Teaching a Child to Walk – perspectives on the contemporary situation in Kosovo

Author: Olof Emilsson
Tutor: Daniel Silander
Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to achieve a greater understanding of the contemporary situation in Kosovo. This understanding is to be made concrete by viewing the international community’s and the domestic actor’s view of the root causes to the contemporary situation. First, the historical background and the contemporary political-, economical- and societal situation of the province are presented. Secondly follows the International Community’s- and the domestic actors stated view that is analyzed using the theories of Political Culture, Relative Deprivation and Human Needs.

The method that I have chosen is the qualitative together with Semi Structured Interviews that took place in Kosovo during spring 2007.

I find in my analysis that the view of the International Community and the domestic actors differ. The international community judge the root causes to be foremost the economy, historical legacy and unresolved status and that these have an Interest need based feature. The Kosovo Albanian elite deems that the economy, dual administration, living in a post-communist society and the unresolved status are the most important root causes. The Kosovo Serbs judge them to be lack of political stability and security, and the unresolved status. These needs are Value- and Human Need based to a greater extent than the International Community’s stated ones.

Keywords: Kosovo, International and Domestic Perspective, Relative Deprivation, Human Needs
Foreword and acknowledgment

The preparation for this Thesis began autumn 2006 when I applied for a Minor Field Study (MFS) scholarship in order to go to a developing country of my choice to collect data for my Master Thesis. Since I am studying Peace- and Development Work and am interested in Security Politics in Europe I could think of few places better to go to than Kosovo. It has a bad ring to it, but it offers an excellent field of study for researchers and scientists of my discipline, because in Kosovo peace and development really come together.

It was during one of the preparatory meetings with my tutor that a Bachelor student with an attachment to Kosovo made the semblance of the International Community's efforts to develop Kosovo as a process of teaching a child to walk. After I had spent some time in Kosovo and got an insight of the province I found the resemblance very striking. Because the International Community can very much be recognized as a parent with a pre-set world image of how the learning should take place and who does not always understand why the child is not learning fast enough and the way the parent wants. The problem is that the child and the parent might view the process differently. Of how the learning should take place and toward what direction the child should walk. Their perspectives regarding the process of Teaching a Child to Walk differ.

There are so many people who have helped and contributed to the making of this thesis, a Thank You to you all. However, some of them deserve a special mentioning. To begin with, Växjö University and SIDA for allowing me to have the opportunity to go to Kosovo, it has been a very insightful experience. Thank you to everybody I have interviewed in Kosovo and for allowing me to use your valuable perspective of the province in this thesis. Finally, a special thanks to some who have provided that additional help, whom without this thesis could never have been written: Rozeta Hajdari, Jennifer Ober, Jhimmy Liljekrantz, Caja Augustzén and finally my tutor Daniel Silander.
List of abbreviations

1244 The Security Council Resolution on Kosovo
AAK Alliance for Kosova
EU European Union
ICG International Crisis Group
IMF International Monetary Fund
JNA Yugoslavian National Army
KFOR Kosovo Force
KLA Kosova Liberation Army
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS Kosovo Police Service
LDK Democratic League of Kosova
MFS Minor Field Study
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
OSCE Organisation for Peace and Security in Europe
PDK Democratic Party of Kosova
PTK Post and Telecom of Kosova
SIDA Swedish International Development cooperation Agency
SKLM Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USAID United States Agency for International Aid
WB World Bank
# Table of Content

Abstract
Foreword and acknowledgment
List of abbreviations

1. Introduction ................................................................. 1
   1.1 Background ............................................................ 1
   1.2 Problem and Aim .................................................. 2
   1.3 Questions .................................................................. 2
   1.4 Delimitation............................................................... 2
   1.5 Disposition ............................................................... 3

2. Theory ........................................................................... 4
   2.1 Political Culture ....................................................... 4
   2.2 Relative Deprivation and Human Needs ...................... 5
   2.3 Summary ................................................................... 8

3. Method .......................................................................... 9
   3.1 Interview structure and participants ............................. 10
   3.2 Material .................................................................... 11
     3.2.1 Evaluation of the Sources ................................. 11

4. Historical and Contemporary presentation of the situation in Kosovo .......... 13
   4.1 The history of Kosovo ............................................... 13
     4.1.1 The Albanian ancestry ........................................... 13
     4.1.2 The Ottomans and the battle of Kosovo Polje ............... 13
     4.1.3 The Ottomans disappear and the Serbs rise to power ....... 14
     4.1.4 The Second World War and the creation of Yugoslavia .... 16
   4.2 The contemporary situation ....................................... 17
     4.2.1 Political situation .................................................. 17
     4.2.2 The economic situation .......................................... 20
     4.2.3 The societal situation ............................................. 22

5. Perspectives on the root causes ........................................ 23
   5.1 The international community’s view ............................. 23
     5.1.1 Economy, infrastructure, unemployment .................. 23
     5.1.2 Historical legacy .................................................. 25
     5.1.3 Unresolved status ............................................... 26
     5.1.4 Lack of social harmony between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians 28
     5.1.5 Lack of proper education ....................................... 29
   5.2 The domestic Albanian view ....................................... 31
     5.2.1 Economy, poor region, infrastructure, unemployment .... 31
     5.2.2 Unresolved Status ................................................ 33
     5.2.3 Problem of establishing a new state in post-communist Kosovo .... 34
     5.2.4 Dual administration of UNMIK and Kosovo Government .... 35
   5.3 The domestic Serbian view ......................................... 38
     5.3.1 Lack of security ................................................... 38
     5.3.2 Lack of political stability ....................................... 39
     5.3.3 Unresolved status ................................................. 40
   5.4 Summary .................................................................... 41
6. Conclusion ................................................................................................. 43
   6.1 Concluding remarks ............................................................................. 44

7. References .............................................................................................. 45

Appendix ....................................................................................................... 49

Tables

Table 4.1 Most important problems in Kosovo according to Kosovo Albanians and non-Serb minorities ................................................................. 19
Table 4.2 Selected Economic indicators for Kosovo ........................................ 21
Table 4.3 Kosovo’s HDI .................................................................................. 21
Table 4.4 Kosovo’s HPI .................................................................................. 21
Table 5.1 Summary of the International community’s view ........................... 30
Table 5.2 Summary of the International Community’s- and the Domestic Albanian view ............................................................ 36
Table 5.3 Summary of the International Community’s-, Domestic Albanian- and the Domestic Serbian view ......................................................... 41

Figures

Figure 2.1 Relative Deprivation ................................................................. 6
Figure 2.2 Relative Deprivation and Unsatisfied Need merged ................... 7
Figure 2.3 Summary of the Theory ............................................................ 8
Figure 5.1 Economy, Infrastructure, Unemployment .................................. 23
Figure 5.2 Historical legacy ........................................................................ 25
Figure 5.3 Unresolved status ...................................................................... 26
Figure 5.4 Lack of social harmony between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians .......................................................... 28
Figure 5.5 Lack of proper education ........................................................... 29
Figure 5.6 Economy, poor region, infrastructure, unemployment ............... 31
Figure 5.7 Unresolved status ...................................................................... 33
Figure 5.8 Problem of establishing a new state in post-communist Kosovo .... 34
Figure 5.9 Dual administration of UNMIK and Kosovo Government ........... 35
Figure 5.10 Lack of security ........................................................................ 38
Figure 5.11 Lack of political stability .......................................................... 39
Figure 5.12 Unresolved status .................................................................... 40
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Noel Malcolm, a British historian, states in the introduction of his book “Kosovo – A short History” that one of the few things that all the parties in the Yugoslav conflict of the 1990’s can agree on is that “the Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo, and it will end in Kosovo”.

This is connected to the former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic statement “No one should dare to beat you” which he uttered to a Serbian crowd at a meeting in Kosovo 1987 after it had gotten out of hand and violence had broken out between Serbian civilians and the police. This statement was the real beginning to his Serb-nationalistic political carrier. After the meeting his popularity rose and he was a changed man when it came to politics. He started to outmanoeuvre and replace people in the Serbian politics and governing bodies more loyal to him. As a consequence of that, the autonomic Serbian provinces of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro lost their former autonomy of the Yugoslav era. As a reaction to this development and the rising nationalism in Serbia, political mobilization occurred in Croatia and Slovenia and the Yugoslav federation started to dissolve. Therefore, the Yugoslav crisis can be said to have started in Kosovo.

When war came to Kosovo, a province which both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians claims as theirs, the troubling history of the province came to live and took an expression of targeting each others national symbols. It was not by coincidence that Serbian troops during the war of 1999 blew up the preserved house in Prizren, where meetings 1878 led to the creation of “The league of Prizren” and the birth of modern Albanian nationalism. Weeks after that, when NATO troops entered Kosovo on June 12th, Albanians answered and began to topple statues of medieval Serbian kings. “For in Kosovo, history in not really about the past, but about the future.” History has shaped contemporary Kosovo and much of the arguments that the Kosovo Albanians used when they choose a peaceful path to fulfil their aspirations regarding independence from Yugoslavia and Serbia during the early 1990’s lies in the history of the region. The same goes for the Serbs who also claim Kosovo as theirs. I experienced this when I was in Mitrovica April 18th 2007 and a banderol on the Serbian side of the divided city stated “In the name of God and Justice do not make our holy land a present to the Albanians”. This statement really gives an outside observer an indicator of how emotional the future status question is, both for the Serbs and the Albanians.

Today, the former Yugoslav republics and provinces have gained their independence one after another and are in a process to consolidate their democracies and self-governing. They have also started improve their relations with the rest of Europe and some have either joined EU or are in a negotiating phase to do so in the future. Kosovo is the last old province of the Yugoslav era that wants, but still has not gained their independence. Hence is the latter half of the statement in the beginning valid, the remnants of the Yugoslav crisis will have a chance to come to a close when the Kosovo question is resolved.

1 Malcolm, 1998, p. xliiv
3 Resic, 2006, p. 261-263
4 Judah, 2000, p. 1-2
5 This will be further elaborated in chapter 4.
1.2 Problem and Aim

The number of international organisations in Kosovo, who posses the financial and economic power and capital to turn the situation around in this post-war society, are numerous. They view the root causes\(^6\) to the contemporary situation\(^7\) differently and in their own way, the same goes for the domestic actors in the region. I do not believe it is incorrect to assume that it is better for Kosovo if all the different actors see the situation in the same way and work together in order to create a better future for the province. But what if the international community does not have the same view of Kosovo’s problem that the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs have? There might be a real hazard then due to the fact that the international community are trying to solve problems and closing gaps of frustrations in Kosovo when the people there have other priorities and perspectives than the international community has. It is vitally important to recognize that domestic and international actors might have different perceptions of a given situation in a region and that “we in the west” – the international community - should recognize the domestic actors’ perception and not just limit our self to our own perception of the root causes to a situation. It is important to study Kosovo because it has been somewhat of a “peace building exercise” of the international community and we can learn from each such exercise.

*The purpose of this thesis is to achieve a greater understanding of the contemporary situation in Kosovo. This understanding is to be made concrete by viewing the international community’s and the domestic actor’s perceptions of the root causes to the contemporary situation.*

1.3 Questions

- What is, according to the international community, the root causes to the contemporary situation?
- What is, according to the domestic actors, the root causes to the contemporary situation?
- Does the view of the international community and the domestic actor’s differ?

1.4 Delimitation

First, I have focused on the contemporary situation in Kosovo and its root causes. However, one must first know the background to the contemporary situation if one is to understand the root causes. Hence, this is presented in chapter 4.

Second, there is a great deal of actors in contemporary Kosovo, both international and domestic. When it comes to the international ones I have tried to identify the most important ones, United Nations Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Red Cross. Some interesting Non Govermental Organisations (NGO) has also been covered, such as International Crisis Group (ICG) and the

\(^6\) By the root causes I mean the reasons that have created the contemporary situation. One can by simpler words call them the main problems of contemporary Kosovo.

\(^7\) By the contemporary situation in Kosovo I mean that Kosovo, despite international attention, resources and presence since 1999 still lacks many of the conditions needed for a fully functioning society. This will be further explored in chapter 4.
Olof Palme Centre. There have also been some focus on the Swedish actors; the reason for this is that Sweden is an important donor in Kosovo. In 2006 Sweden contributed with 220 million SEK and 500 soldiers and police officers.\(^8\) In currency, Sweden is with that the second biggest bilateral donor after USA.

I have tried to identify the elites in Kosovo to get their domestic view on the contemporary situation. The reason for this is when I prepared for the study, a picture emerged that the traditional society is vivid in the province and that the elites that emerges has bonds with families and relatives, a form of clan society. How widespread this phenomenon is, is hard to say and to make any such implication is not my intent with this thesis. However, true or not, elites always have influence in a region, and the political parties of contemporary Kosovo are the parties that will rule or have influence in the near future. That is why there has been some focus on the political elites. The four largest Kosovo Albanian parties have been interviewed, which represents approximately 95% of the total population. The largest Serbian party which represents the Serbian minority, some 5% of the total population, was also covered. Finally a representative from the business sector, Post and Telecom of Kosova (PTK), and some governmental- and non governmental representatives was interviewed in order to balance the political parties view.\(^9\)

### 1.5 Disposition

Directly after this chapter follows chapter 2 Theory, where Political Culture, Relative Deprivation and Human Needs will be presented, the merger between the two latter of these theories ends up in my analytical framework and will be used in later on in the thesis. Chapter 3 Method contains the method of my choice, the qualitative one, as well as a presentation of the interview structure and material used. In order to understand the root causes of the contemporary situation, one must first know the history of Kosovo. History is very much vivid in this province and an explanation to many of the contemporary problems. Therefore deals Chapter 4 with the Historical and Contemporary presentation of the situation in Kosovo. In chapter 5, Perspectives of the root causes, the results are presented. This is the chapter where the merger of Relative Deprivation and Human Needs will be applied. Then follows the final chapter Conclusion where I present some personal concluding thoughts.

---

\(^8\) [http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?a=634010](http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?a=634010)

\(^9\) See chapter 7 References for a more thorough presentation
2. Theory

In this chapter I will discuss the theory of my choice. First I will deal with the Political Science theory of Political Culture. Secondly follows my theory of choice, Relative Deprivation and Human Needs and the merger between these, which thirdly, end up in my analytical framework.

2.1 Political Culture

The political culture is a term which refers to specific political guidelines – attitudes to the political system and its different parts, as well as the individual’s attitude towards his role in the system. In a political culture, the political system is internalised in people’s cognitions, feelings and evaluations. The citizens are “born” into the culture in the same way that they are socialised into apolitical roles and the social system of the norms and values that is distinguishing for the society in question.

The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of the nation. (...)

“Orientation” refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes (1) “cognitive orientation”, that is, knowledge of an belief of the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs; (2) “affective orientation,” or feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance, and (3) “evaluational orientation,” the judgments and political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings.¹⁰

There are three types of political cultures. The first one is Parochial Political Culture; an example of such a culture is the African tribal society and autonomous local societies. In these societies there are no specified political roles, the leadership is instead distinguished by “chieftainship” and there are no expectations with the citizen that the minimal political leadership will accomplish any changes. The second one is Subject Political Culture. The awareness’s about the output of the political system is high, but orientations towards specifically input objects and towards the self as an active participant is close to zero. There is an awareness’s of an existing specialized governing power, but the relationship towards that is passive and limited to the output of the system. The third and final one is the Participant Political Culture where the citizen is aware of the political system as a whole, both the input- and the output aspect of it. The citizen is also an active participant in the process, both the political and the administrative one.¹¹

The political culture will have to be congruent with the structure of the political system. A congruent political structure and culture will be the most appropriate one. In other words, “where political cognition in the population would tend to be accurate and where affect and evaluation would tend to be favourable.”¹²

Hence, political culture functions as an underlying factor, a foundation, of how contemporary societies perform. The population of such a society may then aspire a value at any given time,

¹⁰ Almond/Verba, 1989, s. 12-14
¹¹ Almond/Verba, 1989, s 16-18
¹² Almond/Verba, 1989, s 20
a value that they might not have the capabilities to fulfil and frustration is created. This phenomenon is conceptualized below with the two theories Relative Deprivation and Unsatisfied Needs.

2.2 Relative Deprivation and Human Needs

Relative deprivation is the term used below to “denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction and that disposes men to violence.”13 The hypothesis of the theory, “The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity,”14 requires a definition where Relative Deprivation is defined:

as actor’s perception of the discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.15

The emphasis lies on the perception of deprivation. People may be subjectively deprived with reference to their expectations even though an objective outside observer might perceive the group not to be in want. The objective observer can in the same way judge the group to experience utter poverty or absolute deprivation, but the group may not necessarily experience this poverty as unjust or something alterable. Simply put: if people feel they have no reason to expect or hope for more than they believe they can achieve, they will be less dissatisfied with what they have, even if it is objectively judged by outsiders to be very modest. People may even be grateful simply to be able to hold on to what little they have. If values are something that people want to hold on to or achieve, there is a need to define what values are: “Values are the desired events, objects and conditions for which men strive.”16 I will not go deeper in to the different values; Welfare- and Deference Values, since I, as stated above, have decided to use Burtons theory on Unsatisfied Needs to define and grade the different gaps of frustration that are connected to values.

Values, expectations to fulfil them and the capabilities to do so, lead to the core of Relative Deprivation. First, the value expectations of a collectively are the value positions to which its members believe they are justifiable entitled. Secondly, value capability of a collectively are the average value position its members perceive themselves capable of attaining or maintaining.17 An important addition and a slight modification of the definition of capabilities, is that I in my analytical framework, judge the capabilities to be something that the group in question posses at present, not only what they believe they can attain or maintain in the future.

This reasoning, the upcoming of a discrepancy between expectations or hereafter-called aspirations and the capabilities to fulfil them, can be illustrated with a model.

13 Gurr, 1970, p. 23
14 Gurr, 1970, p. 24
15 Gurr, 1970, p. 24
16 Gurr, 1970, p. 25
17 Gurr, 1970, p. 27
We can draw an important conclusion from all this: all people regardless of class or social stratum can become extremely frustrated – from the richest to the poorest. Frustration is not a feeling which belongs to the poorest; it can arise at any level of society and at any level of material wealth, or needs satisfaction. It should also be noted that it is not necessarily the absolute lack of satisfaction of expectations which is the issue, but the feeling of not being allowed the recourses or possibilities for satisfaction.19

The Human Needs theory rests on the assumption that human beings have certain basic needs which require satisfaction, and which cannot be suppressed either through repression or socialisation. It does not matter what the societal environment is, suppression of these needs will lead to protests and conflicts. There are three different categories of Human Needs: Interests, Values and Human needs.

Interest is the most fluid and transitory of the three; it is about negotiable questions and therefore the one least resistant to change. It is about economic, political and social aspirations which for example regard material benefits, salaries and prices. It also deals with relations between companies, organisations, institutions, trade unions and individuals.

The second one, Values, is bound to culture, thus more stable over time and change more slowly than interest. The concept covers such characteristics of human life as mother tongue, identity of religion, class, ethnicity and other identity identifying aspects.

---

18 Nilsson, 1999, p. 162-163
The third one, *Human needs*, is supposed to be universal, not negotiable and without limits in time and space, and therefore an inseparable part of the human nature. This aspect is not solely focused on biological survival such as access to food, water and shelter but it also contains the need for recognition and human dignity, respect, identity, harmonious human relations, group identity and growth and personal development. The non-satisfaction of these needs will produce a behaviour which breaks existing societal norms. One can from this reasoning imagine that if the human needs are denied a group, a faction may break the existing societal norms that regulate violence and take up arms in order to be assured access to the human needs they feel they are entitled to.

A merger between the two theories above would provide the following analytical framework.

---

*Figure 2.2* As in Figure 2.1 the vertical axis represents absolute level of needs satisfaction of the group; the horizontal axis represents time passed. Changes over time in people’s perception of *Aspirations* and *Capabilities* can be represented by curves. The distance between the curves illustrate the *Relative deprivation* and *Gap of frustration* the group experiences. As stated above, when it comes to *Capabilities*, in my analytical framework it is not only about attaining or maintaining a value but also about what the group possesses at present. Secondly, what is added in this figure is that the *Gap of frustration* is defined, as *Interest, Values or Human needs* according to the *Human Needs* theory.

---

2.3 Summary

First, political culture is a term, which refers to specific political guidelines – attitudes to the political system and its different parts, as well as the individual’s attitude towards his role in the system. In a political culture, the political system is internalised in people’s cognitions, feelings and evaluations. The citizens are “born” into the culture in the same way that they are socialised into apolitical roles and the social system of the norms and values that is distinguishing for the society in question.\(^{21}\)

Secondly, Relative Deprivation can be summarized in three points. To begin with, Relative Deprivation deals with people’s perception of their own situation, their expectations and capabilities. Secondly, the word relative is of great importance due to the fact, as the figure above illustrates, people living at relative high material standard can still have expectations to achieve a higher standard even though they are not even near to experience absolute poverty. Thirdly, the expectations refer to justifiable positions. The different groups, either they are poor peasants or alienated elites really believe they are entitled to have their aspirations realised.\(^{22}\)

Finally the theory dealing with Human Needs holds an assumption that human beings have certain basic needs which require satisfaction, and which cannot be suppressed either through repression or socialisation. It does not matter what the societal environment is, suppression of these needs will lead to protests and conflicts.

Then, if one thinks of political culture as an underlying factor of how contemporary societies function. One could then try to define and discuss the specific root causes of the present situation in a region as gaps of frustration that stems from aspirations regarding a unsatisfied need that does not live up to its capabilities. This hypothesis can be summarized in a figure and will be applied on the interviewed actors stated root causes in chapter 5 as a summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gaps of Frustration defined</th>
<th>International Community</th>
<th>Domestic Albanian Actors</th>
<th>Domestic Serbian actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.3 Illustrates a summary of the theory where political culture is to be seen as an underlying factor to understand contemporary political orientations among a population.

\(^{21}\) Almond/Verba, 1989, p. 12-14
\(^{22}\) Nilsson, 1999, p. 161-162
3. Method

In this chapter the method of the thesis is presented. I begin with discussing the Method used in general, the qualitative one. Then follows the Interview structure and participants where the interviews and their implications are examined. Finally, are the Material and the Evaluation of the sources dealt with.

I have chosen to use the qualitative method. The reason for this is twofold. First I wanted to give the reader a basic historical and contemporary understanding of the situation in Kosovo. \(^{23}\) My aim is to grasp the wholeness in the texts I have chosen to use so that I as truthfully and objectively as possible can reproduce the specific situation in the region. The quantitative data I have used are the existing ones in the texts in question. I have been aware of and tried to look beyond the authors’ possible latent messages to the reader and strived to comprehend the manifest meaning of the texts. My aim has been to present a controversial situation as objectively as possible. That is why I have also decided to present the differing Serbian or Albanian view on events occurred in Kosovo if and when there has been one. \(^{24}\)

The second reason for using the qualitative method is that I wanted to learn and compare how international and domestic actor’s view and conceptualizes his/her surrounding environment of the contemporary situation in Kosovo. \(^{25}\) This is to be conceptualized using semi-structured interviews (SSI), this will be further explained below.

I am using the hermeneutical approach. My intent is to try to understand the historical background and the contemporary situation so I in a better way can understand why the actors interviewed have identified the problem stated. There is always a risk when the researcher is trying to be introspective and empathetic regarding another person’s cognition. The rationale behind this risk is that when one interpret an interviewee’s answers and analyzes them one do it on the basis of ones own feelings and experiences. The researcher is then walking scientific insecure ground because experiences and feelings are not intersubjectively testable. My hope is that I, by being aware of the hermeneutic approach entrapments, I can avoid them. \(^{26}\)

The process that lies between the interview in Kosovo, the analyzes and its final presentation is worth mentioning. I have used what is referred to as “The narrative alternative” when it comes to conducting, analyzing and finally presenting the interviews. By emphasising the form of the interview as a narrative, the story told by the interviewee is tried to be conceptualized in order to simplify the transcription and analyzing phase and to make the final presentation reader friendly. This single narrative is seen as a part of the larger picture.

\(^{23}\) One short mentioning of expressions used is worth pointing out. I use the word Kosovo, the commonly used Serbian name for the province and not the Albanian word Kosova which some authors uses when writing about the province. The reason for this is that I feel that by using the word Kosova, you make a statement about how you regard Kosovo. That it is not an internationally admitted part of Serbia, at least for the time being, and is instead already an independent state. For an outsider it might seem petty to discuss this, but for the Serbians and Albanians it is a highly contested issue and one must be aware of this when working inside the province.

Secondly, I refer to Kosovo as a province, region etcetera, not as a country, state or nation. Cause according to international law that is the status of Kosovo for the time being.

\(^{24}\) Esaiasson, 2004, s. 233-234, 245

\(^{25}\) Kvale, 1997, 34-36

\(^{26}\) Thurén, 2001, 46-48
presented by the interviewees. The made analyzes, that was conducted between the interview situation in Kosovo and the completion of thesis has been the following:27

I divided the domestic Albanian-, domestic Serbian- and the International actors into three different categories after the interviews were made. The three root causes stated by each actor in these groups were merged together and each root cause that dealt with the same topic, for instance *The historical heritage*, were given one point and were put together into one subgroup.28 The stories told under each subgroup were merged together and then analyzed in order to form a final narrative to present to the reader in this thesis.

### 3.1 Interview structure and participants

In development studies, interviews based on written or memorized checklist are increasingly taking the place of large-scale structured questionnaire. Such interviews are referred to as semi-structured interviews (SSI), with this technique questions are open ended and unexpected relevant issues are followed up with further questioning or probing. Interviewees are typically key individuals, focus groups or mixed groups. In this study, focus has been put on key individuals. These are people anticipated to have particular insight or opinion about the topic under study. Issues to be highlighted must determine who the relevant key persons are. In this case, I identified these key individuals to be employees of external organisations and domestic politicians and other influential individuals such as the Deputy Director of PTK. The reason for why I chose to include both external and domestic people as key individuals is that they external organisations have much influence in Kosovo and the domestic elites are the ones who, in the near or further future, will rule Kosovo. My hope is that by doing this I will gain a wider perspective on the contemporary situation and avoid a biased view.29

The biases - or errors - associated when interviewing people in development studies are a few. As an example, biases associated with development studies highlighted with different cultural norms and interpretations and language differences, might be some of them. The language barrier were overcome due to the fact that all the interviews were conducted in English, except with the Swedish ones, so there were no need for interpreters and therefore the possible misunderstandings that can come from this were eliminated. The reliability of the interviews “(repeated observations using the same instrument under identical conditions produce similar results)” is relatively high due to the fact that the same interview guide were used on all the respondents. However, the validity “(what is measured is accurate and reflect the ‘truth’ or ‘reality’)” is not even theoretically possible to achieve cause the questions referred to the respondents’ subjective feelings and opinions about the situation in Kosovo.30 Hence, when it comes to the validity of the results, it is especially important for the reader to acknowledge that this chapter is based on the respondents subjective appreciation of the root causes, it is not objective facts that are presented. All the actors have their view of the situation and their own agenda they want to convey, I believe this is especially true when it comes to the politicians.

---

27 Kvale, 1997, 167-168
28 How many points each group has, how many of the interviewees that stated that specific root cause, is presented in chapter 5.
29 Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 89
30 Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 195-196
3.2 Material

When I have searched and chosen for written sources about Kosovo I have made a selection. I have focused on the historical background and the contemporary situation. The reason for this is that I believe it is impossible to understand any modern-day situation in the world without knowing the regions history and culture before the conflict or the troubling situation that Kosovo experiences became manifest. The selection of theoretical sources that is used to build my analytical framework is the following. Gurr and Burton has been presented and used during my studies in Peace- and Development. I find the two theories very useful since they focus on peoples own perception of their situation and make an attempt to distinguish and conceptualize individuals and groups underlying causes to feel discontent about a given situation or problem they experience. Almond & Verba are, one might call them, founders of the concept Political Culture. I have learned about them during my studies in political science and find them to be valuable when it comes to discussing and bearing in mind a peoples role and influence in a region.

Then, there are some elementary factors that any researcher must be aware of when using the qualitative method. A written source is a historical document and the source reflects the understanding and knowledge that existed in the situation of origin. Before one interprets second hand sources it is imperative that the researcher is aware of what source is being used. Is the source authentic? Normative or cognitive? Oriented towards the past, in my case the history of Kosovo, or oriented towards the present or future understanding of the region and the events that has taken place there? Confidential or public source?

3.2.1 Evaluation of the Sources

The aim of my thesis has demanded a thorough text analysis of the sources that deals with the history and the contemporary situation of Kosovo. I have tried to balance, as much as possible, first- and second hand written sources. When it comes to the sources used I have compared the different sources facts and statements with each other and when differences occur these have been presented in the thesis. I have treated all sources according to Esaiasson’s rules, which discuss critique regarding written sources, in order for the facts presented in this thesis to be as truthfully as possible. Those four criteria are Authenticity, Independence, Recency and Tendency.

To begin with, it is foremost Internet sources one has to be extra careful about when it comes to Authenticity. So these, and the secondary sources, have been compared o each other in order to control the authenticity, consequently the author will be prohibited to put forward any incorrect facts. Secondly, there are three aspects if Independence: The possibility to confirm the story told, the distance between the author and the story told and finally the authors grade of independence. Thirdly, when it comes to the Recency factor of the search for sources for this thesis it was my aim to try to use as up to date sources as possible. This due to the fact that the credibility increases the shorter time passed between the event in question and the process of putting what happened into written words. Finally, Tendency deals with the impartiality of the source. In a region and situation as in Kosovo it is almost impossible to find and impartial or independent sources to interview. Everybody have a story to tell and an agenda to put forward. In general it is easier to find impartial and independent written sources

31 Holme/Solvang, 1996, s. 138
32 Esaiasson, 2004, p. 307-313
about the history and contemporary situation in Kosovo. This will further be discussed below, source-by-source.

**Secondary sources**  
33 – The reasons for choosing the sources used in my *Theory* is discussed above. Almond & Verba, Gurr and Burton are all acknowledged social science writers and they are putting forward their theories of how the certain phenomenon’s can be theorized. The above standards is therefore hard to apply hence they are theories presented, not empirical facts. One can instead either accept or reject the theory, based on if the author is independent or for instance part of a political party, if the author is trying with his theory to confirm his, or someone else’s, narrow view of the world. Or if the is based on facts that are not authentic. There is a problem with the Almond & Verba’s book “*The Civic Culture – Political attitudes and democracy in five countries*”, not the theory in itself but with the countries they applied it on in their work, the result could be told in advance.34 However, this does not effect the use of the theory in general. I found no problems according to the above stated criteria.

As for the secondary sources used in chapter 4., they have been compared to each other and have found very little contradicting facts. The one founded are accounted for in the chapter and regards the historical past of Kosovo. To overcome independence and tendency I have not, with one exception, used any Albanian or Serbian sources. The one used had to do with statistics and these figures were compared with other sources such as UNDP. I have also strived to use as recent sources as possible; the oldest one is from 1999. In general I have found the sources used to be quite neutral, but a bit pro-Albanian, this was not the case for Sanimir Resic book which is very balanced. This could be explained with that they are all focused on the Kosovo-Albanians situation before and during the war of 1999, a time which was, with an understatement, a troubling time for the Albanians.

**First hand sources**  
35 – As discussed above, evaluation of the sources is especially important to be aware of when it comes to the results from the conducted interviews. First, when it comes to authenticity and tendency, the results is based on the actors’ subjective values of the root causes to the contemporary situation. One can not therefore take these results as objective facts. However, this is not my intent. I wanted to get, and be able to compare their opinions. Secondly, there is obviously a problem with the actors’ independence. They represent organisations and political parties which all have and agenda in Kosovo and want to put forward their view and opinions of the situation which suits their interests. This is, however, probably truer for the political parties and less true for an apolitical organisation such as the *International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies*. The recency factor is not an issue since the interviews were conducted during March and April 2007, in direct connection with the completion of this thesis that deals with contemporary Kosovo.

33 Chapter 2-4
34 The countries investigated were USA, Great Britain, Western Germany, Italy and Mexico. In short the authors then examined and discussed which country had the most favorable political culture for democracy. It could not have come as a surprise to anyone that USA in the late 50’s, just a few years after WW2 was the most developed country of the poor Mexico and the other three which have suffered severely during and immediately after the war.  
35 Chapter 5
4. Historical and Contemporary presentation of the situation in Kosovo

Below is Kosovo’s history presented, from their possible Illyrian ancestry, the medieval Serbian kingdom rule, the Ottoman take-over up to the Serbian re-conquest of Kosovo in 1912-1913 and Kosovo’s modern history. It is followed by a brief presentation of the contemporary political-, economical and societal situation in Kosovo that is connected to the actors stated root causes in chapter 5.

4.1 The history of Kosovo

4.1.1 The Albanian ancestry

The distant past of the Albanian presence in the plain of Kosovo cannot be doubted, even though Serbians and Albanians have debated the topic for some 150 years. It is especially nationalistic Serb and Slav scholars who have challenged this view. They claim that the Albanians were imported en masse by the Ottomans from the Caucasus. Among western scholars there seems to be a joint acceptance that the Albanians stem from the ancient people of Illyrians, but also other past tribes as Dardanians and roman speaking Vlachs, who all lived in the region some 2000 years ago. Even though there are no clear evidence that this is the case, a lot points in the direction that the Albanians, who speak the language they call Shqip: “the speech of eagles”, are descendants from Illyrians. Something that points in that direction is that the Albanian language and culture have much more in common with the Mediterranean people than they have with the Slavs.

If one accepts that the Albanians are descendents from the Illyrians, then they would be oldest ethnic group, together with the Greeks, in the Balkans. The Illyrians lived during the antiquity dispersed in the area that during the 1900 were called Yugoslavia. When the Romans expanded into Illyrien 168 B.C. the Illyrians were assimilated with the roman colonizers and the language were influenced by Latin. In one of the many migrations of ancient times the Slavs on rushed into south-western Europe in the 4th- and 5th century and the population in the region withdrew to the mountains and started to live as nomads. In this isolated environment the predecessors to the Albanians developed a typical clan society were male honour was highly valued. Outer influence from other people was not tolerated and it is said that problems were solved with internal feuds.

4.1.2 The Ottomans and the battle of Kosovo Polje

The region was gradually taken over by the Serbs who during the 13th- and 14th century fully controlled this southwestern part of Europe under the Nemanja-kings who ruled their land from the capital of Prizren. But the Serbian kingdom could not resist the Ottoman expansion in the late 1300, even though they desperately tried. The final and most decisive attempt to stop the Ottomans took place in Kosovo at a field just outside of Prishtina called Kosovo

36 Among them Resic, Schwarz, Malcolm
37 Schwarz, 2000, p. 11-12
38 Resic, 2006, p. 41-42
39 Landguiden, 2007, Äldre Historia
Polje, “Kosovo field” in Serbian. After that attempt the power balance pendulum swung over to the Ottoman advantage.

There are two popular assumptions about this battle, which during the centuries that followed were to be an object of disagreement, myth building and bound in both Serbian and Albanian cultural heritage. The first of these assumptions is that it was a Turkish victory that destroyed the medieval Serbian empire and the second one is that the Serbs were immediately placed under Ottoman rule. Both are according to Malcolm wrong. The first assumption disregards the fact that the Serbian kingdom had started to disintegrate soon after the death of Tsar Dusan in 1355 and the second one disregards that Serbian statehood survived for another 70 years with limited Ottoman interference.

The Turkish army finally conquered the region and in the late 15th century, even though the Albanian national hero and former Ottoman commander Skënderbeu for a long time fought off the Ottomans, the Albanian areas were also occupied. The mighty Ottoman Empire, a dynastic state which was not based on nationality but on religion, established itself in the region. The majority of the Balkan population who was Christian farmers, the Albanians as well, were to be ruled by a Muslim Ottoman upper class. It was only the Ottomans who were allowed to possess military and administrative positions. The non-Muslims were made to pay an extra tax and could not own land; most Christians were therefore tenancy farmers.40 It was during this era of Ottoman rule that the majority of the Albanians converted to Islam, the arguments why the chose to do this can not be made with certainty. Whether it was out of religious conviction, a way to escape taxes or to gain other advantages that came to Muslims under Ottoman rule, or perhaps some other reason, is unclear. The Albanians themselves claim that the Turks forced them to accept Islam, if this is true or not can be established. What can be established is that such a conviction is a sign of Albanian particularism and later on secularism. That they have consistently put their language and nationality ahead of religion, “the religion of the Albanians is the Albanian cause.” 41 Another important feature of the Ottoman rule in the southeastern part of the Balkans is that the region had to help to pay for the upkeep of the considerable cost that such a vast empire as the Ottoman required. This was especially the case for the Christian peasantry that enjoyed fewer advantages than the Muslims did.42 During the 18th and 19th century the vast majority of the people who lived in the southeastern Balkans was peasants and had to pay taxes to the Ottomans. The Serbs counted for little politically, but it was another case for the Muslim Albanians who thanks to their religion was the aristocracy in the region and therefore in a constant power struggle with the Sultan and the Turks. This power struggle help to create uprisings and Ottoman troops had to campaign there frequently to put down uprisings. This political and economic situation led to an unfavourable travel review of the British Balkan expert H.N. Brailsford who in 1908 visited Kosovo and called it “the most miserable corner of Europe.”43

4.1.3 The Ottomans disappear and the Serbs rise to power

Nationalism started to gain ground all over Europe during the 19th century and the southeast corner of Europe was no exception. The Ottoman empire of the late 18th century was weakened and its powerful neighbours, Russia and Hapsburg saw its chance to expand on their behalf. Hence, when the Ottoman landlords around Belgrade tried to counteract the

40 Resic, 2006, p. 76, 78-79
41 Schwartz, 2000, p. 29
42 Malcolm, 1998, p. 95
43 Judah, 2000, p. 11
falling apart of the empire by coming down hard on discontent Serbian farmers, the effect was the opposite of what was intended and the Serbs revolted. The Russians gave their support and the Turkish army struck back. The cycle went on like this up until 1867 when the Serbs finally made the Ottomans withdraw and they could start building their own state and modernizing it according to European standards.\textsuperscript{44} If nationalism was in progress in Europe, Kosovo was no exception. As with the case of Serbian nationalism, Albanians saw their chance to have their own state now that the Ottomans were weakened. Therefore, in Prizren the 10\textsuperscript{th} of June 1878 Albanian notables, religious leaders and clan chiefs gathered to discuss the Albanians future. The gathered ones soon found themselves trapped on two different sides, one wanted to create an Albanian state within the Ottoman Empire and the other one wanted an independent one.\textsuperscript{45} 450 years of Ottoman rule had not change the Albanian social structure very much. There was still much suspicion towards any central power that interfered with the daily Albanian life, hence the Turks had never had full power and control over the Albanians who lived in the hilly areas. It was only few of them who converted to Islam; many of them remained catholic or orthodox. The picture was another in the lowlands where the Ottoman had control, there the majority converted.

The league of Prizren’s dreams of creating an Albanian state was shattered in the years of 1878-1881 when the Ottomans, with assistance of Serbs and Montenegrins went to war against the Albanians in order to live up to the Berlin congress agreement that Serbia could have independence but the region south of Serbia where many Albanians lived would stay under Ottoman control. Hence, the region was invaded and the League of Prizren was destroyed. In contrast to other people in the Balkans, it was not religion who gathered the Albanians as a nation, but shared culture and language.\textsuperscript{46} The Albanian nationalism had another serious blow when Serbia after the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 gained more land from the Turks.\textsuperscript{47} And finally, after 500 years the Serbs had regained control over Kosovo and avenged the battle of Kosovo Polje, even though not many Serbs were left there after the Ottoman era.\textsuperscript{48} Another consequence of the 1913 peace was that Albania was created, but many Albanians still lived outside the newly formed country, in the regions of Kosovo and Macedonia.

The Hapsburg monarchy collapsed after the First World War and Serbs-, Croats- and Slovenians joint kingdom was proclaimed under the Serbian ruler Aleksandar Karadjordjevic. But the relationship between the three countries was tense, due to the fact that the Croats and Slovenians wanted a loose federation while the Serbs wanted a centralized state. In the end of the 1920’s the country was at the brink of war. In 1929 king Aleksander dissolved the parliament, sidestepped the constitution and proclaimed him self a dictator and renamed the kingdom Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{49}

The Albanians were the most oppressed group in the new Yugoslav state. All that was Albanian was forbidden; language, culture and traditions. Albanian farms were confiscated and many Albanians were deported; the area was to be re-colonized by Serbian farmers. A plan to deport all the Albanians to Turkey was initiated but could not be fulfilled before the Second World War broke out. The Serbian politics led to forced emigration and deportation of

\begin{itemize}
\item[] \textsuperscript{44} Resic, 2006, p. 111-114
\item[] \textsuperscript{45} Malcolm, 1998, p. 217, 220-221
\item[] \textsuperscript{46} Resic, 2006, p. 151-152
\item[] \textsuperscript{47} Landguiden, 2007, Serbien äldre Historia
\item[] \textsuperscript{48} Resic, 2006, p. 173
\item[] \textsuperscript{49} Landguiden, 2007, Serbien äldre Historia
\end{itemize}
100,000 Albanians to Turkey and Albania from the now Serb controlled Kosovo. This policy gave birth to a strong anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav sentiment among the Albanians.  

4.1.4 The Second World War and the creation of Yugoslavia

Germany and Italy defeated Yugoslavia quickly and divided the country between themselves and their allies. Kosovo was divided into three parts where the lion share went to Albania who was governed by Italy. Italy made some earnest attempts to make Kosovo a real part of Albania. Everybody in Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs, became Albanian citizens and 173 Albanian schools opened in Kosovo. The Albanians in Kosovo initially welcomed this development since they gained some real advantages under their new ruler, although this enthusiasm came more from hatred of the Serbs and joy over won advantages than from love of the axis. When Italy surrendered on September 8th, 1943 the Germans took control of the area and kept it until they had to leave the area during the years of 1944-1945 to escape advancing Russian and Yugoslav partisan troops. The partisans took control over Kosovo and the area was once again a part of Yugoslavia. Sorry to say, the occupation of Italy and Germany in Kosovo led to some tragic events. In the beginning of the occupation, when the Albanians regained power in Kosovo, atrocities were committed against Serbs and then when the partisans regained control Albanians on the other hand were victims of violence. The figures are highly contentious but range somewhere between 30,000-100,000 Serbian refugees and 3,000-10,000 killed. The Albanians lost 3,000-25,000 in Kosovo, most of them died when partisans re-imposed Yugoslav rule. Another embarrassing event for the Albanians was the creation of the 21. SS division “Skanderberg” who consisted of 6,000 Albanians. This division though had no real impact on the events of the war. They never took part in any battle and after 8 months half of them had deserted and the division were disbanded. But before they were disbanded they captured 281 Jews in Kosovo and committed several atrocities against Serbian civilians.

After the Second World War the communist leadership of Yugoslavia made Kosovo an autonomous “constituent” part of Serbia. This new situation in Kosovo made life easier than it had been under pre-war Serbian rule but it was still harsh for the Kosovo-Albanians up to the 1960’s. The reason for this was that there was a lot of tension between Albania and Yugoslavia and the Albanians in Kosovo was suspected to co-operate with the Albanian state. One of the public acts of repression occurred in Prizren where leading Kosovo Albanians were accused of being Albanian spies and were sent to serve long prison sentences. During this period Islam was suppressed and Albanians and Slav Muslims were encouraged to emigrate to Turkey. Serbs and Montenegrins dominated the administration, security forces and industrial employment in Kosovo and public investment in the region was low. The situation began to change in the 1960’s when Rankovic, a Serb in the central committee of Yugoslavia most associated with serbinization policy, was dismissed. As in the rest of Europe, student demonstrations took part in Kosovo and even though they were dealt with harshly, they led to some real improvements for the Albanian community. A university was created in Prishtina, the use of Albanian professors and textbooks was introduced, Albanians were allowed to take part in administrations and security forces and public investment rose. This new era of improved conditions culminated in 1974 when the new constitution of Yugoslavia gave

---

50 Resic, 2006, p. 208
52 Judah, 2000, p. 27-31
Kosovo the status of an autonomous province of Serbia with almost the same status as a Yugoslav republic.\textsuperscript{53}

The new constitution had weakened Serbia’s influence in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, and after the death of Tito in 1980 the Serbs began to openly work for a redistribution of power, both within its own republic and the federation.\textsuperscript{54} In fact, the whole federation began to tremble in its foundations after the death of Tito.

In March-April 1981 demonstrations broke out at the University of Prishtina among students who was discontent with the living conditions. The uprising started almost by accident; at lunchtime on the 11\textsuperscript{th} of March one student found a cockroach in his soup and disgusted throw the tray on the floor. Others felt equally dissatisfied with the situation at the University and joined the protest that soon gathered 500 students, demonstrating at campus.\textsuperscript{55} But the tensions ran deeper than just discontent with poor social conditions, there were also demands made that Kosovo should be allowed to form its on republic, independent from Serbia. The federal government answered impetuous and sent in Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) units with tanks and aerial support to subdue the uprising. Even though federal troops performed severe acts, order was not restored until 1983 and 30 000 policemen and soldiers were under occupational circumstances stationed in the province to uphold order. According to official Yugoslavian sources nine Albanians and one policemen died, Albanian sources on the other hand say that 1 000 Albanians were killed. There was a lot of tension in Kosovo throughout the 80’s. From the Serbian side it was seen as upsetting that the Albanians, after having gained more freedom during the 1974 constitution, now made further demands for more rights. The explanation for these demands can be found in the fact that the freedom gained during the 60’s and 70’s had opened up the political awareness among young Albanians with demand for more freedom from Serbia and equal living conditions as the rest of Yugoslavia. The Serbs started to move out from Kosovo as the Albanian nationalism grew but Serbian media during the 80’s painted a picture that the Serbs left because they were victims of atrocities. The truth is rather that the violence committed in Kosovo between the two ethnic groups was equally divided and the reason for the Serbian migration from Kosovo had foremost an economical cause.\textsuperscript{56}

4.2 The contemporary situation

4.2.1 Political situation

As stated in the background chapter, Slobodan Milosevic political career really had an upspring after the infamous meeting at Kosovo Polje where he stated the word: “\textit{No one should dare to beat you}!”\textsuperscript{57} He alluded on old Serbian nationalistic feelings and played what is sometimes referred to as the “nationalist card”. Serbs say that Kosovo is the Serbian heartland. The explanation for this lay in the history of Kosovo and the uprising and destruction of the medieval Serbian kingdom. The many churches and monasteries that were built during this era, and which many Serbs look back at as the golden days of Serbia, are still left in the province as a testimony that during this period the majority of the population were

\textsuperscript{53} Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 34-36
\textsuperscript{54} Landguiden, 2007, Serbien modern historia
\textsuperscript{55} Malcolm, 1998, p. 334
\textsuperscript{56} Resic, 2006, p. 208
\textsuperscript{57} Malcolm, 1998, p. 341
either Serbs or at least orthodox Christian on their way to develop an identity as Serbs. When Serbian forces lost the Battle of Kosovo Polje and the region were taken over by Ottoman Empire the Serbs still lingered on the notion that one-day their short lived medieval empire would resurrect. This notion was embedded into the Serbian culture and lived on throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule. Serbians felt mistreated under the Ottoman era and bided their time when they could once again be free and take back their original areas and homelands, which very much so included Kosovo that had during the centuries been more and more populated by Albanians. When Serbian forces returned to Kosovo in 1912-1913 and drew out the Ottomans the 40 % Kosovo-Serbs saw it as nothing less than liberation whilst the Kosovo Albanians saw it as a conquest. The following years attempt from the Serbian side to hold onto Kosovo and serbinize it, was from their point of view nothing more than an attempt to take back what is rightfully theirs and where much of their cultural and historical heritage lies.58

So, when Milosevic started to outmanoeuvre his competitors in the end of 1987 and became the leader of the Serbian communist party under coup like circumstances and two years later was elected president of Serbia, this was much due to his ambitions to restore the Serbians importance and playing on nationalistic Serbian sentiments. The rising tensions within Yugoslavia and the development in Kosovo made Slovenia and Croatia demand a looser federation but the Serbs and their allies refused those demands. But the attempts to keep Yugoslavia united was hopeless, during 1991 the political and economical deprivation escalated and on the 25th of June Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Shortly thereafter the Serbian dominated JNA attacked Slovenia and the war in Yugoslavia was a reality.59

Many had anticipated that an eventual Yugoslav war would start in Kosovo, but it did not. The main reasons for this are that the Albanians feared ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in case war broke out. Quite unlike their history they therefore choose a non-violent approach in the structure of the newly formed Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under Ibrahim Rugova who stated: ‘The Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than be massacred.’ 60 Unfortunately, when U.S. and NATO finally acted to stop the war in Yugoslavia, with the closing of the Dayton agreement, the Kosovo question was left out. Critique was now being heard inside Kosovo that the non-violence approach under Rugova had failed and an armed resistance movement took form with assistance from Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, mainly from Switzerland and Germany. The organisation took the name Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, UCK in Albanian) and carried out its first attacks against Serb police in Kosovo 1996. The conflict escalated rapidly and by 1998 there was a full-scale war in the province. The geography of Kosovo, with its many plains and few mountains, gave that the Albanians had few places to hide from the Serbian forces and the KLA could do very little to withstand its enemy. The war was filled with atrocities against Kosovo Albanian civilians. During 1998 nearly 2 000 Albanians were murdered, 3 750 tortured and 800 missing. The victims included 900 women and 450 children and 41 500 houses had been destroyed.61 The outside world was horrified of the development in Kosovo, but could do very little to stop it. Finally NATO made reality of their threat to intervene and commenced a bombing campaign against Serbia in March 1999, after 11 weeks Milosevic surrendered. The following peace agreement, mediated by the EU appointed Martti Ahtisaari, put a stop to the fighting and led to the

58 Buckley, 2000, p. 77-83
59 Landguiden, 2007, Serbien modern historia
60 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 43
61 Schwarz, 2000, p. 136-137, 141
complete withdrawal of Serbian forces; implementation of a NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and as a part of the peace agreement United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was to govern the province as a transitory administrative solution.62

Kosovo is still, eight year after the conflict of 1999, under international administration. The UN body UNMIK was created through the Security Council Resolution 1244 from the 10th of June 1999. UNMIK consists of four pillars, where each of the pillars represents an administrative area. The UN leads the pillar that deals with police- and judicial matters and the pillar for civil administration. Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) is liable for the democratization and institution building pillar. EU heads the forth pillar with responsibility for restructuring and economic development. Kosovo has since 2002 a president, parliament and a government the so-called Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). The UN administration is successively transferring their authorities to this body even if the main responsibility and power lies at UNMIK until the status question is determined. Due to the fact that Kosovo has achieved some goals which were pre-set by the international society, that was to be fulfilled before the summer of 2005, the province has been allowed to start negotiations about its future status.63

The table below shows what the non-Serb population of the province states are the main problems in contemporary Kosovo. This could be interesting for the reader to keep in mind and be able to compare with before the next chapter which deals with the actors view on the root causes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem (% of population)</th>
<th>November 2006</th>
<th>March 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined status of Kosovo</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty/Low living standard</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power/KEK</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuilding the economy/infrastructure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the war in Kosovo was sadly characterized by what can be referred to as New wars, where the political goals are about making a claim of power in a region based on traditional identities, nationality, tribal identity or religion. The military strategy, of territorial expansion by political control of the population in the area in question, is achieved by using violence towards the civilian population and is performed by a mix of regular and irregular forces.65 This New War is therefore something opposite to the Old Wars where political targets where achieved with fighting against and eliminating the opponents armed forces in open battle and where the control of the civilian population were not seen as a primary objective. Something that was the case during the Kosovo war and which nowadays seems to be common in contemporary warfare.

---

62 Landguiden, 2007, Serbien Kosovo
63 UD, 2005, p. 1
64 Index Kosova, 2007, p. 3
65 Kaldor, 1999, p. 61, 81
4.2.2 The economic situation

Kosovo have always been the poorest region of Yugoslavia, despite rising levels of public investment after 1957 and the fact that Kosovo received the largest share of the Fund for Underdeveloped Regions, the gap still grew between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia. In 1952 Kosovo’s the gross material product (GMP)/capita was 44% that of the Yugoslavian average. It declined to 29% in 1980 and to 22% in 1990. Unemployment was 27% 1980 and increased to 40% 1990. In contemporary Kosovo this figure is hard to calculate but is estimated to lie somewhere between 38-50%. Below in table 4.3 is Kosovo’s Human Development Index (HDI) presented which is a good indicator of how high developed the country is compared to the rest if the world and table 4.4 shows Kosovo’s Human Poverty Index (HPI).

Kosovo’s GNP/capita was 790 USD 2003 and is thereby one of the lowest in Europe. The economical growth comes foremost from international aid and money transfers from the Diaspora. Internal incomes come from customs- and tax revenues at the borders. The economy is generally characterized of low productivity and the lack of income making production. The low export, only 3, 7% of the import, is an indicator of that. Furthermore, the unresolved status question makes it hard for Kosovo to gain international loans and credits, which is an obstacle for foreign investment and the economical development in general. The lack of reliable energy supply is also an obstacle, but on the positive side, Kosovo’s major assets of brown coal gives that the energy sector has a chance to develop. But one must take into consideration the environmental aspects and the size of investment before this resource can be used.

The farming sector, which comprise about a third of Kosovo’s GDP and occupies two thirds of the labor force has a great potential to generate growth and is a particular important sector to develop for the poorer rural areas. But then Kosovo has to mend the brain-drain trend from rural- to urban areas. Another aspect that affects the possibility for the rural- and urban areas to develop is an unclear situation of land- and company possession which still is an unsolved problem that is related to the not fully functional rule of law.

The lack of a fully functional rule of law also affects the general living standards in this strife-torn province, which is complicated by grey market activities, smuggling and other illegal activities. The different economic policy of the international community, which has been present in Kosovo since 1999, has also had an impact. Moreover, the Serb population has moved into enclaves throughout this period, which ha made it hard for them to generate high returns on their skills. The rationale for them moving into enclaves is not totally transparent but it could have been out of fear of retribution and the fact that the prior Milosevic government paid subsidies to the Serb community in Kosovo.

The level of absolute poverty has increased and today comprises about 15% of the population. The problem is most acute in the rural areas where low educated, women and ethnic minorities (foremost romas/ashkalia) are the most vulnerable groups. There are great differences between men and women in general in Kosovo. Men makes approximately four times more than women make and takes part in the labor force to a greater extent than

---

66 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 37
67 UD, 2005, p. 2-3
68 Bhaumik, 2007, p. 771
women. Furthermore has violence in the home versus women raised during the last five years, so has trafficking where Kosovo is a transit region.⁶⁹

**Table 4.2** Selected Economic indicators for Kosovo January-December 2006 ⁷⁰

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>2 033 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP growth rate % (annual)</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP/capita, Euro</strong></td>
<td>1 117</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign assistance, Euro</strong></td>
<td>465 000 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade balance, million Euro</strong></td>
<td>-537,5</td>
<td>-761,3</td>
<td>-1235,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Registered job seekers</strong></td>
<td>323 201</td>
<td>324 835</td>
<td>326 026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.3** Kosovo’s HDI,⁷¹ with this figure Kosovo place its self on position 98 among the world’s countries. Sweden holds position 5 with values of 0.951.⁷²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Overall HDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.4** Kosovo’s indicators on its HPI (HP-1) is used to compare developing countries to each other while HP-2 is used on developed countries and includes indicators such as social exclusion.⁷³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of population not surviving the age of 40</th>
<th>Illiteracy rate</th>
<th>Proportion of population with no access to potable drinking water members in %</th>
<th>Infant mortality</th>
<th>Proportion of underweight children</th>
<th>HPI-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The corruption level is somewhat hard to measure but interesting to know hence it says something about how well the society and its institutions function. Transparency Internationals annual report from 2006 estimated that Serbia has a fairly high level of corruption with a value of 3.0 (10 Highly clean - 0 Highly corrupt) and positions itself on 90th place among the worlds countries.⁷⁴ The interviewees deemed the corruption level in Kosovo to be quite high and apparent, most people can be bribed and the legal system do not follow up allegations of it due to lack of time, resources or corruption in the judicial system. Especially occurring is the soft corruption due to Kosovo is a small country and many people know each other or have some relation to one and other.⁷⁵

4.2.3 The societal situation

Kosovo has low labour market participation with an active work force of 0.92 million people, given Kosovo’s population of approximately 2 million, which corresponds to a labour participation of 46.2 %. This rate is quite low both compared to EU standards and Balkan standards where this figure generally does not fall below 60 %. There are three reasons for this. The first one is Kosovo’s young population over 50 % is under 25 years old and many of them are not yet ready for the labour market. The second one is that people leave the labour market prior to retirement age cause a lack of demand for their professional skills. The third one has to do with women’s low participation level. Traditional customs in the province still expect women to stay at home and run the house and there are limited employment opportunities for women in general, especially for lower skilled women.

One would think that a young population is a great asset for the future hence it could be a resource that is just waiting to come to use. Unfortunately there are indicators that this is not the case in Kosovo. The young population in Kosovo lacks adequate education since the status of education is poor. This is a statement which is supported by the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Developments (KIPRED) recent report: “Governance and Competition in Higher Education”, which is concerned about the low educational level. They state that instead of being an asset, the young population is more likely to be a liability. Further more, there is a low labour market demand due to Kosovo’s overall sluggish economy and the ones who do find employment gain low salaries, from 157 euros to 272 a month to those with higher education.

Another troubling factor, which relates to education, employment and the possibility to economic development, is the political situation of the 1990’s that created an Albanian “parallel” educational system. The creation for this was a refusal to accept Belgrade’s control of education in Kosovo. The Serbian strategy for denying the Albanians education was a part of the Milosevic government strategy of the, what they felt, rebelliousness tendencies of the Albanians. The creation of the parallel educational system was a part of the non-violent strategy that was practised during this period by the Albanians. Naturally, the fact that the Albanian population could not go to their ordinary schools during this period is a major setback for them now as adults. Cause of this they are referred to as “the lost generation.”

As for the Serb population, they have continued to decrease over the years, from a share of 23.6 % 1948 to being approximately 5 % of the population today, the ones who are left has moved into enclaves where they are separated from the Albanian population. This is of course a troubling situation when two ethnic groups, with such a violent history, continue to separate themselves form one and other. It is understandable but certainly does not help the reconciliation process in this war-torn province.

---

76 UNDP 2, 2006, p. 58
77 KIPRED, 2007, p. 1
78 UNDP 2, 2006, p. 58
79 Waller, 2001, p. 11
80 Interview: Edman
81 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 39
82 Bhaumik, S.K., 2007, p. 771
5. Perspectives on the root causes

In this chapter the results from the interviews are presented and the Questions answered. The root causes have been thematized, put into categories and given a number, which indicates how many respondents stated that root cause. First the International communities view is presented, followed by the domestic actors, which are divided into two, the domestic Albanian- and the domestic Serbian view. Further, the categories have been analyzed using the analytical framework presented in figure 2.2. It is important for the reader to acknowledge that the results are entirely based on the actors’ subjective view of the root causes. The chapter finishes off with a summary of the stated root causes.

5.1 The international community’s view

5.1.1 Economy, infrastructure, unemployment

Figure 5.1 (8 points) Kosovo’s economic gap of frustration. Kosovo have always been a poor province but the overall economic situation and capabilities became worse during the Milosevic era and the war in Yugoslavia. However, the aspirations for a better life and economic development started to rise -99 and the period after the war.

Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need – There is a general bad economic situation and lack of economic development, which is characterized by a budget run on aid, a lack of governmental services and infrastructure, no working tax system and a high level of unemployment. This gap of frustration is interest-based due to its economic characteristics.

Aspirations – The Kosovars aspire to have a functioning economy and infrastructure so that they can support one self and ones family; they want the same living standards as the rest of Europe. The aspirations dealt more with day-to-day issues before -99 but rose past that and became more international outward looking, this due to the fact that the aspirations to be independent and build a state rose past -99. There is a hope among the Kosovoars that the resolved status will help attract international investors and loans, which will boost the economy and create growth. There is a risk that the desired independence will not generate prosperity and that can create frustration in the future.

Capabilities – To begin with, according to the ones interviewed, Kosovo is typical for the Balkans when it comes to private initiatives in the business sphere. The Kosovoars goes for activities that create instant returns like petrol stations, restaurants and small supermarkets. It is relatively uncommon to have a bright business idea, start small and grow larger and larger. There is some normal business that you find in other countries/economies like public relations firms and insurance companies but they are relatively few in this country.
Further, Kosovo of today do not have a functioning tax system that can constitute the needed part of a state budget, which is required to build a modern state. The incomes to the budget come foremost from customs and to some extent from aid. Also, due to the unresolved status, it is hard for Kosovo to get investments and loans from IMF/WB and EU since Kosovo is still formally a part of Serbia and Belgrade hinders any such attempts.

There is also an important historical explanation for the economic situation in Kosovo. First, the poor economy stems not only from the war with Serbia -99 but also from the transition phase from communism and the industrialization policy of that era that focused on heavy but not environmentally safe industries. The transition away from such industries has not happened here. The fact that Kosovo used to rely on the Chapja mine, that during the Yugoslav era constituted 25% of the GDP, and now have new hopes that the ignite findings in Obelic can be extracted in order to gain electricity for domestic use and export, could be a sign of this. Historically Kosovo has been a neglected region of Yugoslavia with very little investments was made.83 This was especially true after 1974 when the constitution of that same year stipulated that Belgrade should provide investments and infrastructure, before that it was a federal matter, a service that Belgrade did not provide. In spite of this the economy grew in Kosovo, not to the same extent as in the rest of Yugoslavia, but it grew. When the economy went down in the 80’s, this was stated as a root to the conflict and the interethnic tensions that grew during the economical bad years of the 80’s and 90’s. The interethnic tensions were a way to manifest the conflict from the elite perspective, in order to make it more transparent to the population. Traces from this development can be seen in Kosovo today where there is a development divide between the Serbian and Albanian areas. The Serbs are stated to be less affected by the economic situation due to subsidies from Serbia to the Serbs in Kosovo.

Today Kosovo is the poorest place in Europe with no capacity to absorb the aid that comes into the country. Therefore it has been hard for the international community to build up the country because they had to start from scratch. One of the things that do not work satisfactory is the electricity. One thing one cant help to notice is the many power shutdowns that occur in Kosovo. This due to the fact that the current electricity plant was never meant to support the whole of Kosovo on its own, it was a part of the power grid of Yugoslavia and later on Serbia. But due to the war and its aftermath, Serbia does not support Kosovo with electricity.

To conclude, according to the stated answers, Kosovo has the same problem as a developing country with low and to some extent irrelevant education, poor farming low income and high child mortality. As for the future, Kosovo should develop their agriculture, it could be the basis for the economy for many years to come and help overcome the fact that Kosovo today import much of its food. The manufacturing industries have no future. Even if there are low wages in Kosovo, something that might attract manufacturing, it is not enough. Investments are first needed in infrastructure and human capital. An item that could be an important export commodity is electricity from the lignite findings in Obelic, but investments are needed there as well. Something that is booming in Kosovo is construction of houses, but that is not an export commodity. Today Kosovo is surviving a lot on the Diaspora who is working abroad and sending money home and the international organisations in the province that is spending money. Due to this there is a danger that when UNMIK and other international organisations leave the

83Also, the fact that the Albanians now is trying to run the government, something they have never done historically, it was the Serbs who managed that, obviously also effects the situation.
economy will go down. The Diasporas ability to send money home could also deter in the future because Kosovoan degrees are not acknowledged abroad and that can create difficulties.

As for the domestic politicians the ones interviewed has a relative low opinion of their abilities. For instance, the politicians focus on big ideas such as mining and electricity. These are capital-intensive projects and not labour intensive, something Kosovo is in more imminent need since unemployment are high and access to investments are quite limited. This can be explained by the fact that many of the politicians have no experience of how to run a modern economy and are stuck in the communist thinking when it comes to manage an economy. One of the interviewees meant that the political elite treats Kosovo like a cash cow; all they want to do is divide the economy between them like pieces of a pie.84

5.1.2 Historical legacy

![Figure 5.2](8 points) Kosovo’s historical legacy gap of frustration. Contemporary Kosovars have aspirations to be an independent state and adapt to the western/European system of democracy and living. But the capabilities to live up to those aspirations are not sufficient due to Kosovo’s historical legacy of traditional society and the long tradition of being ruled by others.

**Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need** – The Power of tradition in Kosovo with a traditional family structure, which affects everybody, is a part of Kosovo’s social capital and political culture. That, together with the transition from a socialist structure of governing and never have been an independent country creates capabilities which makes it hard to live up to the aspirations of becoming a western market oriented democracy which creates frustration. This frustration can be identified as interest based due to its political and social aspirations. But it also has a touch of a value-based need due to its cultural characteristics and therefore makes it more resistant to change and stable over time than if it only had been an interest based unsatisfied need.

**Aspirations** – Are to try to adapt and build an independent state with a functioning governing body and to be able to support one self, both men and women, and adapt to a contemporary western system with an EU-membership in sight.

**Capabilities** – A still live clan structure in Kosovo hinders the aspirations and can be said to be a part of Kosovo’s political culture. This clan structure is a result from history when the early Albanians in the 4th and 5th century developed their culture in the mountains where they sought refuge from the expanding Slavs. The extended family was to guarantee the economical wellbeing and was intended to help fellow Albanian relatives. This social

---

84 Interview: Hopkinson, Nilsson/McDonald, Lundin, Anderson, Ober, Lindholm, Pratz
structure had a function in the 1900’s when the rest of Europe developed towards one direction, industrialization. Something that did not happen in Kosovo due to the Serbian domination, a domination that was especially visible during the parallel system of the 1990’s when the Albanians were shut out from society. But this social structure, which developed as a defense- and survival mechanism, is an obstacle to the Kosovoan society in the 21st century.

Also, the historical legacy of always being ruled by others, first the Ottomans and later on the Serbs, have not allowed the Albanians to be in governing positions and therefore creates an aggravating factor to rule themselves today. The rule of law also suffers from the fact that the system that existed before was destroyed during the war and a new one had to build up. Today the clan structure shows itself in which the political elites are, no one can advance to the top without being from the right family and the leadership and ideology of the parties are personal based. Also, it is hard to build up rule of law when no one wants to judge his or her own relatives. Blood feud is also said to still be practiced in Kosovo and gender inequality is vivid where women are second-class citizens.

This, the judged political culture of Kosovo, together with the history of both the Serbs and the Albanians claiming Kosovo as theirs and never have being independent and part of a communist governing structure has created unfavorable conditions to develop democracy and for the Kosovoans to get a chance to understand how democracy works. Even if democracy may be visible on the surface, Kosovo suffers from its historical legacy and the difficulties of trying to build a state without the status question being resolved. Today the mentality from the socialist structure is still vivid where the citizens ask: “what can leaders/society do for me”? A question that is asked to a state that is not capable of providing the services and support to the society that is needed.  

5.1.3 Unresolved status

![Figure 5.3](image)

Figure 5.3 (4 points) Kosovo’s unresolved status gap of frustration. The province aspirations to become an independent state rose during the 1990’s when Yugoslavia dissolved. But their capabilities to do so are quite low and have not risen since they historically have never governed a state for themselves.

Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need – The unresolved status of Kosovo has created an unsatisfied need which I believe can be identified as a human need that sprung up during the 90’s, to be allowed to be independent and not be a part of Serbia, but also as a value need since it is the ethnic group Albanians who shares mother tongue and culture who wants independence from the Serbs. The problem is that Serbia will not grant them that and either side is willing to back down on their demands.

Aspirations – A general aspiration for independence has always been there for the Kosovo Albanians. It has just changed over time, from wanting to be a autonomous republic during

85 Interview: Nilsson/McDonald, Lundin, Edman, Pratz, Lindholm, Anderson
the Yugoslav era to wanting full independence when Yugoslavia dissolved during the 90’s. The Kosovo Serbs on the other hand wants Kosovo to be a part of Serbia; the other minorities such as the Romas will go with what the benefit from the most. However, the current status is confusing for everybody in Kosovo and can deter possible investors. The Kosovo Albanians as a group has a clear idea about the past but not necessarily about the future, there is a notion among some of the interviewees that the Albanians are waiting to be told what to do by the international community.

Capabilities – The Kosovo Albanians first commenced on an anti-violence strategy under Rugova in order to fulfill their aspirations, when that strategy did not achieve the desired outcome some Albanians formed KLA and started an armed resistance struggle. The problem is that the capabilities have not gone up together with the aspirations to become independent from Serbia. Contemporary Kosovovars have low capability to manage a state, they have no prior experience and there is a lack of a critical educated mass in Kosovo, much thanks to the lost generation of the 90’s, which is needed for a democracy to function satisfactory. Some of the respondents have stated that UNMIK have not committed itself enough to overcome this problem. The education of today is somewhat a continuation of the temporary solution that the parallel system of 90’s was instead of creating a new modern one. The university is said to be a cocoon that protects itself from the outer world instead of learning from it and gives a mediocre education that fails to produce graduates who can work in state institutions.

The Kosovo Serbs will not accept independence and they might even leave Kosovo in protest, if they decide to do so it is not good but acceptable. Cause it is almost impossible to deny a strive that 95 % of the population share. Further, independence will cause worsened relations with Serbia for some time, but that might be balanced due to the fact that other neighbors accept Kosovo’s independence.

As for UNMIK they have did their part and now they want out, someone else must take over and help Kosovo develop further. According to the ones interviewed Kosovo will probably get their independence cause if Kosovo was decided to remain under Serbia that could cause a revolution and if the international community would continue to rule the province the Kosovovars will loose their patience. In fact, the only reason they tolerate UNMIK today is because they know they will soon leave. But independence in itself will not automatically solve Kosovo’s problems; it is more a step towards a more transparent situation in the province. The resolved status is rather a way to pacify Kosovo to and prevent demands and uprisings about independence. Then, what happens after independence is an open question. The interviewees seem to agree on that it is the strive for independence that holds the political parties together and the period after independence could lead to a power struggle among the domestic elites, one can only hope that this struggle will be peaceful and be fought inside the democratic forum.

In general it is hard to say if Kosovo is ready for independence, because they have never experienced it. One made the comparison that the Kosovo Albanian politicians and institutions are like teenagers leaving home, they are never quite ready for it but you have to let them go and after some months you will see that they can manage on their own, but it will without doubt be harsh period.86

86 Interview: Edman, Hopkinson, Pratz, Anderson, Lindholm
5.1.4 Lack of social harmony between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians

Figure 5.4 (3 points) Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs ethnic tension gap of frustration. Kosovoars have during the history had aspirations to be able to live in a functioning region, however, the capabilities to do so went down during the Milosevic government politics during the 90’s for the Albanians and for both groups cause of the 1999 conflict. The situation and tensions between the two groups has been more or less frozen since then due to the unresolved status.

Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need – The lack of social harmony between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, who want to be able to live in the province. This, as well as the strive for independence above can be identified as a unsatisfied human need since both groups wants to live safe in Kosovo, but also a value need since it has some obvious ethnic characteristics.

Aspirations – Kosovoars who wants to function as region and be able to live in Kosovo.

Capabilities – The lack of social harmony stems from the historical legacy of Kosovo Polje and the ethnic tensions that has existed in the province and has been taken advantage from by leaders who have fuelled these feelings with propaganda. Obviously, the recent war and the unresolved status that followed that have created a situation that is worse than during the Yugoslav era. Even so, contacts is said to work out much better between ordinary Serbs and Albanians than among the elites of those groups.

In contemporary Kosovo, the tables have turned since the 90’s, it is now foremost the Kosovo Serbs who is experiencing and suffers from the ethnic tensions. For instance, the police is required to consist of a certain part Serbs but that is not the case. Further, Serbs are said to hesitate to call the police and ambulance if their services are required because no one will come anyway. The Serbs are opposing independence and are backed by Belgrade who wants to keep Kosovo inside Serbia. The demands are especially apparent in the biggest Serbian enclave of today that lies in Mitrovica and where it exists a parallel Serbian system, somewhat similar to the ones the Albanians had during the 90’s. There, it is a risk there that if KFOR leaves, conflict might break out, similar to what happened during the riots of 2004.87

On the other hand, Albanians is experiencing ethnic tensions with the Serbs because of their demands for independence from Serbia. Albanians in Kosovo have historically been affected by Serb discrimination and that is something that is not forgotten in the province today. This was a reason for the conflict of -99 and the Albanian demand for independence that very much so lives on today. A problem is, and that fuels the ethnic tensions, that after -99 there is

---

87 In March 2004 there was a riot in Mitrovica which spread to the rest of the province, during these clashes between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians 19 people were killed. (UNMIK, 2004:2)
a general attitude among the Kosovo Albanians that “we are the victims, we can do what we want.” The Serbians acknowledge this and have moved out since they did not feel safe. 88

5.1.5 Lack of proper education

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.5** (2 points) The Kosovo Albanians lack of proper education gap of frustration. The Kosovo Albanians aspirations are their own country and get jobs so that they can support themselves, these aspirations rose during 1999. However, the capabilities for that are low since the “lost generation” of the 90’s lack proper education and the overall capabilities since then have not improved to the desired extent. Moreover, the older population who gained education during the socialist system lacks the modern adapted education that is necessary.

**Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need** – Kosovo Albanians who lack proper education. This unsatisfied need is about social and economic needs and is therefore interest-based.

**Aspirations** – Are to have a good education so one can support one self and ones family and so that the population can manage to run an independent country.

**Capabilities** – Historically Kosovo Albanians have had problems getting access to higher education, this was especially true during the 90’s when they were prohibited to benefit from social services in the province. The educational parallel structure was not good enough and the young population of the 90’s is therefore referred to as the “lost generation”. The elite of Kosovo, the ones who governs the province, is educated. Usually they have studied abroad and got a master degree and they are capable to run the governmental institutions, the problem is that they are not many enough. The large population is uneducated and lives traditional rural life.

There is a third group, the ones who graduated from school and continue to the university and go on to the working life, but they never rise to very high positions. Among these are the ones who are older than 45 and graduated from the educational system of the socialist epoch; they have had some problems to adapt to the new era due to an education that is not up to date. Still many of them have leading positions today. The younger population, the ones between 20-30, who have graduated form Prishtina University are somewhat better equipped to the new times and more open towards foreign influences, they have risen in governmental positions and could be able to carry Kosovo for 10 years. However, the standard of their education could be much better and the level of education they get from the university is mediocre. This view is supported by KIPRED. Even so, the NGO’s in Kosovo hires the ones who can speak English and gives them relatively high wages with Kosovoan standards, this steps up the wages and makes it harder for domestic organisations and businesses to hire them.

88 Interview: Hopkinson, Lundin, Nilsson/McDonald, Lindholm
There is a general problem in Kosovo that education is not perceived as a priority. Investments in human resources are a long-term commitment and the majority of the population is beginning to understand this. But the current government have failed to understand how important education is for the future of Kosovo, that education is a prerequisite for a prosperous economy. Even if it is a long term commitment, there are short term wins to be made if a skilled and educated labour could compete in abroad in Europe, be a part of a Diaspora and send money home in order to overcome the social problems in the province.\footnote{Interview: Nilsson/McDonald, Hoxhaj, Anderson, Edman, Hopkinson}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Interest} & \textit{Economy (8), Historical legacy (8), Lack of proper education (2)} \\
\hline
\textbf{Values} & \textit{Unresolved status (4)} \\
\hline
\textbf{Human needs} & \textit{Lack of social harmony (3)} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Summary of the International community’s view}
\end{table}

Table 5.1 summarizes the International community’s stated root causes to the contemporary situation. As can be seen above the root causes have foremost an Interest-based feature where the Economy and the Historical legacy of Kosovo get the highest points. The Value- and Human need based root causes are given less significance.
5.2 The domestic Albanian view

5.2.1 Economy, poor region, infrastructure, unemployment

![Figure 5.6](image)

Figure 5.6 (7 points) Kosovo’s economic gap of frustration. Kosovo have always been a poor province but the overall economic situation and capabilities became worse during the Milosevic era and war in Yugoslavia. Foreign aid has done a lot though to improve the situation. The aspirations for a better life and economic development started to rise -99 and the period after the war. The future looks bright cause of a young and well-educated population.

**Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need** – There is a troubling economic situation for Kosovoars with high unemployment and a lack of a fully functioning infrastructure. This gap of frustration is interest-based due to its economic characteristics.

**Aspirations** – The aspirations changed after the war of -99, then people gained hope for a better future with jobs and a chance to be independent. People in Kosovo are for the first time optimistic and when the status is resolved investors will have a chance to provide support to the province. Today the aspirations is to be able to support one self and ones family and for Kosovo to be equal to other European countries and be a member of the European family. If that is to be achieved, Kosovo needs better infrastructure and a resolved status so investments can be made. The future looks bright though due to a young population who is educated and interested in educating further, gladly abroad. But Kosovo can not gain a positive economical development without support from the international community, especially the EU.

**Capabilities** – The aspirations are to gain a better economical situation, however, unemployment, poverty and lack of fully functioning infrastructure hinders that. Further, Kosovo is a small country with no- or old-fashioned industries that have been priced out by competitors outside the province and have lost its previous markets. Sorry to say, the employment situation has not drastically changed compared to what was the case before the war of -99, there was a harsh economical situation then as well with no foreign investments. Today the average salary is 200 euros/month and the prices are quite high by Kosovoan standards though the wage is low, therefore, the standard of living is low for the majority of the people.

Much of this can be explained by the history of Kosovo. Kosovo have always had a poor economic situation because others have always ruled the Albanians. Due to the war and the political situation since 1989, with the Serbian apartheid system and military regime that shut out the Albanians of the public services in Kosovo, no new investments have been made either to overcome this. During this period Kosovo survived much thanks to the extremely important Diaspora who sent money home to Kosovo. Also, the parallel system of the 90’s who was supposed to replace public schooling was old fashioned and not adjusted to modern standards and that is something Kosovo still suffers from today. As and example of this, one
of the interviewees, Luan Gashi, read his first book in Germany when he was 23. Generally, Kosovo shares the same problem as other former communist transition economies and post conflict societies do, they need a lot of foreign investments to get their economy started. But why should investments take place in Kosovo? It can just as well be done in Macedonia or Montenegro. Kosovo needs to attract investors but how that is to be done is not clear. As a conclusion of Kosovo’s contemporary economic history, the province can be said to have gone through three phases. The first one focused on getting moral- and political support for the Kosovo Albanians aspirations during the 90’s, there were limited opportunities to gain a better economical situation during that period. The second one was after -99 when Kosovo was trying to adjust to market economy and build a democracy in the province. Kosovo is still in that phase and have started to slide in to the third one: becoming prepared for international competition.

Where Kosovo stands today is hard to say, some of the interviewees, the non-politicians, makes a rather pessimistic assertion of the situation and state that the overall social situation is actually getting worse. Especially for the 19-24 year old population who have bad aspirations for finding work and therefore are having a negative view of the near future, one could even talk of a depression among them. They could go abroad and find work but in general that is not seen as an attractive alternative, they rather stay in Kosovo and be content with lesser salary and lower living of standard. Even if they can take that situation today, because they have hope that the future ahead must be better than what it is today and that they will get a job soon, there is a real danger if those aspirations are not fulfilled and hope is lost. What will happen then asked one of the interviewees rhetorically, when so many people just sit in cafés with nothing to do and suddenly loose hope that their situation will be improved? They have to use their energy somewhere and the loss of hope could lead to frustration and violence that has to be given vent, there is a chance they will take part in demonstrations that may become violent, possibly towards the Serbs. In general, it is good to have young population but that is but that is not an asset unless they are well educated and qualified, and they are not due to the education is not updated and budget is too small to invest in education. The social problems of unemployment and the paying out of pensions are taking up a lot of resources. The budget is used on absorptive aspects rather than needed investments in human capital and especially education, which is something that is forgotten by donors. This lack is enhanced by poor donor coordination by UNMIK who have had a slow administrative function and the fact that due to the unresolved status Kosovo cannot get loans from IMF/WB to invest in these areas.

The politicians on the other hand paint the picture of Kosovo’s situation and future in brighter colours. The overall capabilities of Kosovo went down 89-99, but after that they have improved and donor money has done a lot to help. Kosovo have a lot of resources today, among them is a young and educated population where 18 % have a higher degree from domestic schools or abroad ones, some from EU countries such as Sweden and they can therefore compete inside the EU. Other assets are the agriculture, and industrial resources like lignite, which Kosovo possesses the biggest one of in Europe. Thanks to that that resource, power plants can be built which can support Kosovo with energy but also be used as an export commodity. For that to be achieved though, international investments have to be made so that the resources can be used.

For the future, a resolved status is important in order to develop the economy; it is seen as a way to a better life with enhanced security, opportunities and a possibility to be able to develop freely and design one owns future. The economy will improve when the status is resolved and independence comes, cause then the international community will dare to invest
and that will lead to higher employment. Kosovo needs help from the European community to start up its economy. “Just like a car needs fuel to be able to start.”

5.2.2 Unresolved Status

Figure 5.7 (6 points) Kosovo’s unresolved status gap of frustration. The aspirations for the Albanian people in Kosovo were in the beginning to be part of Albania but then switched to be an independent state. Conversely, Kosovo have historically always been ruled by others, first the Ottomans and then the Serbs, so the capabilities have been low.

Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need – Kosovo Albanians plus other minorities who wants independence from Serbia, something they are not willing to grant. Frustration has emerged due to the unresolved political status and the not fully functioning democracy/economy in Kosovo. This can be identified as a human need that has existed in Kosovo since the 14th century, to be allowed independence. But also as a value need since the ethnic group of Albanians conveys the demand for independence.

Aspirations – Albanians have always wanted independence, but the aspirations have had to be modified the current political situation. Historically it was about unification with Albania and in the later era it has been focused on first becoming a republic inside the Yugoslavian forum and after the dissolution becoming independent from Serbia. Today some wants to join Albania and some wants to create a Big-Albania with the Albanians now living in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and elsewhere to form one country. However, the majority of Kosovo Albanians wants Kosovo to be a fully independent country. If that could be archived, the future of Kosovo looks bright and the economy will improve, but the province needs help from the international community, economic assistance and western expertise from the EU and USA.

Also, Kosovo wants to come closer to Europe and USA and become member of international organisations like EU and NATO and to have good relations with its neighbours, Serbia as well. But if a EU-membership is to be possible, a respect for minorities must be established. That is something the politicians of Kosovo should enforce, it cannot happen by itself. All this could be achieved in ten years if Kosovo gets independence and support.

However, some of the interviewees admitted that the aspirations for independence are not in balance with the contemporary capabilities. This may for outside observers seem illogical but one must remember that these strive is an emotional one; to be allowed to make decisions of one owns life and not living under Serbian rule.

90 Interview: Gashi, Musa, Kuqi, Hajdari, Jaliju, Syla
Capabilities – Historically the capabilities to achieve independence have been low, even if Kosovo have consisted of a pretty much heterogenic population consisting of Albanians and a diminishing Serbian minority. The province has never been a democracy and has always been ruled by others. First it was the Ottomans and Serbs, following that Kosovo was a part of Yugoslavia and after dissolution of that federation a part of the Serbian state once again. The Kosovo Albanians are now awaiting independence.

During communism nationalistic feelings were held back, that is an explanation why Kosovo’s strategy at that time was to gain greater autonomy inside the federative structure. Kosovo did have a level of autonomy under Yugoslav rule, but not to the same extent as other parts of Yugoslavia had. People therefore never felt at home in Yugoslavia because they could not make decisions regarding their own life. The uprisings in Kosovo 1981 and in Poland with the Solidarity movement were signs that communism was beginning to deteriorate and Kosovo Albanians aspirations for independence rose. These were however quenched when the sovereignty that the Albanians experienced during Yugoslav rule, especially after the 1974 constitution, were gradually taken away by Belgrade from the 80’s up to the war of -99. Kosovo has therefore never had a chance to develop on its own. To build democracy and economy, there is therefore a lack of investments in infrastructure and human capital.

Kosovo have the prerequisites to become an independent and prosperous country. The interviewees state that Kosovo have the foundations to build a good infrastructure, a young and educated population, natural resources and agriculture that can be developed, a Diaspora who is ready to invest in Kosovo and ones the status is resolved, loans and investments will be available to the province.91

5.2.3 Problem of establishing a new state in post-communist Kosovo

Figure 5.8 (5 points) Kosovo’s move from a communist totalitarian system that created a gap of frustration, this due to aspirations to become a functional contemporary state. These aspirations are hard to fulfil though due to low capabilities that stem from being ruled by a communist totalitarian system under Yugoslavia and Serbia. The newly created governmental institutions lack knowledge and experience.

Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need – Kosovo has always been ruled by others and been a part of a communist governmental system, apartheid system under Serbia and is a post-conflict society. It has led to a situation where it has been hard to establish a new democratic state with functioning institutions. This can be identified to be an interest-based unsatisfied need due to its political relational characteristics between individuals and organisations.

Aspirations – Are to become a functioning state with democracy and a free market economy, these aspirations have always been there but became manifest -99.

91 Interview: N.N., Gashi, Musa, Kuqi, Jaliju, Syla, Aliu
Capabilities – Generally, Kosovo shares the same problem as other post-communist eastern European countries. The communist rule failed to create incentives that are needed for a smooth transition to democracy. Incentives such as accountability of politicians, a plurality among the political parties that the electorate that choose from, a vivid civil society and an expectation from the population that everything is to be solved by the state. Also the Yugoslav era produced economical conditions and experiences that have proved to be difficult to transfer to a market economy. Conditions like a market that was previously controlled from Belgrade regarding what- and how much to produce and a mentality that is adjusted to that way of macro- micro economical thinking. Due to that, Kosovoars have no entrepreneurial- or basic market economy conditions experience, such as consumer demand.

It has proven hard to get rid of the heritage of the communist system. The government lacks experience about how to run a post-communist Kosovo. The different governmental ministries are functioning as individual islands and do not cooperate with each other. For instance, the environment-, health- and privatization ministries that deals with similar topics and should cooperate does not do that, there is an overall lack of sectoral cooperation. It is hard to get people to work together over the administrative boundaries, that is identified to be a heritage from the communist system; people do not like doing things in a new way. This is especially true for those who had and administrative function during the Yugoslav era. Also, the government also suffers from the fact that they have difficulties attracting the young and well-educated workforce. They go to the private sector instead which can pay better salaries and where they feel they get more attention and are being appreciated for the new ideas they have from their more modern education. That provides the government with bad administrative capabilities.

Also, due to the status process, there is no, or little planning ahead in the government cause too much focus have been on independence and the main issues, economical and social ones such as employment, education and the overall social situation, that a government normally deals with have been left behind. Further, the Kosovan government have not been in a position of power for very long and still shares some responsibilities with UNMIK. Cause of this Albanians has little experience and low capacity to govern a state of their own and the Kosovoan government is therefore a fragile one.\footnote{Interview: Aliu, N.N., Hajdari, Syla}

5.2.4 Dual administration of UNMIK and Kosovo Government

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure.png}
\caption{The dual administration creates a gap of frustration in Kosovo. This comes from the aspirations of Kosovoars who want to have a transparent, accountable and effective governing body. This has not change since the period when UN took control over Kosovo in 1999. The capabilities for this are not fulfilled due to UNMIK\textquotesingle s co-governing of Kosovo, which has been present in Kosovo.}
\end{figure}
Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need – Albanians in Kosovo who is experiencing the rule of UNMIK, which is not working out very well, also there is a mix of many organisations, OSCE, EU etc., which makes the situation for Kosovoans un-transparent. Further UNMIK is not accountable to the Kosovoan people regarding their decisions. This is thus, due to its political relational characteristics regarding governing, identified as an interest based unsatisfied need.

Aspirations – Are to become a fully functioning region/state but there is a problem that UNMIKs rule cannot be held accountable. Kosovo Albanians aspired for independence but have no control over what UNMIK does and decides. There is a call for a more effective governing.

Capabilities – One of the interviewees meant that since no UN-mission have been successful before in history, why should the one in Kosovo be that? As an example is the 50 UN policemen from Zimbabwe mentioned who is in Kosovo for two reasons, to police and to educate KPS. “Since Zimbabwe is under authoritarian rule, how can they teach our policemen democratic police work?”

Kosovo is in a status quo situation since -99, the Kosovoans want to know which country they live in, Serbia or Kosovo, as it is now it is not clear. Kosovoans can only get passports from UNMIK and it is not always an easy thing to get a Visa to be able to travel abroad. UNMIK is in Kosovo to implement resolution 1244, not anything else and that is frustrating for Kosovoans who wants a more effective governing. UNMIK cannot be held responsible for their actions, as a normal government would, they can therefore be said “to be above the law”. Further, UNMIK has no demands on them to be transparent and can overrule decisions made by Kosovoan courts if they violate against 1244. The Kosovoans feels that it is hard to govern effectively with dual administrations, both because there is two of them and because they are not equal. UNMIK is therefore experienced by many to be an obstacle to function fully. UN is good for peacekeeping and maintaining a status quo but not suitable to develop a country in the long run. By the Kosovo Albanians they are merely seen as a “necessary evil” on the path to independence.

Table 5.2 Summary of the International Community’s- and the Domestic Albanian view.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>International Community’s view</th>
<th>Domestic Albanian view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy (8), Historical legacy (8), Lack of proper education (2)</td>
<td>Economy (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Unresolved status (4)</td>
<td>New state in post communist Kosovo(5), Dual administration (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human needs</td>
<td>Lack of social harmony (3)</td>
<td>Unresolved status (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93 Interview: N.N., Musa, Syla
Table 5.2 summarizes the International community’s and the Domestic Albanians stated root causes to the contemporary situation. The International Community’s root causes have foremost an Interest-based feature where the Economy and the Historical legacy of Kosovo get the highest points. The Value- and Human need based root causes are given less significance. The domestic Albanians root causes are more evenly spread out. The Interest-based need Economy gets the highest points. That is followed by the Unresolved status which, unlike the International Community’s view, is foremost a Human-need based need.
5.3 The domestic Serbian view

5.3.1 Lack of security

![Diagram showing the gap of frustration](image)

**Figure 5.10** (1 point) the lack of security in the province for all Kosovoars is creating a gap of frustration. The aspirations are to feel secure but the capabilities cannot live up to that due to criminality in post 1999 Kosovo.

*Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need* – All people in Kosovo who is feeling a lack of security, this is identified as a human need.

*Aspirations* – Are to be able to feel secure.

*Capabilities* – To feel secure in Kosovo has diminished since, and due to the war, of 1999. There is an occurrence of corruption and criminality in Kosovo, which affects the province in a negative way. The majority of these heavy criminals, who make up the underground criminal network, consist of up to 90% of former war criminals from the -99 war. The international UN police that are in Kosovo should focus on fighting these criminals and just take them away from the province, deport them to Guantanamo for instance, just so the inhabitants can get rid of them.

KPS cannot deal with this problem alone; there is still a need for participation of international forces. There are a couple of problem with the KPS. First with the selection of policemen, the criteria to become one are low, many of the recruited ones are former KLA fighters and that is no good. Secondly, they need longer training; today it is only 12 weeks, which can be compared to the training in Serbia that is 4 years. Third, the wage for police officers is to low, 250 euros/month, that makes them easily bribed. Fourth, the KPS are arrogant and the participation of non-Albanians, like Serbs, is not satisfactory. The Serbs who have joined did so because they could not find another job and that is not a good precondition. Finally, the underground criminal gangs are better organized and equipped. If there were a real clash between them and KPS, the criminals would win. KPS can never fight the criminals who are becoming stronger and stronger while KPS is becoming weaker and weaker, there is a danger that people might go to the criminals instead to search for security if the normal civil services of a state cannot provide it.

Finally, Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) could maybe hypothetically help KPS and be a good institution of Kosovo, but the international community see KPC as a demilitarized Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), there is a problem with the participation of Serbs there as well. Therefore, it is not a credible future protection corps of Kosovo.94

---

94 Interview: Ivanovic
5.3.2 Lack of political stability

Figure 5.11 (1 point) the lack of political stability produces a gap of frustration. This is derived from the aspirations to have political stability and the lack of capabilities to reach that. The decreasing capability stems from the unresolved political situation in Kosovo after 1999.

Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need – Stems from the lack of political stability and an unsatisfied interest need.

Aspirations – Are to have political stability.

Capabilities – Are quite low in Kosovo and have been reduced since -99 due to the weak post war institutions and leaders. From an economical perspective independence is not important, but political stability with a functioning democracy is otherwise there can be no overall stability in the province. Investors want physical and legal security if they are to invest in a region, that is what is important from their point of view, not if a province is independent or not. Further, investors and Kosovo needs an enhanced infrastructure, foremost railroads which are an important and cheap way to freight goods and people. Also needs better roads and access to electricity, water and telecommunication. Due to the lack of political stability, poor infrastructure and the low level of skill and education of the population, most only have secondary school competence; no major investments will be made in Kosovo for another 20 years.

The only chance to gain stability is a new mission after UNMIK, which aim should be EU-membership for Kosovo. That would force the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs to cooperate towards a common goal. If Kosovo could be an EU-member it would be easier for the Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians to come to agreements within the EU forum. Today, the two groups have too strong positions on either side of the independence issue, where the people push the elites to mini-max positions. An outside observer would get the impression that the elite control the situation, the truth is that they do not.

For the future of the whole region it is imminent that both the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs can come to an agreement that both sides are content with. If one sees the independence issue in a broader regional perspective there is a danger that if Kosovo is granted independence Albanian minorities in other countries and provinces outside Albania and Kosovo, such as Macedonia, might ask themselves what the motherland is the for the Albanians and that could lead to arguments and friction among Albanians and cause instability.95

95 Interview: Ivanovic
5.3.3 Unresolved status

Figure 5.12 (1 point) The unresolved status of Kosovo creates a gap of frustration. The aspirations of the Albanians are to have independence. The Serbs wants Kosovo to stay in Serbia and fears an independent Kosovo, and that is what seems to be coming after the conflict of 1999. However, the majority of the people in Kosovo just want peace.

Gap of frustration/Unsatisfied need – The unresolved status of Kosovo is a human need based unsatisfied need due to its political aspirational need of belonging to Serbia and not grant Kosovo independence. It also has a feature of value need due to its ethnic characteristics.

Aspirations – The Albanians want independence but first and foremost the majority of the Kosovoan people want peace.

Capabilities – For the Serbs to have a clear and transparent notion of the status of Kosovo went away with the war of -99. The Albanians want independence but they show a fake unity towards the outer world. The opposition does not challenge the government of Kosovo on anything, even though the government do not hold a majority position, because they do not want to interfere with the status process towards independence. The Albanian politicians can only agree on the fact that Kosovo should be independent from Serbia, not on anything else, like what do in order to boost economy after independence. One thing is sure though, everyone in Kosovo is biased when it comes to the issue of independence, Albanians and Serbs.

The Serbs are afraid of independence and few will accept it. Those who accept it and stay in Kosovo will continue to fight politically for their rights. The others, and that goes for most of the Serbs, will flee to Serbia and there make political demands on Belgrade and demonstrate for what they believe is their right, to be able to stay and live a secure life in Kosovo. The fear and unwillingness to stay is justified. In 1999 there were 60 000 KFOR troops in Kosovo and that was not enough to stop the Albanians from expelling and violence against the Serbs. After independence KFOR will have even lesser soldiers than that and then it would certainly not be enough to protect the Serbs. Kosovo Albanians want to reduce the Serbs inside Kosovo and some of the politicians are eager to put blame on Serbs and Serbia for the problems in Kosovo. If Kosovo is not granted independence Kosovo Albanians will threaten the international community that riots, like the one that in occurred 2004, can happen again.

To prevent violence in the future in Kosovo, KFOR must make a clear statement that violence is not accepted by anyone. Violence will be met with violence by KFOR, whoever is the perpetrator. The international community must be clear on the fact that if violence occurs, the Kosovoan provincial government will take the blame and responsibility for it, they must not be allowed to blame someone else like UNMIK.96

96 Interview: Ivanovic
5.4 Summary

Table 5.3 Summary of the International Community’s-, Domestic Albanian- and the Domestic Serbian view.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>International Community’s view</th>
<th>Domestic Albanian view</th>
<th>Domestic Serbian view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Economy (8), Historical legacy (8), Lack of proper education (2)</td>
<td>Economy (7)</td>
<td>Lack of political stability (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Unresolved status (4)</td>
<td>New state in post communist Kosovo (5), Dual administration (3)</td>
<td>Unresolved status (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Needs</td>
<td>Lack of social harmony (3)</td>
<td>Unresolved status (6)</td>
<td>Lack of security (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in the table, the actors view differs. The International Community’s stated answers, which the root causes to the contemporary situation are, is focused on economical and educational shortcomings together with an unresolved status which all creates a lack of social harmony between Serbs and Albanians. In general, The Albanian aspirations started to rise during the late 90’s when the independence struggle became an armed one, their capabilities went down during the 90’s era of harsh Serbian rule and the war of -99. Further, the international community emphasizes the fact that the economic and political shortcomings of Kosovo has historical and to some extent political culture features. Some of the Albanian politicians have their faith set to high that the young population is an asset for the future, the fact is that they might be a liability due to high aspirations for a better life while their capabilities are low with insufficient educational- and professional skills. The International Community’s stated root causes are foremost Interest-based needs, and can therefore more easily than Value- and Human-need based needs change and be negotiated with.

The Albanians state that the economy, dual administration, living in a post-communist society and the unresolved status are the most important root causes. In general, the aspirations for a better life and independence have always been there but rose during the late 90’s and became more manifest and international outward looking. The capabilities to fulfill them have been low due to Kosovo have always been ruled by others and been a neglected part of Yugoslavia during the latter half of the 1900’s. Further, the heritage from communist rule and Serbian rule is something that the Albanians emphasize to a greater extent than the international community does, they point to the political culture further back as a root cause. Albanians identify themselves to having the same problems as Eastern Europe countries has and that much of these problems can be overcome with a resolved status and the investments and loans that will follow from that. The belief that independence will create a chance for a better future, that investment will follow and that the young educated population will help to develop Kosovo is more perhaps more based on high hopes from the politicians’ side than an impartial reality. The domestic Albanians root causes are more evenly spread out. The Interest-based need Economy gets the highest points. That is followed by the Unresolved status which, unlike the International Community’s view, is foremost a Human-need based need.

The Serbian politician on the other hand has a different perception of the root causes. He accentuated contemporary causes, not historical ones such as Ottoman, Serbian and
communist rule or the economic situation. Instead, the lack of political stability, unresolved status and security for the people of Kosovo, not only the Serbs were the ones stated. It is imminent for Kosovo to develop political stability and rule of law if financiers are to look to Kosovo as a possible region to invest in, independence is not necessarily a solution to all this. If Kosovo becomes independent many Serbs will leave the province because they will not feel secure to stay when the police are dominated by Albanians and the KFOR-soldiers might be too few to protect them. Instead of independence, he believed that Kosovo should try to aim for EU membership, because that would develop Kosovo and force the Albanians and Serbs to work together towards a common goal that would benefit them both. His root causes has a slight overweight towards Value- and Human-need based needs which are more resistant to change and more deeply bound than an Interest-based need.
6. Conclusion

If the Yugoslav crisis is to come to an end in Kosovo, the gaps of frustration has to be closed. The problem is that the actors do not have a common understanding of the root causes of the contemporary situation. The International Community sees them, to a greater extent than the domestic Albanians, to be interest based. Hence, needs that is negotiable and can be mended with easier than values and human needs. The Albanians and the Serbs in the province on the other hand tend to see the root causes to be more value and human need based. An explanation for this could be that the International Community evaluates Kosovo from their pre-understanding of the world, where interest based needs is a more common societal problem than in the developing world. The Kosovo Albanians desire for independence as a path to a more prosperous and self-determining life and the Kosovo Serbs craving to feel safe and be allowed to continue to live in the province might be underestimated.

For Kosovo to be a functional and prosperous region, the gap of frustration most acute to close is, as the actors’ states, the economy. However, they seem to have a different understanding of the aspirations and the capabilities of that root cause. The International Community has a more nuanced image of the capabilities, but perhaps they underestimate the strong aspirations for a better life that exists in the region. Further, I believe there is a genuine hazard with the Kosovo Albanian politicians’ view of the capabilities of Kosovo, that the province have a educated population, that the lignite resources is such a valuable resource and after independence investments will come and that all this will lead to economic development. It is hard to appraise how much of this is political propaganda to convince outside observers that Kosovo will develop and be able to handle its problems if only the aspired independence comes, and how much of it is an actual conviction. If it is a conviction and the population is convinced that prosperity and a better life will come after independence, I believe the aspirations are set to high for Kosovo’s capabilities. The frustration of the population in general and the young population in particular might rise fast if the situation does not improve considerably after independence.

Another important aspect to take into consideration is the Kosovo Serbs future situation in the province. What is to become of them? Naturally, the Serbian politician has his agenda to put forward when emphasizing the insecure situation of the Serbs, that the Kosovo Serbs do not want Kosovo to be independent. Despite this implicit agenda, they show explicit signs of alienation from the rest of the society; they are forming their own parallel society, somewhat similar to what the Albanians did during the 80’s and 90’s, and make an opposite stand than the Albanians do regarding the independence issue. They must be integrated and be made felt that they have a future and a secure life to live in Kosovo; otherwise they will be a frustrated and worried group in Kosovo or as refugees in Serbia. None of the alternatives is appealing, neither to Kosovo Albanians, Serbia nor the rest of Europe.

If Kosovo is to be a functional region, it needs a lot of support in the future, especially the period close to independence where the danger of aspirations not met is most imminent. Heavy investments must be made in human capital regarding the young population, so that they in the future can boost development and contribute to a democratic, functioning and uncorrupted society in Kosovo. Further, as stated above, the Kosovo Serbs is a part of Kosovo’s population and they must be included in the future, regardless of what has happened in the past. Otherwise the past is doomed to repeat itself and the Yugoslav crisis will continue in Kosovo and never be allowed to come to an end.
6.1 Concluding remarks

Can one put the findings in this thesis into a broader perspective? I strongly believe that is possible. I found that the perspectives, or perceptions, of the root causes to the contemporary situation in Kosovo differ between the different actors. What does this mean then? As stated in chapter 1.2, Problem and Aim, I do believe it is a bad thing if the international community is trying to close the gap of frustration that they have deemed as the most important ones when the domestic actors have another perception of them. This could lead to a situation where the policies imposed by the international community, many times funded by donor money, fail due to the fact that it not targeted at the gaps of frustration identified by the target population. I am not saying that that is the case in Kosovo, but facts remain. Kosovo is, as elaborated in chapter 4, not today a fully functioning region despite the time, money and effort the international community has put into the region. The conclusions of this thesis, even though it has not covered the entire international- and domestic actors, show that the perceptions of the root causes differ. This might be an answer to why Kosovo has not developed further than it has.

My recommendations is that closer attention is paid to international- and especially domestic actors perceptions of the root causes to a contemporary situation before policies are being formulated of how a not fully functioning political-, societal- and economical society’s is to become a functioning one.
7. References

Articles

Bhaumik, S.K.; Gang, I.N.; Yun, M.S., Ethnic conflict and economic disparity: Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo, Journal of Comparative Economics, 2006 Nr. 34

Larsson, Lars, Sverige kräver roll i Kosovo, Dagens Nyheter, 2007-03-29


Internet

Landguiden – Länder i Fickformat
www.landguiden.se 2007-05-07

Interviews

Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK)
Syla, Gjylnaze, Chairperson of parliamentary group (Prishtina) 2007-04-16

Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK)
Kuqi, Hajredin, Deputy President in party, responsible for new constitution of Kosovo (Prishtina) 2007-04-19

Government of Kosovo, Democratic League of Kosova (LDK)
Jaliju, Naim, Senior adviser to the president and parliamentary member, former vice president (Prishtina) 2007-04-16

International Crisis Group
Anderson, Alex, Head of Office (Prishtina) 2007-04-12

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societes
Pratz, Gunther, Head of office (Prishtina), 2007-04-02

Not named influential organisation
Anonymous local employee (Prishtina) 2007-04-04

Office of the Prime Minister
Hajdari, Rozeta, Coordinator on Donor Coordination (Prishtina) 2007-04-16

Olof Palme Center
Bicaku, Leven (Prishtina) 2007-04-10

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Lindholm, Sven, Official spokesperson (Prishtina), 2007-04-11
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Ober, Jennifer, Programme Officer, Democratisation (Prishtina), 2007-04-06

Post and Telecom of Kosova (PTK)
Musa, Leke, Deputy Director (Prishtina), 2007-04-03

Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) Ivanovic, Oliver, Parliamentery member, Committee for Public Services, Local Administration and Media, 2nd Vice Chairperson (Mitrovica) 2007-04-18

Swedish Contingent Kosovo Force (Swedish KFOR)
Kommendörkapten Lundin, Clas, Commanding Officer (Ajvalija) 2007-04-02

Swedish International Development Association
Edman, Ervor, Senior Programme Officer (Prishtina) 2007-03-29

Swedish Liaison Office
Nilsson, Ann-Sofie, Head of Office, McDonald, Karen, Deputy Head of Office/Development Cooperation (Prishtina) 2007-04-04

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Aliu, Lundrim, National Politics Affairs Officer, (Prishtina) 2007-04-13

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Dr. Hoxhaj, Enver, Chairperson of committee on education, culture and youth (Prishtina) 2007-04-19

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Hopkinson, Bryan, Strategy coordinator (Prishtina) 2007-04-13

US Agency for International Development (USAID)
Gashi, Luan (Prishtina) 2007-04-10

Literature
Almond, Gabriel, Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, cop. 1989


Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik, Wångnerud, Lena, Metodpraktikan Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2004


Judah, Tim, Kosovo – War and Revenge, Suffolk: St Edmundsbury Press, 2000

Kaldor, Mary, Nya och gamla krig : organiserat våld under globaliseringens era, Göteborg : Daidalos, 2000

Kvale, Steinar, Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun, Lund : Studentlitteratur, 1997


Mikkelsen, Britha, Methods for development work and research – a new guide for practitioners, New Delhi : Sage, 2005

Nilsson, Anders, Peace in our time – towards an holistic understanding of world society conflicts, Göteborg : Padrigu, 1999

Resic, Sanimir, En historia om Balkan – Jugoslaviens uppgång och fall, Riga: Preses Nams, 2006

Schwarz, Stephen, Kosovo: Background to a War, London: Anthem Press, 2000

Thurén, Torsten, Vetenskapsteori för nybörjare Malmö: Prinfo/Team Offset & Media, 2002


Reports

Index Kosova, Current Political Affairs in Kosovo, Prishtina: Index Kosova, 2007
http://www.indexkosova.com

http://kipred.net

UD, Strategi för utvecklingssamarbete med Kosovo – juni 2005-december 2006, Regeringskansliet UD, 2005
http://www.ud.se/content/1/c6/01/14/92/97699f7c.pdf

UNDP 1, Early Warning Report Kosovo – Report nr 15, UNDP Kosovo, 2006
http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/EWR15FinalENG.pdf


UNMIK, *Press Briefing*, UNMIK, 7th of April 2003

Appendix

Interview guide

1 A presentation of me
   • Student from Växjö University, studying a master in Peace and Development Studies, doing my master thesis.
   • Here on a SIDA sponsored Minor Fields Study.

2 Personal data
   • Name
   • Age
   • Organisation
   • Occupation in the organisation

3 Why isn’t contemporary Kosovo a fully functional region?  
   • Could you name, what you feel, is your organisations view of three root causes to the contemporary situation? Could you rank them, starting with the most important one?

   • 1 Which group and their RD:
     Aspirations:
     Capabilities:

   • 2 Which group and their RD:
     Aspirations:
     Capabilities:

   • 3 Which group and their RD:
     Aspirations:
     Capabilities:

---

97 Political/economical/societal situation in Kosovo
98 The main problems of contemporary Kosovo
4 How does your organisation work to solve those three problems?

5 End of interview
- Any questions for me?
- Thank you very much for all your help!