates and re-creates opportunities for change on both the individual and communal levels. However, the same interactive dynamic allows a person’s thinking to be chained to old patterns, where previous actions and arguments receive confirmation and status as unchangeable social phenomena (Candy 1991; Cross 1992; Jarvis 2004; Field 2006).

The process that leads to learning in a post-genocide society, through people’s association with post-war behavioural patterns, involves the same mechanisms that play a part in other types of learning. This association also applies to the Bosnian post-genocide society. Schooling in pre- and post-genocide Bosnia is an important component in learning processes, but everything else that happens throughout life has a great impact on the person and their perception of themselves and society. In this context, it is important to note the individual’s approach to and perception regarding the past, present, and future. In this context, Bosnian post-genocide and post-war society and the formation and reformation of personal identity during and after the war can be linked to the genocide and the importance of current genocide denial. It also can be linked to the importance of a shared desire for a better life in the future, which we can assume that most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina share. Lifelong learning takes place in various situations, and what may have been relevant in the past can still influence our present and future.

Identity formation, which is important to lifelong learning, takes place in the interaction between individuals and groups of individuals in a cultural context. Mead (1934/2015) postulates that the self is a foundational construct for the
formation of a person’s identity. The self does not exist at birth but is developed through a person’s experiences and relationships with others. Mead’s explanation of the self relies on two basic concepts: reflexivity and role-taking. Reflexivity only begins once the child can react to symbols such as language. In this way, the individual shows an ability to use objects that signify self or others. Later in life, the individual’s reflexivity grows with the ability to signify objects of all types, such as people in various groups, ideas, opinions, attitudes, motivations, arguments, driving forces, and rationalisations. According to Mead, this capacity means that the individual takes on the role of the objects in addition to the role of a human, even if we know that objects do not possess consciousness and instead merely exist. The second basic concept regarding the self, i.e., the taking of roles, begins early in life. The child gains perspectives on themselves from all the people they spend time with, from parents to passing visitors. Being someone else prior to the establishment of the self is a process that shapes the child’s self-perception through two stages, the play stage and the game stage. Mead believes that the self gains its uniform nature when it is formed as an object based on the significant other’s point of view. Over time, the child meets more and more people whose roles need to be taken on and who will give acknowledgement. It is reasonable to say that we are now talking about an individual/personal identity. To be acknowledged in our roles is to be acknowledged in our identities. Throughout their lifetimes, people in a society play a number of different roles before different audiences, causing the self to be shaped and modified daily in each individual social situation where a person is acting (von Wright 2000). Individual lifelong learning takes place on a spectrum between casual learning (informal learning) and organised learning (formal education). Learning takes place in the interaction between individuals, and one of the most important elements of this interaction is communication.
Through communication with others in the same context and through media reporting, individuals in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina receive the informal learning that is an important part of lifelong learning. Each person’s self is shaped as an object and is given its uniform character based on the significant other’s point of view. By interacting with other individuals and via media reporting, individuals receive acknowledgement in their roles or lose their identity through lack of acknowledgement. One example of a lack of acknowledgement in war-time and post-war roles relates to the victims of genocide who most likely experience a loss of identity through persistent denial by representatives of the Republika Srpska that any genocide took place.

Interpersonal communication in Bosnian post-genocide society takes place through symbols, language, and actions that also are symbolic. To be classified as symbolic, an action must mean something to the person carrying it out. Role-taking means seeing the world from the perspective of others. Individuals in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina act by taking on the role of the other in order to manage post-war situations. Mead (1934/2015) states that symbols develop cultural community – those who live in the same society understand each other, can interact, and have agreed on what the symbols signify. The symbols will form the foundation for society’s continuing existence and development. In Bosnian post-genocide society, the interactive dynamic differs with regard to the definitions of social objects. Bosnia and Herzegovina do not appear to have any natural, shared goals that could lead to a shared culture and shared perspective. Jürgen Habermas (1986) states that communication that claims to be intelligible to everyone involved must meet certain requirements. For example, the participants in the communication must be contained within a normative framework that has been approved by all participants. For communication to be successful, participants must go through certain fundamental agreements and
produce good conditions for shared understanding (Bećirević 2009; Bećirević 2010; Medić 2013; Mahmut će hajić 2018; Basic 2018; Basic & Delić 2019; Basic & Delić 2018; Basic & Delić 2024). Individuals, politicians, and journalists in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina do not appear to have the same normative framework or interests, so accounts of the genocide during the war are interpreted differently after the war. Fundamental agreements that produce good conditions for shared interpretations, which would have helped facilitate post-war dialogue, have not been established after the war. Instead, embers that have lingered since the end of the war in 1995 are constantly ignited and reignited.

**Post-genocide society and pedagogy**

The aim of this paper was to analyse institutional paralogisms, social and economic inequalities, and frustrating consequences of decades of symbolic and war and post-war violence against the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Party leaders and the media in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina tirelessly use erroneous and distorted discourse – the language of hatred. Party leaders, allegedly, represent vital national interests of ‘their people’ when they are in actuality discussing the vital national interests of their constituents, which is also not precise or correct, as noted. When talking about people, ethnic and nationalist (or ethnic, clerical, and nationalist) party leaders erroneously name, label, and claim the ‘people’. They do so each time they use the possessive pronoun ‘my people’ (Jutarnji list 2009). To use such an act of speech, to say ‘my people’ and simultaneously hold a responsible role of a political representative and citizen means, in fact, to treat the people, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as private property and holdings (as opposed to the equality discussed above, Freire 1968, 1992; Candy 1991). It is treating them as cattle, a herd, as animals that can
at the will of the self-proclaimed exclusive owner be sold, resold, exchanged, marketed, humiliated, and slaughtered, throughout the decades, bit by bit. Transitional party leaders and political representatives (‘of their entire people’) are said, erroneously again, to come from ‘the ranks’ of ‘their people’ (Telegraf 2018). But what does it even mean ‘to come from the ranks of (your) people’? What does the noun ‘rank’ even mean? Are the people in the identified group ranked in a hierarchy that separates them from other people, like different species? It should be clear that human beings are human beings. Different populations of people cannot be sorted into different ‘orders’ or ‘domains’ or other levels of biological taxonomy; they are all one species. So how is it possible that human beings in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina are persistently and perpetually represented in categories such as ‘rank’? (Also in contrast with the equal status of student/teacher discussed above, Freire 1968, 1992; Candy 1991.) The use of these classifications to politically represent the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina implies in fact something very significant and far reaching about the legitimacy (or, more precisely, illegitimacy) of the production and reproduction of the post-genocide politics of representation ( overseen also by the High Representatives, one after another, from the international community). Therefore, instead of reaching a conclusion, it is very important to analyse the daily language and vocabulary of politics and politicians. It is, in this manner, possible to perceive the concealed or distorted mechanisms of many decades of vulgar and illegitimate functioning of a political constellation of government and power. The status of a term such as the Greek word ‘entity’ could never be precisely determined. In fact, even the best scholars of Greek language, who could analyse the abstractness of the meaning of the word ‘entity’, would probably not be able to find valid arguments for the idea that anyone who means well for the peace agreement of a state (in our case this is the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
as one of the republics of the former Yugoslav federation) could have implemented the attitude that one state consists of ‘two entities’. The problem is that such terms, which are used here as well, have after two and a half millennia of use accidentally or deliberately (in the context of international diplomatic efforts to stop or delay the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina) become part of the vocabulary of international and national law. After the genocide, during the horrendous period of robbery and violence directed against the citizens throughout the transition and privatisation processes, these terms remained to act as key mystifying and obscure nominal designations from the repertoire or vocabulary of post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The reasons for post-war problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be found in the crisis of the politics of representation and variously contextualised analyses of relations and correlations between international law, the right to use lethal force, and the notion of power and counterpower in the global society of knowledge and the global society of risk (Beck 1992; Beck 2005; Basic, Delić & Sofradzija 2019). Certain prosecuted individuals who are guilty of the genocide against Bosniaks are now, in 2023, free. Through the media, they have taken the role of spokespeople advising the political representatives of Bosnian Serbs about how to create strategic alliances and coalitions, and between which parties.

This situation is perhaps for some an interesting paradox; for others, it is something entirely different that cannot be easily named or explained. It is necessary to institutionalise a post-positivistic, critical, phronetic, and holistic approach to social sciences in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina. Introducing such a methodological approach is necessary to even be able to rationally analyse the institutional, social, and public responsibility of science and scientists in the context of increasingly evident negative social consequences of globalisation and transition in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Knowledge is not independent of global and local politics of knowledge and different regimes of truth (Foucault 1991; Foucault 1994; Foucault 1998; Foucault 2003; Foucault 2005; Foucault 2010). Knowledge is not independent of industry, technology, culture, market, corporative interests, and other social spheres, where the role of different social movements should by no means be disregarded nor underestimated. The reconstruction of social sciences and our systems of knowledge in the context of the global society of risk (Beck 1992; Beck 2005) and the reconstruction of research methodology cannot be performed without a more active cognitive and discursive role of the sociology of knowledge, war sociology, criminology, social epistemology, and the pedagogy of emancipation and lifelong learning as well as other close areas of knowledge and mentally communicated experience.

During the second decade of the 21st century, the cognitive and methodological situation in social sciences has become more complex than in the 20th century because of institutional, political, financial, symbolic, and, accordingly, real domination of natural-science methodology (which primarily limits the development of sociology, criminology, and pedagogy and other critically oriented social sciences). As the most persuasive tool of the new economy of knowledge, this methodology, with the help of quantitative methods and techniques (Hindess 1995; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Broome 2014; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Basic, Delić, & Sofradzija 2019), aims to impose the natural-science ideal of science, rationality, objectivity, and value neutrality not only on the discipline of economy but also on all other social disciplines. Research that could possibly question the (politically) privileged approaches to explaining economic and political transitions is therefore most often strategically avoided. Such research cannot be put on the agenda for consideration as topics for future research or as problems or riddles. The essence of quantitative
methodology is the technical and operational procedure of converting the notion of quality into quantity. The conversion is performed to demonstrate that social sciences should be value neutral and that the best way to achieve neutrality – realistic descriptions of the life of people and communities – is to replace words with numbers.

In science and in society, a great confusion has arisen – an intersection now exists of various politics of knowledge and of different technological regimes of the production of organised truth and organised lies, at times difficult to differentiate. Interdisciplinary projects to reconstruct the sense and meaning of the abovementioned changes are necessary. The globalisation we live in now is both a symbolically and socially constructed power of naming, labelling, identifying, perceiving, selecting, explaining, and experiencing society. Its power is visible in the fact that it is presented (as if acting) as a historical inevitability, as a natural force, similar to gravity. Globalisation is thus easily transformed into globalism – and into ideology – and this happens even when we are talking about the ‘global society of knowledge’ and the ‘new economy of knowledge’ (Hindess 1995; Schwarzmantel 2009; Weber et al. 2011; Guile & Livingstone 2012; Broome 2014; Sanín & Wood 2014; Vudli 2015; Couldry & Hepp 2016; Nussio 2017; Basic, Delić, & Sofradzija 2019) as a purported cognitive foundation of that society. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the midst of this vortex in the 1990s and has been in the midst of a turbulent discursive environment and its aggressive surroundings for the past two decades. In view of immanent antinomies, contradictions, and the political, legal, and criminal nonsense that perpetually institutionalise and reproduce the identitary references of this vocabulary, it is necessary to create publicly responsible programs of evaluating prescriptive impacts of the domination of culturally produced politics of difference. Because of the development in Bosnian post-genocide society, the
time has come for a completely different description, prescription, logic of naming, and an explanation strategy of achieved transitional differences. It is necessary to (re)focus sociological, criminological, and pedagogical analyses on criminal, social, economic, ecological, anti-educational, sociopathological, and anomic consequences of the (catastrophic) impact of decades of symbolic and real war and post-war violence against the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Conflict of Interest**
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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