A secure or sustainable world?

How Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation affect the Sustainable Development Goals

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Abstract

This thesis aims to evaluate Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation and create a better understanding of how these policies affect Sweden’s work towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Amid global concerns about nuclear weapons and their impact on peace, security and sustainable development, Sweden stands as a global leader both regarding disarmament and non-proliferation and sustainable development. In this thesis, Swedish policies and statements both from the Swedish government and parliament have been evaluated along with a few laws relating to the topic. An evaluative qualitative content analysis was employed, which with coding and categorisation has delved deep into these dynamics to create a better understanding of the connection between policies on nuclear proliferation and the SDGs in Sweden. From the coding, seven categories emerged; Alignment with the SDGs, Positive Impacts on the SDGs, Negative Impacts on the SDGs, International Collaboration, Adaptive Capacity, Global Leadership Role and Disarmament Efforts.

To provide more perspectives and create a deeper understanding of the connection between nuclear proliferation and the SDGs and the findings from the coding, an analytical framework, realism and the security-development nexus, were employed. These two frameworks were put next to each other to give two different views of how nuclear proliferation affects the SDGs. Sweden is not a country typically examined from the perspective of realism as it is peaceful and not one of the world’s great powers. The same goes for the security-development nexus, which often focuses on conflict-ridden countries or countries that are underdeveloped. This thesis has therefore provided a new perspective of both Sweden and these frameworks that will benefit policymakers and academics in the future when similar studies or studies on similar issues are conducted.

**Keywords:** Nuclear Proliferation, Sustainable Development Goals, Sweden, Security, Development
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Defence Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAN</td>
<td>The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPNW</td>
<td>Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Appendix 1: The Sustainable Development Goals

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1. Introduction

This chapter will focus on introducing the topic of this thesis as well as the research problem, research objective, research questions and structure of the thesis.

1.1. Introduction to the topic

Nuclear proliferation can be defined in many different ways. In this thesis nuclear proliferation will be defined as “the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional nation states.” (Robinson, 2015). Ergo, nuclear proliferation is here defined as the spread of nuclear weapons between states (Robinson, 2015).

This section will present the topic of the thesis, nuclear proliferation and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). After presenting the topic, the case of Sweden will be presented as this is a case study of Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation and how they affect Sweden’s work towards the SDGs.

Nuclear proliferation is a topic that has been debated since the invention of the atomic bomb, the first nuclear weapon, in 1945. During the Cold War there was an arms race between the two great powers of the world, the United States of America (the USA) and the Soviet Union (later Russia), over which state could acquire the most Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which includes nuclear weapons and thus potentially nuclear proliferation. The arms race resulted in the two countries acquiring a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. The technique of creating nuclear weapons spread from the USA to the Soviet Union and later to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the UK), France and China. The nuclear proliferation had begun. Today, these five states are the only recognised nuclear powers in the world, even though there are other states believed to have nuclear weapons as well, further increasing nuclear proliferation in the world (Chestnut Greitens, 2020:467).

At the same time as nuclear proliferation began, the United Nations (the UN) was created. This is also when talks and debates regarding nuclear proliferation, its consequences and how to stop it began. International as well as national treaties regarding nuclear proliferation were created
throughout the rest of the 20th century and continue to this day as it regardless is a large international problem (Chestnut Greitens, 2020:467).

Another international problem is global warming and continuing conflicts, instability and underdevelopment that persists and grows in the world. An attempt was made by the states of the world to combat these problems, which resulted in the SDGs and Agenda 2030 being created. Agenda 2030 and the SDGs were created in 2015 by the UN (A list of all SDGs is provided in Appendix 1). The goals follow the baseline of 2015 and focus on ending poverty and inequality, protecting our planet and ensuring everyone enjoys peace and prosperity by 2030. These goals are a joint effort by a majority of the world’s states and are designed to help those that are the furthest behind. If the goals are achieved, they will end hunger, poverty, AIDS, and discrimination against girls and women (United Nations Development Programme, 2023).

The SDGs are integrated, meaning that it is recognised that movement in one area will affect the outcome in other areas as well as the fact that development must balance economic, environmental and social sustainability. Therefore, all countries that have agreed to achieve the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs work towards all goals and not only a selected few (United Nations Development Programme, 2023). One country that has agreed to work towards the SDGs is Sweden. Sweden is one of the Nordic countries in Northern Europe and is a country that has been neutral in the realm of international politics and international conflicts since the beginning of the 20th century. This included during both World Wars, where Sweden as opposed to its Nordic neighbours was neither involved nor invaded (Andersson, 2018).

The neutrality continued during the Cold War. After the Cold War, Sweden, despite its policy on neutrality, became a member of the European Union (the EU) and closely allied with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This put Sweden in a unique situation with being closely allied to the West and the USA along with being geographically close to Russia, a previous war enemy (Andersson, 2018). Today Sweden has applied to join NATO but has yet to have been accepted by Türkiye and Hungary. This shift has been one of the largest in modern Sweden’s history of foreign policy and is changing the entire foreign policy (Aggestam, Schierenbeck and Wackenhut, 2022). At the same time as this shift, Sweden is making good
progress towards achieving the SDGs, even though the recent COVID-19 pandemic has halted the progress somewhat (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2023).

1.2. Research Problem

The research gap of this thesis that was found when conducting the literature review is Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation affects Sweden’s work towards the SDGs. There is literature concerning Sweden and nuclear weapons, Sweden and the SDGs, and nuclear weapons and the SDGs. However, there is not a large quantity of literature that concerns all these aspects together. This research gap is important to study as it concerns both international security as well as the development towards a better world that the SDGs are striving for.

This topic is of relevance to the field of Peace and Development because the focus of the thesis is how the SDGs are affected. Nuclear proliferation is part of International Relations rather than Peace and Development, as is the theory of realism, which implies a weaker connection. But the SDGs and the field of sustainable development are an integral part of Peace and Development Studies, as is the security-development nexus. The security-development nexus touches upon both parts of Peace and Development Studies, peace and conflict and international development. Thus, the thesis has a clear connection to the subject area.

Nuclear proliferation and the SDGs are two topics that are not traditionally connected, but research suggests that they should be. There is research that suggests a connection and that nuclear proliferation is affecting the SDGs. Nuclear proliferation increases the risk of a nuclear conflict or war, which will have large effects on the earth and its inhabitants and hence on the SDGs as well. Goal 16 of the SDGs is Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Target 16.1. is “Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere”. (Office for UN Affairs and Soka Gakkai International, 2019). This will not be possible without reducing the number of weapons in the world, including the number of nuclear weapons. The number of nuclear weapons in the world will not be reduced if there is nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation must therefore be stopped if the SDGs are to be achieved (Office for UN Affairs and Soka Gakkai International, 2019).
1.3. Research Objective and Research Questions

The research objective of this thesis is to create a better understanding of the connection between Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation and Sweden’s work towards achieving the SDGs and how nuclear proliferation affects sustainable development. This is relating to the research problem outlined in the previous section.

This research objective will be accomplished by answering a set of research questions. The research questions are as follows:

- What policies on nuclear proliferation does Sweden have?
- How does the debate on nuclear proliferation in the Swedish parliament relate to the Sustainable Development Goals?
- How have Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation affected Sweden’s work towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals?

1.4. Limitations and delimitations

There have been a few limitations and delimitations when conducting this thesis. One limitation is that there was somewhat of a challenge to find reliable and relevant sources in enough quantity as the policies on nuclear proliferation are few and limited, which is why different motions and propositions in the Swedish Parliament were included along with Governmental reports, statements and policies.

One more limitation and concern when writing a thesis is the question of both the researcher and the material being impartial. Since I am a Swedish citizen and am researching the Swedish government, I had to take extra care to ensure I was being impartial when conducting this thesis. Extra care also needed to be taken when choosing the data as treaties, policies, statements and other literature concerning the topic might intentionally or unintentionally be biased in favour of for example the USA, a great power with a large quantity of nuclear weapons.
As this is a desk thesis and no interviews or surveys have been conducted there have been no other ethical considerations than those mentioned above beyond avoiding committing the act of plagiarism.

1.5. Structure of the thesis

The thesis will be structured as follows; First, an extensive literature review of the previous research on the topic will be provided. This will be followed by an overview and discussion of the analytical framework and an explanation of the methodological framework that has been used. After this, the findings of the research will be presented followed by an analysis of the findings and finally a conclusion of the research.

The analytical framework that has been used in this thesis is realism and the security-development nexus. Realism focuses on state sovereignty and national interests rather than the international system. This framework is thus a good choice for a case thesis of a country and said country’s policies (Mearsheimer, 2001:17; Morgenthau, 1985:4-13).

The security-development nexus combines security and development and examines the connection between the two (Nilsson, 2020). Since this thesis investigates the connection between nuclear proliferation, a subject of security studies, and the SDGs, a subject of international development, this framework is a good choice for this thesis. The results were analysed with this in mind in chapter 6.

This thesis is a case thesis that is part of the field of policy research. The methodological approach is an evaluative qualitative content analysis with an abductive approach, in which selected documents are assessed, classified and evaluated. The abductive approach is used in relation to theory, as a way of uncovering patterns that assist the possibility to integrate deep and surface structures that can be found in the data selection (Graneheim, Lindgren and Lundman, 2017).
2. Literature Review

This chapter will provide an extensive literature review of previous research related to the topic of the thesis as well as outline the research gap that has been found when conducting the literature review.

2.1. Nuclear proliferation

The literature on nuclear proliferation is substantial and has many different focus areas. There is literature on the different debates regarding nuclear proliferation, literature on whether nuclear weapons are good or bad, literature on the causes of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation and literature on nuclear proliferation from the perspectives of different theoretical frameworks (Chestnut Greitens, 2020; Hymans, 2010; Levite, 2003; Monteiro and Debs, 2014).

There are three major debates on nuclear proliferation. The first debate is on the concept and definition of nuclear proliferation, which might seem obvious but is highly debated. This debate is regarding what it means to have nuclear weapons, which has emerged because several states have obtained their nuclear weapons in other ways than the traditional way of superpowers to obtain extremely large arsenals. The debate outlines two issues concerning the definition of nuclear proliferation. The first issue is that of nuclear opacity. Nuclear opacity is a policy pursued by Israel, a state that has not, as of 2020, signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) established by the UN. Israel has also not, as of 2020, verified the existence of an Israeli nuclear weapons arsenal, nor administered a full, undisguised, nuclear test. This approach has been called “nuclear ambiguity”. The second issue is that of latent nuclear capacity, in which a state possesses the means to rapidly construct a nuclear weapon, but has never chosen to do so. Japan is such a state. This issue is seen as very critical when nuclear proliferation is discussed (Chestnut Greitens, 2020:473).

The second debate concerns the motivations and behaviours states have concerning nuclear weapons. Why do states obtain nuclear weapons? Why do states want to obtain nuclear weapons? Why have certain states chosen to relinquish nuclear weapons? Why do states assist other states in obtaining nuclear weapons? Why have nuclear weapons been used only once in
history? These are a few of the questions that are being discussed and have been discussed in this debate (Chestnut Greitens, 2020:473).

The third large debate on nuclear proliferation concerns the effect nuclear weapons have on the international community and conflict and stability in the international system. The advantages and disadvantages of nuclear weapons, for example. The security benefits of owning nuclear weapons are discussed, such as the occurrence of nuclear proliferation and the decreased risk of smaller conflicts escalating. But the risk of proliferation spreading even more is also discussed as well as the concern that a stability-instability paradox is created by nuclear weapons, meaning nuclear-armed countries consider themselves safe from large-scale retaliation and therefore see no hindrance in engaging in small-scale conflicts with other countries. These are the three biggest theoretical debates on nuclear proliferation, but there are several more (Chestnut Greitens, 2020: 473-475).

There is another debate regarding state security and its relationship with WMD. The debate discusses whether a state is safe after acquiring WMD and why states acquire nuclear weapons. What are the reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons or for choosing not to acquire nuclear weapons? These are questions that are debated within the field of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation (Hymans, 2010).

Another debate is regarding which theory is the best to use when explaining or analysing WMDs and nuclear weapons. Hymans (2010) believes there to be two major theories, realism and idealism. Realism believes that states obtain nuclear weapons because it is a demand for their security, while idealism believes that states obtain nuclear weapons because they believe it to be beneficial or necessary and because they are not worried by the prospect of having nuclear weapons. Monteiro and Debs (2014), on the other hand, have coined their own theory, which is a strategic theory that also focuses on the security environment, although with a broadened and shifted focus. Rather than focusing on the consequences that the acquisition of nuclear weapons has on that state’s security, Monteiro and Debs (2014) focus on the security environment a state is confronted with during the construction of nuclear weapons.
Finally, there is a debate on which strategy is the best to use when attempting to stop or hinder nuclear proliferation. The strategy of nuclear hedging is suggested by Levite (2003), while Monteiro and Debs (2014) and Hymans (2010) promote the need to focus on the supply and demand of nuclear weapons. The hypothesis for the supply and demand theory is that states who have can nuclear weapons might not choose to acquire them simply because they can, thus demoting the supposed connection between supply and demand. Levite’s (2003) strategy of nuclear hedging is based on nuclear reversal and consists of maintaining or pretending to maintain the capability to produce nuclear weapons without creating and owning nuclear weapons. This strategy along with the supply and demand theory are different approaches to nuclear proliferation, but there are many more.

2.2. Civil society against nuclear proliferation

In addition to the literature specifically on nuclear proliferation there is also literature on the work civil society is doing to prevent nuclear proliferation and, in a few instances, prohibit nuclear weapons completely. Greenpeace is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that over the years has worked tirelessly to prevent and stop nuclear proliferation entirely. The organisation believes that the trend of continuing nuclear proliferation has been going in the wrong direction and that if one state abandons schemes and treaties that prevent nuclear proliferation, more states will soon follow suit (Tinsdale, 2002).

Greenpeace is also of the opinion that there is a connection between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. If the goal is to stop the spread of one, then the spread of the other must also be stopped. To control the spread of nuclear proliferation, Greenpeace believes in controlling the supply of plutonium and uranium and will campaign against the nuclear industry until the last plant in the world is inoperable (Tinsdale, 2002).

In 2017 the organisation the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) won the Nobel Peace Prize. ICAN won the Nobel Peace Prize for their work against nuclear proliferation and the abolition of nuclear weapons. ICAN has worked tirelessly to alert the world to the disastrous humanitarian effects the use of nuclear weapons has as well as their central role in designing a new UN treaty to ban the use of nuclear weapons. The organisation
has for a long time worked to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and achieving the Nobel Peace Prize for their actions is a great accomplishment that further strengthens the credibility of the organisation (Sanders-Zakre, 2017; Zarocostas, 2017).

2.3. Sweden and nuclear weapons

Additionally, there is literature that is more specifically aimed at different countries and their relationship with nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. These articles have a different focus than this thesis. For example, Sweden’s switch in foreign and defence policy from wanting to acquire nuclear weapons to not wanting to acquire nuclear weapons and working against nuclear proliferation. Another example is the literature on Sweden’s application to join NATO and what that would result for Sweden and the state of the world (Jonter and Rosengren, 2014; Aggestam, Schierenbeck and Wackenhut, 2022).

Another area in which much research has been done is case studies of countries about nuclear weapons or the increase of security. Many of these case studies focus on the nuclear powers or the international community. But there has also been research done on the security policies of European countries. This literature gives a good overview of European security policies as well as a good background of said country. Amongst these case studies is one of Sweden’s history and foreign policy, which gives a good background to the case of Sweden, and provides more understanding of Sweden’s situation today (Andersson, 2018).

2.4. The Sustainable Development Goals

There is much literature concerning the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). There are reports that discuss the progress that the world is in concerning the SDGs made by both the United Nations which created the SDGs, but also by other organisations and academics who analyse the SDGs from different perspectives. For example, the Sustainable Development Report by The United Nations (2023) discusses this as the world is halfway to 2030, the finish line of the SDGs and it seems the targets of the SDGs are far from being reached.
The literature on the SDGs indicates that while the world is halfway to the finish line, the goals might not be met by 2030 and that the finish line is far away while at the same time approaching too quickly. On more than 50 per cent of the targets, progress is insufficient and weak and on 30 per cent of the targets, progress has been stalled or is going backwards. The world is not doing enough to reach the goals and needs to implement more measures to reach the targets. No country in the world is doing enough to reach the goals, including Sweden (The United Nations, 2023).

An event that further interrupted the progress and helped cause this development is the global COVID-19 pandemic. For the first time in a generation, extreme poverty increased and the recent three decades of poverty reduction were interrupted. The pandemic was also the cause of the largest rise in inequality between countries in three decades and has thus been detrimental to the SDGs. Because of the pandemic, the world needs to work even harder and implement even more measures to reach the targets of the SDGs in time (The United Nations, 2023).

Sweden has been working towards achieving the SDGs and has had several national measures put in place. The literature on this implies that Sweden is working towards the SDGs while at the same time not doing enough to achieve every target. Civil Society in Sweden plays a large role in working towards the SDGs and even though the state has the largest responsibility, the work that civil society does is vital for Sweden being able to achieve the SDGs. As the civil society in Sweden has a freer role, the different organisations working in Sweden have according to the literature a bigger chance of doing work beneficial to the SDGs as they are not as restricted politically as the Swedish government and authorities (Johansson and Strandhäll, 2022).

There is also literature on the impact other phenomena have on the SDGs, such as the connection between the SDGs and nuclear proliferation. The literature suggests there is a connection between the two and that nuclear proliferation affects the SDGs and the work towards them (Hunt, 2022; McGowan, 2021; Office for UN Affairs and Soka Gakkai International, 2019; ICAN, 2019). This literature will be used in the analysis to examine and analyse the case of Sweden regarding this connection.
2.5. The research gaps

The literature review shows that there is a research gap on the relationship between Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation and Sweden’s work towards the Sustainable Development Goals. This is what will be examined in this thesis, from the perspective of the analytical framework: realism and the security-development nexus, which will be explained below.
3. Analytical Framework

This chapter will provide the reader with an overview of the framework that have been used when conducting the thesis; realism and the security-development nexus. These were used in the analysis to complement each other rather than as one big framework. This analytical framework was operationalised by first linking the key concepts of the frameworks to the codes and categories that were defined when conducting the study to see how the context of the findings fit within the frameworks. The data and the frameworks were then compared and contrasted to each other to display if the data could be supported by the frameworks or not and if there were any patterns or trends in the data that aligned with the frameworks. This was done to create a better understanding and perspective of the findings and to see how well the frameworks applied to the findings.

3.1. Realism

The first framework that has been used in this thesis is realism. Realism is well-established and has existed for several decades. According to realism, the most important actor in the international arena is the state, especially great powers and their dominance and impact on international politics and the international order. In realism, the focus is on the behaviour of the state and how this is influenced and guided by states’ internal attributes and interests while the international system frames the surrounding environment and foreign policies (Mearsheimer, 2001:17).

According to realism, objective laws govern politics and have their base in human nature. At the core of politics lies interests, which are defined in terms of power. Every nation has its own interests and aspirations and will act on them a majority of the time. This is one of the core beliefs of realism (Morgenthau, 1985:4-13). The theory is a valid choice when conducting a case thesis on policies on nuclear proliferation as nuclear proliferation is closely related to realism. Security is a focus area of both realism and nuclear proliferation and states work to ensure their safety and security before anything else. One solution for states to ensure their security is to obtain nuclear weapons because according to realism, states require nuclear weapons to ensure their security against other states (Hymans, 2010).
While realism is well established, there has been critique against it, particularly concerning nuclear weapons. One critique is that realism has a bigger focus on supply rather than demand when it comes to nuclear weapons and other WMDs. Realists expect that states with the means and ability to acquire nuclear weapons will acquire them. This would then result in the supply of nuclear weapons rising. But the fault of realism is that even though states have the ability and means to obtain nuclear weapons, they might choose not to acquire them. While the supply of nuclear weapons might potentially rise, the demand does not necessarily rise with it or is not high from the beginning. The realist prediction is that if the supply could become high, then the demand is already high, which has been critiqued as not being true and is one of the largest faults of realism in recent decades (Hymans, 2010).

In this thesis, realism has been used to create a greater understanding of the behaviour of the Swedish government regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. As mentioned, realism focuses on states and states’ behaviour, especially regarding their security, and nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation play a large part in that. Even though Sweden is not one of the great powers of the world, realism is applicable as Sweden in the current international climate with the war in Ukraine and Russian aggression must work to preserve its own security against, amongst others, Russia (Andersson, 2018). Much has not been written regarding the policies on nuclear proliferation and specific countries’ involvement in them, and in the case of Sweden, there has not been anything written from the perspective of realism. This is why the theory of realism will be used, to create a new perspective on Sweden’s policies and their impact. This will be done in the analysis, chapter 6, by analysing and evaluating the data and the findings from the perspective of realism.

3.2. The Security-development nexus

The second framework that has been used in this thesis is the security-development nexus. In the field of Peace and Development Studies, there is an understanding that the concepts of security and development are becoming increasingly more interlinked and connected. Thus, a nexus was created, mapping out the connection between security and development. In colonial times before the end of the Cold War, both security and development were decisive aspects of state policies in both colonial and post-colonial states. Security concerns governed the
development policies of the donors and development activities were embodied in counterinsurgency strategies (Nilsson, 2020).

In today’s international policy framework, the security-development nexus is strong and prevalent. Conflict prevention work, DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) and SSR (security sector reform) are crucial components of global development policy and are also influenced by the security-development nexus (Nilsson, 2020). Economic inequality, underdevelopment and poor governance are seen by policy-makers and researchers as the source of armed conflict and crime, which allowed for an explanation for terrorism. Thus, development is seen as more and more important and has been merged more with and subjected to security concerns (Buur, Jensen and Stepputat, 2007:9).

Many internal state policies combine security and development. In these policies, the subjects of development have been transformed into objects of security. State campaigns, often organised in the name of development, have criminalised and securitised citizens within selected spaces and are often disguised as ordinary development projects. A frequent component of this criminalisation and securitisation is the identification of “others”, deemed to be dangerous by the state and whom the state believes can be eliminated, contained and/or ignored. People who have been violated and excluded by these state projects tend to, after these practices have been implemented, redefine the conditions of their rights to livelihood, security and belongings, while at the same time attempting to legitimise their claim to citizenship. The security-development nexus highlights this and points to the connection between security and development (Buur, Jensen and Stepputat, 2007:32-33).

Within a state, the security-development nexus creates a situation in which security and development mutually reinforce each other. The conditions of development, such as economic growth, democritisation and social welfare, can only exist if the state has conditions for security, such as considerable domestic control, a strong defence and high levels of political legitimacy. In contexts where neither security nor development is obtainable, the mutuality of security and development deteriorates. The nexus thus claims that sustainable development is
closely linked with security and that security is often dependent on development (Stern and Öjendal, 2010).

In this thesis, the security-development nexus has been used to complement realism to create an understanding of how Sweden’s work towards achieving the SDGs has been affected by the Swedish government’s behaviour and policies regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation is connected to security studies, while the SDGs are a core part of international development, hence making the security-development nexus a good choice for examining the connection between nuclear proliferation and the SDGs. This will be done in the analysis, chapter 6, by analysing and evaluating the data and the findings from the perspective of the security-development nexus.
4. Methodological Framework

This chapter will provide the reader with an overview of the methodological framework that has been used when performing the thesis.

4.1. Methodological approach

When conducting this thesis, a qualitative content analysis with an abductive approach in the form of a desk thesis was performed. This is a frequent approach in document analysis and consists of analysing the selected documents to deduce themes or categories from the data that can then be presented as the result of the thesis (Bryman, 2016:563). The process starts with deciding the documents that will constitute the data selection and the researcher familiarising themselves with the data selection. After this, the initial coding process starts. The coding process entails identifying themes or categories in the documents that relate to the research questions. These themes or categories may be determined beforehand but may also appear when reading the data (Graneheim, Lindgren and Lundman, 2017).

There are different variations of qualitative content analysis. The variation that has been used in this thesis is an evaluative qualitative content analysis. This type of qualitative content analysis comprises of the assessment, classifying and evaluation of content. The data is assessed and categories are built, the levels of which are ordinarily set as ordinal numbers. An evaluative qualitative content analysis does not rigorously demand the definition of levels by ordinal scales. In certain cases, nominal scales that are not ranked or interval scales could also be used in combination with an evaluative qualitative content analysis. After coding the data, the categories can be used to investigate the hypothesis regarding correlations or test the initial hypothesis, for example by the use of crosstabs (Kuckartz and Rädiker, 2023:124-131).

An evaluative qualitative content analysis is generally holistic in the sense that it is the case as a whole that is evaluated rather than individual passages in the data collection. Using this type of qualitative content analysis, individual passages can be coded in more detail, but generally, the entire text is considered for a broader context to be included. The entire text is then evaluated in relation to the category it was placed in. Evaluative qualitative content analysis is case-oriented and is especially advisable in theory-oriented research. It is a method that demonstrates
that qualitative research is more than primarily exploring, and generating theories and is not advisable for testing theories. There are exceptions, such as an evaluative qualitative content analysis (Kuckartz and Rädiker, 2023:137-139).

The abductive logic of enquiry has been used in this thesis. Theory will be used in the thesis, but not as a point of departure nor will theory be developed from the data selection. Rather, theory will be used as a framework to create a better understanding and generate more perspectives on Sweden's policies on nuclear proliferation in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals. An abductive approach is useful as it provides a more thorough understanding of the research, especially as it uncovers significant underlying patterns that enable the integration of surface and deep structures in the data selection (Graneheim, Lindgren and Lundman, 2017).

4.2. Research design

This thesis is a case study. The reason for choosing a case study is that case studies analyse a specific case more in-depth and in detail and can better focus on the nature and complexity of the case. The object of interest is the case itself and the aim of the research is to produce an extensive examination of the case (Bryman, 2016:60-61).

This case study is part of the field of policy research as it examines a specific set of policies that a country has developed. Thus, this thesis is part of policy research but the case itself that the thesis examines is nuclear proliferation policies and policies on the sustainable development goals that Sweden has established or is involved in (Tight, 2019:125).

The case of Sweden was selected as it is very interesting and unique in the sense that Sweden’s security situation is that of being a neutral state between two great powers. Sweden is close to the United States of America (the USA) in terms of diplomatic relations and collaborations but also close to Russia in terms of geography, while at the same having had for centuries an official policy of neutrality in terms of international conflicts (Andersson, 2018).
4.3. Data selection

The data that has been selected for this thesis is different Swedish policies and statements. The specific policies that will be examined are as follows:

From the Swedish Government:

- Stockholmsinitiativet – ett förnyat engagemang för kärnvapennedrustning
- Regeringens fortsatta arbete för kärnvapennedrustning
- Nedrustning, icle-spridning och exportkontroll
- Proposition 2023/24:1. Budget propositionen för 2024 - Utgiftsområde 5 Internationell samverkan
- Proposition 2023/24:1. Budget propositionen för 2024 - Utgiftsområde 6 Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap
- Proposition 2023/24:1 Budget propositionen för 2024 – Utgiftsområde 7 Internationellt bistånd
- Swedish Government and Government of the United States of America: Agreement on Defence Cooperation

From the Swedish Parliament and Members of Parliament (MP):

- Yttrande 2022/23:UU4y Riksdagens skrivelser till regeringen och riksdagsstyrelsen – åtgärder under 2022
- Committee on Industry and Trade: Betänkande 2023/24:NU5. Ny kärnkraft i Sverige
- Committee on Defence: Allvarstid - Försvarsberedningens säkerhetspolitiska rapport 2023 (Departementsserien 2023:19).
- Swedish MP Berginger, E. et.al., Motion 2023/24. Arbete för kärnvapennedrustning och förhållningssätt till Nato
- Swedish MP Berginger, E. et.al., Motion 2023/23:2450. En förstärkning av det civila försvarset och krisberedskapen
- Swedish MP Berginger, E. SKRIFTLIG FRÅGA TILL STATSRÅD
• Swedish Foreign Minister Billström, T: FN:s dag för totalt avskaffande av kärnvapen (Svar på skriftlig fråga 2023/24:29 besvarad av Utrikesminister Tobias Billström (M)).
• Swedish MP Naraghi, L. SKRITLIG FRÅGA TILL STATSRÅD.
• Swedish Foreign Minister Billström, T: Kommande statspartsmöte (Svar på skriftlig fråga 2023/24:250 besvarad av Utrikesminister Tobias Billström (M)).
• Swedish MP Emilsson, A. et.al. Motion 2023/24:482. Säkerhetspolitik
• Swedish MP Guteland, J. Motion 2023/24:2658. Bevara förbehållet om att inte tillåta kärnvapen på svensk mark
• Swedish MP Johansson, M. et. al., Motion 2023/24:2562. Internationell samverkan
• Swedish MP Lakso, L. et. al. Motion 2023/24:1526. Ett globalt nuddrustningsavtal för utvinning av fossila bränslen
• Swedish MP Lundgren, K. et. al. Motion 2023/24:2466. Utrikes- och biståndspolitik

Swedish legislation:

• SFS 2000:140. Lag om inspektioner enligt internationella avtal om förhindrande av spridning av kärnvapen
• SFS 2005:278. Förordning om inspektioner enligt internationella avtal om förhindrande av spridning av kärnvapen
• SFS 2008:452. Förordning med instruktion för Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten

The data selection process started with the literature review. The literature review was conducted by using search tools such as Google Scholar, ResearchGate and OneSearch at the Linnaeus University Library. The policies and statements by the Swedish Government were selected via a search of “spridning av kärnvapen” (nuclear proliferation) or “kärnvapen” (nuclear weapons) on the Swedish Government’s website regeringen.se and the Swedish Parliament’s website riksdagen.se.
The policies and laws by the Swedish government and parliament were selected as they provide insight into the standpoint and legislation of the Swedish government regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation as well as the debates regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation that have taken place in the Swedish parliament.

All of the data was selected before the 9\textsuperscript{th} of December. Any data that would be relevant to this thesis but that was released after the mentioned date was not considered in this thesis. Sweden had a parliamentary election and elected a new government in September 2022. A few of the selected documents were written and published under the previous government and parliament but were included as they assisted in showing if and how the policies have changed since then. Because a relatively short amount of time has passed since the election, the thesis would have been too limited only to include documents from the current government.

4.4. Implementation

In this thesis, the categories were not decided beforehand, which meant that the coding process did not start until after completing the data selection and reading the documents. The thesis started with the literature review to determine the research gap and was then followed by the selection of the data, after which the examination and coding process began. The data collection was thoroughly read, after which evaluative categories were defined. These categories were decided based on the data and the research problem. As the research problem was the connection between policies on nuclear proliferation and the SDGs, the categories had to focus on that connection for it to be evaluated. The categories were decided because they were believed to cover several areas and angles in relation to the research problem. The categories were also decided based on features or topics that were mentioned in the data and that were then believed to be of value for the study.

After deciding the categories and their characteristics and levels, the data set was then coded one text at a time. All coded segments of the categories were then compiled on a case-by-case basis to determine the categories’ characteristics and develop levels. The final phase of the coding included the final assessment of the categories and an evaluative coding of the entire data collection. This was then detailed and organised in the findings, chapter 5, and later
analysed from the perspective of both realism and the security-development nexus in the analysis section. A further perspective was added with assistance from other articles on the topic. Finally, the thesis was concluded and the abstract was written.
5. Research findings

This chapter will provide a description of the findings of the evaluative qualitative content analysis. From the data, seven categories were created. These categories are Alignment with the SDGs, Positive Impact on the SDGs, Negative Impacts on the SDGs, International Collaboration, Adaptive Capacity, Global Leadership Role and Disarmament Efforts. All categories have four levels, three levels ranging from the most characteristics to the least characteristics in the policies. The fourth level is for policies that are unable to be classified because of a lack of information or unclarity. The specificity of the categories and the levels can be viewed in Appendix 2. In Appendix 3, a chart of the coding of every document can be viewed.

This chapter of the thesis has been divided into three parts. The first part will give a short account of what policies on nuclear proliferation Sweden has. The second part gives an account of the debate that is ongoing in the Swedish parliament on nuclear proliferation. The third part will detail the findings that came from the coding of the data and narrate each category one by one. This is a mere description of the findings, which will be further evaluated and analysed in the analysis, chapter 6.

5.1. Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation

Sweden has several policies on nuclear proliferation. The main theme is a focus on non-proliferation and disarmament rather than the creation of Swedish nuclear weapons or the increase of nuclear weapons globally. This is mentioned in several of the policies that were evaluated and is a theme in the policies and statements that come from the Swedish government. One policy from the government that was widely discussed in the media, especially regarding nuclear weapons is the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between the government of Sweden and the government of the USA (Eriksson, 2023; Lindberg, 2023; Youcefi and Radlovacki, 2023). However, this agreement does not mention nuclear weapons at all, nor nuclear proliferation.

Even though the bilateral defence agreement between Sweden and the USA not mentioning nuclear weapons, there are both international and national policies on nuclear proliferation in
Sweden, with the national policies being in the majority. The Stockholm Initiative is for example an international agreement that focuses on nuclear non-proliferation. However, it is also a policy of the current Swedish government to not sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), even though it works to prohibit nuclear weapons fully (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2017).

There are three laws concerning nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, radiological waste and radiation. In addition to this, there are yearly reports by the Swedish Committee of Defence that summarise and analyse the state of the world, including violence, conflicts and nuclear weapons acquisition. There are also statements from the parliament to the government regarding measures that have been taken during the year. The statement for the year 2022 was more focused on measures to achieve the SDGs rather than nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, but both areas were mentioned and discussed.

There are also parliamentary motions from different MPs in the Swedish parliament. These varied in their approach, but the general consensus is that all of them advocate for non-proliferation and disarmament of traditional weapons, WMDs and nuclear weapons. Although, despite this consensus, there was and is still debate on the issue in the Swedish parliament, especially since Sweden applied to join NATO.

5.2. The debate on nuclear proliferation in the Swedish parliament

When reading the documents and coding the data, it became clear that the Swedish parliament was split on the issue of nuclear power and nuclear proliferation. When coding it became clear that these two were related. Nuclear power was viewed by one side of parliament as something that would lead to easier and more access to nuclear weapons as Sweden would already have some of the technology and resources, thus increasing nuclear proliferation. At the same time increasing nuclear power was viewed as increasing the risk of exposing the Earth to more radiological waste. The other side of parliament viewed nuclear power as something that would increase Sweden’s security as Sweden would be in possession of the same technology and resources as every other nuclear state. The risk of radiological waste was also toned down by
this side, who believes they could contain it and chose to focus on the fossil free energy that comes from nuclear power plants.

In general, the entire parliament was against nuclear proliferation and supporting measures for non-proliferation. But the right-wing government and its support party, Sverigedemokraterna (the Swedish democrats) was more supportive of expanding nuclear power plants and supports NATO’s nuclear doctrine, while the opposition, especially Miljöpartiet (the left-wing environment party) was more against expanding nuclear power plants and supporting NATO’s nuclear doctrine. There were motions from different MPs from the opposition parties to stop the expansion of nuclear power and for Sweden to become more involved in, and sign, the TPNW which Sweden has not signed. This treaty is in alignment and positive for Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, but the fact that Sweden has not signed it is not and is in fact a hindrance to achieving the SDGs, as it goes against goal 16 (Peace, Justice and strong Institutions) of the SDGs. Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström said this about the TPNW in a statement:

“The Government believes that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has several shortcomings and does not offer a reliable or effective way towards either nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation or a promotion of peaceful use of nuclear technique. The government further considers that the TPNW, as a result of its design, is not compliant with the commitments that follows a membership in Nato.” (Billström, 2023b) (translated by author).

The debate in parliament focused on nuclear weapons and nuclear power both in relation to security and the climate, where both were viewed negatively and positively mainly depending on whom the author of the document or policy is. The left-wing MPs tended to focus more on the negative effects on Sweden’s security rather than the positive. But mostly, the focus was on the negative effects on the climate, especially in terms of radiological waste or the de-prioritisation of the climate in favour of Sweden’s security. The right-wing government and the right-wing support party tended to focus more on the positive effects on Sweden’s security and climate action. In these policies and documents, positive contributions or impacts from the policies on nuclear proliferation on both the security situation of Sweden and the climate in terms of more fossil-free energy such as nuclear power, were enhanced.
Most of the data is from 2023 after Sweden applied to join NATO, which is reflected in the data. NATO is mentioned many times, both in relation to nuclear proliferation and in relation to nuclear proliferation and the SDGs. The sentiment of the MPs in parliament was relatively positive to NATO, especially from the government parties and support party. However, the opposition had reservations, especially regarding non-proliferation and the work towards the SDGs.

5.3. The coding and categorisation

5.3.1. Alignment with the SDGs

For the first category, Alignment with the SDGs, the objective was to evaluate to what extent the Swedish policies and statements on nuclear proliferation aligned with the overarching principles of the SDGs. These principles are defined as ending poverty and inequality, protecting our planet and ensuring everyone enjoys peace and prosperity by 2030. The documents were assigned high alignment, moderate alignment, and low alignment or were determined to be unable to be classified. Out of 25 documents, 4 were determined to have high alignment, 14 displayed moderate alignment and 7 displayed low alignment with the overarching principles of the SDGs.

Thus, a majority of the data indicated that Sweden’s policies and statements on nuclear proliferation do align with the SDGs, but that there is room for improvement as only four policies showed high alignment and a total of seven policies showed low alignment. This means that four policies aligned very well with the overarching principles of the SDGs while seven policies aligned with the overarching principles of the SDGs to a very little degree.

When coding, several connections were found. One connection that was found when coding is the connection between climate and security. With the increasing climate change, an important part of the SDGs, comes, according to the data, increasing international instability and tension. The connection between climate and security can be found in several of the policies and is part
of the reason several of the policies align well with the overarching principles of the SDGs, as the policies align with the principles regarding both peace and the environment.

Försvarsberedningen, the Swedish Defence Committee, said this about the connection in their security policy report of 2023:

“*The connection between climate and security is clear. Climate change constitute a threat in itself and increases international tensions and instability as well as deepens existing conflicts. If vigorous measures are not taken to quickly reduce the global emissions of greenhouse gases, the 1.5-degree goal will be missed.*” (Försvarsberedningen, 2023:44) (translated by author)

Three policies that showed high or moderate alignment were the three areas of expenditure of the budget for 2024 that were evaluated in this thesis. These policies propose the budget of the Swedish state in three areas: International cooperation, Defence and societal emergency preparedness, and International aid. Considering which areas these policies focus on, it is positive for Agenda 2030 that they show high or moderate alignment with the SDGs since they will have an effect on policies on nuclear proliferation and the SDGs that are created during 2024.

Other policies that displayed high or moderate alignment with the SDGs are the parliamentary motions that were included in this study. The motions are all but one written by MPs that belong to a left-wing opposition party. The motion that was not written by a member of the opposition was written by a member of the government support party.

5.3.2. Positive Impacts on the SDGs
For the second category, Positive Impacts on the SDGs, the objective was to evaluate the positive contributions or impacts the Swedish policies and statements on nuclear proliferation could have on specific SDGs. The documents were assigned to have either many, some or few positive contributions or impacts, or were determined to be unable to be classified. Out of 25 documents, 2 displayed positive contributions or impacts on many SDGs, 9 displayed positive
contributions or impacts on some SDGs, 13 displayed positive contributions or impacts on few SDGs and 1 was unable to be classified.

Thus, even though the policies aligned with the SDGs overall, it was difficult to deduce any visible positive contributions or implications towards the SDGs. The section “few positive impacts” includes all policies that positively impacted three goals or less. Several policies positively impacted only one or perhaps two goals out of 17. When coding, it became clear that there was one goal in particular which aligned with all categories, namely goal 16, Peace, Justice and strong Institutions. Goal 16 is focused on peace, violence, weapons, security and more. Out of all 17 Sustainable Development Goals, it is the only goal that is related to the topic of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation (The United Nations, 2023).

In those cases where the alignment with the SDG is low, goal 16 is often a goal that the policy does align with, although sometimes not many other goals. But in those cases where more than one goal was positively affected it was for example goal 3 (good health and well-being), goal 5 (gender quality), goal 7 (affordable and clean energy), goal 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), goal 10 (reduced inequalities), goal 11 (sustainable cities and communities), goal 15 (life on land) and goal 17 (partnership for the goals) (The United Nations, 2023).

However, in the data, the words “globala målen” (Sustainable Development Goals) or names or targets of specific goals were not often mentioned. The SDGs were sometimes indirectly mentioned in the form of specific targets such as “klimatomställningen” (climate change) or the mention of “jämställdhet” (equality) and then from that it was deduced that it implied the SDGs. But that is a subjective judgement from the author as few of the policies actually mentioned the SDGs and rather hinted at them.

5.3.3. Negative Impacts on the SDGs
For the third category, Negative Impacts on the SDGs, the objective was to evaluate the negative consequences or challenges that Sweden’s policies and statements on nuclear proliferation could have on specific SDGs. The documents were assigned to have either many,
some or few consequences or impacts, or were unable to be classified. Out of 25 documents, 0 displayed negative consequences or challenges on many SDGs, 1 displayed negative consequences or challenges on some SDGs, 13 displayed negative consequences or challenges on few SDGs and 1 was unable to be classified.

The data therefore suggested that individual policies from Sweden on nuclear proliferation did not have negative consequences or challenges on several different SDGs. The level of “few negative impacts” adhered to those policies affecting three goals or less. At this level, some policies had negative consequences or challenges to only one goal, such as goal 16 (Peace, Justice and strong Institutions) or goal 13 (Climate action). These two were the most common goals to be affected negatively. But there were also policies that adhered to the same level even though they affected two goals negatively. This was not often the case, but those policies it applied to often affected goals 13 and 16. However, in certain cases other goals were affected as well. These goals were for example goal 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), goal 11 (sustainable cities and communities), goal 15 (life on land) and goal 17 (partnership for the goals) (The United Nations, 2023).

This, the fact that goals 13 and 16 sometimes were affected together by the same policies, is an interesting find. It is related to a connection that was also found, namely the connection between climate and WMD. Much of the data suggests a connection between the two, in particular concerning waste, such as radiological waste, that is created in nuclear plants and when creating nuclear weapons. Many of the policies that had negative consequences or challenges related to goals 13 or 16 had negative consequences or challenges for this reason. It was mentioned in several policies when nuclear power or WMD was discussed that the environment might come to harm from it. Yet it appears to be the position of the current Swedish government to continue and to expand the nuclear power plants in Sweden.

One more interesting finding is the DCA between the government of Sweden and the government of the USA. This agreement has low alignment with the SDGs and few positive contributions or implications on the SDGs. What it also has is some negative consequences or challenges for the SDGs. As this agreement is important for Sweden and its security, its
implications on the SDGs will matter for Sweden’s work towards achieving the SDGs.

5.3.4. International Collaboration
The fourth category, international collaboration had the objective of evaluating Sweden’s engagement in international collaborations and partnerships related to nuclear proliferation or the SDGs. The documents were assigned either much engagement, some engagement, little engagement or were unable to be classified, depending on how clearly the engagement was visible in the document. Out of 25 documents, 5 displayed much engagement, 4 displayed some engagement, 15 displayed little engagement and 1 was unable to be classified.

More than half of the policies displayed little engagement in international collaborations and partnerships related to nuclear proliferation or the SDGs. This level adhered to those policies that displayed engagement in less than three international collaborations and partnerships. This means that the Swedish policies on nuclear proliferation do not have a strong focus on being part of multiple international collaborations or partnerships, but rather believe that one or two or possibly zero is sufficient. Rather, what became apparent when coding was that the focus of most policies was on Sweden instead of the international community. The consequences and effect on the international community were not often discussed, but rather the effect on Sweden, occasionally in relation to the SDGs, although the goals were only indirectly mentioned in most policies. The actual SDGs or individual goals were not mentioned by name.

One particular international collaboration that was mentioned quite often in the data is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This treaty is the first major treaty concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1963) and is the background and inspiration for many other collaborations and partnerships regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMDs.

The NPT has been referenced multiple times in the data as a model for other collaborations and partnerships and as something that needs to be expanded and modernised. The Swedish government is working towards this in their international collaboration the Stockholm Initiative, which has drawn up suggestions for improvements for the NPT. This initiative was
designed and created by the former Swedish government and is a collaboration between different non-nuclear states to increase nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the world (Utrikesdepartementet, 2021). Former Foreign Minister of Sweden Ann Linde made a joint statement in 2021 with Germany’s then foreign minister Heiko Maas and Spain’s then foreign minister Arancha González Laya regarding this initiative which states:

“During a series of Minister meetings in Stockholm, Berlin, Amman and now in Madrid, we have developed more than 20 concrete proposals for strengthening the non-proliferation treaty and the implementation of the disarmament goals for the upcoming review conference.” (Utrikesdepartementet, 2021:2) (translated by author).

The current Swedish government have in other statements and policies stated their willingness to continue the Stockholm Initiative.

5.3.5. Adaptive Capacity
The fifth category, Adaptive Capacity, had the objective of evaluating the ability of Sweden, as seen in the policies and statements, to adapt its nuclear proliferation policies in response to changing circumstances, including shifts in the global context and SDG priorities. The documents were assigned high adaptability, moderate adaptability, low adaptability or were unable to be classified. Out of 25 documents 9 displayed high adaptability, 5 displayed moderate adaptability, 7 displayed low adaptability and 4 were unable to be classified.

14 out of 25 documents displayed high or moderate adaptability, while 11 displayed low adaptability or were not possible to classify. This number is not high percentage-wise and indicates that Sweden does have somewhat of an adaptability in response to changing circumstances in their nuclear proliferation policies and statements. In four of the policies, adaptability was not mentioned, displayed or hinted at all, making them impossible to categorise.
Many of the policies that mentioned, displayed or hinted at changes and adaptations that were made in relation to the War in Ukraine and the Russian aggression. A majority of the policies were created after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and mention the war in Ukraine as a major point of change in global politics and security. Most of the policies that displayed high or moderate adaptation related these changes or adaptations to the War in Ukraine. The War in Ukraine is also mentioned in several policies as an event that resulted in a change of priorities when it comes to issues to pursue. The data indicates a change in SDG priorities. Before the invasion goal 13 (Climate action) and goal 5 (Gender equality) were big priorities of the Swedish government. They still are priorities but it seems that goal 16 (Peace, Justice and strong Institutions) has become a bigger priority.

Three policies that displayed low adaptability were the three areas of expenditure of the proposed budget for 2024. These are policies that have been discussed and developed for many months by the government before being presented to the parliament for further debate. These policies are therefore more difficult to change than other policies, which is why this discovery is not surprising.

5.3.6. Global Leadership Role

The sixth category, Global Leadership Role, had the objective of evaluating the extent to which Sweden, as shown in the policies and statements, demonstrates leadership in global efforts to address nuclear proliferation or the SDGs. The documents were assigned either much leadership, some leadership, little leadership or were unable to be classified. Out of 25 documents 9 displayed much leadership, 7 displayed some leadership, 5 displayed little leadership and 4 were unable to be classified.

The data suggested that Sweden has a leading role globally regarding both nuclear proliferation and the SDGs, sometimes in connection to each other and sometimes alone. Four documents were unable to be classified. These documents did not discuss Sweden globally or in relation to the international community, and it was therefore not possible to evaluate their global leadership.
The level of much leadership adhered to those policies that displayed Sweden’s leading role in more than one global effort to address nuclear proliferation or promote SDGs. Although more than one global effort does not seem to be much, only nine documents out of 25 passed this characteristic. This is an indication of what was clear when coding, that the policies did not discuss Sweden’s global leadership role much. But, as can be deduced, Sweden’s global leadership role was discussed somewhat in the policies, as 16 out of 25 policies showed at least one global effort that Sweden had a leading role in. Although, unfortunately, many of these policies referred to the same global effort, the Stockholm Initiative, and not 16 individual efforts.

In this study, there were three types of documents, there were policies from the Swedish government, there were policies and statements from the Swedish parliament and different MPs and there were three laws concerning nuclear power and nuclear proliferation. The three laws had a common factor, that in all three laws, it was not possible to classify the global leadership role that Sweden has in global efforts to address nuclear proliferation and the SDGs. This is because it was not mentioned in the laws, which only focused on the situation in Sweden.

5.3.7. Disarmament Efforts

The seventh and final category, disarmament efforts, had the objective of evaluating Sweden’s perceived effort in the policies and statements on nuclear disarmament and the implications of said efforts for global peace and the SDGs, especially goal 16 (Peace, Justice and strong Institutions). The documents were assigned much efforts and implications, some efforts and implications, little efforts and implications or were not possible to classify. Out of 25 documents, 9 displayed much efforts and implications, another 9 displayed some efforts and implications, 6 displayed little efforts and implications and 1 was not possible to classify.

The data thus indicated that most Swedish policies on nuclear proliferation showed Sweden to have given much effort towards nuclear disarmament, although sometimes with positive implications and sometimes with limited implications. Overall, the data showed Sweden to have made several efforts in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. However, in the data, it was not always clear if these efforts indicated nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation or if they indicated disarmament and non-proliferation of traditional weapons. Disarmament and non-proliferation were often mentioned in the data, more often than specifically nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Sweden is mentioned multiple times in the data as a leading state in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

In the data, NATO and the Swedish application to join NATO are mentioned along with NATO’s doctrine on nuclear weapons. This doctrine is mentioned in a document by the Swedish government in the context of NATO’s structure and policies the Swedish government supports. The content of the doctrine is that NATO is working towards non-proliferation and disarmament but will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist (NATO, 2023). In the data, NATO and the Swedish application to join are mentioned many times, often in connection to disarmament and non-proliferation. The nuclear doctrine is mentioned in one policy, the area of expenditure for Defence and societal emergency preparedness in the proposed budget for 2024:

“Sweden should be a credible, reliable and solidary member of Nato and live up to the commitments that follow the membership. Sweden is in favour of Nato’s nuclear doctrine and strategic deterrence. As a member of Nato, Sweden will over time participate broadly in efforts, activities and operations within the framework of Nato’s deterrence and defence measures.“ (Sveriges Regering, 2023b:40) (translated by author)

Another finding was found in the proposed budget for 2024. There were three areas of expenditure in the budget proposal for 2024 that were examined in this thesis. Nuclear disarmament efforts are mentioned and discussed the least in the area of expenditure called Defence and societal emergency preparedness. The other two areas of expenditure of the budget for 2024 that are included in this thesis displayed much and some disarmament efforts, while this particular area of expenditure displayed only little disarmament efforts. This means that the policy that displayed little efforts in the area of disarmament and indicated little implications of said efforts for global peace and the SDGs was the area of expenditure that focused on defence, an area of global politics that generally is focused on weapons and disarmament.
6. Analysis

In this chapter, the findings of the evaluative qualitative content analysis will be analysed to create further perspectives and a greater understanding of the topic. The findings will be analysed and discussed with the assistance of articles on the topic that are mentioned in the literature review, chapter 2. The findings will also be analysed from the perspectives of the analytical framework, realism and the security-development nexus that is mentioned in chapter 3, analytical framework. With the assistance of this, the research questions will be answered and the research objective achieved.

6.1. The connection between nuclear proliferation and sustainable development

The findings of the evaluative qualitative content analysis show that the connection between nuclear proliferation and the SDGs is visible and profound. This is most likely due to a connection between security and climate. In the Swedish parliament, the debate on nuclear weapons supported this connection as the different MPs seemed to refer to this connection. Some MPs argued that nuclear weapons and power contributed to decreased security and danger and damage the climate. Other MPs argued that nuclear weapons and power contributed to increased security and actions that are positive for the climate and climate change. This debate is interesting but not that surprising. The MPs that supported nuclear power and weapons were right-wing MPs and the MPs that opposed were left-wing MPs. Traditionally, climate change has been something that has engaged voters and politicians from the left far more than the right (Rönnerstrand, 2022).

An interesting finding is the fact that the Swedish government openly supports NATO’s nuclear doctrine which states that NATO will always be a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist (NATO, 2023). This is especially interesting since the findings also show that Sweden’s policy is one of non-proliferation and disarmament. It seems to me that these two statements are contradictory. NATO states that they work for disarmament and non-proliferation as well (NATO, 2023), but how much is the alliance really working for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament when the core members are the three nuclear states of the USA, the UK and
France? How can Sweden support this doctrine of being a nuclear alliance while Sweden at the same time is a global leader in both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the SDGs?

These two positions that Sweden has do not seem to align and could potentially put Sweden in a difficult position should a nuclear threat arise. The findings suggest that Sweden’s work towards the SDGs has been impacted both positively and negatively by Sweden’s nuclear proliferation policies. Nuclear proliferation has practically only negative implications for the SDGs, which is backed up by literature on the subject, but since Sweden’s policies focus on non-proliferation and disarmament there are positive implications too (Hunt, 2022; McGowan, 2021; Office for UN Affairs and Soka Gakkai International, 2019; ICAN, 2019).

The literature argues that nuclear proliferation is causing great harm to the SDGs and that Sweden should sign the TPNW to combat this (Hunt, 2022; McGowan, 2021; Office for UN Affairs and Soka Gakkai International, 2019; ICAN, 2019). However, in the findings, it becomes clear that even though Sweden has not signed the TPNW, the Swedish policies have negative implications for few SDGs, and align with the SDGs to some degree. This is a good indication that Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation affect the SDGs positively. However, the findings also display positive impacts on few SDGs, which is less positive. Overall, almost all policies affect at least one SDG positively, and sometimes no SDG negatively. I believe this to be because Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation focus on non-proliferation and disarmament and is not a nuclear state.

6.2. The perspective of realism

Analysing the findings from the perspective of one of the frameworks, realism, is clear that the findings fits somewhat into realism, but not entirely. One of the key concepts of realism is the state as the most important international actor. Realism focuses on a state’s behaviour and how it is guided by interests and internal attributes (Mearsheimer, 2001:17). This is something that is observed in the findings and a common denominator between the theory of realism and the findings. When coding the data, it was clear that Sweden more often was the focus of the policies rather than the international community. In the Swedish policies, the focus was more often on how Sweden could be affected by the policies and the current state of the world rather
than how the international community could be affected. The realism concept of the state as the most important actor connects thus to this finding as the state and the state’s interests are the most important for the said state (Mearsheimer, 2001:17).

This finding was deduced from the category Global Leadership Role, which evaluates Sweden’s leadership in global efforts to address nuclear proliferation and the SDGs. Sweden is not one of the great powers of the world and has therefore most likely limited influence in global politics. But what Sweden does have, according to the findings, is a leading role in certain global efforts, despite being a smaller country. This goes against realism, which focuses on great powers and believes that they control global politics, which they mostly do. But what realism disregards is the role smaller countries such as Sweden can play internationally in global efforts (Mearsheimer, 2001:17). This is where the findings differ from realism, as they suggest a small country such as Sweden can play a large role internationally in global efforts.

However, the findings also show that Sweden focuses on itself and its own interests. This is yet another concept of realism, which believes that a state always will act according to its own interests (Mearsheimer, 2001:17). But since those interests are, according to the findings, at least occasionally, connected to the SDGs and achieving specific targets, then it is not necessarily a bad thing. For example, the Stockholm Initiative, which works for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (Utrikesdepartementet, 2021) and thus goal 16 of the SDGs (Office for UN Affairs and Soka Gakkai International, 2019; ICAN, 2019).

The debate in the Swedish parliament showed that some MPs and parties believed that Sweden would be more safe and secure with more nuclear power plants and being part of the nuclear alliance that is NATO. This belief is central to realism, as realism believes that obtaining nuclear weapons makes a state safer against other states (Hymans, 2010). So far, the findings and realism go hand in hand, but as the findings also show that Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation are those of non-proliferation and disarmament, the similarities with realism end there.
The realist belief that obtaining nuclear weapons makes one safer (Hymans, 2010) is something that is not visible in the category of disarmament efforts. This category displayed that a vast majority of the policies displayed some or much disarmament efforts and implications for global peace and the SDGs. This is not compatible with realism, as it means that Sweden’s security is compromised (Hymans, 2010). However, it is positive for the SDGs, as non-proliferation and disarmament go hand in hand with sustainability and climate by many is seen as a security issue (McGowan, 2021).

6.3. The perspective of the security-development nexus

When conducting this study, the connection between security and climate was found. This has been discussed from the perspective of realism. But it is also important to discuss from the perspective of the security-development nexus. The security-development nexus is based on the notion that development and security are becoming more and more interlinked. Part of the development is climate change. Thus, climate change and security are closely connected from the perspective of the security-development nexus (Buur, Jensen and Stepputat, 2007:9). As this connection is part of the core of the security-development nexus, it is not surprising from the view of the nexus that Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation affect the SDGs in both positive and negative ways and that the two are closely connected.

The majority of the policies that were evaluated had either moderate or high alignment with the SDGs. This is positive and is an indication that the Swedish policies on nuclear proliferation affect the SDGs to a somewhat large degree and in a mainly positive way. The security-development nexus supports this notion as security and development are becoming more entwined in global politics and are often combined in state policies (Buur, Jensen and Stepputat, 2007:32-33), such as many of the Swedish policies on nuclear proliferation that also mention for example climate change, equality, clean energy and in some cases, global partnership.

The sustainable development that is mentioned in the policies confirms another notion of the security-development nexus. The nexus states that sustainable development is closely linked with security and that security is often dependent on development (Stern and Öjendal, 2010). Applying this notion to the findings, the Swedish work towards the SDGs is linked to the
policies on nuclear proliferation, namely non-proliferation and disarmament. Following this reasoning, the policies on nuclear proliferation are dependent on the work towards the SDGs. The success of the SDGs depends on the work for non-proliferation and disarmament being successful too. The work for non-proliferation and disarmament can only be successful if the work towards the SDGs, and thus peace, continues.

There is not much in the study that contradicts the security-development nexus. However, since the connection between security and development is as prevalent as it is, one would think that it would be discussed more and that the connection between nuclear proliferation and the SDGs would be stronger and more visible in the policies on nuclear proliferation. Sweden is a leading state in both non-proliferation and disarmament and sustainable development. One would therefore think that Sweden would mention this connection more in their policies, and perhaps not be so quick to accept NATO’s nuclear doctrine when becoming a member of the alliance.
7. Conclusions

In this chapter, the thesis will be concluded and the research question will be answered clearly along with the research problem which is the connection between nuclear proliferation and the SDGs in Sweden and how nuclear proliferation affects sustainable development.

The first research question of what Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation are can be concluded as nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation have many different angles and details, but the main theme is that Sweden is against nuclear proliferation and is advocating for the non-proliferation of all WMDs. Sweden is also heavily advocating disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

The second research question relates to this as it asks how the debate on nuclear proliferation in the Swedish parliament relates to the SDGs. The answer to this is that the different Swedish MPs often connect nuclear proliferation and other security issues with issues related to the SDGs, often climate and climate change. The debate in parliament is on nuclear power and the nuclear alliance NATO that Sweden has applied to join. The government parties’ and support party’s MPs are often enhancing the positive implications for both security and the climate and SDGs that nuclear power and being in a nuclear alliance have. The opposition parties’ MPs are often enhancing the negative implications for both security and the climate and SDGs that nuclear power and being in a nuclear alliance have. Thus, the debate in parliament on nuclear proliferation relates clearly to the SDGs and discusses the negative and positive implications it has for mainly the climate.

The third research question of how Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation affect the SDGs is a complex question that does not have a short answer. It is clear from the findings of the study that the policies on nuclear proliferation do affect the SDGs, both positively and negatively. The main goals that are affected are goal 13 (Climate change) and goal 16 (Peace, Justice and strong Institutions), which are affected both positively and negatively depending on the policy. Other goals are also affected, such as goal 5 (Gender equality), goal 17 (Partnership for the goals) and goal 7 (Affordable and clean energy). These goals are affected to a lesser extent, sometimes negatively and sometimes positively.
To summarise the research problem, in Sweden, the work towards the SDGs is affected in multiple ways by the Swedish policies on nuclear proliferation. This is because of the connection between security and climate which is evident in the findings and is confirmed by the security-development nexus, which highlights the connection between security and development. Realism was also used in this thesis, which mainly focuses on nuclear proliferation and not the SDGs. Sweden’s policies conform to this theory to some extent, but not entirely.

This thesis highlights the connection between nuclear proliferation and the SDGs in Sweden. This is an angle that has not been researched to a great extent and future research should therefore examine it further and deeper since this study is limited. It would be interesting to look more at the implications for specific SDGs or perhaps the relationship between policies on nuclear proliferation and policies on sustainable development. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine different political parties’ views and policies on both subjects and their connection. It would also be interesting to examine this connection in a nuclear country such as the USA or UK and see if those findings are different from the ones in this study.
Bibliography


Emilsson, A. et. al. (2023) Motion 2023/24:482. Säkerhetspolitik. www.riksdagen.se


*Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. Opened for signature 1 July 1968

*Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*. Opened for signature 20 September 2017


Appendix 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Sustainable Development Goals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No poverty</td>
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<td>2. Zero hunger</td>
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<td>3. Good health and well-being</td>
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<td>4. Quality education</td>
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<td>5. Gender equality</td>
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<td>6. Clean water and sanitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Affordable and clean energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Decent work and economic growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure</td>
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<td>10. Reduced inequalities</td>
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<td>11. Sustainable cities and communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Responsible consumption and production</td>
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<td>13. Climate action</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Life below water</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Life on land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Peace, justice and strong institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Partnership for the Goals</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix 2

#### Category definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.</th>
<th>Name of category</th>
<th>Alignment with the SDGs</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Content description</td>
<td>The extent to which Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation aligns with the overarching principles of SDGs (Ending poverty and inequality, protecting our planet and ensuring everyone enjoys peace and prosperity by 2030.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|    | Levels | - High Alignment: The policy aligns very well with the overarching principles of the SDGs.  
- Moderate Alignment: The policy aligns somewhat with the overarching principles of the SDGs.  
- Low Alignment: The policy aligns very little with the overarching principles of the SDGs.  
- Unable to Classify Alignment: It is unclear if the policy aligns with any overarching principles of the SDGs. |

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<tr>
<th>2.</th>
<th>Name of category</th>
<th>Positive Impacts on the SDGs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Content description</td>
<td>Positive contributions or impacts of Sweden’s nuclear proliferation policies on specific SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Levels</td>
<td>- Many Positive Impacts: The policy implies positive contributions or impacts on more than ten SDG.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of category</th>
<th>Negative Impacts on the SDGs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content description</strong></td>
<td>Negative consequences or challenges of Sweden’s nuclear proliferation policies on specific SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Many Negative Impacts: The policy implies negative consequences or challenges on more than ten SDGs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some Negative Impacts: The policy implies negative consequences or challenges on four or more SDG.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few Negative Impacts: The policy implies negative consequences or challenges on less than four SDG.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unable to Classify Negative Impacts: It is unclear if the policy has any negative impacts on the SDGs.</td>
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</table>

### 4.

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<tr>
<th>Name of category</th>
<th>International Collaboration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content description</strong></td>
<td>Sweden’s engagement in international collaborations and partnerships related to nuclear proliferation or the SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Much Engagement: The policy implies that Sweden is actively</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
engaged in more than seven international collaborations and partnerships related to nuclear proliferation or the SDGs.

- Some Engagement: The policy implies that Sweden is actively engaged in at least three international collaboration or partnership related to nuclear proliferation or the SDGs.
- Little Engagement: The policy implies that Sweden is actively engaged in less than three its international collaborations and partnerships related to nuclear proliferation or the SDGs.
- Unable to Classify Engagement: It is unclear in the policy what Sweden’s engagement in international collaborations and partnerships is or if it is related to nuclear proliferation or the SDGs.

5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of category</th>
<th>Adaptive Capacity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content description</td>
<td>Sweden’s ability to adapt its nuclear policies in response to changing circumstances, including shifts in the global context and SDG priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels</td>
<td>• High Adaptability: The policy implies that Sweden have made or can make more than three different efforts at adapting its nuclear policies in response to changing circumstances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• **Moderate Adaptability:** The policy implies that Sweden have made or can make at least one effort at adapting its nuclear policies in response to changing circumstances.

• **Low Adaptability:** The policy implies that Sweden has made or can make no efforts at adapting its nuclear policies in response to changing circumstances.

• **Unable to Classify Adaptability:** It is unclear in the policy if Sweden is able to adapt or has adapted its nuclear policies.

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<tr>
<th>6.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name of category</strong></td>
<td>Global Leadership Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content description</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which Sweden demonstrates leadership in global efforts to address nuclear proliferation and promote SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Demonstrates much leadership:</strong> The policy implies that Sweden has taken a leading role in more than one global effort to address nuclear proliferation or promote SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Demonstrates some leadership:</strong> The policy implies that Sweden has taken a leading role in one global effort to address nuclear proliferation or promote SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Demonstrates little leadership:</strong> The policy implies that Sweden has not taken a leading role in global efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to address nuclear proliferation or promote SDGs.

- Unable to Classify the demonstration of leadership: It is unclear in the policy if Sweden is demonstrating leadership in global efforts at all or if the efforts are addressing nuclear proliferation and the SDGs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of category</td>
<td>Disarmament Efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content description</td>
<td>Sweden’s effort in nuclear disarmament and their implications for global peace and the SDGs, especially goal 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Much Efforts and Implications: The policy implies that Sweden has made efforts in nuclear disarmament, which has had positive implications for global peace and the SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some Efforts and Implications: The policy implies that Sweden has made efforts in nuclear disarmament but that it has had limited implications for global peace and the SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Little Efforts and Implications: The policy implies that Sweden has made little effort in nuclear disarmament and that it has had limited implications for global peace and the SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unable to Classify Efforts and Implications: It is unclear in the policy what effort Sweden has made towards nuclear disarmament or it is</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Unclear what the implications for global peace and the SDGs are.
Appendix 3

Coding of all cases into categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Alignment with the SDGs</th>
<th>Positive Impacts on the SDGs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Stockholmsinitiativet – ett förnyat engagemang för kärnvapenredrasfatt</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>Regeringens fortsatta arbete för kärnvapenredrasfatt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nedrasfatt, icke-spredning och exportkontroll</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 2023/24:1. Budget.propositionen för 2024 - Utgiftsområde 5 Interna Moderate</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Proposition 2023/24:1. Budget.propositionen för 2024 - Utgiftsområde 6 Första Moderate</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Swedish Government and Government of the United States of America: Agree</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee of Defence: Allvarslöst - Förväntningar om skyddspolitiska utsatte Moderate</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yumane 2022/3-UU4y Riksdagens skrivelse till regeringen och riksdagsstyrelse Moderate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Industry and Trade: Rutinskande 2023/4:NUS, Ny kärnkraft i Sv Moderate</td>
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<td>Swedish MP Lasko, L, et al. Motion 2023/24:1526, För globala nedrustningsavtal High</td>
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<td>Swedish MP Lundgren, K, et al. Motion 2023/24:2466, Utökade- och bättreförbindelser Moderate</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Impacts on the SDGs</th>
<th>International Collaboration Adaptive Capacity</th>
<th>Global Leadership</th>
<th>Rel</th>
<th>Disarmament Efforts</th>
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<td>The Case of the SDGs</td>
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