The Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline & the European Union's security situation; a case study of economic securitization

Filip Goglund
# Table of Content:

- **1. Introduction**
  - 1.1. Introduction
  - 1.2. Research purpose and questions
  - 1.3. Limit & division of research
  - 1.4. Disposition
- **2. Theory**
  - 2.1. Basic outline & the Copenhagen School
  - 2.2. Securitization
  - 2.3. Sector Analysis
    - 2.3.1. Economic Sector
    - 2.3.2. Political Sector
  - 2.4. Summary & operationalization of analysis
- **3. Method & material**
  - 3.1. Method
  - 3.2. Material
  - 3.3. Source Criticism
- **4. Research background**
  - 4.1. The Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline
  - 4.2. CFSP & the Four Common Spaces
  - 4.3. Previous research
- **5. The EU & the Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline**
  - 5.1. Economical Sector
  - 5.2. Political Sector
- **6. Conclusions**
  - 6.1. Conclusion
  - 6.2. Summary
- **7. References**
  - Literature
  - EU documents
  - Other documents
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central &amp; Eastern European Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign &amp; Security Policy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>(EU-Russia) Common Spaces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Critical security studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAA</td>
<td>European Union Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEGP</td>
<td>North-European Gas Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSNGP</td>
<td>Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization of Security &amp; Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>(EU-Russia Energy Dialogue) Permanent Partnership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Security studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction
1.1. Background

“Nord Stream is a gas pipeline to link Russia and the European Union via the Baltic Sea. It will carry natural gas to supply both businesses and households. The new pipeline will be an important factor of energy security in Europe. Nord Stream will transport up to 55 billion cubic metres of gas each year. This is enough to supply more than 26 million households.

Nord Stream is more than just a pipeline. It is a new channel for Russian natural gas exports, and a major infrastructure project which sets a new benchmark in EU-Russia cooperation.”¹

The North-European gas pipeline (NEGP) is a natural gas offshore pipeline planned by the company Nord Stream AG, stretching from Viborg in Russia to Greifswald in Germany. As of the 9/4 2010 ² this pipeline is in a state of construction. Its production has been superseded by heated discussions of its implications on European politics, and Russia's role in Europe of today and towards individual European states. When talking about its construction, it is not only the technical aspects that have fallen under public interest as much pan-European fear of being connected with Russia and the security-political questions and problems such a union entails.

The European continent's approach to his eastern neighbour has from a security perspective through the ages, been one of moderate uneasiness. There has always existed a sort of scepticism against Russia which often has been viewed as a bit different and apart from the rest of Europe. Or in the worst case full out hostile and intimidating. The end of the cold war ushered in a new hope of liberalization and openness in the former states of the Warsaw pact, and so too with Russia. The perception of Russia as a threat to Europe (or more specifically Western Europe) changed dramatically to one of hopeful cooperation for the betterment of all. Twenty years on this vision has faded into nearly nothing. The hope of seeing Russia taking the same swift steps along the road to western democracy and free market economy as other nations of the former Soviet-bloc has today too all but faded. To many, Russia of today is a nation caught up in a identity crisis of as of yet unsure outcome. The implications of this on the continued security of the European Union (EU) is a matter of great dispute both among scholars and experts, as well as of state representatives.

The primary reason for the creation of the EU (or rather it's predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)) was the continued preservation and promotion of European peace. It

---

² Nord Stream press release 9/4/1010
remains so till this day. The EU is built on principles of economic interdependence and it is primarily through collaboration in economic matters that the deepening of the EU has occurred. With the signing of the Maastricht treaty (The treaty of the European Union) and the former establishment of the EU, the Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP) formed the second of the Unions three pillars, and effectively created European stance on security issues (although strictly under the control of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers). With the signing of the Lisbon treaty the pillar system was removed and the CFSP redirected to the new post of “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, effectively creating an EU foreign minister of sorts.

As part of the EU’s foreign relations program the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) involves the Unions southern and eastern neighbours into a framework for diplomatic contacts and individual association agreements (AA) of various nature. These agreements are based upon the European *acquis communautaire* and aim to integrate the EU and the target country for a deepening of economic and political cooperation. Russia has opted to not partake in this and instead insisted upon an alternate program specific for EU-Russia relations; the four common spaces agreements. These “spaces” are: The Common Economic Space, Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, Common Space on External Security, Common Space on Research, Education and Culture. The spaces are funded through European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) which also fund the ENP. To conclude, the spaces form the same kind of association as the ENP albeit with another label. For this thesis, all Russo-European relations are of interest and as such also official documents from the common spaces as well.

For the purpose of this paper it is convenient to view the issue through the perspective of securitization as put forward by the Copenhagen school of security studies. The theory enables us to study perceived threats to the security of states (or other actors) other than strict military ones. Traditional theories of security studies such as realism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism study the direct impact of nations projections of power upon each other. Further, they largely also ignore the possibilities of national politics as such having an impact on the international stage. More on this under “theory” (p 9).

---

3 Official Journal of the European Communities, 1992
4 Official Journal of the European Communities, 2010
5 Baylis, 2008, p 90-123
1.2 Research purpose and questions

The NEGP is a project that can be analysed in many different ways according to just as many theories. The subject of this paper is not a classic security issue as traditionally stipulated through realist or liberal security train of thought (i.e. not concerning a state and strict military issue). Therefore it is convenient to study the issue through analysis by sectors and securitization from the Copenhagen school of International Relations (IR).

The subject of this paper is to examine to what extent the Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline (NSNGP (built and conducted by Nord Stream AG)) has affected or changed Europe's security situation. The main research question is therefore:

- To what extent has the building of the North-European Gas Pipeline been securitized by the European Union?

This paper is not interested in analysis of Russia's greater security implications to the EU or individual states within the EU. Instead it will focus on explaining the purposes of various political actions and statements made by actors involved; Through qualitative text analysis it will determine whether or not EU authorities recognize any risks towards the Union’s security situation caused by this project. In order to be able to explain the above question, it is necessary to answer the following:

- Wherein lies the possible threat and need for the EU to classify the NSNGP as such?
- Does the EU have a security purpose for supporting Nord Stream and the construction of the NSNGP?
- Is it possible to define the NSNGP as a security issue falling primarily under the economic sector of sector analysis?

By answering these secondary questions it is possible to determine the answer of the primary question. The secondary questions will help defining specific areas of interest in individual documents from official EU departments and thus find clues to the overall nature of securitization on this issue. The secondary questions will furthermore help to determine whether or not the issue truly should be perceived as a question of securitization within the economic security sector or if more would be gained by interpreting it as a question of broader political nature.
1.3 Limit & division of research
This dissertation will deal with theory of securitization as defined by the Copenhagen School of IR (whose primary authors are Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver & Jap de Wilde). It will use these theories as a filter through which official documents from concerned EU authorities and departments will be analysed. It will not deal with second hand sources of information such as media related documentations (papers, blogs or news reports). Neither will official documents from other security actors of interest be part of the analysis (such as the Russian Federation, NATO or OSCE).

1.4 Disposition
The dissertation will continue into the following chapters consisting as follows: Chapter 2 will go into more depth of sector analysis and securitization. The chapter is devoted to explaining the theory used for analysis of the content and the meaning of documents gathered from EU departments and divisions. Ch. 3 will go into depth concerning method and material used in order to secure a high level of scientificity. The derivation of documents and their veracity will be questioned and described. Furthermore the choice of scientific method and angle of analysis will be explained and motivated. Ch. 4 will introduce the reader to what research has come before this thesis and put this dissertation into context with it. It also contains a brief description of the Four Common Spaces, NSNGP and Nord Stream AG, as well as a chronology of the project. Ch. 5 analyse documents chosen by means of theory as stated in ch. 2. Ch. 6 concludes and summarize the dissertation by stating answers of the research questions.

References and appendixes are added to the back.
2. Theory

2.1 The Copenhagen School & other theories of security

There exists a wealth of different theories of security studies (SS), forming “schools” of thought, all with their own sub-divisions. Traditionally SS have been the focus of a very narrow interest, mainly concerning military security and by extension states as the object of security. As a field of study SS became more focused during the early Cold War, aiming at the scientific study of security issues. The reason of this scientific study was the betterment and development of governmental policy through innovation and research. The traditional concept of security only being a concept of interest to states and of military issues has though long since been a matter of contest. This paper will not delve much on this issue. However it is of interest to note some basic explanation of the theory used. Security can at its most basic level be perceived in two different ways: either as a synonym for power and therefore also as a product which you either have or do not. Realism is the most obvious policy subscribing to this mindset, as it retains the classical perception of the nature of security. On the other hand security can also be perceived as a relationship between actors where action is not perceived as a zero-sum game. For example, the EU's efforts to integrate its members to a common security effort does not necessarily mean the decreased security of it's neighbours. Theories more inclined to this position would prefer to discuss the importance of common interest, interdependence and so on. Security thus is either positive or negative in this basis of theory, where as events are either of an enabling character or acting as an obstacle to security.

There is also the issue of widening versus deepening of the concept of security. With the broadening of thought around security in the late Cold War and post-Soviet era, classical security thought with its state centrist and military focus became more and more perceived as an instrument of analysis, obsolete to handle all situations of security nature. Is security for example a issue relevant to more basic levels of human intercourse than the state? Theories relating to deepening most often come to see issues such as starvation. Widening/deepening theories runs the risk of making the concept of security fuzzy, risking the term to ultimately become a synonym for every kind of threat to anything. Such a term would be useless; it tries to say everything and ends saying nothing.

6 Williams, 2008, p 4
7 Williams, 2008, p 6
8 Baylis, 2008, p 92, 93
9 Williams, 2008, p 6
In order to be able to analyse the issue of this paper, a framework for security fitting its definitions was needed. In order to perceive the NSNGP as a potential security issue to the EU, one has to understand the EU as a security actor even though it does not fit the traditional template of a state (and do lack several traits unique to states). One also has to acknowledge or at least theorize the possibility of the NSNGP as a potential issue of concern to political actors. The Copenhagen School fits nicely to the conditions of the problem. As stated in Security: A new framework for analysis;

“We argue against the view that the core of security studies is war and force and that other issues are relevant only if they relate to war and force /.../. Instead, we want to construct a more radical view of security studies by exploring threats to referent objects, and the securitization of those threats, that are non-military as well as military”

The school therefore belongs in a place of widening, although principally still within a realist framework. As such the basic realist assumptions of power and referent objects remain although in a wider context than the state/military one. The use of level analysis provides a framework for theory on levels other than that of states, while still using states as the point of reference in order to keep the scale related. It is of interest to identify three levels of analysis; states or actors with their own subunits, international subsystems consisting of actors and subunits existing within actors.

The theorems of the Copenhagen school will not be used as a template for scientific investigation but rather as frame which limits the efforts of the papers scientific art to a more handable result. The theory is therefore not to be perceived as the purpose of the paper to confirm, but rather as a tool which is most suited to explain the research question of the paper.

This paper will perform an analysis of documents using the Copenhagen School of security. This theory originates primarily from the thoughts of Barry Buzan, later also coming to incorporate the ideas of Ole Waever and Jap de Wilde. Barry Buzan's first work, in the vain that would mean the foundation of the school, came through People States & Fear in 1983. In this book Buzan tries to expand the impact of the concept of security while still retaining classical state-centrist through the introduction of sectors. Sectors allow the analysis of political issues that are not of a distinct

---

10 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p 4
11 Ibid, p 5, 6
12 Ibid, p 5, 6
13 Buzan, 1990, p 112-145
military nature, although often discussed and perceived as a threat in practice:

“/.../ global capabilities makes it difficult for any state or society or individual to escape from the increasingly large consequences of actions taken by others. And it becomes increasingly difficult to act without coordination with others. The first reason for adopting a broad conception of security is therefore simply that the realities of the policy environment call for it.”

This is discussed further under point 4.3. With the addition of securitization, the framework allows to discuss how political acts are transcended into security issues, simply by perception of the situation\(^\text{15}\). Securitization, as outlined in “Security a new framework for analysis”, utilizes the terms 'referent object', 'securitizing actor', and 'functional actors' in order to describe the intricate procedure between 'objects', or 'actors'\(^\text{16}\), leading up to the process of securitization in which a non-political situation gradually becomes a political issue and thereafter risks being securitized. More on this under point 4.2.

The following points will describe in more full detail the theory and its utilization in this paper.

2.2. Securitization

The authors of the Copenhagen School define the concept of security as the act of lifting a specific political action, situation or matter to a level beyond the scope of normal politics\(^\text{17}\). Once a problem has been coined as a security issue, it has been securitized. An issue thus moves from being a non-issue, to being politicized, becoming a political issue which in turn might become securitized blooming into an issue of security. Because of this, different people and different societies will acknowledge various situations differently. In order for an issue to become politicized it must first become debated in general, transforming it into a problem of the state rather than just of people or society. For it to become a security issue, the political problem must in turn become a security issue of a threatening and dramatic nature to the fabric of society or state\(^\text{18}\). It is then pushed through a “securitizing move “\(^\text{19}\) presenting a threat to a referent object. If the move then is accepted as a threat, the process of securitization is complete. Once a problem has been given cataclysmic

\(^{14}\) Buzan, 1990, p 370
\(^{15}\) Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p 23, 24
\(^{16}\) Ibid, p 36
\(^{17}\) Ibid, p 23
\(^{18}\) Ibid, p 24
\(^{19}\) Ibid, p 25
implications, one also has to deal with it in a drastic, extra-ordinary manner risking the use of force. Naturally an issue can make the opposite journey from securitized to non-issue. Desecuritization is a just as important a term as securitization. That something is perceived as a threat is not a good thing in itself as it easily could be perceived as. Once an issue becomes securitized, the risk of catastrophe is high and the risk of war and human suffering all the greater. The term and analytical tool “securitization” is a means to avoid threat and combat political differences before they reach dangerous proportions and become the province of arms.

2.3 Sector Analysis
Sector analysis is the practice of dividing different kinds of threat to a potential referent object by the different nature of origin. Different sectors work differently when security analysis is applied and have different kinds of threats affecting them. The five different sectors are Military, Economic, Environmental, Societal and Political. The theory was first put forward in Peoples, States and Fear and then refined in Security a new framework for analysis. Most issues stretch across the different sectors due to broad nature of most problems. For example, there are few questions of ecological character that in broader rending do not risk becoming political or societal. This is also why this paper will utilize the economic and political sector. The NSNGP is possible to analyse from all manner of positions. However, at its most basic, the NSNGP is a pipeline primarily designed for the use of gas delivery as part of trade between Russian gas producers and European consumers. As such, it is firmly rooted in the economic sector. Its nature as an international creation between several states and a matter of EU interest makes it by necessity a political matter. An issue of such national character as the NSNGP involves primarily economic issues but because of the nature of gas processing in Russia this inevitably also becomes a matter for the state. The same can be said of the EU. Natural resources, or for that matter all kind of international trading are ultimately the province of policy action in the respective states. The NSNGP accessing to Germany and from there onwards to the rest of Europe, brings EU members the political problems as well as gas. The three other sectors have been omitted in order to provide a higher degree of validity, as well as to more specifically note the definitions of different economic or political arguments. Thus the study is not a analysis of the NSNGP using the Copenhagen school, but rather a analysis of the NSNGP utilizing the economic and political sectors from the Copenhagen school of security studies.

20 Buzan, 1990
21 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998
2.3.1. Economic Sector

Economic security is a problematic sector which derives wholly from the economic/political system one personally subscribes to. There are three main distinctions in this matter which define to what extent the state (or possibly referent object) should involve itself in economy. The main positions one can hold in this matter are of a mercantilist, liberal or socialist position. Mercantilist position is of national character defining economy and economic life as another part of the state, existing for the betterment of the state. Socialist try to focus on economy towards “social and political goals of justice and equity”, which in practice puts them in the same boat as mercantilist, needing the direct control of the economy through the state in order to achieve the above. For liberals economic security becomes problematic in that economy is the basis of the state, existing with or without it independently. The state’s function is to provide law and order for society and economy to work in a structured way. For liberals economic security therefore is primarily to uphold market principles and rules in order to keep states and other actors of the economic scene.

World economy of today is primarily liberal. Intergovernmental and supra-governmental organisations are founded on liberal principles of economy (such as the IMF, World Bank, etc). Only a few sectors within national or international economy risk becoming securitized. However, this risk exists in conjunction with actors whose economy is still controlled through socialist/mercantilist thought. Pre-eminent here is the use of national quotas and national control over natural resources via state-owned companies and/or monopolies.

As Buzan & others declare in *Security a new framework for analysis*, one of the most likely objects of economic securitization is that of economic loss, or loss of welfare as a result of economic loss. It might be the “risk” of certain companies moving production abroad, and thereby risking the jobs and income of their former employees. It might be energy security such as decreased domestic production, rising consumption, rising prices or an insecure global or local market situation. However, liberal states are not likely to see these threats as worthy of securitization. Economic security is not the province of such a state, and although all states strive towards economic growth they are unlikely to encourage such by using threatening language of securitization. Economy in

---

22 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p 95
23 Ibid, p 95
24 Ibid, p 96
25 Ibid, p 95, 96
26 Ibid, p 102, 103
liberal societies is by necessity insecure in order to provide competitive situations and the meddling of political authority is likely to upset that order. To provide economic political resolutions for a fertile commercial environment is quite another thing.

2.3.2. Political Sector

“Political security as distinct from politics in general is about threats to the legitimacy or recognition either of political units or of the essential patterns (structures, processes or institutions) among the. /.../ In the classical tradition /.../ politics is a continuous struggle to to establish quasi-permanence of an ordered public realm in a sea of change.”

The political sector can thus be defined as hinted above as the threat towards the political survival and autonomy of a referent object (most ubiquitous a state). It is a threat that risks to undermine the political legitimacy of the referent object inwards, as well as outwards, and thereby securitized by necessity. A political threat is defined by the weakness of the referent object or rather, of the referent object’s perception of its own weakness and the basic principles of a referent objects existence, such as the fundamental differences between a democracy and a dictatorship, a racist-ruled nation and its counter-part, religious versus secular rule, etc. Because of the objects weakness it will also be more prone to that kind of threat, but also less capable to deal with it in an effective way. Weak states, for example, are more prone to security threats from within, lacking a coherent perception of itself to accommodate all its citizens and thus exist in peaceful contentment. To apply this to the EU, threats towards it would have to come primarily from the risk of squandering member-state integration, break-up of treaties governing its own body of existence as well as particular threats to specific member states (thereby threatening all members and the EUs sovereignty and integrity).

27 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p 144
28 Ibid
29 Ibid, p 153
30 Ibid, p 118-122
31 Buzan, 1990, p 99-101
2.4. Summary & operationalization of analysis

The analysis of documents will utilize the above framework. By analysing documents one can discern the perceived level of threat or tension expressed from a level of neither one, through politicization to securitization. One will furthermore also be able to discern the specific speech acts in which this happens. It is thereafter possible to classify to what extent a specific act is based on a threat originating in a specific sector. Finally it is possible to analyse the whole picture of security risk that the EU perceives out of the NSNGP to itself, or the NSNGP as part of the larger energy dialogue between the EU & Russia.

The analysis will consist of the study and interpretation of key passages in the documents, ultimately in order to discern a level of politicization or securitization. This can then be described in terms of economic or political sector analysis.

To summarize: the thesis will analyse the situation/documents to discern political tone level the EU takes of the NSNGP and in a broader scope the energy dialogue between the two. Furthermore, to discuss whether the situation is described as a political or economic sector problem, using the above method for analysis in order to answer the research purpose and question.
3. Method & material

3.1 Method

This paper will be authored as a case study of the EU security political stance vis-a-vis the NSNGP. The method of research is single case study qualitative text analysis of official EU documents concerning or related to the subject. The research material will then be analysed using the Copenhagen School of IR as a framework. This allows the subject (which utilizing traditional IR theories such as realism and liberalism would be hard to discuss) to be analysed as security issue. The research question can then be answered.

The reason for utilizing this framework of research is as follows; in order to produce an answer of adequate quality for the research question, the use of case study framework is most suited. The paper will exclusively deal with whether or not the EU perceives this isolated occurrence as an issue affecting Union security. As such, the research is concerned only with rather specific (the study of official documents) and limited (in both time and extent) material, suiting a case study perfectly. The impact of other variables such as the general political sentiment in the EU of the CFSP, or state of EU-Russia relations is of no interest to this research because of the narrow scope of the research question. If the research question had been of a more general nature, such as a study of the European energy security situation, the impact of energy security on EU-Russian relations and so on, a comparative framework had been more suited. Such a study would have involved more than one unit of measurement and would therefore need analysis of two or more stances from each other independent actors (such as the EU and Russia) against the object of the research (f ex overall EU-Russia energy security). This study is however not. The use of a single case study is suitable to the subject. The case (the NSNGP) and its effects upon the EU (the context) is studied through a lens of security analysis. The thesis is thus written as a test of hypothesis; whether or not the NSNGP is perceived as a threat to and by the EU.

The use of qualitative text analysis is useful because of the limited material available for analysis. Furthermore, and most specifically, a quantitative method is unsuited for this subject simply because of the nature of political documents. A governmental paper discussing the NSNGP does not necessarily become a vehicle of positive sentiment of the subject simply because it utters positive

---

32 Yin, 2006, p 27
33 Ibid, p 60, 61, 67
statements more often than negative. It is in the sub-context that one will find more specific and more subtle diplomatic hints used in international politics. Additionally the use of quantitative method would by definition demand that all sources be of equal worth\textsuperscript{34} in order to make a balanced and scientific conclusion. In the case of this study which involves documents from sources with varying degree of influence and authority, it would be impossible.

Qualitative research is sometimes criticized for its lack of scientific validity. The research risks becoming subjective to the researchers personal opinions and is hard or nigh on impossible to replicate in order to prove a high degree of validity. Furthermore, qualitative research often finds itself in a situation where it is hard to argue for how or why the study was planed and with what kind of sources as a basis for analysis\textsuperscript{35}. This is not the case in this thesis. Construct validity\textsuperscript{36} is provided through the use of definition of different sectors within sector analysis. To this is also added the use of securitization and politicization whose defined uses are thoroughly defined. Internal validity\textsuperscript{37} is provided through the arguing both for and against the theory used for analysis, and the mentioning of rival theory. Furthermore, the thesis limits itself to draw conclusions solely from the material used, the result of which can not be generalised from further then that of EU energy relations. The conclusion is not to be perceived as universal endorsement of the theory's general excellence, truisms about economic threat and so on. Based upon the conclusion one can simply draw further theories and the probability of results. This leads us to external validity\textsuperscript{38}. The thesis is based upon analysis rather than statistics. The result will be that a new theory, which in turn will be testable. It does not provide absolute mathematical results true to all similar situations, but rather an answer to a specific theory based situation.

Finally reliability\textsuperscript{39}; this thesis provides it by following the general framework for case studies, the use of qualitative text analysis and a wealth of different well documented sources to provide as material for analysis. It furthermore provides a thorough description of the theory used, the specific nature of sector analysis (and description of the economic and political sectors respectively) as well as the nature of securitization and politicization and how to specify and interrelate these two

\textsuperscript{34} Esaiasson et al., 2007, p 223, 224
\textsuperscript{35} Yin, 2006, p 27-29
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, p 55
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p 56
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, p 57
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, p 59
important terms.

3.2. Material
The research is based on primary sources. Primary sources are official documents of the European Union, related to the CFSP, and documents discussing the NSNGP. These documents are official resolutions, treaties and statements made by the EU. The existence of further material on the subject other than that presented here might exist. However, the material used for this thesis is primarily of highest official nature, thus superseding lesser material in terms of relevance to official EU stances on related matters. From these sources it is possible to disclose the act of possible securitization through speech acts (see theory) and there relation to different security sectors. Secondary sources is literature written by published researchers concerning the subject and the EU. However, this thesis contains no material based on secondary sources. The material used as a basis for theory is books and material published by its authors, creators or researchers relating and describing it in further or different detail.

3.3. Source Criticism
This thesis utilizes official EU documents as a basis for analysis of the EU’s security perception of the NSNGP. All official documents are primary sources. This leads us to note and consider the tendency and possible twist put on the document by the author and for what purpose. However, this thesis is primarily interested in the official stance of the EU, and whether or not there exists a possibility of finding less than obvious messages within the documents themselves. Whether or not this written standpoint is the exact same today as on the day it was written, or whether all authors share the opinion is of secondary nature. Of importance is the specific wording, which forms part of the official EU opinion in the matter. This can then be used as a basis of interpretation and analysis.

40 Esaiasson et al., 2007, p 324-326
4. Research background

4.1. The Nord-Stream Natural Gas Pipeline

The NSNGP is an under-sea gas pipeline scheduled to be finished in 2012, starting operation and delivering its first gas in 2011\textsuperscript{41}. It is built between the Viborg in Russia and Greifswald in Germany, linking Russia up directly to the European gas network, projected to deliver 27.5 billion cubic metres (bcm; km\textsuperscript{3}) per year to recipients in the EU. The company building the pipeline, Nord Stream AG, is owned by OAO Gazprom (Russia, 51 percent), E.ON Ruhrgas AG (Germany, 20 percent), BASF SE/Wintershall Holding GmbH (Germany, 20 percent) and N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (Netherlands, 9 percent). The pipeline will be a significant addition to the capacity of Russia to deliver gas to its European customers, whose dependence on Russian gas imports is projected to increase significantly in the next 20 years\textsuperscript{42}. The initial survey paving way for the project was conducted in 1998\textsuperscript{43}. Construction began on the 9\textsuperscript{th} of April 2010\textsuperscript{44}.

4.2. CFSP & the Four Common Spaces

The EU’s relationship with its immediate neighbourhood in the European continent, in North-Africa and the Middle East is primarily handled through the ENP. The ENP is based around state specific association agreements (AA). AA’s are the basis of cooperation between the recipient state and the EU, governing business and the conditions for its implementations for both parties\textsuperscript{45}. After the signing of an AA the EU will draw up a country report on a regular basis in order to reach an action plan. The underlying tendency of the ENP and AA’s is the often very specific conditionality with which the EU handles states interested in a closer cooperation with it. The reforming of financial markets or economic situation matches the European \textit{acquis communautaire} which usually form the basis of the AA, but general liberalisation and democratisation are most often part of the conditionality.

When talking about Russia however, the situation differs from the standard EU practise. Russia is not part of the ENP, instead opting for a more loose connection with the Union. EU-Russia relations have been governed through several different agreements over the years, starting with the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{41} Nord Stream AG, 2008  
\textsuperscript{42} EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2006  
\textsuperscript{43} Nord Stream AG, October 2007  
\textsuperscript{44} Nord Stream AG, April 2010  
\textsuperscript{45} European Commission, April 2008a, p 3
\end{footnotesize}
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997\textsuperscript{46} leading up to the road map of the Common Spaces agreed upon in the 2003 Moscow summit\textsuperscript{47} to the subsequent signing of the Common Spaces in 2005. The Common Spaces agreement concerns a host of different subjects and details, split into four categories; the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space of External Security and the Common Space of Research, Education and Culture\textsuperscript{48}. The Common Spaces programme is, for lack of a better word, a thin association agreement outlining the various points of mutual interest that make up the agreement. It is “thin” due to the highly mutual nature of the document, in which there are few real action points with which to implement, and few actual deals or promises of political action. As a result of this, there is neither any conditionality of great importance to penalize lack of implementation of the agreement.

4.3. Previous research

There has been little earlier research into the NSNGP's security implications to the EU. Several studies & policy papers have discussed European energy security on the whole, and some the specific security implications for countries (such as “Nord Stream, Sweden and Baltic Sea Security” by Robert L. Larsson), or the pipeline itself and the technical or environmental side of its construction (CIVPRO, North European Gas Pipeline). However the study of this specific pipeline's impact upon the foreign relations of the European Union is, as far as this researcher knows, utterly unstudied. To analyse it through the spectrum of the Copenhagen School adds to the unknown character of the fields of research this paper is endeavouring to shed light on. In more general terms, studies and policy papers of EU-Russia relations are aplenty, defining different areas of analysis. The study by Michael Emerson (EU-Russia – Four common spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy) is an example of discussion of EU-Russia relations on the whole. However because of the starting-point and the combination of theory applied to it, the result of this study will be the first of its kind.

\textsuperscript{46} European Council, November 2007
\textsuperscript{47} European Commission, 2005
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid
5. The EU & the Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline

The documentation of the NSNGP as a specific issue of interest to the EU is veiled in indirect reference. In EU lingua, it is impossible to speak of the NSNGP without talking of the department a project of its magnitude would fall under in general, and from that point on to speak of an increasingly high level of political magnitude. For this issue the pyramid of power consists of the following pattern:

CFSP and EU Commission → EU-Russia Common Spaces Agreement → EU-Russia Energy Dialogue → Respective reporting theme groups

The documents from the respective levels vary slightly in wording and type of language. By necessity this is the case in order to create a semblance of operative and more political-abstract planing. However, the most obvious interest for the researcher is the seemingly great lack of different lingua depending on origin of the papers, journals and reports on EU-Russian energy and the NSNGP. The use of semi-operative language is persistent and consistent throughout publications based on the Common Spaces.

The original Common Spaces Agreement is a document based on independent key points of mutual interest to the two signature parties. The combined document covers approximately 400 such points. This document is key to the whole policy area of energy between the EU and Russia. The common stance the two parties take on their combined situation in this document is an increased need of greater co-operation between themselves. The two parties agree to step up efforts primarily in the field of reliability as it is specifically important to preserve continued mutual interest;

“particular emphasis on addressing issues related to the sustainability and continued reliability of the production, distribution, transportation and use of energy, including energy efficiency, energy savings and the use of renewable energies”49

There is a constant tendency in the following text towards the use of various levels of co-operative language on most issues. When discussing energy the agreement firmly sticks to pure economic language and the promotion of values of common interests to both parties economic development. The outline for shared infrastructure projects are mentioned rudimentary in sentences such as

49 European Commission, 2005, Annex 1, p 15-16
“cooperation on energy infrastructure projects of common interest”\(^{50}\). The mentioning of infrastructure is however very much downplayed in the document, especially when putting alongside the comparatively more encompassing points regarding energy savings or the mentioning of more specific integration of market access between the two parties. When the CSA is put into context with the continued progress reports and more specifically the most recent\(^{51}\), the reference to energy infrastructure or the direct projects derived from that sector is of lesser importance compared to other policy areas within the sub-category “energy” of the economic common space. The single most prioritised policy area, throughout the subsequent reports is that of an “Early Warning Mechanism”\(^{52} \; 53 \; 54\), implemented in order to prepare and combat the risk of significant disruption of supplies of gas. Compared to the acknowledgement of infrastructure related issues there are few comparatively equal points.

For all intents and purposes, the CSA is the highest ranking official policy of economic co-operation between the two parties, and energy plays a significant role in the discussion of this space in general. Russian exports of energy make up almost 60% percent of total Russian exports to the EU\(^{55}\). The importance of Russian gas to the EU is throughout the whole dialogue underlined by the references to facts presented by theme and sub groups as well as independent actors\(^{56} \; 57 \; 58\) as needed to fulfil the demand of European consumers. This is furthermore underlined by the projected increase of dependence on Russian fuels. The framework for co-operation founded in the CSA and the energy dialogue form together the possibility of smoother policy adjustments in the future. The interconnected nature of energy distribution is underlined strongly in all documents. Indeed the whole basis of a specific energy dialogue as part of EU-Russia relations is based on the mutual interest of a functioning, effective and profitable energy trade;

*The overall objective of the energy partnership is to enhance the energy security of the European continent by binding Russia and the EU into a closer relationship in which all issues of mutual concern in the energy sector can be addressed /.../ With the strong mutual dependency and common interest in the energy sector, this is clearly a key area of EU-Russia relations*\(^{59}\) (Memo

\(^{50}\) Ibid, p 16  
\(^{51}\) European Commission, March 2008  
\(^{52}\) Ibid, p 19  
\(^{53}\) European Commission, March 2009, p 22  
\(^{54}\) European Commission, March 2008, p 16  
\(^{55}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2006  
\(^{56}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2008, p 3  
\(^{57}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2006, p 1  
\(^{58}\) European Commission, March 2010, p 22, 23  
\(^{59}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, March 2009
The prospects of mutual infrastructure projects are thus governed through this overarching principle, to promote a tightening market for Russian gas sales to the EU which will enable economical growth for both parties. The dialogue is primarily governed through the *permanent partnership council* compromising several high ranking officials from both sides, the more regular contacts through the *coordinators of the Energy Dialogue* (made up of the Russian energy minister and the European Commissioner for Energy (MEMO)). The thematic groups work under the PPC and consist of appointed experts from EU member states and the Russian Federation. The groups specialize into a specific field of the energy dialogue in order to find areas of interest and propose resolutions to arising situations in their field\(^6^0\), in order to promote further deepening relations.

The thematic groups in the Energy Dialogue started out as three; Energy, Strategies, Forecasts and Scenarios; Market Developments and Energy Efficiency\(^6^1\). However, since the start of the dialogue the list has been augmented somewhat to also encompass subgroups. To the strategies group a subgroup of energy economics was added in 2007, and to the Market developments a subgroup on investments and one on infrastructure\(^6^2\). Of note here is the late instalment of the last subgroup, whose implementation in 2009 was only pending of its first work program\(^6^3\). However the report published as part of the Energy dialogue in October 2006\(^6^4\) is written as part of the Infrastructure theme group. Seemingly, there have been several reorganisations of the dialogue and its theme -and sub groups (see 3, Method, p 14). The Energy Dialogue is presented in yearly reports, indicating resolved issues and problems as well as pointing to new areas or older situation that through the work of the various theme groups have been examined.

The different description of the various infrastructure projects mentioned throughout the Energy Dialogues progress reports can be described as substantial, both in tone, descriptives and context to each other. There are however notable differences in the context of the individual documents too (see conclusion p 26). The seventh progress report\(^6^5\) refers to the Nord Stream project as part of a number of projects who's progress is noted:

> “Both Parties welcome /.../ the implementation, according to plan, of the Nord Stream gas

---

\(^{60}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, November 2006, p 2
\(^{61}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, November 2009
\(^{62}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, March 2009
\(^{63}\) Ibid
\(^{64}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2006
\(^{65}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, November 2006
pipeline project and underline importance of the project for creation of additional gas supply infrastructure from Russia to the EU”.

The difference, or lack of difference, to the following quotation from the eight progress report shows a similar optimistic outlook;

“The parties highly value cooperation on energy infrastructure projects of common interest. The Parties positively view the results of cooperation in energy markets in developing projects of common interest for the EU and Russia /...work to realize the Nord Stream project, which is continuing successfully. The Parties stress the importance of the environmental impact assessment study, which is underway; “

In the following reports, nine and ten, the formulation is identical to each other;

“implementation of the joint natural gas transportation projects, including North Stream and others.”

However the reports also mention the construction of infrastructure projects as one of the most important facets of the dialogue bearing in mind the overall goal of energy security. It is this, and other terms voicing the concern of reliability as the premier interest of the reports that the reports discuss in order to improve and uphold. This is not a primarily European concern, but rather one shared by both parties out of common interest.

The reports in general examine the current state of play or tone of speech between the parties and as such they primarily focus on the current figures and the most recent events of note. The progress reports tend to talk of events in two manners. One; the importance of improving situations to a state of heightened co-understanding. This primarily implies that the current situation is less than satisfactory, or even non-existent. Two; noting with satisfaction the production of new figures as a result of successful cooperation, the mutual opinion of specific point. The papers do not pin-point specific areas of troublesome discourse and do not give any direct explanation, hint or voice to what

66 Ibid, p 4
67 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2007, p 4
68 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2008, p 4
69 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, November 2009, p 7
70 Ibid
71 Ibid, p 3
72 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2008, p 3
73 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2007, p 2
74 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, November 2006, p 2
the background of possible discord stems from. The thematic groups follow suit and utilize the same format.

The EU-Russian relationship outside the CSA is limited, and plays a marginal role in the lingua of declarations in the CFSP. However the amount of spotlight dedicated to Russia is very much in line with all other mentioning of specific states, issues or sectors. In the document “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World”, under energy security Russia is mentioned simply by stating “Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations”\(^\text{75}\) and then further under “Greater engagement with our neighbourhood”;

“Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives.”\(^\text{76}\)

The direct references to the Energy Dialogue is non-existent, or even issues of conflict within a wider discussion of the subject. Indeed the references to energy pale in comparison to the rebuke of Russia's action towards Georgia at the time and can scarcely be perceived as a prioritised area of the document (more under Conclusion, p 26). Of note here is also the general tendency of the Council of the European Union to only take a stand on issues once the situation has deteriorated. This is the case in all documents published by the Council used in this paper documenting EU-Russia relations and energy.

5.1. Economic Sector

Perceived through the film of sector analysis the picture painted by the EU of the NSNGP is one of primarily the secure delivery of gas according to schedules. In so doing the economic implications to security become that of what indirect damage the lack of gas might produce, as well as the threat of market situation which hampers competition and thus quality and price. The reports of theme groups and the overall Dialogue between the parties underlie the mutual interest in each other. Russia in the EU as a market for its enormous energy supplies of gas, oil and coal and the EU in Russia as a convenient supplier of energy in general and gas in particular in a stage where domestic production is expected to fall and demand to increase\(^\text{77 78 79}\). This is further underlined by the

\(^{75}\) Council of the European Union, December 2008, p 5
\(^{76}\) Ibid, p 10
\(^{77}\) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2006
European reaction to delivery cuts of gas supply from Russia to Ukraine in 2008 and 2009.\textsuperscript{80}

The term 'energy security' in the Energy Dialogue progress reports is used in order to convene the importance of invariant delivery of gas to its destination, but also of EU and Russia to have a common opinion on issues to facilitate a smooth energy partnership. In order to provide this the Energy Dialogue puts a lot of effort into the market development in both Russia and the EU. Energy efficiency is another part of the dialogue that also becomes related to the 'energy security' phrase. Flaring (flare stack, the release and combustion of gas waste from refineries) in particular is seen as part of needles and damaging production hazard that threatens overall quality of Russian production by the EU, directing particular interest.\textsuperscript{81}

The particular references to the NSNGP in EU documents point directly at the issue that is being perceived as an economic issue first and foremost, with economical political implications rather than one of strong political motive. Maybe best summarized in the Report of Energy Infrastructure Theme Group:

"Nord Stream /.../ should ensure an increase of volume and could strengthen the reliability of Russian gas supplies to the European market through a diversification of export routes."\textsuperscript{82}

The specific project “Nord Stream” is not referenced as a political project that might have a political purpose, but rather as an important step on deepening Russian-European business ties.

\subsection*{5.2. Political Sector}

The basis of EU-Russia relations is formed through the CSA. The focus on economic situations are when mentioned squarely set in an economical/political form, fiercely non-political in outlook. The discussion of economic interdependence is political in nature (simply by virtue of being discussed on such a level of potentates as ministers) but relates simply to the economic situation between the parties as a whole. Compared to other parts of the CSA, such as for example external security\textsuperscript{83} whose language is one of significant dissimilarities to the Economic Space. The economic space is primarily built on mutual interest. However, as the mentioning of cuts in deliveries underlines, this language is changeable for tones of more political nature. Much of the ambitions of both the CSA

\begin{flushleft}
78 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2008, p 2, 3
79 European Commission, Undated b
80 European Commission, March 2010, p 2, 6
81 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, undated, p 4
82 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, October 2006, p
\end{flushleft}
and Energy Dialogue specifically are aimed at combating just such instances\textsuperscript{84}. This is highlighted through the mentioning of the several “gas crises” between Russia and its client states outside of the European Union. In the wake of Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2007-2008 the Council urges;

“\textit{both parties to resume gas deliveries to the EU immediately in order to rebuild the credibility of both parties and avoid further economical harms and suffering to the citizens of the EU and of neighbouring countries}”\textsuperscript{85}

Making references to the well being of citizens is an implicit way of perceiving the issue as one of most grave political interest. Continuing, the Council says;

“\textit{invites the Commission to identify \ldots/, the economic and social consequences resulting from the crisis and to map out the relevant measures \ldots/, in assisting those Member States.}”\textsuperscript{86}

(source underlining)

In a speech by Benita Ferrero-Waldner\textsuperscript{87} the year later, the discussion of economy forms the basis for a political outline of Europe's future. By talking of energy security as one of the things needed to be safeguarded in eastern policy in general, primarily political rather than economic terms of descriptions are used in many instances. The term “energy security” is not simply used as a goal to be achieved through extended EU-Russian talks but rather through diversification of energy sources/partners. Moreover the possible need, or question of using sovereignty in the debate of energy security vis-à-vis the Unions energy suppliers is mentioned\textsuperscript{88}. Most intriguingly however is the mention of acknowledgement of actual discord between the EU and Russia in several areas and the need to abridge these in order to promote common interests. The fact that political issues of current nature are obstructing economical issues of long term importance seems to only underline the sentiment that the two facets needs to be kept apart\textsuperscript{89}.

\textsuperscript{84} EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, November 2006, p 2
\textsuperscript{85} Council of the European Union, 2008
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid
\textsuperscript{87} Ferrero-Waldner, 2009
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, p 3
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, p 4
6. Conclusion

6.1. Conclusion

This paper has tried to paint a picture of the EU’s perception or view on the Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline in a security perspective. In this chapter the results from the previous chapter will be applied to the theories presented in chapter 4. In order to answer the research questions from the introduction we will put in relation the facts discussed previously. This in order to answer the questions; to what extent has the building of the NSNGP been securitized by the EU? Wherein lies the possible threats and need to classify the NSNGP as such? Does the EU have a security purpose for supporting the NSNGP? Is it possible to define the NSNGP as a security issue falling primarily under the economic sector of sector analysis? The results will then be used as a basis for a more abstract reflection on the nature of the theory used, and security in general. Finally the paper will conclude with a discussion on a more general level, and suggestions, on how further research might add knowledge in the matter. Moreover it will reflect on the possible results had the research purpose been stipulated in a different way.

We will start with discussing the questions in reversed order. Gathered from chapter 5, we can conclude that from the way official documents are written it is possible to categorize the EU’s perception of the NSNGP as a threat from a particular sector? The language and formulation in all EU-Russian official documents or communications of situations set in the energy dialogue, is aimed at combating or rather promoting energy security. The definition of the economic sector (as described under Theory see ch. 2.3.1, p 7) in liberal economy is primarily the effort to securitize economical continuation. It is the aim to, or the means, to safeguard jobs, income or sales guaranteeing income to its citizens, revenue to the state and a stable environment for society to exist in. When discussed in journals, memos and agreements, the NSNGP is portrayed as means to diversification of deliveries of gas to the European market from the Russian partner. The NSNGP, when mentioned in correlation to issues of energy security, is synonymous with the EU’s efforts of promoting energy security against drops or cuts in delivery (as experienced by Ukraine). The mentioning of political implications and thereby connecting the issue to the political sector is only made through the risk of direct energy cuts, and the risk of these being transformed into a more general diplomatic crisis. Examples of this are the comments made through the Council on the Ukrainian gas crisis's in 2008 and 2009. The mentioning in these documents of threats to EU citizens (see ch 5.2, p 24) and the proceeding references to political power is from a sectoral point.

---

90 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, March 2009
of view, the act of defining the problem in terms belonging to the political sector. This underlines the problematic situation of trying to define sectors as clearly distinct and separated from each other. The economical sector is defined through the wish to preserve the economic interest against the outside world. However a economic threat that escalates beyond its origins and whose threat spreads to affects more parts of state and society will, if unchecked, sooner or later become a matter of grave political interest. This seems to be the case of EU relations with Russia, explaining in part the language and spirit in which the CSA and ED is written in. More specifically it explains the European perspective of viewing Nord Stream as a project of economic rather than political nature. This nature is only changed when wider implications starts taking a heavy toll on the political system in general. Thus we may conclude that the NSNGP is to be recognized as intricately part of the economical sector of sector analysis. The fluid barriers between sectors however mean that the issue is never truly confined to a specific, rigid interpretation. Instead, the changes wrought over time affecting the EU and the NSNGP will force European institutions to constantly re-asses the current view of the economical-political situation. Right here, right now the NSNGP is firmly described as a strict economical issue.

This leads us to reflect on the more general European sentiment towards the pipeline. It is to be understood on several occasions that the EU endorses the project on the whole. When discussed as part of a wider debate the pipeline is without a doubt as part of a solution for Europe's looming energy shortage that is projected to befall the Union in the near future. By supporting the pipeline the EU decreases the risk of European consumers suffering as hard in future energy crises as they did in 2008-2009. As is frequently mentioned, the pipeline is envisioned as part of a European plan for diversification in the energy market. This specific project is only part of a larger schedule. Without the construction of the pipeline the EU would come to rely even more heavily on third party actors and client states such as Ukraine and Belarus as transit states in the future. This would increase the risk of cuts or other delivery issues affecting European customers because of delivery problems through transit states. The risk of this for European consumers already exists, but would become even greater if estimates of future import quotas are accurate (see ch 5). Other projects that share many aspects with the NSNGP might be South Stream, or the construction of several pipelines across the Mediterranean which all serve to diversify the EUs dependence not only on Russian gas, but gas delivered under all to similar circumstances and through third parties.

Based upon the text analysis it is quite clear, as far as the material used is representative of the referent object, that the EU does not perceive or deign to articulate the project as a hazard towards
its security. On the contrary, the construction in itself is politicized as an imperative for the Unions energy needs to be supplied for. This paper acknowledges the fact that there are limits to the general width one can claim this to be true. However, based on the facts presented in the material which was chosen for its high suitability to the issue, the result is that the EU is unconcerned as to what possible security concern the project might compose to it. More so because the most important documents studied for this thesis is the most high ranking documents sanctioning the EU-Russian relationship. The NSNGP is thoroughly seen through out the documentation as a non-threatening project. It is possible to say that as far as the official political stance goes the EU does not politicize the NSNGP nor in any way securitize it.

On a wider scale it is prudent to review the suitability of the Copenhagen school as a method of analysis in this case and similar ones. Using sectors as way of analysis enabled this thesis to isolate specific points of reference in text as a way of detecting threat, and thus understand the EUs security political situation better. By looking for hints of politicalization or securitization one can find subtleties that otherwise might be deemed to trivial to affect analysis. Bearing in mind the results, would it have been more suitable to analyse the NSNGP from a different theory of security? Other theories of security are primarily based on military situations, or situations that are more fundamentally connected to violence. The military aspect of the NSNGP has not been discussed in this thesis. However, there are several reasons for this. Firstly, the EU is a organisation that is tricky to define. It is a mostly bi-lateral organisation of states, but one that also encompasses several areas of supranational elements. Classic realist thought would not agree to the possibility of analysing the NSNGP as a threat to the EU, simply because of the unions lack of sovereign nature (military capability primarily). The NSNGP would instead fall under the aegis of individual European states to classify as they wish. That would also enable one to take into context power struggles, the perception of power and how to handle it, and most importantly the potential use of force.

There are several problems with studying the NSNGP in this way, or economic projects of similar stature. Firstly, one risks reading qualities into the project which it does not posses or are irrelevant to the study as a whole. The NSNGP is a international company, working to make money and improve trade between the EU and Russia. It is a project devoid of military linkage. Secondly, the project is firmly international. To study it, one will inevitably end up having to study international cooperation. When studying security in a classical realist way one ultimately has to focus upon states and states interest. In the context of this project one would therefore risk to exaggerate the possible threats from one state to another (such as using gas or gas cuts as offensive weapon) on the
expense of the positive reasons for its construction. As stated several times, the pipeline is a creation of interdependence. What possible scenario a gas pipeline ever could play in military scenario, it would coincide with the level of interdependence suddenly shifting to simple need of one party. As for the NSNGP that seems unlikely unless there are several fatal errors in the projections of EU import needs, production and effective.

Does this study then help us understand the wider concept of security? The Copenhagen school resides firmly within the halls of widening theory; that security is far more than strict military necessity. To acknowledge the fact that civil unrest for example is of vital importance to the security of a state just as the threat of foreign intrusion, is an example of widening theory. Naturally, one also risks inflating the term security by applying it to more areas of political interest. If we were to see possible threats of force in everything, we might end up prioritizing things that, by the end of the day, has no bearing on essential threat and thus risks us all ending up destroyed. However, we should also bear in mind that there is also huge risks in forcing ourselves to selectively analyse situations that only fit our own self-imposed criteria. Such action is the benefit of no-one. Thus, the two extremes of security definition are equally dangerous when trying to encompass every facet of threat to states or other actors. Is economy then really one of the eligible provinces of security analysis? By talking of economy as a possible source of threat one risks upsetting the boundaries between state and civil (economical) society, and the rules of market economy. If state or other actors see economic threats they will by necessity also try to combat them. In doing so one also risks upsetting economic order to the point of it no-longer being a source of wealth. We should although also underline here that the possibility of defining economic threat not necessarily leads to this being the case, nor that there is anything positive to be gained from such action. Is the reason for this thesis conclusion of non-threat then maybe simply the logical result of the economical sectors non-importance to actors in security matters? The answer is no. If anything we can conclude that the EU is very much concerned with economical threat or the possibility of it. What we can conclude is that the EU in this case takes a very positive opinion of a specific occurrence. Further more we can conclude that the EU is perceiving potential economical threats and working towards normalization of them, before they turn into more severe situations of political (or worse) nature. Moreover it is possible to say that if any possible threat in the future could come from the NSNGP, it is the threat of the project not coming to fulfilment. The risk of this and the effects it would possibly have upon the EU are easy to perceive from the material gathered. It is this risk, as part of the wider energy situation and needs of the Union, that is politicized by the EU. Whatever other risk the project is deemed to possibly contained as a threat by others, is not perceived nor described by
the EU. Fitting subsequent research on energy trade and relations, based on this knowledge, might be to study the direct importance of different methods of energy import such as specific pipelines, the use of lorries, tankers or trains. Not to mention studies of the overall importance of the gas- and electrical grid or the energy market within the EU and between partner states. Or maybe the study of energy as a factor in general foreign relations of the EU? The list goes on.

6.2. Summary
Concluding one can say that: Based on the material used, the Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline is described in terms of economic security. The EU endorses the NSNGP as part of wider plan for energy proliferation. The EU does not perceive the NSNGP to be a threat, nor does it securitize the project process. To conclude, the EU does not securitize the Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline. The NSNGP is not, or is not articulated as, a threat to the European Union.
7. References

Literature

Buzan, Barry (1990), *People, States & Fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold war era, 2nd ed*, Pearson Education Limited, Essex


Yin, Robert K (2006), *Fallstudier: design och genomförande*, Liber AB, Malmö

– EU documents


Council of the European Union (December 2008 b), *Press release 2842nd meeting of the Council*, Brussels

Council of the European Union (June 2009), *Press Release 2949th Council meeting Transport, Telecommunications and Energy*, Luxembourg


Official Journal of the European Communities (30 March 2010), *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*

European Council (November 1997), *EU-Russia Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)*

European Commission (12.5.2004), *Communication from the Commission European Neighbourhood Policy STRATEGY PAPER*, Brussels

European Commission (2005), *Road Map of four EU-Russia Common Spaces*

Annex 1: *Road Map for the Common Economic Space – Building Blocks for Sustained Economic Growth*

Annex 2: *Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice*

Annex 3: *Road Map for the Common Space of External Security*

Annex 4: *Road Map for the Common Space of Research, Education and Culture*

European Commission (March 2008), *EU-Russia common spaces progress report 2007*


European Commission (March 2009), *EU-Russia common spaces progress report 2008*

European Commission (March 2010), *EU-Russia common spaces progress report 2009*


EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (October 2006) *Report of Energy Infrastructure Theme Group*

EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (November 2006) *Seventh Progress Report*, Moscow/Brussels

EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (September 2007a) *Thematic Group on Strategies, Forecasts and Scenarios*, Moscow

EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (September 2007b), *Thematic Group on Energy Efficiency*, Moscow

EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (October 2007) *Eighth Progress Report*, Brussels/Moscow


EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (19 March 2009) *Memo*, Brussels

EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (November 2009) *The Tenth Progress Report*, Moscow

EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, Joint Thematic Group on Energy Efficiency (undated), *Final Report 2008*

– **Other documents**

Nord Stream AG (October 2007), PROJECT INFORMATION
Status of the Nord Stream pipeline route in the Baltic Sea PDF

Nord Stream AG (2008), Facts about the Natural Gas Pipeline across the Baltic PDF

Nord Stream AG (March 2010), Factsheet the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline project PDF

Nord Stream AG (9th of April 2010), Press release, Official launch of construction of Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline PDF