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U.S., ISRAEL, PALESTINE

- A REFLECTION OVER THE IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATION -

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the U.S. relations to Israel and the affect the relationship has had on Palestine from the viewpoint of Robert D. Putnam's 'two level-game' theory. The core of the theory is that representatives have been placed between two tables; where one represents domestic negotiations while the other represents foreign negotiations. The bargains made at the foreign table affects the state's domestic politics and vice versa. Applying the theory on U.S. relations to Israel it is possible to see that the U.S. is leading an unsuccessful negotiation at both tables. The relationship between the U.S. and Israel has existed since U.S. decided to recognize the state in 1948. Events such as the Holocaust and 9/11 have let Israel keep its underdog status as well as its sympathy from the American population. Israel also has a very powerful lobby group which have tried to steer U.S. policies towards its goal, the continuation of the Israeli state. The U.S. government have different interests in the region, besides the peace between Israel and Palestine. This leads to the government's most difficult mission, being able to both satisfy their own people as well as proceeding with its plans and agendas for the region.

Keywords: Robert D. Putnam, Two-level game, Israel-U.S. relationship, the politics of Truman.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Presentation

The end of the Second World War resulted in many changes in the world. For instance in 1947, Palestine was divided into a Jewish and an Arabic part by a United Nations (UN) resolution and a year later the state of Israel was declared.¹ This resulted in a declaration from the U.S. where they decided to, immediately after the end of the war, help nurture the Jewish state in Palestine.² Consequently the long relationship between Israel and U.S. had begun.

In September 2011, the Palestine president Mahmud Abbas handed over an official petition for becoming a member in the UN.³ But weeks before Abbas handed over the petition, the U.S. released a statement, saying that they would use their veto in the Security Council if an attempt to become members was made by Palestine. This was the first time the country openly declared that the veto power will be used on a resolution⁴, but it is not the first time U.S. has used the power to support Israel.⁵

In 1972, the U.S. used their veto for the first time in favor of Israel. The casting of the veto was explained as a new policy to fight terrorism. The vetoed resolution was about condemning Israel's attack on Lebanon and Syria, a day after 11 Israeli athletes were killed by Palestinians at the Munich Olympic Games. Yet, a year later, another veto was cast in favor of Israel. This time, the resolution was about withdrawing Israel from the occupied territories and affirming the rights of the Palestinians which had no relations to terrorism. This veto was followed by a repeated use of the veto in order to protect Israel from international sanctions and criticism.⁶

¹Johannesson Martina, *Israel-Palestina*, <http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/Konflikter/Israel-Palestina/>, updated 2011-12-16, taken 2012-01-05.

². Quandt William B, (2004) *American and the Middle East: A Fifty-Year Overview*, in Brown L Carl (ed.) *Diplomacy in the Middle East – The International Relations of Regional and Outside powers*, p. 59

³ Rapport (svt.se), *Palestinier söker FN-medlemskap*, http://svt.se/2.22584/1.2543806/palestinier_soker_fn-medlemskap, updated 2011-09-23, taken 2011-11-29.

⁴ Dagens Nyheter, *USA stoppar Palestina med veto*, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/usa-stoppar-palestina-med-veto>, published 2011-09-09, taken 2011-11-29.

⁵ Neff Donald, *The U.S. cast the First of 29 Security Councils Vetoes to Shield Israel*, <http://www.amedtrust.org/component/content/article/150-1993-september-october/7306-the-us-cast-the-first-of-29-security-council-vetoes-to-shield-israel.html>, published September/October 2003, taken 2011-11-29.

⁶ Ibid.

The Global Policy Forum, which is an independent policy watchdog for the UN⁷ presented a table of the used vetoes in the Security Council between 1946 and 2008. In almost every resolution condemning Israel, the U.S. used their veto and all the Israeli resolutions included the same area, Palestine.⁸

The relationship between U.S. and Israel has always been good and Israel has always been able to count on the support from the U.S. No country has provided as much aid, both economic and military, as U.S. has to Israel.⁹

1.2. Purpose

The purpose with the study is to examine the relationship between Israel and the U.S. and its affect on Palestine. By examining the Israeli-U.S. relations from Putnam's theory, the two-level game, the study will show how statesmen need to negotiate at both international and national level in order to satisfy both domestic and foreign interest. As well as how this interplay can affect the conception of the world.

1.3. Formulation of questions

Against the background of the purpose, the following questions will be answered:

- Which domestic groups/interests/events have affected U.S relations to Israel?
 - How has it affected the common denominator Palestine?
- Which foreign groups/interests/events have affected U.S. relations to Israel?
 - How has it affected the common denominator Palestine?

1.4. Material and method

This essay will consist of an empirical analysis of the gained material, literature such as books and articles where the U.S. relationship with Israel is examined from different perspectives. For instance, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt article have analyzed the effect the Israeli lobby has had on U.S. foreign policy.

⁷ Global Policy Forum, *About GPF*, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/about-gpf-mm/introduction.html>, taken 2012-01-13.

⁸ Global Policy Forum, *Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes*, http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/Tables_and_Charts/vetosubj.pdf, taken 2012-01-14.

⁹ Quandt William B, (2004), p. 61.

The study will focus on the domestic and foreign groups and events which have helped outline the current relation between the two countries. But since the Palestine question is and has been a large part of the Israeli-U.S. relationship, the study will bring up Palestine and the triangular relationship made up by these three parties.

There will be some focus on the third part but for the most part, it will serve as the joint consequence of the two countries' behavior and negotiation. In this essay it will only serve as the common denominator. No litterateur where the Middle East conflict is the main focus has been actively sought after nor has literature where the Palestine point of view is the main focus. Yet, in many of the literature used, the conflict has been brought up. In many cases a comparison of the U.S. relation to Israel and Palestine has been made, which to an extent have been used by the author. The author is aware of the long and complicated history between the three parties featured in the essay but since the Middle East conflict only serves as common denominator, the events analyzed in the essay will focus on events having an impact on the Israeli-U.S. relation.

The end of the Second World War and the effects of Truman's policymaking as well as the events of 9/11 are the two main situations featured. The end of the 1940's and Truman's policy serves as the beginning of the state of Israel. As well as where the American people first were introduced to Israel and Palestine. The situation at the end of the 1940's stated and shaped the policies of the next few years. The event of 9/11 had a massive effect on the triangular relationship and consequently strengthened the bond between Israel and the U.S, both on an international level as well as national level.

The material will be examination from the viewpoint of the applied theory which is called 'two-level game'. It is a political model which views negotiations between countries consisting of negotiations on both a domestic and foreign level. In this case, power is a major cause behind the parties' current state.

The power to steer policies towards a certain direction, the power to influence opinions and viewpoints are all concepts applicable on the subject of the essay. Since power is such a wide concept within the international politics, Putnam's theory narrows down the concept into only two levels. A state's place in the worlds politic is decided through negotiation the actor makes on both international and national level.

1.5. Delimitations

The study is from the viewpoint of U.S. relations to Israel therefore will it only take a deeper look upon the domestic and foreign interest groups, public view and events from the viewpoint of the U.S. It only gives a small overview of how Israel views the U.S.

The study is also not about the UN Security Council and the permanent members veto power nor does the study take a stand on whether the veto power should be abolished or not. Even though the study does examine the Israel-Palestine conflict, it does not take a stand on the conflict or the countries' involvements and actions nor does it try to explain or describe the conflict.

1.6. Disposition

The introducing chapter gives a background to the study's topic as well as explaining the buildup of the study. The second chapter of the study begins with a theoretical overview of the 'two-level game'. In this chapter the theoretical explanations of the theory is presented. The following chapter is dedicated to the relationship between the U.S. and Israel. How the relationship has looked from the end of the Second World War to present day as well as which events and interest, both domestic and foreign, has shaped the relationship into what it is. The fourth chapter will present the findings from the empirical analysis, while the fifth chapter will give a brief summary of the essay and its purpose.

2. Theoretical overview

2.1. Previous research

“Politics itself has been described as the process of deciding “who gets what, when, how”¹⁰ It is not only shapes by internal dynamics of individual or group decision but also by states and societies within which decision makers operate.¹¹

Therefore, power is a central concept within the international relations, and is often defined as the ability to be able to get an actor to do something it otherwise would not have done. But it can also be defined as one actor being powerful enough to affect others more than others affect them because if an actor gets its way, it must be powerful.¹² Some researchers also

¹⁰ Goldstein Joshua S, (2005), *International Relations*, p. 63.

¹¹ Goldstein Joshua S, (2005), p. 155

¹² Goldstein Joshua S, (2005), p. 57.

explain it through the *power of ideas*, where the power to influence another actor is through a psychological process which includes domestic mobilization of capabilities such as religion or nationalism. Influence can also be gained by being the actor who forms the rules and the values of a behavior.¹³

An actor's power can come from state power which is made up by different concepts such as natural resources, military preparedness and popular support of government. This mix of elements varies between actors but the power does overall relate to quantities of the specific elements it is based on. Elements an actor can draw on over a long term are called power resources, they are attributes that changes slowly and includes political culture, patriotism and territory. While elements an actor can draw on over a short term is called power capabilities. One of the most important power capabilities is the military force.¹⁴

To exercise power, two or more actors have to be involved where each of the actors tries to influence the other more than it is being influenced and the mutual attempt to influence is called a bargaining process. But different theories highlights different tactics and motivations and sometimes the content is communicated through actions rather than exchange of words.¹⁵ The actors in a bargaining process bring different means of leverage into it and it comes from the power capabilities. The leverage operates from three different dimensions of power; the promise of positive sanctions, the threat of negative sanctions or the appeal to the other actor's feelings. Leverage generally opens a new dimension in the bargaining space thus allowing the outcomes in this new dimension to be traded off against the ones in the original dimension, this way leverage helps deals to get done.¹⁶

There is often one or more issues that each of the participants hopes to become an agreement or at least favorable to itself. But the interests of the participants diverge on the issues discussed and create conflicts. The conflicts are represented by bargaining space, which means the distance between the participants' position and the end result is the agreed on position within this space. Yet the end result is not necessarily a fair result, often they are one-sided and unfair but they always contain mutual gain.¹⁷

¹³ Goldstein Joshua S, (2005), p. 57f.

¹⁴ Goldstein Joshua S, (2005), p. 60.

¹⁵ Goldstein Joshua S, (2005), p. 62.

¹⁶ Goldstein Joshua S, (2005), p. 63.

¹⁷ Goldstein Joshua S, (2005), p. 62.

Another way of viewing power is to see it as a very important driving force, when examining a state's action almost all action can be seen as an ambition for exercise power and therefore, the concept of power is often regarded as too wide.¹⁸

A common view is instead that foreign policy is shaped to realize three types of goals; security, welfare and ideology. The security concept refers to the state's ambition to withstand a military attack as well as guarding the constitution while the welfare concept refers to the aspiration of being an economical benefiting state. The ideological aims refer to being able to affect on a conceptual level.¹⁹

In order to realize the goals, states have different form of resources, on an overall level it is about four different resources. The first resource is propaganda, where the state has the opportunity to show its standpoint on different matters to the different actors on the international level. The second is diplomacy which means that the state can use the official channels which have been established for communication between states and their governments. While the third is economical means, here the state can use their economy in order to try and affect their surroundings. The last is military means and is based on force and violence but most of the states in the world only have a military force in a deterrent purpose. The different resources contribute to realizing different foreign policy goals.²⁰

In many of the literature existing on the relationship between domestic and foreign affairs, the authors list either countless of "domestic influences" on foreign policy or generic observations on how domestic and foreign affairs are linked in some way.²¹ More recently, the domestic determinants of foreign policy have focused on structural factors and more particularly state strength.²² Explaining the relationships between states has traditionally been categorized in relation to their level of analysis. The level of analysis tells the researcher on which level to look for the causes of the states behaviour.

Kenneth Waltz introduced the most widely levels of analysis in the 1950s when he discerned three levels of analysis. The international-level which explains through a states position in the international system, the domestic-level where the explanations look to the particular states

¹⁸ Gustavsson Jacob, (2009), *Utrikespolitiskt beslutsfattande*, in Gustavsson Jacob and Tallberg Jonas (ed.) *Internationella relationer*, p. 262f.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Gustavsson Jacob, (2009), p. 264f.

²¹ Putnam Robert D, (1988), *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*, p. 430.

²² Putnam Robert D, (1988), p. 431.

culture, society and political institutions and the individual-level where the explanations are made up of individual statesmen's personal and psychological characteristics.²³

According to Robert D. Putnam, the debate regarding if domestic politics affects foreign politics more or if it is the reverse is a useless debate. According to him, both policies affect each other to a similar degree and the questions regarding this debate should instead be about when and how they affect each other.²⁴ Many of the negotiations made at a foreign level can be conceived as a 'two-level game'. At domestic level the internal groups pressures the government to adopt policies in their favor while governmental politicians try winning power by constructing coalitions among these particular groups. At foreign level, national governments try to maximize their ability to satisfy the internal groups' demands while trying to minimize the consequences of foreign development. Neither of the two games can be ignored by the decision makers.²⁵

What could be concluded from this overview of the previous research is that none of these studies have examined on the same level as Putnam. Although foreign and domestic levels have been researched, Putnam puts the negotiator, the statesman, as the main character.

2.2. 'Two-level game'

Putnam's 'two-level game' explains the relationship between foreign and domestic politics. In this 'two-level game' the representative has been strategically placed between two "tables", where one represents the domestic negotiations while the other represents the foreign negotiations.²⁶ "Each national political leader appears at both game boards. Across the international tables sit his foreign counterparts, and at his elbows sit diplomats and other international advisors. Around the domestic table behind him sit party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups and the leader's own political advisors".²⁷ The 'two-level game' is built on the recognition that domestic politics can be used to affect outcomes from bargaining made internationally and that moves made internationally can help achieving domestic goals.²⁸

²³ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), *Introduction – integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining*, in Evans Peter B, Jacobson Harold K, Putnam D Robert (ed.), *Double Edged Diplomacy – international bargaining and domestic politics*, p. 5.

²⁴ Putnam Robert D, (1988), p. 427.

²⁵ Putnam Robert D, (1988), p. 434.

²⁶ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p. 4.

²⁷ Putnam Robert D, (1988), p. 434.

²⁸ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p. 16f.

The 'two-level game' is concerned with all three levels defined by Waltz²⁹ but the theory by Putnam differs from previous theories in three different ways. The first is that it is a theory of international bargaining, the second is that the key player is the statesman. The strategy the statesman chooses is an important component in international negotiations. The third difference as well as the most distinctive, is that the statesman's strategy reflects a "double-edged" calculation of opportunities and constraints on both tables.

2.2.1. The statesmen's assignment

The theory assumes that the statesmen are trying to do two things at once, manipulate both domestic and foreign politics at the same time. But the strategies and tactics are controlled with, what is acceptable for the other state as well as with what the domestic constituencies will ratify.³⁰ "Diplomatic tactics and strategies are constrained simultaneously by what other states will accept and what domestic constituencies will ratify. To conclude a negotiation successfully, the statesmen must bargain on these two tables, both reaching an international agreement and securing its international ratification".³¹

The negotiation is divided into two stages, the bargaining phase where the statesmen bargaining with each other to reach international agreements and then there is the ratification phase where the domestic constituents in each country decides whether to ratify and implement the agreement, formally or informally.³² The strategy a statesman chose, how the statesman influences his own as well as his counterpart's domestic politics, can define how the outcome of an international negotiation may look. For example, by gaining control over information or resources the statesman can open new possibilities for bargaining advantages in the negotiation. The statesmen can also direct the policy's directly towards domestic groups in foreign countries, thereby seeking allies "behind the back" of his or hers counterpart.³³ But because the statesman has no direct control over foreign institutions and agendas in the countries that are counterparts, the statesman have more limited resources to influence foreign policies.³⁴

²⁹ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p. 5.

³⁰ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p.15.

³¹ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p. 4.

³² Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p. 23

³³ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p. 15.

³⁴ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p. 28f.

The complexity of this game is that one move deemed rational by a player on one table can be deemed unfitting for the same player at the other table. Yet neither of the two tables can be ignored by the decision makers as long as their country is interdependent.³⁵

Putnam's theory consists of a double-edge negotiation process where the statesmen negotiating must consider both foreign and domestic interests on both a foreign and domestic level. The statesmen's most important mission as well as most difficult is to satisfy all the interests and at the same time the statesmen must take in consideration the different consequences an action can have on the ratification of a resolution or agreement. The most important part of Putnam's theory is that negotiations happens on both a domestic and foreign level since the domestic politics affects the outcome of foreign level negotiations and foreign politics affects the outcome of domestic level negotiations.

3. The relationship between the U.S. and Israel

3.1. An overview

A special relationship has existed between U.S. and Israel since the forming of the Israeli state in 1948 and it is estimated that around two thirds of the world's Jewish population are living in both of the countries.³⁶

Before the events of the Second World War, USA had few political interests in Palestine. Occasionally the government endorsed Zionism, in order for it to serve their political interest domestically. Many Americans also embraced Zionism in the 1930s and early 1940s. In addition, the American Jews formed a Zionist lobby group which demanded a Jewish state to be established in Palestine.³⁷ Even though the American Jewish community was relatively small, it was well organized and only had one focus, the support for Israel.³⁸ Non-Jewish citizens also sympathised with Zionism, mostly because of pitying the people harmed by Nazi actions but also due to despising Muslims and Arabs. Religious Americans saw an establishment of a Jewish stat as a fulfilment of a Biblical prophecy.³⁹

Politics, values and the guilt, all lead to Americans helping the new Jewish state. The support for Israel largely came from American domestic politics since Israel was seen as a progressive

³⁵ Putnam Robert D (1988), p. 434.

³⁶ Nauntofte Jens, (1987), *USA och Israel – ett speciellt förhållande*, p. 3.

³⁷ Hahn Peter L, (2005), *Crisis and Crossfire – The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, p. 22.

³⁸ Quandt William B, (2004), p. 61.

³⁹ Hahn Peter L, (2005), p. 22.

democracy surrounded by Arabic monarchies.⁴⁰ Between 1949 and 1967, the media in the U.S. depicted Israel as a geopolitical underdog and both the public and policymakers saw the Israeli state as a tiny David confronting the larger Goliath-like Arabic states.⁴¹

Unlike other areas of U.S. international policy, the case with Israel is affected by different factors. These factors include the powerful Israeli lobby, the deep historical and cultural sympathy Americans have for Israel as well as the limited discussion of Israel in the mass media and the political arena.⁴²

3.2. *The politics of Harry S. Truman*

In 1945, Harry S. Truman, the U.S. president at the end of the Second World War, once said to his Middle Eastern ambassadors: “I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands Arabs among my constituents”.⁴³

The policymaking of Truman emanated from the clash between national security interests in the Arab states and the domestic political sympathy for Zionism.⁴⁴ But global, regional and domestic factors also contributed to the complicated situation Truman was faced with after the war. On global level, the emerging Cold War made U.S. security experts assign more importance to the protection of Arab states thereby getting more involved in the region as well as sympathies with them regarding the Palestine question. On regional level it was Britain’s inability to restrain the growing violence in Palestine that threatened neighbouring states into war and on domestic level, the advisers of Truman urged him to adopt a pro-Zionist policy on domestically political reasons. From the beginning, the divergence between national security and domestic politics caused clashed in the country’s policy towards Palestine.⁴⁵

As mentioned above, the domestic level was complicated by the dynamics within Truman’s administration. The president accepted the Pentagon and State Department’s view on the strategic importance Middle East had, but the issue of Zionism made the President include unofficial interests based on domestic political, cultural and humanitarian considerations as

⁴⁰ Quandt William B, (2004), p. 61.

⁴¹ Little Douglas, (2008), *American Orientalism – The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, p. 25.

⁴² Lieven Anatol, (2004), *America Right or Wrong – An Anatomy of America Nationalism*, p. 183.

⁴³ Wawro Geoffrey, (2010), *Quicksand – America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East*, p. 597.

⁴⁴ Hahn Peter L, (2005), p. 22f.

⁴⁵ Hahn Peter L, (2004), *Caught in the Middle East – US Policy towards Arab-Israeli Conflict 1945-1961*, p. 20.

well. As a result, the policy making regarding Palestine in the 1940s was a contest between official and unofficial interests and produced an inconsistent and vague policy which strongly leaned toward Zionism.⁴⁶ Even if Truman's professional and personal advisors gave conflicted advices regarding the Jewish state. The president, in the end, made decisions which contributed to the fulfilment of the Zionistic lobby group's goal.⁴⁷ The actions taken by Truman affected the Palestine situation dramatically but also the country's relation to Israel and Arab states and in the weeks following, the State Department tried to limit the impacts the recognition of Israel had.⁴⁸

The recognition of Israel caused a double-edge negotiation process to appear within the Truman administration. Since it had to take a stand on how recognizing Israel would affect the foreign as well as the domestic U.S. policies in the Middle East. The end of the world war lead to U.S. taking an interest in Palestine, but at the same time both the American people and Israeli lobby pressured the president towards a pro-Israel path. By making the administration consider the difficulties Israel and the Jewish population had suffered due to the war. In the end, Truman decided to recognize the state of Israel through both pressure from domestically interests but also "[...] unofficial interests based on domestic political, cultural and humanitarian considerations as well".⁴⁹

The case with Israel gives a clear example on Putnam's theory. Though most of the negotiation took part within the administration, it still shows how domestic politics and more importantly, domestic interest groups and viewpoints, can affect the outcome of foreign level negotiations. In this case, the decisions taken by Truman had a long term consequence on U.S. policy towards Palestine and the Arab world. Through the recognition, the U.S. policy was set on a path which later have been proven very difficult to wander away from.

3.3. America in favor of Israel

Many Americans sympathy for Israel came in form of symbolic compensation for doing too little too late in order to prevent the Holocaust.⁵⁰ It was also the Holocaust, with help from Hollywood, which mostly reaffirmed Israel's status as the underdog in the mind of many

⁴⁶ Hahn Peter L, (2004), p. 31.

⁴⁷ Hahn Peter L, (2005), p. 22f.

⁴⁸ Hahn Peter L, (2004), p. 50.

⁴⁹ Hahn Peter L, (2004), p. 31.

⁵⁰ Little Douglas, (2008), p. 29.

Americans. Movies such as *Sophie's choice* and *Schindler's list* gave the Americans comfort in the knowledge that Israel was the best assurance against a repeat of Hitler's final solution.⁵¹ "Well into the last quarter of the twentieth century, films, books and magazines continued to depict Arabs as primitive, untrustworthy and malevolent figures who bore close watching. By contrast, the eagerness of Jewish newcomers to assimilate themselves into Main Street's mainstream and the awfulness of the Holocaust combined to reduce American anti-Semitism and to stimulate U.S. support for the creation and preservation of Israel, despite Arab objections".⁵² Another view amongst the America population is that Israel should be viewed as a piece of the U.S. which has been planted in an Arabic world who is hostile towards the U.S.⁵³

The events in Munich 1972, where seven men from the Palestine terrorism group Black September shot down eleven defenceless Israeli athletes, set the main preoccupation for U.S.'s foreign policy regarding the Middle East for the next twenty years; to fight Palestinian terrorist and their patrons such as Saddam Hussein.⁵⁴ "The common paradigm of hostility to Muslims, and the inability to distinguish between even radically different Muslim states, traditions and ideologies made it possible to mix up Iraq and al Qaeda in the minds of a majority of Americans [...]"⁵⁵

Another argument made in favour for Israel is that the country is a fellow democracy as well as the "only democracy in the Middle East" and therefore the country deserves support from the U.S. But this argument has become more and more difficult to defend since Israel occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip.⁵⁶ Yet the religious argument, that Israel alone is entitled to possess the Holy Land, is a very strong argument. Especially amongst the Christian Right whose members make up a significant proportion of congressmen and senators as well as powerful proportions of the Republican Party.⁵⁷ With the rise of the Christian Right, the Republic Right's support for Israel has increased strongly over the past decades.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Little Douglas, (2008), p. 40.

⁵² Little Douglas, (2008), p. 41.

⁵³ Nauntofte Jens, (1987), p. 5.

⁵⁴ Little Douglas, (2008), p. 33.

⁵⁵ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 27.

⁵⁶ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 179

⁵⁷ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 179f.

⁵⁸ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 182.

Truman's decision would most likely not have been the same if not the American population had felt as strongly for the Jewish population and the Israeli state. The events of the Second World War gave the Jewish population a predominant support and sympathy. The society in America had taken a stand on the question regarding the Middle East. By making the Israelis the heroes in both books and movies, they showed the officials in Washington where they stood. Since all of society had taken the same stand, to stand united with the Jewish population, this led to the domestic interest groups becoming a very strong force, a force no official could ignore. A part of the theory is governmental politicians trying to win power by winning the favors of the internal groups. In this case, because such a strong group of people stood on the same side, it left politicians with no other choice than becoming pro-Israel if they wanted to be reelected.

Even though the movies and books were not as frequent in the later years. Events such as Munich 1972 and the rise of the Christian Right, and with them the religious arguments, has made it possible for Israel, or more specifically its lobby group, to remain its stronghold on the domestic politics in the U.S as well as deciding U.S. foreign policy's path.

An effect of the relationship between the two countries is that the U.S. does not have the same intimate bond, as it has with Israel, with any of the Arabic countries.⁵⁹ Yet, the American administration has always been concerned with maintaining contact with some Arabic countries.⁶⁰ The identification with Israel would not matter as much if, over the same time period, the wider Arab world equally identified themselves with the Palestinian people and their struggle with Israel. For U.S., who has a separate agenda in the region, the access to oil and removal of hostile states and develop democratic states, this means finding themselves pinned in an anti-American region. A prolonged conflict may result in a divided country much like it was during the Vietnam War.⁶¹

“Israel's special relationship with the United States – revolving around a broadly conceived ideological factor based on positive perception and sentiment evident in public opinion and official statements, and manifest in political and diplomatic support and military and economic assistance – has not been enshrined in legally binding commitment joining the two in a formal alliance.[...] Israel has no mutual security treaty with the United States, nor is it a

⁵⁹ Nauntofte Jens, (1987), p. 5.

⁶⁰ Quandt William B, (2004), p. 61.

⁶¹ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 189f.

member of any alliance system requiring the United States to take up arms automatically on its behalf. The American commitment to Israel has taken the generalized form of presidential statement (rather than formal documents)".⁶² Though their relationship has always been good, Israel has been criticized by U.S., and particularly in official Washington, in the past. For instance, during the 1956 Sues crisis, the two countries did not agree regarding the crisis but since 1967, Israel has generally been seen in a positive light in official Washington.⁶³

Today, the U.S. is an indispensable ally to the country and provides it, through one form or another, with economical (both governmental and private), military, technical, political, diplomatic and moral support. Therefore the collective popular judgement among the Israelis, it that this special relationship must remain since it has also been a vital foundation for the country's security and foreign policy for years.⁶⁴ Each year, Israel receives about \$3 billion in foreign assistance. Roughly counted, it is one-fifth of the total of the U.S. foreign-aid budget. Israel is also the only recipient that does not have to report how their aid is spent.⁶⁵

At the same time, there will always be a divergence in the two countries' policy interests. Israel has more narrowly defined goals which are limited to only concern the survival of the state of Israel as well as the Jewish community. Therefore, the issues relating to the conflict with Palestine and the future of Palestinians will always be a disagreement between the two states.⁶⁶

As Putnam explains, one rational move made by a statesman at one table can seem unfitting for the same statesman at another table. This is the case with the huge public support Israel has gotten by the Americans. Since majority of the population sided with Israel, the rational move for the government was to support Israel while at the same time the decision was unfitting for the politics U.S. lead in the Middle East. U.S. identifying itself with Israel meant that the entire Arab world indentified itself with Palestine thus trapping U.S. in a conflict.

Because U.S. also has other agendas in the region, there is a case of double-edge diplomacy. While trying to keep the domestic groups satisfied by being an ally with Israel, they also have to try and satisfy their foreign agenda in the Middle East, where Israel is seen as the enemy.

⁶² Reich Bernard, (2004), *Israeli Foreign Policy*, in Brown Carl L (ed.) *Diplomacy in the Middle East – The International Relations of Regional and Outside powers*, p. 134.

⁶³ Quandt William B, (2004), p. 61.

⁶⁴ Reich Bernard, (2004), p. 134.

⁶⁵ Mearsheimer John J and Walt Stephen M, (2006), *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 31.

⁶⁶ Reich Bernard, (2004), p. 135.

This is also a clear case of the complexity the statesmen are faced with while trying to negotiate at both tables.

Putnam also points out that the statesmen do not have any direct control over the foreign agendas. Therefore there is a limitation in the amount of influence the U.S. can have on the Palestinian side since they have no bond in the same way the U.S. have bonded with Israel.

Even though the Palestinian question is an unresolved matter, Israel have gained diplomatic support from the U.S. and since 1982, the country have vetoed 33 Security Council resolutions which were critical of Israel's actions. This number is greater than the combined total of vetoes cast by other members in the Council.⁶⁷

In 2003, two votes were taken in the Security Council concerning Israel and its policy towards Palestine. The first resolution demanded that Israel did not harm or deport Yasser Arafat. The second condemned the Palestinian suicide bombings and called on both parties to implement "Road Map" designed by U.S. which demanded Israel to end its "security fence" construction on the West Bank. The countries rejecting the resolution were Israel itself as well as U.S and the two Pacific islands Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, both which are quasidependent of the U.S.⁶⁸ "Since the end of the Cold War, vetoes have been less common, and cast chiefly by the US in connection, not with substantive proposals, but with language condemnatory of Israel".⁶⁹

3.4. *The events of 9/11*

It was the Cold War that drew the U.S. into the Middle East and it also shaped the country's policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict.⁷⁰ Both superpowers, U.S and the Soviet Union, sought after Israel for an alliance after the country gained its independence but it soon became clear that Israel swayed towards a U.S.-Israel alignment, which has remained unformalized by treaty to this day.⁷¹

The global war on terror which USA launched in autumn of 2001 strengthened the bond between the country and Israel since both were prime targets for Osama Bin Laden and his

⁶⁷ Mearsheimer John J and Walt Stephen M, (2006), p. 31.

⁶⁸ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 173.

⁶⁹ Dunbabin J.P.D, (2008), *The Security Council in the Wings: exploring the Security Council's non-involvement in wars*, in Lowe Vaughan, Roberts Adam, Welsh Jennifer and Zaum Dominik (ed.), *The United Nations Security Council and War – The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945*, p. 502.

⁷⁰ Hahn Peter L, (2004), p. 62.

⁷¹ Reich Bernard, (2004), p. 132.

allies. The months after 9/11 both countries shared intelligence on al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups as well as deciding on how to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons. Both countries also refused to meet with the Palestine leader Yasser Arafat unless he could prove that he could restrain the Palestinian extremists.⁷² The U.S. support for Israel has since the beginning of the 1990s and especially after the 9/11 attacks been justified by claims that both states are seen as a threat by terrorist groups originating from the Arab or Muslim world. Israel's enemies are said to be America's enemies and therefore Israel is also seen as an ally in the war on terrorism.⁷³ A U.S. State resolution from 2002 attacks the terrorism by Palestine and declared to stand united with Israel and take the steps necessary to secure the Israeli people. Nothing in the resolution criticized Israeli actions taken in the conflict with Palestine and the resolution was passed with 92 votes to 2.⁷⁴

After the 9/11 attacks and the links made to anti-American, many public opinions as well as much of the political classes have become strongly anti-Palestine and sees the actions made by Israel as a part of the war on terrorism. This consequence as well as Israel's strong lobby group in Washington has led to an unchanged support towards Israel and the country's politics.⁷⁵ But there is also another side, because since 9/11, many newspapers have taken on a more fair view of the conflict than they did twenty years ago. Many writers are requesting Washington to pressure Israel through threatening with withdrawing the country's support. Yet the criticism is deficient in both political and moral content. The State Department produces a human rights report each year on Israel and the occupied territories, the report is often very critical of the country's behaviour but the problem is that the U.S. does not take any action to these results.⁷⁶

Much like the events in 1972, when Israel first was defended by the U.S., the attacks of 9/11 brought Israel and USA closer as the two states bonded over a mutual enemy. The years between the two events have not led to any major changes in the relationship even though the two states have not always been in agreement. Some of the American people have become a little less critical of Palestine's part in the conflict but there are still powerful and influential groups who refuse to acknowledge Israel's part and actions.

⁷² Little Douglas, (2008), p. 114.

⁷³ Mearsheimer John J and Walt Stephen M, (2006), p. 32.

⁷⁴ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 173f.

⁷⁵ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 179.

⁷⁶ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 199.

Many foreign interests is to end the violence in the conflict, but when the U.S does not take action on the results presented and instead ignores or acts if they do not exist there is nothing to negotiate about. Palestinian interest is for instance that Israel stops the occupation but when U.S., the leading supporters of Israel refuses to admit the facts, why discuss the matter or any other matter? Why should Palestine sit down with the U.S. when they do not make offers on the right terms, such as admitting Israel's incorrect action?

3.5. *The Israeli lobby group*

The central focus of the U.S. foreign policy, for the past decades has been the relationship with Israel. The overall trust of the country's policy in the region is primarily due to the U.S. domestic politics and foremost the activity of the Israeli lobby group. Other groups have managed to steer the foreign policy in their favored direction but no other lobby group has diverted the country's policy as far from what the national interest would suggest as well as convincing the government that Israeli and U.S. interest are essentially identical.⁷⁷ "Not all Jews are supporters of the official Israel lobby, and many supporters of this lobby are Christians. Indeed, in numerical terms, there are more Christian evangelicals in this lobby than Jews".⁷⁸

But still many Jewish Americans have a guilty conscience for not living in Israel and cures this by sending money, either by buying Israeli government bonds or donating to different Jewish organizations. But most importantly is to make sure that the American government are giving Israel economical, political and military aid. Therefore, Israeli lobby has developed into the most efficient and successful lobby in the country.⁷⁹ The Israeli lobby is largely dependent on foreign politics and geopolitical considerations which are contrary to other domestic lobbies. The Israeli lobby also functions more as an agent of a foreign state.⁸⁰ The major factor in effectiveness for the lobby is the power and utility of Israel and if it is lost, it seems possible for the lobby to lose some of its influence as other lobbies done before.⁸¹ But what speaks for a continuing activity is that among the American Jews, the state of Israel is

⁷⁷ Mearsheimer John J and Walt Stephen M, (2006), p. 30.

⁷⁸ Guerlain Pierre, (2011), *The Israel lobby, American Democracy and foreign perceptions of the USA*, p. 373.

⁷⁹ Nauntofte Jens, (1987), p. 5.

⁸⁰ Guerlain Pierre, (2011), p. 377.

⁸¹ Guerlain Pierre, (2011), p. 381.

seen as a guarantee for a Jewish national home who awaits the American Jews with open arms if a new anti-Semitic wave would sweep through the Western World.⁸²

There are three essential reasons for the huge impact Jews have had on American politics. The first is that the Jewish people are very politically active, 90 percent of the Jewish population vote in elections which mean that in a country where about 55 percent of the population vote, the Jewish population is represented with about 6 percent. The second is that the Jewish population are often situated in the most densely populated federal states such as California and New York. These federal states have many electors and are therefore crucial in presidential elections. The third is that generally, the American Jews are very wealthy and donates large amounts to campaigns where the candidate is pro-Israel or can be persuaded into caring pro-Israeli politics which is why the Israeli lobby groups are listened to closely.⁸³ The riches Jewish society can be found in U.S., much due to the number of rich Jewish Russians that immigrated to the country before and after 1948.⁸⁴

Also, the rise of powerful lobby groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has improved the influence from both the Jewish voters and the Jewish state on Capitol Hill and in the White House.⁸⁵ “The bottom line is that AIPAC [...], has an unchallenged hold on the U.S. Congress. Open debate about U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting Israel.”⁸⁶

An example of the impact AIPAC can have is the Camp David peace talks in 1978, where president Carter worried that the Israelis was more interested in a separate peace with Egypt than a lasting one with Palestine. This lead to the Carter administration deciding to, in 1980, support the UN resolution where Arab rights on the West Bank and East Jerusalem was affirmed. The consequence of the action was that AIPAC influenced many pro-Israelis not to vote for him in the election eight months later, and thereby also helping widen Ronald Regan’s margin of victory.⁸⁷ “Were it not for the lobby's ability to work effectively within the

⁸² Nauntofte Jens, (1987), p. 4.

⁸³ Nauntofte Jens, (1987), p. 12f.

⁸⁴ Nauntofte Jens, (1987), p. 3.

⁸⁵ Little Douglas, (2008), p. 78.

⁸⁶ Mearsheimer John J and Walt Stephen M, (2006), p. 43.

⁸⁷ Little Douglas, (2008), p. 110.

American political system, the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less intimate than it is today.”⁸⁸

Putnam points out that statesmen have more limited resources to influence foreign policies. But since the Israeli lobby group acts more in the interest of a foreign group than a domestic group it has been able to work on both sides and through this way the group has been able to tie both domestic and foreign policy towards the same path.

As mentioned before, Israel has a long history with the U.S. and the American people have earlier identified themselves with the Israelis and not the Palestinians. Therefore, the lobby group of Israel has been able to affect as much as it has and the story about Jimmy Carter and Ronald Regan gives a good view on exactly how much influence the lobby group have.

As Bernard Reich have pointed out, the agenda for the two states regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict will always remain a disagreement which means it is a question that is not easily negotiated into a settlement. Yet the two states are deeply entwined on many levels leading to this one matter not being enough for the relationship to end. In an overall view, Israel has all the advantages and by that the state has a strong hold on U.S. due to both its past and present but more specifically due to its lobbying.

3.6. The rest of the world's view

“Because of the way in which America and Israel is entwined spiritually, politically and socially, and because so many people in the world treat the Israel-U.S. relationship as a litmus test of U.S. behaviour, the choices that Israel makes will have very grave implications not only for the security of the United States and its Western allies, such as Britain, and for America’s role in the world, but also perhaps for the political culture of the United States itself”.⁸⁹

Israel has often been portrayed as the weak David surrounded by hostile Arab Goliath but the opposite image is closer to the truth. The truth is that, today Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its forces are superior to its neighbors and it is the only state in the region with nuclear power.⁹⁰ “In short, [...] the Israeli-American special relationship is being restricted, largely because neither side can agree whether Israel should be America’s partner

⁸⁸ Mearsheimer John J and Walt Stephen M, (2006), p. 40.

⁸⁹ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 185.

⁹⁰ Mearsheimer John J and Walt Stephen M, (2006), p. 4334f.

or merely its proxy. [...] Viewed from Washington, Israel sometimes proved a strategic asset and other times constituted a diplomatic liability”.⁹¹

Critics to the relationship compare Israel with authoritarian states such as China or Russia. But the Israeli lobby uses this comparison repeatedly to prove that the U.S. demands on Israel are hypocritical or anti-Semitic, since the authors of these demands do not request the similar pressure on China or Russia. But European and U.S. critics mean that they are not asking U.S. to expel Israel from the international arena or impose trade sanctions. Only that the country uses its support and aid to influence the Israeli behaviour. As of 2004, more than a quarter of the U.S. aid budget is received by Israel. In the eyes of the world and in reality, this makes the U.S. morally complicit in Israel’s actions and crimes. It also gives the U.S. both the right and the duty to pressure Israel on ending the occupation.⁹²

Many polls and surveys have indicated that the Israel-Palestine conflict is an important factor for how Muslims view the U.S. but also how the rest of the world views the U.S. strategy in the Middle East.⁹³ The state’s strategy has contributed to a widespread European doubt about the wisdom and sanity of American leadership. But many Americans refusals to distinguish this circumstance are helping to drive a deeper wedge between Europe and the U.S.⁹⁴ Because unlike the situation in the 1930s, the majority of the European states are successful and stable democracies and the Jewish population have the same right as all other citizens. The Jewish population has also been replaced as a target for many extreme right-wing parties that have appeared in many of the European states, these parties have abandoned their anti-Semitic views for anti-Muslim views and Muslim minorities have taken over the position of the disliked “other” in the right-wing thinking.⁹⁵

4. Conclusions

Putnam’s theory consists of a double-edge negotiation process where the statesmen negotiating must consider both foreign and domestic interests on both a foreign and domestic level. By applying Putnam’s theory on U.S. relations to Israel and its affect on Palestine, it is

⁹¹ Little Douglas, (2008), p. 115.

⁹² Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 185.

⁹³ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 175.

⁹⁴ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 186.

⁹⁵ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 203.

possible to see that the U.S. is leading an unsuccessful double-edge negotiation. The state has a close relationship with Israel, which has led to foreign and domestic policy treading on the same path. But at the same time, the U.S. has an agenda for the states in the Middle East, an area which has become more anti-American much due to the U.S. relationship with Israel.

The close relationship with Israel is mostly due to domestic interests as well as American's guilt and sympathy for the Jewish community and a common viewpoint of Arabs as the not accepted "other". While the U.S. involvement in the Middle East region and the conflict is mostly due to agendas such as democratization and oil.

As Putnam writes: the statesmen's most important mission as well as most difficult is to satisfy all the interests, and at the same time the statesmen must take in consideration the different consequences an action can have on the ratification of a resolution or agreement. The government's biggest issue is to satisfy both its own population yet, at the same time proceed with its plans and agendas for the region.

The relationship between the three parties has been similar through the years, with Palestine on one side and Israel on the other and the U.S. in the middle since the state has interests in both parties. But from the viewpoint of Palestine, U.S. took a stand when Truman decided to recognize Israel 1948. Palestine instead identified itself with the Arab world. Nowadays Israel has such a very close relationship with the U.S. that when the U.S. negotiates with other states, Israel is a part of the deal since the two states are deeply entwined.

The U.S. always brings Israel to the table since it has become a huge part of the U.S. foreign and domestic politics. The clearest evidence for the deepness of the relationship is through the number of resolutions which has been vetoed by the U.S. Since 1972, U.S. has vetoed resolution that condemns Israel and as a consequence for this U.S. is alienating the rest of the world by not acknowledging the Israeli actions in the conflict as well.

Which domestic groups/interests/events have affected U.S relations to Israel?

How has it affected the common denominator Palestine?

According to Putnam: the representative has been strategically placed between two "tables", where one represents the domestic negotiations while the other represents the international negotiations⁹⁶ but in the case of Israel and U.S, the two tables have been pushed together and

⁹⁶ Moravcsik Andrew, (1993), p. 4.

are now working towards the same aim. This is due to the strong hold the Israeli lobby group has on the country's policies. But another factor is that the group differs from other ones since it acts as an agent for a foreign state. Its motive as well as its members has made it one of the most successful groups in the U.S.

As Mearsheimer and Walt writes: the central focus of the U.S. foreign policy, for the past decades has been the relationship with Israel and the overall trust of the country's policy in the region is primarily due to the U.S. domestic politics and foremost the activity of the Israeli lobby group.⁹⁷

The function of the 'two-level game' is that "at domestic level the internal groups pressures the government to adopt policies in their favor while governmental politicians try winning power by constructing coalitions among these particular groups"⁹⁸ which is what the Israeli lobby groups has managed to do. Nowadays, the group has a strong support from the Republican Party and especially the Christian Right. This means that politicians within these two groups are working towards the lobby group's goal. Since a politician's goal is to be re-elected. In other words, the Israeli lobby group is strongly united with official Washington and thereby can affect policies easily.

Nauntofte explains the lobby group's strong position: that generally, the American Jews are very wealthy and donates large amounts to campaigns where the candidate is pro-Israel or can be persuaded into caring pro-Israeli politics, which is why the Israeli lobby groups are listened to closely.⁹⁹ Statesmen do not have direct control over foreign agendas according to Putnam. But since the Israeli lobby group is working both national and international, they are able to influence on both levels.

But the influence on the politics in Washington is not the only advantage, the lobby group has also gotten aid from different events in the history. The Israeli-U.S. relationship began as a consequence for the Holocaust and later depended through Munich 1972 and 9/11. The Holocaust had no links to the Arab world but the other two events had. Especially 9/11 had a major impact on the U.S. continued foreign policy. The event also helped Israel's cause in remaining an ally to the state but the most helpful factor is that the counterpart to Israel is

⁹⁷ Mearsheimer John J and Walt Stephen M, (2006), p. 30.

⁹⁸ Putnam Robert D, (1988), p. 434.

⁹⁹ Nauntofte Jens, (1987), p. 12f .

Arabic. Therefore in the eyes of many Americans the enemy of U.S. and the rights and values the country represents.

The position Israel had after the world war, and the position the Jewish community was in made American's sympathies with the newly formed state. Since then, Israel's position as an ally to the U.S. has continued to grow. Even though the argument for Israel's case may have varied over the years, many Americans consider Israel as the underdog and the state in need of U.S. protection.

“[...] films, books and magazines continued to depict Arabs as primitive, untrustworthy and malevolent figures who bore close watching. By contrast, the eagerness of Jewish newcomers to assimilate themselves into Main Street's mainstream and the awfulness of the Holocaust combined to reduce American anti-Semitism [...]”.¹⁰⁰ The quote from Douglas Little gives a good hint on how both Israel's and Palestine's relationship towards U.S. has been as well as how Israel became a close ally. Israel or its people's tragic history has gained them the sympathy of the American people, this is something the Palestinians have never had.

Which foreign groups/interests/events have affected U.S. relations to Israel?

How has it affected the common denominator Palestine?

As Putnam's theory explains, the domestic politics affects the foreign politics and in this case, the domestic politics of the U.S. makes them unable to pressure Israel into ending the occupation. They are also protecting the state from being condemned by the rest of the world.

Lieven writes: as of 2004, more than a quarter of the U.S. aid budget is received by Israel. In the eyes of the world and in reality, this makes the U.S. morally complicit in Israel's actions and crimes. It also gives the U.S. both the right and the duty to pressure Israel on ending the occupation.¹⁰¹ But there is another side to the European view, as extreme right-wing parties has gained more support the view on Arabs as the “other” has also spread. Therefore the viewpoint on U.S. being morally compelled to pressure Israel is perhaps no longer the viewpoint of the majority of the states in Europe.

Since the view of Palestinians and the Arab world is beginning to take the same path in Europe as it has in the U.S. When discussing at an international level, the two parties will perhaps no longer disagree on these questions.

¹⁰⁰ Little Douglas, (2008), p. 41.

¹⁰¹ Lieven Anatol, (2004), p. 185.

The events that helped the Israeli lobby in gaining more power and support did the opposite for the Arab world and Palestine. Where Israelis were seen as the underdogs and the victims, the Palestinians were seen as the terrorists and anti-Americans.

Putnam writes that foreign politics also affects the domestic politics but in this case, the domestic politics of the U.S. is deeply entwined with the position towards Israel and is therefore more difficult to change or redirect. As previously asked, why should any state negotiate with U.S. when they do not act on the right terms and instead keeps defending a state who's action are seen as wrong by the majority of the world.

5. Summary

The U.S. is a strong ally to Israel and gives the state support, both economically and democratically. The both states also have a long history and throughout the majority of the years been on the same side. Yet, on the question regarding Palestine as well as the conflict, the two states does not agree nor will they. Israel refuses to yield on their position and U.S. non-action towards Israeli action makes negotiations regarding this particular question come to a standstill. Douglas Little sums up the U.S. relation to Israel very good by saying: “viewed from Washington, Israel sometimes proved a strategic asset and other times constituted a diplomatic liability”¹⁰².

Statesmen need to negotiate at both international and national level in order to satisfy both domestic and foreign interest is a core argument and in this particular case, Putnam's theory can be applied. The U.S has to both consider the domestic groups, where the Israeli lobby group have taken the lead. But at the same time try and negotiate terms which will enable the state to continue working towards the agenda they have for the region.

The decisions and actions taken within this relationship have had an effect on the conception of the world. For instance, if Truman had not decided to recognize Israel, would the two states still have the same deep relationship? And if both of the events in 1972 and 2001 had not been performed by groups with Arabic connections, would Palestine be regarded in the same way as Israel is today?

¹⁰² Little Douglas, (2008), p. 115.

There are many questions which can be asked on how this case would have looked like if the events and actions would have been carried out differently. But the fact remains, in order to gain results, negotiations needs to be made on both domestic and foreign levels. In this particular case, it is not a simple thing. Israel and its lobby group has a firm grip around the U.S. policies and due to the current state, U.S. have little chance for change.

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