Planting the Tree Upside Down?

– Perspectives on Actors’ Influence on the Development of Democracy in Kosovo

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“The task before the international community is to help the people in Kosovo to rebuild their lives and heal the wounds of the conflict”

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
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Abstract

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This study explores different actors’ perceptions on how the democratization process is being influenced in Kosovo. It is based upon empirical facts gathered during a field study in Kosovo. The material was mainly gathered through interviews with different representatives from international organizations present in Kosovo and with members of the Kosovar political elite.

The theoretical standpoint in the study draws on the theory of polyarchy for defining the concept of democracy, and the two-level game. The interaction between domestic and international actors within the democratization process is highlighted.

The conclusions are that different actors are influencing the ongoing democratization process in Kosovo, mainly international external ones acting in several ways and on different levels. This influence is considered by the international community and the domestic political elite to be necessary both for the continued development of democracy and for the preservation of stability. However as the influence has more or less become institutionalized, problems occur when responsibility is handed over to domestic authorities without accountability being made clear.

Keywords: Kosovo, Democratization, Actors, International Community, Domestic Political Elite, Polyarchy, Two-level game
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Abbreviations

AAK  Alliance for the Future of Kosovo  
EU  European Union  
ICG  International Crisis Group  
IFRC  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
KFOR  Kosovo Force  
LDK  Democratic League of Kosovo  
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe  
PDK  Democratic Party of Kosovo  
PISG  Provisional Interim Self Government  
SIDA  Swedish International Development Agency  
SLKM  Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija  
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo  
UN  United Nations  
UNMIK  United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo  
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
1. Introduction

In this introductory chapter my study’s problem and aim will be defined. I will also present the delimitations made in the study and the disposition of this thesis.

On June 10, 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which mandated the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to establish an interim administration. The international mission was charged with enhancing the capacity for self-government, building its capacity to provide services, promoting reconciliation between formerly warring factions and developing democratic political practices.¹ This could be seen as a starting point for the recent development of democracy in Kosovo. Considering the role that UNMIK and other international organizations have played and still play in Kosovo, they are central when studying the democratization process in Kosovo. It is important to keep in mind that the case of the UN mission in Kosovo is more or less unique in its parallel roles of development of democratization and state building².

The mission, along with other international actors, has the responsibility to create a foundation for a future democratic Kosovar society. It was initially vital to have a strong international presence and to have executive powers, as without the governance of the international community the democratization process might have come to a halt, which would have had a negative effect on development. This illustrates the delicate situation of the current democratization process in Kosovo, it being heavily influenced by the international community but lacking a clear goal. In many ways the situation in Kosovo could more or less be described as an experimental democracy; a playground for many actors, foremost those from the international community. The democracy being promoted can be illustrated as a tree with the crown symbolizing consolidated democracy and the roots as the foundation from which democracy emerges. What the international community is trying to do in Kosovo is to influence the development of democracy in such a way that the tree does not have any stable roots and the democratic tree is more or less planted up-side down.

In Kosovo, the dynamics of democratization highlights the relationship between domestic and international actors and the implications of these within the process, but also de facto that Kosovo is not to date a sovereign state. The dynamics of the democratization process in Kosovo makes it a unique and interesting phenomenon to study.

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¹ [www.unmikonline.org](http://www.unmikonline.org)
² The UN mission in East Timor can be seen as an exception
1.1 Problem

The advancement of democracy throughout the world during recent decades has encouraged research on the phenomenon of the democratization process. Looking back just twenty years the situation around the world was totally different, with democracy seen as a type of superstructure concerning a small number of highly modernized and developed countries. Today in the globalized world, democracy is a matter that concerns all countries in one-way or the other.

Democracy as concept could, according to some scholars, be defined as a condition that characterizes a state or a society, and democratization is the process that leads to this condition, namely; democracy is the goal, democratization is the road leading to it. The process of democratization is highly dynamic with different levels of structures and number of actors. Much of the previous research explaining democratization has traditionally focused on factors that are structure-oriented. But lately the focus has shifted to include different actors as well as their interests and actions in the process. This new way of perceiving the process, who takes part and in what way, makes this field an interesting research area but raises new questions as well. What roles do the actors play and what effect do they have on the process, and in what way do they interact with each other? These types of questions show the complexity of a democratization process that involves high-level actors and interests. Furthermore, when studying the process of democratization it is important to have in mind that it is not possible to study the “process” alone, without knowing and conceptualizing what the “goal” is. In fact the conditions that determine the progress towards democracy are dependent on the factors that define the condition democracy.

The recent development changes in Kosovo have showed that progress is being made in the democratization process. Such progress is a good sign that Kosovo is heading in the right direction. However, UNMIK still holds executive powers in number of institutions and this cannot be ignored when studying the democratization process in Kosovo. This great influence that the international community has, not only on the process but also on the domestic actors in Kosovo, raises the question of how this influence is viewed by the domestic political elite but also by the international community itself.

Against this background, in my thesis I have chosen to study the ongoing democratization process in Kosovo, as it is interesting in many aspects. Kosovo could be seen as a new path to the development of democracy, as it is not yet a state; this contradicts the arguments of scholars who maintain that consolidation of democracy can only take place in a state. Because the process and in fact many institutions in Kosovo are still under the regulations of the UN and other international organizations the situation in Kosovo is in many ways unique and has a dynamic that has rarely been seen in other democratization processes that have occurred.

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3 Karvonen, L, 1997 p 11
4 Silander, D, 2005 p 9
5 Karvonen, L, 1997 p 11
1.2 Aim of Study

The overall purpose with my project is to achieve a greater understanding of the international community and the domestic political elites’ role in the present democratization process in Kosovo. My focus is on the political arena, where a comparison is to be made between the international community’s and the domestic political elite’s perceptions of the way the democratization process in Kosovo is being influenced.

1.3 Delimitations

During my study, three delimitations have been made. Since this thesis is about the process in Kosovo and the views of different actors on how the process is being influenced I do not attempt to carry out any discussion on how the process should occur or what the end result will turn out to be, and it is not a normative analysis on the quality of the democratization process in Kosovo. Regarding the issue of the future status of Kosovo, I do not have any intention of addressing the validity of Kosovo becoming an independent state or not. Further to this point, I have chosen to apply the term “domestic actors” when talking about Kosovar actors. The status question can also be seen as somewhat of a limitation in itself for my study. As it was, the largest sole issue that occupied most of the high officials’ time was the question of status, which overshadowed all topics and answers even during appointments.

Secondly I have limited my focus to actors that are participating either directly or indirectly in the Kosovar political arena. A further definition of political arena can be found in the theoretical frame chapter. The actors included in my study are divided into two groups, domestic and international. The domestic includes representatives from the four largest political parties in Kosovo: Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) and representatives from the President of Kosovo’s office and the Prime Minister’s office (Provisional Interim Self-Government) and from the post and telecommunications company of Kosovo (PTK).

The international includes representatives from the larger international organizations such as: the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Liaison Office in Pristina, the Swedish Contingent of KFOR, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and The International Crisis Group.

A third delimitation is the study’s time period, which stretches from the end of the conflict when Kosovo became an UN protectorate in 1999, to the developments of today (April 2007) in Kosovo. Another time consideration is the period that my fieldwork lasted on site in Kosovo and primarily in Pristina. This came at about the same time as many negotiations on the future status of Kosovo were taking place,
mostly abroad, which affected my study in the sense that it was somewhat difficult to get appointments with some high officials, both international and domestic.

### 1.4 Disposition

In this first introduction chapter I have stated the problem and the purpose of this study. In the following second chapter I will describe the methodological framework utilized in order to fulfill the purpose of this study. The third chapter presents a theoretical framework for the study. The chapter will first introduce a general definition of the concept of democracy, which will follow with a notion and description of the process of democratization. A presentation is given of the concept of political arena and what actors might be involved in the process and how these interact with each other. Finally the theoretical framework will end with a summary and a presentation of this study’s analytical frame.

The fourth chapter provides a brief background and presentation of the main actors that have played a major role in Kosovo. This will continue with the presentation of this study’s results based on the interviews conducted in Kosovo. In the fifth chapter a brief conclusion will be given, responding to this study’s aim. Finally in chapter six I will present my own thoughts and reflections on my study of the democratization process and its influences in Kosovo.
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter the methodological approaches are described and my choice of research approach is explained. I will also describe the procedure used in order to fulfill the purpose of this master thesis as well as present a critical evaluation.

2.1 Data Collection

Primary data constitutes my main source of information for my empirical research. The primary data was gathered from interviews with officials from a number of international organizations represented in Kosovo and representatives from the domestic political institutions. Qualitative interviews have the advantage of flexibility and I consider it the most appropriate method, considering my data. This has provided me with information not available in any other way. Using interviews instead of, for example, questionnaires has given me the opportunity to receive less hard-wired and more spontaneous answers. All of the interviewed respondents in my study represent an official organization/institution, either international or domestic. I have chosen to separate the opinions from the respondents depending on whether they represent a domestic or an international actor, in order to get an overall picture of the different actor’s views on the area presented.

The personal interviews were of a semi-structured sort, which means a method where the interviewer controls the interview as little as possible. This method is useful when the researcher is interested in phenomena that have occurred and would like to know the opinion of someone who had direct involvement in the process. The questions and concepts are based on a partly standardized predetermined interview guide that was handed to the respondent during the interview. The interview guide was constructed so that all questions were based on the theory of polyarchy and the seven institutions that define it, and international influences on these institutions. All questions are judged both thematically and dynamically, thematically with regard to the question’s relevance to the subject being researched and dynamically according to the interaction between the respondent and me as an interviewer.

Using a semi-structured method allows me as a researcher more liberty when asking the interviewees questions e.g. adding questions in order to get further insight into an answer given. The exact formulation of the questions is however determined during the course of the interview and adjusted to the answers given by each respondent. The aim is to gather information from the subjective viewpoint of the person interviewed and the purpose of the interview is not well defined, so the scope is wider and less focused. The respondent’s values regarding a situation, views and attitudes

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6 A brief introduction of each respondent can be found in references
7 Halvorsen, K, 1992 p 85
8 The interview guides can be found in appendix I
9 Kvale, S, 1997 p 121
10 Andersson, B-E, 1994, p 76-77
are as important as facts. The questions are presented in a way that stimulates the respondent to develop their answers and thoughts.\textsuperscript{11} But there are both strengths and weaknesses to using an interview guide approach. Strengths are that the outline increases the comprehensiveness of the data collected and makes collection systematic for each respondent. Logical gaps in the data can be identified and filled. The interview type is of a fairly controversial and situational sort. However the weakness that I as an interviewer have to beware of is that important and prominent topics may be unintentionally neglected. As the interviewer’s flexibility in sequencing and wording questions can result in substantially different responses from different perspectives, the comparability of the responses given may be reduced.\textsuperscript{12} While I have chosen to use an interview guide approach, I am aware of its pro’s and con’s.

Most of the interviews were carried out at the respondents’ offices in Pristina and Mitrovica as more formal types of meeting. However some of the respondents wanted to meet in a less formal environment such as cafés, where the interviews also became more informal. None of the interviews were recorded on tapes as this might have made them hesitant and reluctant to tell the whole story. Instead of recording, note taking was used and the transcription was done straight after the interview had occurred. The purpose of this was to maintain quality high, and to minimize the risk of forgetting any vital information from the interview. The selection of respondents was made with the intention of gaining a representative picture of the international community that is represented in Kosovo. The same procedure has been undertaken with the officials from the domestic political arena.

My main secondary data consist of official documents from UNMIK, OSCE, ICG and literature. Most of the literature used in my study covers my theoretical and methodology framework, the development, history and culture of Kosovo. I am aware that while using a source describing the culture and history of Kosovo I have to have in mind the author’s background and who’s picture he wants to present.

As my study involves some questions that are somewhat complicated to comprehend only through interviewing different actors to reveal their view on them, I have chosen to also use measurements of the level of political rights and civilian liberties in Kosovo from the organization Freedom house. Freedom House is a non-profit organization established in 1941 that since the 1970s has compiled the annual Freedom house Survey evaluations of political rights and civil freedoms in the world. They are the result of a multi-layered process of analysis including different views from, for example, regional academic experts, information from news reports, academic analyses, NGOs, think tanks, professional contacts and field studies. The Freedom House Survey consists of two checklists on political rights and civil liberties that are based on international comparative indicators in order to measure the progress of democracy.\textsuperscript{13} The reason why I chose to use Freedom house in my study is the fact that their results are based on indicators that occur in the concept of Polyarchy. This concept is one of the theoretical foundations in my study, and is well suited to giving additional information regarding the institutions of polyarchy that the respondents

\textsuperscript{11} Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999 p 117
\textsuperscript{12} Mikkelsen, B, 2005 p 171
\textsuperscript{13} Freedom house methodology \url{http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005}
have not covered. The Freedom house results should be regarded as supplements to what my respondents have stated in the empirical study. Adding the statements from Freedom house aids me in my study on the democratization process by giving me a more comprehensive picture of the situation in Kosovo.

2.2 Critical Evaluation

The empirical study was carried out in Kosovo, mainly in Pristina. The data for the study was collected from eighteen separate interviews made with different officials, domestic as well as international. All interviews were carried out in English, with no translation, and prior to each interview the respondents were given background information regarding me, the purpose of the interview and my study. This was in order to minimize the level of misunderstanding that may occur if the respondent is unclear of the purpose of the study. It is however vital that the researcher can prove that the collection of data has been carried out in a satisfactory way, that hasty conclusions are not being drawn and that the interpretation is not based on the researcher’s own prejudices. Another aspect that is important when conducting interviews is to consider the reliability of the sources.

I as a researcher have to make my own judgments on the respondents’ objectivity, i.e whether they have interests of their own in the issues being discussed. If the respondents have such interests, the risk of bias in the information collected has to be considered. Another potential risk when conducting personal interviews as a main method of data collection is the so-called interview effect. This might occur when some respondents give the interviewer answers that he or she would like to hear. I am aware that there is a risk of receiving these kinds of answers and that my choice of questions has affected this thesis outcome. Another area that has come to my notice is that interviewing people about their work and their opinion regarding the situation in Kosovo at their place of work might be problematic. For example politicians often want to present their work and their views in a better light than might actually be the truth. However, I must say that some of the interviewees were in many ways self-critical. They expressed their personal views on the current situation and what future developments might be.

All the interviews gave me a lot of useful information and the respondents took time for the interviews and replied to my questions in a very helpful way. After coming back to Sweden in late April 2007 all the material was analyzed according to my model of analysis and the thesis was completed in June 2007.

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14 For further information about Freedom house visit: www.freedomhouse.org
15 Halvorsen, K, 1992 p 31f
16 Ibid p 89
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter I will present the theoretical points of departure for my study. I start with a general definition of democracy and continue with the notion and the consistence of the democratization process. Furthermore I present how actors remain to the process and the interactions between actors. The chapter will be finalized with a brief summary.

3.1 Concept of Democracy

To be able to understand the concept of democratization there is a need to define it. Giving a straightforward definition of democracy is difficult, as the concept is very broad, and there seem to be as many different interpretations as there are scholars on the subject. The notion originates in the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, *demokratia* and the literal meaning is *demos* (people), and *kratos* (to rule) *rule of the people*.\(^{17}\) The term refers to government on a national level, and the discussion centers on the problem of constructing such a political body. However it is important to recognize democracy as a mode of decision-making that facilitates further evolution of the concept in relation to the specific context.

In my thesis, the concept of democracy takes foremost the form of westernized liberal democracy, constructed around the idea that those people affected by any decision should have the right to influence the procedures by which the decision is taken. Democracy could be seen as having three dimensions: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties. These include: a) Meaningful and extensive political competition, excluding the use of force among individuals and groups to attain positions of power, b) A high level of political participation in selecting leaders and policies through regular and fair elections, excluding no major social group, c) Civil and political liberties, e.g. freedom of expression and organizational freedom, sufficient to ensure functioning political competition and participation.\(^{18}\) Lijphart argues that democracy today is in practice representative democracy; that is government by the freely elected representatives of the people.\(^{19}\) This is called liberal democracy as it is based on liberal ideas about state and citizens. Hadenius points out the principle of equality as central to the concept, as liberal theories emphasize the freedom of the individual:

“[Political democracy] is to be governed by the freely expressed will of the people whereby all individuals are to be treated as equals.”\(^{20}\)

There are various theories on the subject of democratization. Here I present four possible preconditions for the process. One precondition of a process that leads to

\(^{17}\) Dahl, R, 1998 p 11
\(^{18}\) Sörensen, G, 1998 p 12
\(^{19}\) Lijphart, A, 1984 p 1
\(^{20}\) Hadenius, A, 1992 p 9
democracy factors as economical and industrial development, have a positive effect on democracy in areas as education and urbanization.\textsuperscript{21} Another set of preconditions stress the political culture. Lijphart argues that the desire of the leaders to cooperate with different sectors of society is decisive for the achievement of stable democracy.\textsuperscript{22} The emergence of a stronger pluralistic society including diverse associations creates power centers outside the state apparatus. This is an important precondition for a thriving democracy as it gives society the opportunity to balance state power. In addition, the internal organization of such associations creates forums for the education of citizens in democratic decision-making.\textsuperscript{23} In addition, the development of a democratic political culture is seen as necessary for the consolidation of a democratic system. A third set of preconditions that may favor democratic development is associated with a society’s social structure. Where some specified groups and classes are identified, that has in one way or the other favored democracy. Finally the external factors that provide possible preconditions are identified as the economic, political, ideological and other essential circumstances that constitute the international context for the process taking place in individual countries. It implies that no country is isolated from external influence, especially from what can be identified as western countries. Traditionally this influence has been considered as beneficial for democratic development. Even though these preconditions facilitate the emergence of a democratic system, its success depends on the way popular power is used. The different preconditions that have been discussed, they do not separately or together gives shared any definitive results, they do however; give views on the prospects of democracy.\textsuperscript{24}

However, it is important not to take the existence of democracy, even liberal democracy, as the ultimate form of state system. Democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon. Even though a country has achieved a high level of democracy there are still many areas that can be improved, e.g. consolidation and deepening of the democratic institutions. The political competition can be more vital, transparent and fairer, the people’s participation and knowledge can grow and become more inclusive, officials can be more accountable for their actions and civil liberties can be better protected. Seen from this perspective, continued democratic development is a challenge for all countries since all democracies, new as well as established, can become more democratic.\textsuperscript{25}

Taking a more normative approach to defining democracy Robert A. Dahl explains that there will always be a difference between democracy as an ideal and as a practical form of governing. Dahl proposes that a political system he calls polyarchy is the closest to ideal democracy. The difference between democracy and polyarchy is that which – the former or the latter? is not an ideal but a selective type of government.

Polyarchy builds on two foundations: participation and contestation, which refer to the election procedure. The relation between these dimensions could be illustrated in a

\textsuperscript{21} Sørensen, G, 1998 p 25  
\textsuperscript{22} Lijphart, A, 1984 p 1  
\textsuperscript{23} Sørensen, G, 1998 p 57  
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, p 26  
\textsuperscript{25} Diamond, L, 1999 p 18
The basic concept is that all citizens should be electable to the seats at the representative institutions that are present, the political elite could compete over the voters and finally the elections should be free and fair.

Fig. 3.1  The two foundations of Polyarchy

The are seven criteria that have to be met in order for a society to be considered democratic (polyarchic): elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, rights to run for office, freedom of expression, of the press, and of association. These institutions are a major advance in that they create multiple centers of political power. Democracy according to Dahl requires more citizen participation and tighter control of policies by citizens that any nation has achieved. The institutions of polyarchy could be explained as follow:

1. Elected officials: Control over the government’s political decisions according to the constitution are to be in the hands of the elected officials.
2. Free and fair elections: The elected officials should be appointed in regular and impartial where elements of constraints are limited.
3. Inclusive suffrage: More or less all adults should have the right to vote in the election of officials.
4. Rights to run for office: More or less all adults should have the right to run for public elected offices. The age limit could be higher to attain an office than to vote.

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26 See fig 3.1
5. *Freedom of speech:* The citizens should have the right to freely express their opinions about politics without risking any punishment. This encompasses criticism of the potentates, the state, government, the socioeconomic system and the ruling ideology.

6. *Freedom of the press:* All citizens should have the right to seek alternative sources of information. These should exist and be protected by the law.

7. *Freedom of association:* To ensure their rights, the citizens should have the right to create independent associations and organizations, such as political parties and interest groups.

The seven institutions and rights that define polyarchy should not only be formal but also exist in a society, where they can serve as indicators to measure which countries are or have been defined as *polyarchies.* Even though polyarchy is similar to the concept of democracy, with public contestation and inclusiveness, polyarchy is not and was never intended to be the exact equivalent to democracy.

The concept of Dahl’s polyarchy, however, has not been without its criticisms. Two especially have been persistent; firstly it has been argued that the concept of polyarchy is too narrowly defined. Secondly, polyarchy has been criticized because one of its two dimensions (inclusiveness) has not been successfully demonstrated to any extent in practice. The former criticism suggests that a country may meet the basic institutional requirements such as “free and fair elections” thus enabling it to join the club of polyarchies, but such a minimal requirement tells us very little about what kind of member it is and if we should expect it to be a member in the longer term. Evidence of political contestation and general participation in the political system are important, but not sufficient to allow us to adequately compare variation in the quality and stability of different polyarchies. In addition this criticism raises the issue that polyarchy in its simplest form could be described as elite-based democracy, where the elite are elected in fair and free elections by the citizens and then form the elite-based ruling society.

I have considered the above criticisms when choosing to apply the theory of polyarchy in my study. However I do find polyarchy to be the most suitable form for defining democracy when applying the concept to a developing democracy such as Kosovo.

When formulating the interviews that are reported in the fourth chapter I choose to construct them from the seven institutions of polyarchy, adding questions to ascertain the respondents’ views on the influence different actors have on them. I have chosen to divide the seven institutions into two categories when applying them in my analysis. In the category I have chosen to call political institutions I include *Elected officials, Free and fair elections, Inclusive suffrage,* and *Rights to run for office.* The other category called societal freedoms includes *Freedom of speech, Freedom of the* 

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27 Dahl, R, 1992 p 245-246
28 Baker & Koesler, 2001 p 6
press and Freedom of association. This was done in order to make collection of the material easier and to answer the three questions in my analytical framework. It was also intended to make the interview situation as much of a discussion as possible and in order to obtain information that would give me an overall picture of the subject. One category was more discussed than the other, as I chose to add views from the organization Freedom house in order to complete the overall picture of the democratization process in Kosovo.

### 3.2 Democratization Process

Democracy has to be seen as an ongoing process that can always be improved in different ways.

Even though a country has started the process of democratization and even after achieving a high level of democracy, the fragile system will confront other obstacles. It is not enough just to implement democracy; the system has also to be nurtured, protected and stabilized. These can be seen as factors that will secure the consolidation of democracy. But before examining where in the process of democratization a country is, it is necessary to attend to the process that is called transition – the development from a non-democratic, to a democratic system.

**Fig. 3.2 The process of democratization**

![Diagram of the democratization process]

**3.2.1 Transition**

The concept of transition has been a heavily debated over the years: What does it stand for - is it the actual concept of transition or the transition process? Some authors simply state the fact that transition is an interval between two different regimes. But the general simple definition of transition could be said to be a phase where the rules of the political game are neither well-defined nor implemented.29 I will not go further by trying to give my own definition of transition, but my approach to the transition

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29 Linde & Ekman, 2006 p 22
process in Kosovo is that it could be regarded as having ended and therefore I will rely on Linz & Stepan’s definition of when the transition process has ended:

“Democratic transition is completed when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power de jure”.  

According to this definition it could be said that the transition process has ended when the new democratic order has resulted in a new constitution and when free and fair elections have been held. The definition gives a minimum standard of democracy and even though some democratic elements have been implemented they might exist in parallel with undemocratic ones in the society. This is important because transition not only means a straight process from an undemocratic to a democratic system, but can also be a process backwards, from a democratic towards an undemocratic system. This reveals the delicate situation that characterizes the transition process, where stable development and a dedicated society on all levels is required in order to progress. But the story does not end there; after the transition process comes to an end (with reference to the definition of Linz & Stepan) the society will experience the challenges and complexities of consolidating the new regime of democracy.

Fig. 3.3 The concept of transition in the democratization process

3.2.2 Consolidation

With the end of the democratic transition process the complexity of consolidation begins. However it is not always easy to point out when the transition ends and when the consolidation begins, as the two processes sometimes imbricate? on each other. First of all the consolidation begins with revoking the lack of predictability concerning the political rules of the game that strikes the transition process. There

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30 I consider this is so due to the fact that elections that have taken place in Kosovo 2001 and 2004 have been considered free and fair by the international community.
31 Linz & Stepan, 1996 p 3
32 Silander, D 2005 p 37
33 Linde & Ekman, 2006 p 23
34 Linde & Ekman, 2006 p 24
are also other important initial phases in the consolidation process: An institutionalization process in the development of effective and representative political institutions; legitimate regime performance; civil controlled military; executive, judiciary and legislature branches; rule of law; transparent public administration.\textsuperscript{35}

Consolidation requires more that a commitment to democracy in the abstract, that democracy is in principle the best form of government. For a democracy to be consolidated, elites, organizations and the mass public must all believe that the political system they actually have in their country is worth respecting and defending. This robust legitimacy involves a shared normative and behavioral commitment to the specific rules and practices of the country’s constitutional system. Consolidation takes place in two areas, norms and behavior, and at three levels, the society’s elite, organizations and at the mass level.\textsuperscript{36} As my study focuses on the political elite in Kosovo I will foremost describe behavior and norms at the elite level in order to apply this with my results.

The society’s elite could be described as the top decision makers, leaders and opinion shapers in politics, economy, society and government. Due to the elite’s strong position of power and influence they play a key role in the consolidation of democracy as well as the promotion of stability. Diamond suggests that it is both the elite’s behavior and their beliefs that have a crucial impact on the consolidation process.\textsuperscript{37}

However it is important in a consolidated democratic regime that all significant political actors are well acquainted with the democratic rules of the game within an existing institutional framework. Consolidation in the long run also presupposes that democratic values are spread and strike root among the citizens. Compared to transition that mostly engages the elite of the society, consolidation also involves the masses and the civil society.\textsuperscript{38}

There are a lot of different definitions of consolidation ranging from the level of democratic quality to \textit{the two-turnover test} that argues that a democracy could be defined as consolidated as follows: If the party that wins power after the first election following the transition then loses the subsequent election and hands over power to the new election winner, and if they in turn lose the third election and peacefully hand over power to the winner of that election.\textsuperscript{39} This is a rather simplified definition that is not always correct to apply due to the fact that one party might win several elections in a row. More useful and more comprehensive is Linz & Stepan’s argument that a democracy could be considered consolidated when democracy as a regime becomes \textit{the only game in town}. They suggest there are three areas, \textit{behavioral, attitudinal} and \textit{constitutional} where this takes place. Furthermore they conclude that:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} Silander, D, 2005 p 38
\item \textsuperscript{36} Diamond, L, 1999 p 64-65
\item \textsuperscript{37} Diamond, L, 1999, p 65-67
\item \textsuperscript{38} Linde & Ekman, 2006 p 24
\item \textsuperscript{39} Huntington, S, 1991 p 266-267
\end{itemize}
“Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.”

However, Linz & Stepan point out that there is not only one type of consolidated democracy. And even when a democracy is to be considered consolidated this does not mean that it cannot further develop or improve. To the contrary, as other authors imply, democracy is not the end station and should not be considered as such, but is a governing system that can always further improve.

Fig. 3.4 The concept of consolidation in the democratization process

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40 Linz & Stepan, 1996 p 4-6
41 Linz & Stepan, 1996, p 6
3.3 The Political Arena

As I have pointed out in the aim of my study, this thesis will focus on the political arena in society. But it is necessary to clarify what I mean by this and what my intention is in addressing this arena in my study.

As Linz & Stepan explain, in order that consolidation of democracy can exist and proceed there need to be five different arenas and conditions that interact with each other. These arenas are The Civil Society, Political Society, Rule of Law, State Apparatus and Economic Society. Whereas political society is defined as an arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus, Linz & Stepan further state that:

“The composition and consolidation of a democratic polity must entail serious thought and action concerning the development of a normatively positive appreciation of those core institutions of a political society; political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures, by which society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government”. 42

Linz & Stepan argue that for consolidation of democracy to take place, it has to be existence of a functioning state where this is taken place, and all these five arenas are parts of the functioning state. However as, when doing this study, Kosovo had not yet attained the status of a state it could be argued that the arenas of Linz & Stepan cannot be applied in the case of Kosovo. But as I have stated earlier the democratic development that has occurred in Kosovo in the absence of statehood demonstrates that democratization can occur outside the state system.

There is a need for inclusive thinking in defining who is affected by the decision what decision? and who exerts influence. Huntington states that today democracy is closely associated with the nation-state as an inclusive concept. 43 Democracy can also be defined as government in accordance with people’s preferences. 44 The definition may be theoretically valid, but the implementation of this ideal is unlikely. Similar arguments are often used to justify non-democratic regimes. So in order to find out who is influencing and who is being influenced there is a need to discuss which actors have a role to play in the process.

As my study focuses on the democratization process in Kosovo and the perceptions different actors have on how this is being influenced, and as the domestic political elite (who are among my respondents) are actors playing a major role in the process, my focus on the political arena of domestic and international actors is appropriate for fulfilling the aim of the study.

42 Linz & Stepan, 1996 p 8
43 Huntington, S, 1991 p 13
44 Lijphart, A, 1984 p 1
3.4 The Political Actors

3.4.1 Domestic Political Elite

The domestic elite actors that play a role in the transition process not only serve as bargaining tools and in preventing hostilities between different groups in society. They might even as a consequence of their interaction with other political elites start a process of integration. Unity among the citizens, which is considered by some scholars to be a foundation for democracy, can be facilitated through the domination of the elite in the democratization process. The importance of the political elite is stressed by several scholars, who state that the behavior of the political elite can have a great impact on whether or not a positive route is followed. This is explained by the fact that the political elite holds power and thus is a key player in the game of transformation. There is also interaction within the political elite, being divided between political soft-liners and political hard-liners. Whereas the soft-liners favor the striking of deals and are prepared to reach compromises, hard-liners pursue a more confrontational approach. Which of these categories of political groups holds power and gains the favor of the masses may have an impact on the development of democracy.\textsuperscript{45}

The political leaders can install democratic institutions through careful rational choices. Through its continued practice democracy may strike roots and become regarded by the actors as “The only game in town”, as the well-known Linz & Stepan expression puts it.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{diagram.png}
\caption{The domestic political elite’s influence on the process}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{45} Hadenius, A, 2002 p74
\textsuperscript{46} ibid p 74
3.4.2 International Community

It is indisputable that traditionally the domestic actors have a presentational role in democratization processes. However, other types of actors that have not been studied to such an extent are the international actors that might play a more or less active role than the domestic actors in a democratization process. In the case of Kosovo it is the international actors that have been the primary engine in moving the democratization process forward, of course in co-operation with the domestic political elite. What role can the international actors then play in the democratization process?

Uhlin suggest that there are at least six questions to be asked when trying to find out the external dimensions and what relation and effect they have on domestic aspects of the democratization process:

1. What external forces are influencing? (Actors and Structures)
2. Through what modes of influence? (Pressure, Adjustments, Socialization)
3. In what country-specific context? (Level of development, Status in international system)
4. Influence in which domain of the society? (State, Civil society, Economy, Military)
5. What are the effects? (Positive and Negative effects, the timing of democratization, its nature, intensity etc.)
6. In which phase of the democratization process? (Liberalization, Transition or Consolidation)

Uhlin continues by stating that the influence from external actors is mediated by the domestic structures and the global context of the country. Further, the impact of the external influence is likely to be different depending on what domain (the state, civil society, economy etc.) is in focus. Applying this to the case of Kosovo the foremost area that is of interest in this study is the influence the international actors have on the domain of the state.

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47 Uhlin, A, 2002 p 175
48 These questions have inspired me in constructing my interview guide in order to get the views from both international and domestic actors on the democratization process in Kosovo.
49 Uhlin, A, 2002 p 175
3.5 Political Interaction Between Actors – The Two-Level Game

The domestic political elite has a great interest in their relationship with the international community as well as with the population of Kosovo. The domestic political elite can be seen as a receiver of influence that originates from the international community present in Kosovo, which is the transmitter (sender). But still, the political elite are obliged to follow the UN guidelines and standards that could be considered as the starter motor of the process. Also the actor that I name the people has a great influence on who becomes and remains a member of the political elite through exerting voting power. This shows the dual responsibility and paths of influence that the domestic political elite experiences and the dual demands that they have to take into consideration. Against this background I would like to state that it is not only of interest to study the direct or indirect influence the two actors (international and domestic) have on the process, but also the dynamic relationship between these two and the responsibility they have towards those that should gain from it, the people of Kosovo. This interaction between international and domestic actors has been studied and presented by Robert D. Putnam in what he calls “the Two-level-game”. This metaphor refers to understanding the interaction between international and domestic actors on several levels. In particular, a two-level analysis shows how internal politics serves both as a constraint on the negotiator and, surprisingly, as a potential source of leverage in international negotiations.

The primary problem that Putnam points out regarding the two-level game is that the negotiator must satisfy two demands at the same time. In the case of the domestic political elite in Kosovo, a strategy must be found to face and comply with the demands of both the international community (UN, OSCE etc.) and domestic interests groups. This presents a strategic dilemma for the negotiator, in my case the Kosovar political elite. As Putnam notes, rational moves in one direction may be misguided in relation to the other:
“At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.”

What has been discussed is the ideal interaction between international and domestic actors as a dual relationship. However, in the case of Kosovo, it cannot be, in this ideal sense, applied. As will be shown later, the international community does have such a degree of influence on the domestic political elite that it cannot be considered to be a mutual relationship. It is more of a one-way relationship, in which the international community is transmitter and the domestic political elite receiver.

Fig. 3.7 The interaction between international and domestic actors

3.6 Summary

The main purpose of this chapter has been to illustrate and give an explanation of the concepts of democracy, democratization, the actors who take part and their influence on the process of democratization. The theories presented have mainly focused on the state as the central arena where democratization can take place, but in this case applicable to the process in Kosovo as well. I have chosen to focus on the institutions of polyarchy when constructing my interview guide in order to cover as large a spectrum as possible of the democratic (polyarchy) situation in Kosovo and its process. Furthermore, in accordance with the purpose of this thesis, the theories of polyarchy will later be applied to the chapter presenting empirical study. However, even though much of the study is based on the theories of polyarchy, I have chosen to use the term democracy, as this term is more commonly known than polyarchy. The main actor in the democratization process has traditionally been the domestic, on the domestic level. This chapter gives an explanation of the impact that the international actors have on the process as well. It also illustrates the somewhat complex interaction between the two main actors in the process, by applying the logic of the “two-level game”, in order to understand the dynamic relationship between the actors.

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50 Putnam, R, 1988 p 434f
The democratization process is a very wide and multifaceted process that needs to be studied in various ways on different levels if it is to be comprehensible.

My analytical frame\textsuperscript{51} illustrates how different actors are influencing the democratization process, as the domestic actors do have a major role to play and should be seen as having a direct influence on the process. The international community however does have influence on the process as well in two ways. First they influence it directly by having some executive powers and are de facto in charge of some of the decision making process. But they have an influence on the domestic actors in their advisory capacity, and are able to guide them in the direction they want because the domestic actors are more or less dependent on the international community. Secondly the interaction between the two actors involves the domestic actors, even though they are dependent on the international community, also trying to influence them to aid them in ways they would like.

\textbf{Fig. 3.8} \hspace{1cm} The analytical frame

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\textsuperscript{51} See Fig.3.8
In this chapter I will first present some brief background history to the conflict and present some of the main actors involved in Kosovo. After that I will present the interview results by summarizing the answers topic by topic according to my interview guide. After that I will go further by using my analytical framework that relates directly to my research questions.

4.1 Background

The developments in Kosovo over recent years, particularly in the arenas of electoral politics and institution building, reveal significant moves towards the creation of a political regime for democratic self-government. But still the situation in present-day Kosovo could more or less be described as a democratic laboratory where the international community in different ways and through different channels contributes to the democratic consolidation process. What the result will be is still unclear while the future status remains on the negotiation table. The main problem lies in the different views on how the process will be consolidated and what it will result in for the international community and the domestic political elite.

The status of Kosovo has been a cause of tension in the region for many decades. Kosovo gained the status of autonomous province with generous powers of self-rule under the Tito era in Yugoslavia. This changed dramatically during the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, when it fell within the strict authority of Serbia under the regime of the new President, Slobodan Milosevic. The new authority became nationalistic and developed into one that suppressed the Kosovar Albanian population, which comprised more than 85 per cent of the whole Kosovar population. All Albanians in the public sector lost their jobs. Albanians were denied school education etc. An underground parallel structure was formed among the Albanian population as a reply to the Serbian suppression. But during most of the 1990s the strategy among Kosovo Albanians was non-violent resistance. The Kosovo Albanian independence movement, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and its leader the late Ibrahim Rugova, especially promoted this strategy. When the suppression continued and there were no signs that independence could be gained by using the non-violent strategy, it came to be questioned and a new independence movement emerged that promoted armed resistance against the Serbs. The KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) was formed in 1996 and started to attack Serbian forces. This developed into an open conflict between the Serbian army and the KLA guerrilla in 1998. There were initial attempts to reach a ceasefire by diplomatic means but this failed and the Serbian aggression continued and intensified (including elements of ethnic cleansing).\(^5\)

\(^5\) ICK, 2000 p 42-50
The conflict did not end until the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 78-day bombing campaign and intervention by force in March 1999. Serbia agreed to the international conditions for a halt to NATO action, which included the withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo and the return of refugees. It had been decided that the United Nations should be involved in a transitional role before Kosovo’s final status would be determined. While the Kosovo Albanian majority sought immediate independence from Serbia, there was international opposition to boundary changes within the Balkans. As NATO ended its air campaign and the conflict had been stopped the UN Security council passed Resolution 1244 that set out the basic guidelines and regulations for the international community’s handling of the postwar situation in Kosovo.\(^{53}\)

### 4.2 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 – Laying the Foundations for the UN Mission

The UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which was adopted in June 1999, provided the basis for how Kosovo was to be run by the UN. However it was never meant to be applied over a longer period of time or to lay the foundations for the democracy building process.

The resolution mainly consists of three areas: it set up the foundations and endorsed the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) that was directed by the international civil presence to facilitate the political process and to determine the future status of Kosovo; it required the demilitarization of the KLA; it called for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons.

“[...Authorizes the Secretary-General], with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo”\(^{54}\)

However many parts of the resolution were surrounded by uncertainty as to the future status of Kosovo. The reason why independence could not be mentioned was because most of the members of the Security Council opposed any change to the borders resulting from the armed conflict. Another reason was the reluctance to make Kosovo an example for those that had previously agitated for independence, as well as fear that other locations in the world that can be regarded as having the same status as Kosovo might claim independence.\(^{55}\)

The unclearness of Kosovo’s status has caused problems and complicated the task of international organizations working with the democratization process.

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\(^{53}\) IICK, 2000 p 99  
\(^{55}\) O’Neill, W, 2002 p 30
Even though the start was slow and there were initial problems in fulfilling its mandate, UNMIK succeeded in reversing the immediate chaos after the war. UNMIK managed to impose a degree of order by dismantling the KLA and the parallel structures. UNMIK also had the authority to appoint provisional officials, decide which laws should apply and override any laws if UNMIK consider there was a need to do so. Resolution 1244 authorized the creation of the post of Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in order to oversee the development of the so-called provisional democratic self-government institutions towards a political settlement.\(^{56}\) Even though UNMIK initially experienced executive powers and the SRSG had the right to exercise final authority in several areas, the intention was to distribute more and more power to the provisional institutions within the coming years.

UNMIK is organized in four areas of responsibility called pillars, which the text of Resolution 1244 sets out in outline. Despite the fact that these pillars relate to different areas of responsibility, they are also interconnected:

**Pillar I:** Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations\(^{57}\)

**Pillar II:** Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United Nations

**Pillar III:** Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

**Pillar IV:** Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU)\(^{58}\)

Despite initial problems, especially in the security area, the UNMIK administration has succeeded in building up an administrative framework for Kosovo. The Interim Administrative Council of Kosovo was created with the inclusion of the three largest Kosovo Albanian political formations (parties) and later secured representatives from the Kosovo Serbian population.\(^{59}\) UNMIK has, besides organizing democratic elections, been committed to assisting and developing democratic institutions, civil society and the rule of law. Under paragraph 11 in UN Resolution 1244 the international civil administration’s obligations are:

“Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement including the holding of elections […and] transferring as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions.”\(^{60}\)

\(^{56}\) IICK, 2000 p 100

\(^{57}\) Pillar I was earlier known as Humanitarian Assistance that was phased out in June 2000 and the new pillar was established in May 2001. (www.unmikonline.org/intro)

\(^{58}\) For further reading: www.unmikonline.org/intro

\(^{59}\) Dannreuther, R, 2001 p 26

The mission structure gave the UN, through its mission UNMIK, a key role in shaping Kosovo’s political development as well as the mission of OSCE. Both organizations have been heavily involved in the details of Kosovo’s transition politics, not least due to the fact that the SRSG, which is the highest civilian office within the structure of UNMIK, has a very powerful position in relation to Kosovar institutions.

4.3 Building Democracy in Kosovo - Organization For Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)

The establishment of the OSCE mission in Kosovo came about through a decision in the Security Council in July 1999. It took charge of pillar III, Institution Building within the UNMIK. Under the framework of UNMIK, which has the legislative and executive power, the OSCE mission in Kosovo had the mandate to:

“...human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School which it will establish and operate, the training of judicial personnel and the training of civil administrators at various levels, in co-operation, inter alia, with the Council of Europe; [...] Democratization and governance, including the development of a civil society, non-governmental organizations, political parties and local media; [...] Organization and supervision of elections.”

The OSCE focuses on the sectors that are recognized in a well functioning democratic society, such as central government, local municipalities, media, human rights, elections and electoral bodies, political parties and politicians, the rule of law and the judicial system and law enforcement. The main task in all these areas is capacity building. This effort is increasingly directed towards central government, the Provisional Institution of Self-Government (PISG), in order to enhance its capacity as more and more powers are transferred from UNMIK to the PISG. The overall aim of the OSCE mission in Kosovo is to create a democratic society that upholds the rule of law and respect for human rights and that contributes to economic development and integration in the European structures.

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4.4 Kosovar Political Elite

Kosovo’s domestic political parties have also played a key role in the political development, not least through inter-party political competition. In the aftermath of the conflict, significant levels of antagonism have continued to exist between the Kosovo Albanian and Serb factions, and the Serb minority has frequently refused to participate in politics in Pristina, relying instead on Belgrade-funded parallel institutions for the provision of public services. Since 1999, Serb participation in and engagement with politics in Kosovo has been uneven, with moderate and hard line factions at times at odds over the most appropriate strategy to pursue to further Serb goals.63

After the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) had more or less enjoyed monopoly status during the 1990s, two significant parties with their origins in the KLA emerged. The first and largest is the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), which the KLA leader Hashim Thaci formed right after the end of the conflict. In the political vacuum between the end of aerial bombing by the forces of NATO and the arrival of UNMIK, the PDK quickly established a strong network of authority at the local level in Kosovo and proclaimed a Provisional Government with Thaci as unofficial Prime Minister. Another party that has its roots in the KLA, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), was established by former KLA commander, Ramush Haradinaj. These three parties enjoy the largest support among the Kosovar population. However the relationships between the parties have experienced low points, with rivalry, sometimes violent, that might be explained by their different strategies for opposing Serbian rule.64

The context within Kosovo since 1999 has been marked by the presence of a powerful international mission with an explicit mandate to be involved in the development of institutions of democratic self-government, along with fragmented and often antagonistic domestic political elites. The resulting interactions have often been fraught, as international, Kosovo Serbian and Kosovo Albanian interests and priorities have collided over the direction and pace of the entity’s political development. Through a complex process that has featured elements of cooperation, conflict and international imposition, the actions of these political factions have combined to lead Kosovo on a path of democratic development that has included the establishment of new institutions of self-rule and the democratic election of a domestic assembly and government.

63 For further reading: ICG, Europe Report no 161, 2005
64 For further reading: ICG, Europe Report no 163, 2005 and no 170, 2006
4.5 Domestic Actors’ Perspectives on the Kosovar Political Institutions

Four elections have taken place since the conflict in 1999 and the general statement from Freedom house is that there have been no observable irregularities. The elections have been held at municipal level in 2000 and 2002 and at central level in 2001 and 2004. The judgment from both domestic and international observers has concluded that all the elections are to be considered free and fair. The turnout in the first election in 2000 was 73 per cent and that turnout has not been repeated in later elections. However, immense discrepancies between public expectations and actual results have created a sharp sense of disappointment and have severely affected the voting turnout in later elections. In the parliamentary election of 2001 the turnout was 64 per cent, decreasing to 51 per cent in the election of 2004. There are some factors that might explain the downwards spiral in voting turnout. The political parties’ ability to communicate their distinct policies has been limited, the system failing to separate individual or local interests as choices for the voters.

However, there are also concerns regarding the Kosovo Serbian population’s lack of participation in the elections. The reason for this has mostly to do with the Serbian government, the Orthodox Church and local Kosovo Serbian politicians encouraging a boycott of the elections.

Several of the domestic actors have raised the problem that Kosovo is not only under a process of democratization but also undergoing two other types of transition; that of a post-conflict society and the fact that the whole state system, including political and economical institutions are in a transition process from the previous communist state system to a liberal democracy and a market oriented economy. These have an impact on the democratization process as a whole in Kosovo.

Even though UNMIK has started to transfer more and more powers to the domestic political and legislative institutions, some respondents commented that there is still a lack of responsibility and ability among the domestic institutions. As one respondent put it, UNMIK has a strange top-down approach regarding democracy building in Kosovo in the political arena, describing democracy as a tree where the crown of the tree should be regarded as developed democracy and the root system the movements which start the process of democratization.

In the case of Kosovo, UNMIK and other international organizations have tried to plant the tree up-side down. The interviewee thought that when an outside actor influences the democratization process it ought to focus as much on the “root system” that can support democracy as on the “crown”, in order to facilitate stable development towards democracy that will be accepted by all levels.

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65 In this part that I have called Political institutions I have included the following institutions based on the theory of polyarchy: elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage and the right to run for office.

66 Freedom house report on Kosovo 2006 p 8
According to some of the domestic respondents there is a great deal of influence from the international actors in the Kosovar political arena. The government and the institutions in particular are more or less dependent on international actors and their aid and assistance. This raises concerns regarding the question of responsibility and credibility within the domestic government as the people are voting for a government and not for international actors. Examples of how international influence is exerted are the education of officials and capacity building for the domestic institutions.

There is also an interaction going on at higher levels between representatives from the international community and the domestic top elite concerning democratic development. This interaction however, which could more or less be seen as a monologue from the international community’s side, impacts on the Kosovars trust in the domestic institutions and especially in the government. It is regarded as weak even though it is taking on more and more responsibilities, since it is not exerting its powers. It might be considered that the international community does not want to transfer more responsibility to the domestic institutions, and neither do the domestic institutions want more responsibility, but the system itself is making the process complicated. This results in a lack of legitimacy for the domestic political elite among the voters and might lead to a greater willingness of the domestic political elite’s accountability from the voters. This is a delicate balance that the political elite has to achieve, pleasing the voters in order to remain in position at the same time as trying to please the international community in order to maintain their support. Many among the domestic political elite do, however, concur with some of the international actors that in some areas they are not ready to take full responsibility and a great deal of influence from the international community is necessary in order to preserve stability. But this should not prevent it from being transferred when the domestic actors are ready for it and have the capabilities needed.

However several respondents expressed that there will still be a need for an international presence in Kosovo with a close connection to the domestic institutions in order to ensure steady development. As one respondent described it:

“They (the domestic politicians) have to convince the people that the international community has the right ideas and those are the best for the whole of the Kosovar population...”

Yet some interviewees gave other reasons why the international community has to be present, such as concerns regarding security for some of the people in Kosovo. As there is still a lack of experience among the elected officials, there is a need for support from the international community, although in an advisory role instead of holding executive powers that may overrule decisions made by the domestic institutions.

One respondent gave the explanation that democracy and the process leading to it might be threatened due to the weak central governmental structures and the failure of the institutions created to follow the “rules of the game”. This is the case in Kosovo according to the interviewee, as new domestic political institutions that have been created since 1999 are weak and are questioned if they are unable to implement new policies and enforce rights in their area of competence. There are examples of some institutions that are unable to implement such policies, and that cannot ensure that all people are treated equally and have equal access to the legal and political system.
An issue that has been highlighted by several of the domestic respondents is the process of law making in Kosovo, whereby all the laws that the Kosovar assembly passes have first to be approved through UNMIK and the UN headquarters in New York. This process often takes a long time and is considered to be bureaucratic, and according to the respondents illustrates the complications in the relationship between the domestic Kosovar political institutions and UNMIK. There are similar difficulties with setting the agenda and its ownership, or lack of it, since given the reserved powers of the SRSG, it makes it hard for the PISG to prioritize when UNMIK has their own and often totally different agenda.

The establishment of new parallel political structures in the Kosovo Serbian dominated areas presents challenges that have been brought up in the interviews. Whereas most of the Kosovo Serbian areas are tightly connected to the Serbian government and are being supported both politically and economically, the parallel structures such as courts, hospitals, education, electricity etc in these areas are not connected to those in other parts of Kosovo or to the central authorities. In fact the two communities are mostly living totally separated with hardly any interaction with each other. The communities are directly funded and run by the ministries in Serbia. This development is problematic as it is widening the breaches between the two peoples instead of finding a way of joining them.

4.6 International Actors’ Perspectives on the Kosovar Political Institutions

The views from the international actors are in many cases very similar to those of the domestic actors but are slightly more positive.

The topics that have been discussed have mostly involved the problems facing the domestic political institutions and what the international organizations are doing to assist them. One such problem concerns bureaucratic local administration that is faced with challenges to their capacity. One reason why the administrations are bureaucratic, as one respondent explains, is the fact that the political parties have a great influence on them and that they are being highly politicized. It affects efficiency when service and employment are dependent on social networks and other kinds of ties. The consequences are performance weaknesses, as attitudes towards service users are marked by party loyalty. This also illustrates the lack of capability at both central and local levels within the authorities.

One interviewee explained how the influence of the international community on Kosovar society has changed over time since the end of the conflict in 1999 when UNMIK was mandated to take over the entire administration of Kosovo. One of the first actions of UNMIK was to bring leaders of different local factions together in order to find a common solution. A government was created but all the decisions were taken by UNMIK because the government was not capable of taking decisions then. The second period revealed the delicate situation in Kosovo, with an exceptional incident erupting while an external actor was in power. This event was the March 2004 riots when it became clear that UNMIK could not handle the situation and thus came to be recognized as a passive spectator. The third period can be described as a
new tactic from UNMIK that was based upon the PISG showing UNMIK that they are capable of governing. This improved the relationship between the two and UNMIK took on a more advisory role to the PISG instead of solely taking the lead. These three periods have led to today’s situation where the PISG is more independent, has gained more experience and has begun to govern in more areas. Yet this development has to take time and needs the international community present to monitor the process.

Other views on this development suggest that UNMIK has more or less become a hostage to Kosovo. The reason for this is that they are still obliged to follow Resolution 1244 and have implemented it sometimes quite brutally, and at the same time are obliged to answer to the Security Council. Concerns surrounding the process arise from the fact that there have been no real exit plans for UNMIK until recently. It was never intended that the mission should create a whole new country, which is what the situation has more or less developed into.

The consequence of the heavy influence that the international actors have had and continue to have on democratic development is that instead of creating a strong and independent domestic government and institutions, the government is weak and has become heavily dependent on the international actors in several areas. This mostly concerns UNMIK, which has become heavily involved in most areas of the political arena so that it is now difficult to imagine functioning political institutions without the direct influence of UNMIK. From the international side it is seen as necessary to be present and to assist the building of functioning institutions, but the transition from direct influence decision-making to a more advisory and supervisory role has proven to be complicated and difficult. This comes down to the fact that UNMIK has a continuing responsibility to follow Resolution 1244 and the Security Council, which complicates the situation. But even so, this transition of power, and with it also responsibility, could be seen as having given other international actors increased opportunities to exert influence on the more independent domestic institutions.

The influence that the international community has on domestic institutions can be illustrated by the 2004 elections when, according to one international respondent, some powerful international actors more or less forced some of the political parties to form a coalition government in order to preserve stability, instead of letting the elected parties decide for themselves. As a result this has created a weak government, while the international community has invested a great stake in order to maintain relative stability in political life and prevent its deterioration into chaos. The main international actor that has had a direct input in the process of elections in Kosovo since 1999 has been the OSCE. They have had responsibility to apply the rules and to organize the elections. Lately the OSCE has started to transfer some of its responsibilities to local and central Kosovar election authorities and the OSCE has stated that they expect the PISG will organize the forthcoming local election.

As pointed out by some of the domestic respondents there have been several of the international interviewees that described to problem of lack of experience and capabilities among the domestic institutions. Some of the respondents explained what their organization did to cope with this problem. Most of them stressed the importance

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67 Freedom house report on Kosovo 2006 p 8
of education for elected officials, with advising and monitoring as the most important contributions to tackling the problems. Other representatives from some of the international organizations have stressed the importance of working at both a central and a municipality level. The effects of the international organizations’ work that have been noticed are that the domestic institutions are getting more and more dependent?, and their work more transparent.

Another concrete example that shows the effect international influence has on Kosovar domestic institutions is, as one of the respondents described, the fact that there is now a law that demands representation of 30 per cent women in the assembly. This might have come about without the direct influence of international actors and illustrates that the influence is helping the progress of development.

4.7 Domestic Actors’ Perspectives on Societal Freedoms in Kosovo

Kosovar journalists have also been subject to different kinds of pressures from both state and non-state actors. When not being abused physically for writing on topics that are sensitive to government officials, journalists have been labeled “opposition media” and become targets of political pressure. In many cases journalists are being banned from institutions they have criticized. Another common way for the government to exert pressure is to withdraw advertising from newspapers that have been critical. This tactic has been successful due to the weak Kosovar economy that makes the newspapers heavily dependent on advertisers, of which the state is one of the biggest. Therefore it is difficult for newspapers to stay independent from pressure from the government or some private actors as well, as they are the ones that “feed them”. This financial dependency makes the private media subject not only to the market but also to political influences and also to the commitment of donors. Even though journalists might form their own associations, these are often too weak and unsupportive when journalists are faced with violence or threats from different actors.

However, there are no restrictions to accessing the Internet in Kosovo and usage of the Internet is wide-spread, especially among the younger population. This can be seen as a positive development, where Internet might become a means of being influenced by new ideas and values.

In general among the domestic actors there seem not to be any particular concerns regarding freedoms within the group that I call freedoms in society.

Freedom of speech has, according to one respondent, improved since just after the conflict in 1999. Then there was no tolerance at all, especially between the ethnicities and with regard to what newspapers could publish or not. Nowadays it is not really a matter that people in general consider to be a problem. However the respondent points

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68 In the concept of societal freedoms I have choose to include the institutions from the theory of polyarchy: freedom of speech, freedom of the media and freedom of association, as all of them are related to the level of individual freedom in the society.
69 Freedom house report on Kosovo 2006 p 11-13
out that it is known that threats and some violence occur when a journalist publishes matters that are considered delicate, with corruption given as an example.

Other respondents have highlighted the numerous Kosovar newspapers that exist and explain that this shows that the Kosovar media is very lively and free. Some of the media is politicized and others are not.

4.8 International Actors’ Perspectives on Societal Freedoms in Kosovo

Having a different perspective on the situation in Kosovo, many of the international respondents concur with the general picture that Freedom House gives regarding freedoms in Kosovar society. On interviewee explains that even though demonstrations take place sometimes, this is not what the overall Kosovar population agrees with. According to the respondent many Kosovar do not have any respect for those who demonstrate because they are regarded as causing social disturbance. This might have its heritage in the communist era when demonstrations were banned.

Even though there are Kosovo Serbian media programs broadcast on state owned Kosovar television, these are received with skepticism by the Kosovo Serbian communities. This mistrust, according to some respondents, enhances once again the separation between the communities and is problematic.

Regarding the Kosovar media some respondents question its quality and standards, which are considered poor. Much of the news is based on gossip rather than facts and investigative news is very seldom published as some topics considered taboo, such as corruption. They call for more regulation in order to raise the quality and to enhance access to printed media in the rural areas that experience very limited access today. The fact that overall newspaper sales are very low is linked to low incomes and the high price of newspapers.

To regulate the Kosovar media UNMIK introduced a Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC). However, despite the existence of this commission, the media in Kosovo cannot be regarded as free and independent. Actually Kosovo is considered the worst place in Europe for freedom of the press by the organization Reporters without Borders, with journalist being subject to violence or even killed because of what they have published. Problematic is that in many cases the violence against journalist comes from the police or government officials. This has been blamed on the heritage of the communist era when journalists where obliged to comply with the state.70

70 Freedom house report on Kosovo 2006 p 11
5. CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I will return to the aim of my study, which was to research the present democratization process in Kosovo. As I have presented the results of the study in the chapter above, I will now go further by answering three questions in order to fulfill the aim of this study.

5.1 What is the Domestic Political Elite’s View on Ways in which the Democratization Process is Being Influenced in Kosovo?

The domestic Kosovar political elite in my study have stressed the importance of considering the development of democracy in the light of two key contexts, in order to understand what challenges Kosovo has faced: First of all the problematic transition from a former communist state-controlled system to a market oriented democratic system and second, the transition from a post-conflict society. These two are vital in order to understand what preconditions Kosovo has had for its democratic development. However, these are also reasons behind the international community’s involvement in Kosovo. There is a general view among the domestic actors in my study that the influence and direct involvement of international actors in Kosovo has been necessary, otherwise Kosovo would not be where it is today.

When bargaining with the international community the domestic political elite does not always gain what it wants in accordance with what it might promise to the voters, who de facto have the power to determine who is going to belong to the political elite or not. Instead it is more likely that the domestic political elite will conform to the international community’s will in order, hopefully, to gain their confidence.

International influence on the democratization process is seen from the domestic perspective as a way of being directed on the right path towards a fully democratic society and to becoming integrated in the international community.

5.2 What is the International Community’s View on Ways in which the Democratization Process is Being Influenced in Kosovo?

There seems to be a common view among the international actors that have participated in my study that they do have a great deal of influence on democratic development in Kosovo. It is justified by the fact that the domestic institutions are not yet ready or mature enough to take sole responsibility and therefore should be aided by international actors. This also implies that some of the executive powers should remain with some of the international actors in order to preserve stability until the domestic institutions are ready and capable of using these executive powers. This justification is to be seen as a temporarily solution, with powers being transferred as the domestic institutions demonstrate that they are able to handle these in a responsible way. However this does not mean that the international community loses its influence. On the contrary, influence is instead moving away from direct decision making to an advisory role, where the international influence becomes more indirect as the international actors gain a new function as advisory and supervisory to the
domestic institutions. The influence might instead increase in a way, in that they can guide the national institutions in the direction they consider to be right, but do not have to take responsibility, as it is the domestic actors that make the official decisions.

This indirect influence might actually have a stronger impact on the decisions taken by the domestic institutions, and it could be a strategy for the newly more independent government to ally itself with certain international actors in order to gain political points domestically. As the influence of external actors is mediated by domestic structures and in Kosovo there were no really functional structures that could decide how to receive the influences, the international community had a strong position from the start and were more or less free to shape the rules by themselves. This could be seen as one of the fundamental problems of the problematic transition process of transferring powers to domestic actors, as from the start it was shaped by international actors. There is however progress evident in that the influence the international community has on the process is leading to a more integrated and more democratic Kosovar society.

5.3 What Are the Similarities and Differences in the Views on the Democratization Process From the (Transmitting) International Community and the (Receiving) Domestic Actors?

After concluding what perspectives both international and domestic actors have on influences on the development of democracy in Kosovo, it is possible to outline general similarities and differences in their perspectives.

A common view that both international and domestic actors have is that the international community does have a great deal of influence on the democratization process both directly and indirectly. Both agree that it has been essential in order for Kosovo to arrive at the situation it is in today. There is a conception that this influence has given Kosovo a democratic foundation from which it can develop further. However perceptions do differ somewhat between the actors regarding what impact the influence has had on the role and responsibilities of UNMIK and the PISG. The notion emerging from the international actors is that more powers are to be transferred when the domestic authorities are capable and ready for them. But at the same time the international community indicates that this process of transfer of powers is taking too long. The answer to this might be that the transfer of competence from the international community to the domestic political institutions is not happening at the same pace as the willingness to transfer power. The domestic actors agree with this, noting that it is taking too long, but disagree on the point that they are not ready to take responsibility. They consider themselves ready to handle both the tasks and the associated responsibility. According to them it is a question of accountability towards the Kosovar people because the people are voting for a Kosovar government that is supposed to take responsibility for their actions and not for a supreme entity like UNMIK. Both actors do agree that the influence and direct impact the international community has and has had are to be considered as the engine moving the process forward. But a negative effect of the slow pace of democratic development voiced by
both sides is that the general public’s as well as the involved actors’ frustrations are increasing due to the enduring status quo situation.
6. AN EPILOGUE

After concluding the findings of my study on influences on democratic development in Kosovo, I am struck by the diverse but still so similar perspectives that different actors in Kosovo have on the matter. There is a willingness among all involved actors to move development forward, no matter what obstacles lie ahead.

This is indeed a very interesting and most crucial time for Kosovo as the negotiations continue on what status the protectorate will have in the future. It would be most appealing to do a follow up report to this thesis after the status issue has been resolved. Will it be a state or not, and what effects will this have on the democratic development? As well as the question of what will happen to the ethnic minorities, will a new parallel societal structure emerge, widening the gap between the ethnicities even more? I will not attempt to answer these questions but leave them for future researchers and scholars to discuss and study. I do however believe strongly that with the assistance of the international community Kosovar society will move forward in its democratic development. This has to progress in an environment of mutual understanding between the two main actors involved in the process, the international community and the domestic political elite. One thing is sure, that these actors cannot afford to fail in their responsibility towards both the Kosovar people and themselves.

It could be considered that the international community has been successful in its initial attempts to plant the democratic tree in Kosovo. Many people in the western countries take democracy for granted and consider that the task of consolidated democratic countries is to promote and spread the values of democracy to other countries that do not enjoy this same status. I cannot agree more with this idea of spreading the values of democracy. However what is happening in the case of Kosovo is that the international community seems to have a deadline for when democracy should be considered as consolidated, and therefore want democracy to be achieved as soon as possible. The problem is that democracy cannot just be applied by external actors. It has to be planted with its roots down and then be encouraged to grow, not the other way around, where it seems that the international community expects Kosovo to become democratic over-night by planting the tree upside down. The question still remains, however, whether these attempts to plant a flourishing crown will strike root and enable Kosovo to grow into a stable democracy that will include the entire Kosovar society.
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Appendix I: Interview Guides

Interview Guide – Domestic (Political) Actors

1. Introduction
   - Short introduction, presenting myself and my work
   - Short description of the interviewee’s work and organization

2. Personal data
   - Name
   - Organization
   - Position

3. Contemporary democratic political institutions in Kosovo and how they are influenced?
   - **Elected decision makers (officials)**
     - External impact? Actors?
     - How do they impact?
     - To what extent?
     - The effects? Positive, Negative? Intensity?
     - Attitude towards this?
   - **Free and fair elections**
     - External impact? Actors?
     - How do they impact?
     - To what extent?
     - The effects? Positive, Negative? Intensity?
     - Attitude towards this?
   - **Inclusive suffrage**
     - External impact? Actors?
     - How do they impact?
     - To what extent?
     - The effects? Positive, Negative? Intensity?
     - Attitude towards this?
- **Rights to run for office**
  - External impact? Actors?
  - How do they impact?
  - To what extent?
  - The effects? Positive, Negative? Intensity?
  - Attitude towards this?

- **Freedom of speech**
  - External impact? Actors?
  - How do they impact?
  - To what extent?
  - The effects? Positive, Negative? Intensity?
  - Attitude towards this?

- **Freedom of press**
  - External impact? Actors?
  - How do they impact?
  - To what extent?
  - The effects? Positive, Negative? Intensity?
  - Attitude towards this?

- **Freedom of association**
  - External impact? Actors?
  - How do they impact?
  - To what extent?
  - The effects? Positive, Negative? Intensity?
  - Attitude towards this?
Interview Guide – International Actors

1. Introduction
   - Short introduction, presenting myself and my work
   - Short description of the interviewee’s work and organization

2. Personal data
   - Name
   - Organization
   - Position

3. Contemporary democratic political institutions in Kosovo and how they are influenced?
   - **Elected decision makers (officials)**
     - Influence? How do you influence, your work?
     - To what extent?
     - The effects? Internally and on the receiving side? Positive, Negative, Intensity?
     - Change of attitudes?
   
   - **Free and fair elections**
     - Influence? How do you influence, your work?
     - To what extent?
     - The effects? Internally and on the receiving side? Positive, Negative, Intensity?
     - Change of attitudes?
   
   - **Inclusive suffrage**
     - Influence? How do you influence, your work?
     - To what extent?
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     - Change of attitudes?
   
   - **Rights to run for office**
     - Influence? How do you influence, your work?
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  - Change of attitudes?

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  - Influence? How do you influence, your work?
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- **Freedom of association**
  - Influence? How do you influence, your work?
  - To what extent?
  - The effects? Internally and on the receiving side? Positive, Negative, Intensity?
  - Change of attitudes?