"We have whistles instead of guns"

Nonviolent resistance in the 21st century

Lærke Arvedsen
Department of Peace and Development Studies
2FU31E HT2014
"The purpose of understanding this world
is to be better able to change it”

Cox & Sinclair, 1996
Abstract

Nonviolent resistance has been found to be more effective in bringing about societal and political transformation than violent insurgency.

Nonviolent resistance as a nonconventional form of engagement in conflict, furthermore attracts more people, encourages diversity in participation, has the moral high ground and has positive long-term effects on a society, in terms of citizenship skills, civilian peace and democratisation.

However, a discourse of militarism and violence can be said to dominate the world today.

Macropolitical incompatibilities are often confronted with arms and violence, whether by political leaders or civilians.

This thesis aspires to challenge this violent discourse, and encourage the move towards nonviolent approaches to confronting and circumventing power and authority, by exploring the mechanisms at work in nonviolent resistance movements, and attain a deeper understanding of which elements of nonviolent resistance movements may be supportive of achieving the aim of the collective action for change.

The methodological approach is conducting a qualitative, deductive study within the framework of a structured, focused cross-case comparison of four nonviolent, anti-regime movements in the Middle East and North Africa, which have taken place in the 21st century.

The findings reveal the ambiguous and context-dependent nature of most of the elements scrutinised for their operativeness, and yield suggestive tendencies of few - while they offer a nuanced insight into the dynamics within which these elements work in nonviolent conflict.

This study explores the phenomenon of nonviolent resistance, provides an understanding of the complexity of the mechanisms and dynamics involved, and suggests the need for further research into nonviolent resistance, to improve the understanding and utilisation of it.

Key words: Nonviolence, resistance, revolution, Middle East, North Africa
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Introduction

1.1 Problem identification

Violent resistance often comes as a result of or results in, violent regime repression, and has a tendency to end up in a destructive spiral. This causes immense suffering and casualties amongst the population, as well as chaos, material destruction, displacement and social dislocation. Violent resistance is characterised by its tendency to protract and has a great likelihood of failure and undesired outcomes, both in the short and long run. However ambitious and persevering, "violent rebellion has rarely won freedom" (Sharp, 1993:4). Currently, the world is bearing witness to the catastrophes populations suffer, when revolutionary uprisings transform into lethal internal conflicts.

On the contrary, nonviolent resistance used in macropolitical conflicts increasingly demonstrates itself as more effective, more successful, more popular and representative and less costly in terms of human and other resources (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:6).

Furthermore, nonviolent resistance has been seen to result in more durable and sustainable transformations of societies (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:212; Sharp, 1993:32).

Nonviolence can also be argued to hold a superior moral position, giving this form of resistance an ethical imperative. Nonviolence can serve to delegitimise violence (Demmers, 2012). The avoidance of aggression, death and destruction is a compelling argument for this form of creating change.

This is how clear the divide between nonviolent and violent resistance is. When looking at all political campaigns between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent campaigns have been twice as likely to succeed as the violent ones (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:7). During the past 50 years, this tendency has been on the rise; nonviolent campaigns are becoming increasingly successful and common, while violent insurgencies are becoming increasingly rare and unsuccessful. This is true even in extremely authoritarian conditions (Ibid.). The long term implications of nonviolence, both in terms of democratisation and civil peace, are another strong indicator of its favourability.

Gene Sharp calls this increasing global move towards the use and success of nonviolent means of pushing for societal transformation a "positive trend" (Sharp, 1993:1).
However, it can be argued that a contemporary hegemonic discourse of violence and militarism is dominant. Violence has come to be perceived as the most effective means of executing power (Sharp, 1993:4).

"[I]n our time this perversion of politics and the use of mass-scale violence are accepted and endorsed as normal not only by rulers but also by the common citizen." (Bharadwaj, 1998).

Our politicians lead us with the politics of fear. Violence is engrained in foreign policy and international security alliances. The media constantly exposes us to conflicts and human misery. The current discourse promotes the idea that global or local challenges of societies can merely, or most efficiently, be solved with violent 'solutions' and military power. The majority of the global citizenry appears to accept, and more or less actively support, this automatised response and norm. The discourse and cycle of violence is perpetuated the by international politics, the media and the lacking or insufficient objection by general society. Bombing for peace and democracy has become a reiterating paradox of our time.

There is a risk that this discourse may submerge into the culture of civil resistance. The struggle for difficult change may incline the change makers involved to resort to arms and a violent, reactionary approach (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:226). A reality of political oppression, economical privation and social degradation may usher people fed up with the status quo to conclude that it can only be ceased through violence, compelling them to militancy, despite the odds against them. When turning to violent resistance, "one has chosen the very type of struggle with which the oppressors nearly always have superiority" (Sharp, 1993:4). The battle is asymmetrical by nature, and hence destined to an unsuccessful outcome for the insurgents.

1.2 Research problem

Contemporarily, there has been a wave of movements for freedom, justice and revolution. Citizens around the globe urge societal transformation, and liberation from oppression and exploitation. Within recent years, nonviolent campaigns have brought Presidents Mubarak of Egypt and Ben Ali of Tunisia to surrender their power. Mass protests have spread through Serbia, Ukraine, Nepal, Lebanon, Algeria, Yemen, Madagascar, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and more. Some movements appear able to adhere to the nonviolent principles, while others transform into violent campaigns, or become fractionalised. Some nonviolent campaigns become 'corrupted' by agent provocateurs sent by the opponent to provoke riots, by defiant individuals resolving to militancy, or by marginal violent, ideological groups. In many cases, this causes the (often state-
controlled) media to present these movements as solely and initially violent (Ibid.). In some cases, the general public loses sympathy for the movement. The international community may come to misperceive the instigators of the movement as violent revolutionaries, or confuse the actors involved.

The impulsion towards nonviolent resistance, in this study argued to be the preferable means of affecting societal change, must be advocated and supported. When a decision has been made to rise up, it is imperative that people know and utilise the best ways to challenge the system and create change.

The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the accessibility of the knowledge, principles and strategies, that can guide a nonviolent movement towards success. There are compelling reasons to help uncover the mechanisms involved, and make supportive strategies available to any citizen or community urging for change, to guide the global citizenry towards ensuring the prevalence of justice and human freedom through peaceful means (Sharp, 1993:17).

The current impetus for social change motivates the effort to ensure that revolutionaries and activists are aware of the rationale and power of nonviolence, and have the alternative strategies at hand.

By building upon the current knowledge and scrutinising the mechanisms involved, a more comprehensive and meticulous understanding of the dynamics and contributory instruments of nonviolent resistance can support, encourage and enlighten the change makers on the ground.

The progress towards nonviolent resistance can have implications for the global society. It may reverse, or at least challenge, the violent discourse by disclosing and supporting other possible approaches to societal change and overcoming oppression and injustice. It may facilitate a more critical public debate, which questions the current global predisposition towards militarism. The divulgence of the nonviolent way to freedom and justice can be argued to be a moral responsibility, supporting a “paradigmatic shift” towards nonviolence (Mallat, 2011; Sharp, 1993:18).

1.3 Research objective and research questions

This study attempts at making a contribution to the existing research on nonviolent resistance by examining selected elements within nonviolent resistance movements, with the aim of identifying and increasing the understanding of some of the qualities of nonviolent resistance movements, which appear to be contributory to a successful outcome of a campaign.
The research questions of this thesis are:

**Which elements of nonviolent resistance can be surmised to have a supportive or contributory role in achieving a successful outcome?**

- Which dynamics do these elements work within?
- Which effects do these elements have?

1.4 Methodology

This study on which elements of nonviolent resistance are supportive of achieving the aim of the collective action for change, will be a qualitative study.

A deductive approach will be used to carry out a structured, focused comparison. The structured, focused comparison will be conducted in order to explore whether the presence or absence of the proposed variables have potential implications for the outcome.

The study will conduct a micro-hypotheses testing and analysis of a sample of 4 nonviolent anti-regime campaigns, which have taken place in the 21st century in the Middle East and North Africa. The comparative case study will enable an exploration into possible tendencies in nonviolent resistance.

The case selection will be based on a most similar system design. This will enable a double application of Mill's methods of difference and agreement.

1.5 Structure

The structure of this thesis will be as follows.

In chapter 2, the analytical framework will be formed on the basis of a comprehensive discussion and conceptualisation of the phenomena involved. Furthermore, the determination of the dependent variable will be discussed. Lastly, a complementary literature review will place this study in its current field.

In chapter 3, the selection of the research method will be explained. Furthermore, the independent variables will be explored, operationalised and coded. The general questions, accompanying each variable will be developed. The sampling method and case selection will be presented. Lastly, the limitations of the method will be discussed.

In chapter 4, the empirical information relevant for each case will be presented.

In chapter 5, the information will be interpreted and the variables will be analysed and discussed.
table for visualisation of the findings and analysis will be presented. In chapter 6, the research question will be answered, and conclusions drawing on the analysis will be made.

1.6 Delimitations and limitations

The study will be delimited to nonviolent anti-regime campaigns, which have taken place in the 21st century within the Middle East and North Africa region.

As this study is a desk study, the data forming the basis of the study are secondary sources, limited to the research and writing done hitherto in the field of nonviolent resistance. Furthermore, there is a linguistic limitation, in that the focal region of the study is the Middle East and North Africa, where the primary language is Arabic. Thus, the empirical literature within the field, which is composed by natives to the region and written in the Arabic language, making a crucial contribution to understanding the cases and phenomena, will fail to be included. In extension of the linguistic barrier, the implications of a limited cultural insight and understanding must be borne in mind. An understanding of the influence of historical and cultural factors is required for a comprehensive analysis of the cases and phenomena involved.

Limitations connected to the conceptualisation, method, the sampling, the evaluation of the variables and conclusion will be discussed in their relevant sections.
Analytical framework

2.1 What is nonviolent resistance?

2.1.1 Nonviolence

Nonviolence is a phenomenon reaching far back in human history. According to historical research, examples of nonviolent action have been identified already during the Roman Empire. Furthermore, nonviolence is a universal phenomenon, which transcends cultures, religious beliefs, political systems, national economies and historical periods. (Powers et al., 1997)

Nonviolence is a comprehensive phenomenon, and the debate on nonviolence is shaped by different approaches and understandings. Within the research, there is a tendency to divide nonviolence into two separate concepts: the principled nonviolence and the pragmatic nonviolence.

Principled nonviolent practitioners perceive nonviolence as a way of life. They reject violence on moral grounds and approach resistance with a pacifist mind. The principled nonviolent resistance, represented by e.g. Ghandi, aspires towards the long-term aim of peaceful societal relations and human harmony. (Sørensen, 2008:170)

Pragmatic nonviolence takes a more realist and instrumentalist approach and perceives nonviolence as an effective tool, strategically superior to violent resistance (Bharadwaj, 1998). Pragmatic nonviolence, represented by amongst others Gene Sharp, regards conflict as normal, and at times necessary. Here, it is important to distinguish between 'conflict' and 'violence'. Conflict should be understood as a possibly constructive situation of disagreement, not necessarily involving violence. The motivation driving pragmatic nonviolence practitioners is that nonviolence is a powerful tool of challenging oppression and injustice - they can be said to have a "technique approach" to nonviolent action (Weber, 2003:250ff).

For this study, nonviolence will be approached in the pragmatic sense as an effective instrument of resistance, since this is in line with the purpose of the study; exploring the elements, which make nonviolence effective in creating change. That said, these two approaches are not in this thesis considered mutually exclusive. Whereas the pragmatic use of nonviolence can help creating change, the values underpinning it can help creating a more empathic world.
2.1.2 Nonviolent resistance

The term resistance implies the noninstitutional and confrontational nature of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:12). Resistance implies the involvement of collective contentious, disruptive and coercive action (Dudouet, 2013). Sharp (1973) elaborates on the nature of resistance, by describing it as collective action of defiance used actively for political purposes, applying power to challenge authority in a conflict without the use of violence.

This nonconventional form of struggle accommodates the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, and enables challenging the power of a strong opponent (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:65). Nonviolent resistance should be understood as the active engagement with society, rather than erroneously associating nonviolence with passivity, neutrality, compromise and submission (Sharp, 1973:65; Kashtan, 2014:595).

Powers et al. (1997) define nonviolent action as "a range of methods for actively waging conflict without directly threatening or inflicting physical harm to human beings" (Powers et al, 1997:xii). The emphasis on the avoidance of harming other human beings is important for this study. Material destruction, which can be observed in many movements, will not be regarded as breach of nonviolence, in line with the pragmatic approach.

Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) similarly draw on associations to the principles of war, conceptualising nonviolent resistance as “a form of unconventional warfare”, which eludes and subverts conventional political channels, and makes use of "social, psychological, economic, and political methods" (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:12ff).

It is a challenge to form a final conception of a nonviolent resistance movement, which will guide the sampling of the movements to be studied in depth in this thesis, since there are many nuances within the phenomenon; "characterizing a campaign as violent or nonviolent simplifies a complex constellation of resistance methods" (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:12).

However, in an attempt to delimit this concept, a nonviolent movement is defined as a movement, which is “principally nonviolent based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods and the nature of the participation in that form of resistance” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:12).

It is difficult to draw the line. The choice of identifying the specific cases in this study as nonviolent movements, will be justified in the specific case studies in section 4.
2.1.3 **Forms and methods of nonviolent resistance**

Nonviolent resistance can involve methods of protest and persuasion, noncooperation and omission, nonviolent disruption, intervention and civil disobedience (Sharp, 1973). The methods include caricature, creative disruption, candlelight vigils, human banners, infiltration, public filibustering, sit-ins, guerrilla theatre, humorous carnivals, flash mobs, mass protests, blockades, boycotts, general strikes, stay-aways and other tactics of dispersion, "media-jacking", occupation and the establishment of parallel societal institutions (Sharp, 1973; Boyd, 2012; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011 *passim*).

2.2 **Elements to explore**

The elements selected for exploration and analysis in this study are participation and representation, nonviolent discipline, organizational structure, communications and humour. A justification of this choice, as well as the categorisation and operationalisation process, will follow in the Methodology section below.

2.3 **Change - how, why and what?**

When explaining political and societal transformation in relation to nonviolent resistance, there are two basic approaches. The emphasis can be placed on structural factors, i.e. societal conditions, or on human agency. This structure-agency dichotomy requires elaboration, in order to show how the focus of this study has been chosen.

The approach, which emphasises structural factors can be argued to be deterministic (Johnstad, 2012:517). It argues that structures may determine both the potential for success, as well as the mobilisation, activities and adherence to principles of a movement.

The agency approach takes the assumption that people cannot merely be defined by their context and structures, but have the capacity to overcome, shape and change them.

Chenoweth & Stephan present evidentiary arguments showing that intra-movement factors and dynamics overrule structural factors, environmental conditions and external processes (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:82). They take into account regime type, government capacity and regional factors, and conclude that "[t]he evidence suggests that civil resistance is often successful regardless of environmental conditions that many people associate with the failure of nonviolent campaigns" (Ibid.:62).
In support of this, Marchant et al. (2008) found that aspects like regime type, economic development, literacy rate and fractionalisation of society did not have significant effects on the outcome of nonviolent resistance campaigns (Marchant et al., 2008 in Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:63).


The “contentious politics framework” recognises the effect and constraints of structures on resistance movements. However, it simultaneously argues for the independent effects of resistance movements on the opponent, the structure and the system (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:64).

The potential of people power is the raison d'être of this study. Hence, the focus will be placed on human agency. This study will take the point of departure that human agency has the ability to overrule conditions. This is a voluntaristic approach, based on the assumption that the explanatory potential of intentional strategic and tactical choices made by the change makers outweighs structural factors.

Within the field of development, this can be argued to be in line with the approach to development as transformation, rather than as natural history (Hettne, 2009:11ff). This implies that societal transformation is a matter of human agency, and not merely symptomatic of an imminent, immalleable course of historical events predetermined by contextual factors.

Despite the above mentioned assumptions, it is nevertheless acknowledged in this study that it is important to attend to whether different structures may influence a campaign prior to, during and after it takes place. The movements, though arguably not conditioned by them, are working with the constraints of the present social and political conditions (Johnstad, 2012:517).

It is important to consider the presence of equifinality; the multitude of causes. Thus, structural factors and their possible implications will be accounted for and discussed in the Sampling and Analysis sections.
2.3.1 Success and failure defined

The aims of nonviolent resistance can be many, and can include anything from influencing policies, promoting fundamental rights and liberties, demanding social and economic justice to ousting a government or demanding national independence (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994).

In the case of this study, the definition of success will be the full achievement of the central stated goal of the movement. Hence, if a movement explicitly aims at overthrowing a regime, it is considered successful, if the regime steps down or is toppled.

Surely, this is a very limited definition of success. This indication disregards the long-term effects of nonviolent resistance. A more comprehensive conception and understanding of success would involve the implications of nonviolent resistance beyond the immediate achievement of a movement's central stated goal, and account for the post-revolutionary aftermath such as whether the country experiences civil peace, democratisation, the respect of human and political rights and the fulfilment of other demands put forward by the movement. However, due to the limited scope, this thesis merely strives to understand the effects of different elements of a movement on its ability to reach its immediate goal and not the long-term effects.

The dynamics and factors involved in building a powerful movement may support, but are not necessarily the same as the ones required for building a peaceful and democratic society. As Nepstad argues: “When researchers conflate these processes, we lose analytic clarity and obfuscate causal dynamics” (Nepstad, 2011:xiv).

Hence, this definition of success is a deliberate delimitation.

A movement will be considered unsuccessful if it did not achieve its stated goals. Here, there is an important consideration in determining any of the uprisings considered for this study as decisively unsuccessful, since many of them are still ongoing albeit with lower intensity and activity. Hence, in this study, the criteria for being considered unsuccessful is that the movement has been hitherto unsuccessful in achieving its central stated goal.

2.4 Complementary literature review - the research in context

Much research and scholarly writing have been done on nonviolent resistance, and it is a field rapidly progressing simultaneously with developments in the use of nonviolent resistance taking place across the globe.
Central to the literature on nonviolent resistance is "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict" by Erica Chenoweth & Maria Stephan (2011) - a ground breaking contribution to the research and understanding of nonviolent resistance. Chenoweth & Stephan combine comprehensive statistical analysis with case studies, and discuss the factors involved in the successful outcomes of nonviolence. Based on rich, evidentiary quantitative research, they have shown that nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent rebellion. They have also dug deeper into determinants of success. Amongst the aspects they have explored are participation, which they show has critical implications for the outcome of a campaign. Security-force defections also play a key role. Furthermore, according to them, neither external state support, international sanctions or regime crackdowns affect the outcome of campaigns. However, Chenoweth & Stephan merely identify a few possible intra-movement factors of significance, which this thesis attempts to explore deeper.

Gene Sharp (1973) is a pioneer and one of the most important scholars within nonviolent resistance. He has shaped the theoretical and conceptual foundation for nonviolent resistance, and proposed a large set of principles, methods and tactics, which have inspired uprisings worldwide. Based on Sharp's seminal theoretical framework, this study attempts to empirically explore the operativeness of different mechanisms.

Peter Ackerman & Christopher Kruegler (1994) in "Strategic Nonviolent Conflict" uncover the opportunities and risks involved in nonviolent resistance, and ascertain the large potential for positive outcomes, when nonviolent resistance is carried out strategically. They develop a framework of twelve principles informed by strategic theory. Some of these principles, such as the adherence to nonviolent discipline, will be further analysed in this thesis.

Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2011) uses a comparative research design involving 6 case studies to explore the relationship between structural circumstances, and the strategic choices made by both the change makers and their opponent. Amongst the aspects internal to a movement, which Nepstad finds to be significant for the outcome are undermining the opponent's sanctions, encouraging security personnel defections and maintaining unity and nonviolent discipline within the movement. The 'social movements theory' and 'resource mobilisation theory' are other theories related to this topic. However, they will not be integrated in the analysis because their approaches are beyond the focus of this thesis.
All of the above mentioned, amongst many, attempt to explore and show the relationship between structural conditions, strategies and outcomes within nonviolent resistance, an undertaking this study hopes to contribute to.

This thesis aims to build upon the principles already identified in previous research, and scrutinise and explore their contribution or lack thereof to greater chances of success. This study focuses on the voluntaristic aspects of nonviolent resistance, setting itself apart from earlier contributions to the field by aiming to elaborate specifically on elements internal to a movement. Many studies within nonviolent resistance has placed emphasis on successful cases, with a tendency to neglect the failed movements. This study finds it useful to compare successful movements with failed ones, in order to discern more clearly which aspects may be critical in leading to success.
Methodological framework

This chapter will explain and justify the choice of methods, research design, sources, operationalisation and sampling method.

3.1 Research Method

In this study on which elements of nonviolent resistance movements are supportive of achieving the aim of the collective action for change, the approach is conducting a qualitative, deductive study within the framework of a structured, focused comparison. A most similar system design will be combined with Mill's joint method of difference and agreement.

3.1.1 Selection of research methods

The method of structured, focused comparison is chosen since it allows for an exploration into the complexity of human behaviour and relations\textsuperscript{iii}. Since the aim of this study is not to examine whether or how much nonviolence brings successful outcomes, but rather why it does, a qualitative cross-case comparison is appropriate, as it can analyse phenomena, and relate the specific issue studied into a broader, more complex context.

This method will allow for a systematic comparative analysis of the elements chosen for exploration in this study. Furthermore, it yields high conceptual validity, as variables are finely shaped and differentiated, with a consideration of the complexity of the social world.

This method rather appeals to analytical richness than a broad representativeness.

The method also has weaknesses and limitations which require awareness. These are the potential of selection bias, the "degrees of freedom problem", potential lack of representativeness and independence of cases, amongst others\textsuperscript{iv} (George & Bennett, 2005:23ff).

It is also important to bear in mind the possible presence of equifinality - the “plurality of causes” which is difficult to eliminate using this method (Ibid.:157).

However, this method attempts to establish possible relationships exploring which effects the selected variables have regardless of other factors. One way to attempt to accommodate this difficulty is to apply Mill's method of difference and agreement - discussed below.
The most similar cases design, will select cases in which the concomitant variation with respect to individual variables is minimal, so that the analysis can focus on identifying the explanatory power of those variables that show much variation between the selected cases. However, there are important methodological challenges in shaping a most similar design. These are the problem of controlling for other variables and “unit homogeneity”. King et al. (2008) argue that unit homogeneity is often impossible, and suggests that it is more useful to develop an understanding of the “degree of heterogeneity” in a sample. However, King et al. recognise that within the case study method, matching is one of the “most valuable small n strategies” (King et al., 2008:199ff in George & Bennett, 2005:172). Where careful matching can yield useful results, it must be kept in mind that matching can never be complete or reliable in the social world (Ibid.). Despite these possible limitations of applying a most similar design, an attempt has been made to find the most similar cases, to control for some aspects.

The joint methods of agreement and difference, developed by Jon Stuart Mill (1843), are used here in order to identify conditions (variables) that are frequently present in movements with a positive outcome, and conversely absent in movements with a negative outcome. This increases the validity of any correlation found between the independent and dependent variables, in that the method of difference can support the findings of the method of agreement.

3.1.2 Methodology
This study will analyse a sample of 4 nonviolent resistance anti-regime movements, which have taken place in the 21st century in the Middle East and North Africa, two of which have been successful, and two that have not been successful.

The following process will be conducted with the purpose of answering the research questions. Based on the literature, the initial empirical exploration and the analytical framework, a logical structure of possibilities formulated as micro-hypotheses, in the form of different selected variables accompanied by propositions, will be developed. A set of general questions will be constructed to guide the analysis of each individual case selected for this study. This will reveal whether a variable appears to be present, partially present or not present in the different cases. By looking at the dependent variables, successful or hitherto unsuccessful, it can be evaluated whether the variable can be analysed to be supportive in attaining success. When analysing variables in this thesis, it will be borne in mind that it is very difficult to "measure the effectiveness" of any element in the social world, hence a deliberate choice has been made to
make the propositions, indicators and questions as open and qualitative as possible, to allow for a rich analysis of the cases, rather than enable the generation of general inferences around the variables.

Hence, the propositions derived from the theoretical and analytical foundation, will be supported or challenged by systematically comparing the answers to the general questions. In this way, a deductive study has been carried out, to corroborate or refute the proposed hypotheses surrounding nonviolent struggle. This will help shape an idea of which elements in a nonviolent movement may be important to consider when developing a resistance campaign. Testing these micro-hypothesis in a deductive manner will not enable broader generalizations or definitive explanations, but rather allow for case-specific interpretations (George & Bennett, 2005:130).

3.2 Sources
The data collected for the case studies will be derived from secondary sources including academic books, reports, empirical research projects, peer-reviewed academic literature and journals, as well as texts, photographies and videos generated from the movements themselves. News articles from generally recognised news outlets and documentaries will be used for supplementary information. These sources are appropriate for this study due to the nature of its inquiry as well as their wide availability.

3.3 Operationalisation of variables

3.3.1 Independent variables, indicators and questions
The conceptual content of the independent variables, which will be subjects for exploration in this study, has been drawn from the theoretical and empirical literature on nonviolent resistance, case studies and activist resources.

First, the criteria for identifying the independent variables will be discussed. Then, the independent variables will be presented, and the set of propositions, indicators and general questions will be established and attached to each of the variables. The nature and conceptualisation of each of the variables will be discussed, and the propositions justified. One important criteria for all independent variables examined in this study is that they represent
qualities, which are internal to the movement. This evades other intervening external factors that may influence the outcome of a movement. For this reason, the variable selection omits the possible influence on the outcome of some external processes, such as balance of interests, government response, security force defections, timing, media coverage and international factors, such as external assistance and international sanctions.

However, some of the structural factors and external processes will be discussed and accounted for in the Sampling section below, in regards to the most similar design.

This delimitation is made in order to allow the structured, focused comparison to have a clear focus on human agency, to explore the mechanisms within a movement that are “subject to intentional human choices” (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994:21).

This emphasis has implications for the possible contributions of this study, in relation to future uprisings.

The elements internal to a movement can be categorised into subtypes. A distinction of these types will be: structural aspects, strategy, tactics and methods. This study attempts to understand and analyse a mix from the different categories.

This study will explore the dynamics and operativeness of the following intra-movement elements of nonviolent resistance: Participation and representation, which belong to the structural part, nonviolent discipline and organisational structure which are connected to the strategisation behind the movement, communications belonging to the tactical aspect and humour as a method of nonviolent resistance.

Some of the variables have been found to be interconnected and affect one another. In these cases, this will be mentioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE 1</th>
<th>Participation and representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROPOSITION</td>
<td>Great popular support and participation, as well as a high degree of representativeness are important elements in a strong and effective movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDICATOR 1</td>
<td>The amount of participants, in absolute and relative terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION 1</td>
<td>Did there appear to be a great participation in the campaign?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDICATOR 2</td>
<td>The general society appears to be well-presented in the movement and its activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION 2</td>
<td>Did the population appear to be well-represented in the movement?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participation can be defined as "the active and observable engagement of individuals in collective action" within a resistance campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:30ff). In this study, the amount of participants is determined by identifying estimations of the maximum number of participants observed in the course of the campaign. There are limitations to this form of measurement, as it is nearly impossible to account for all individuals involved in a campaign, since many contributions to a resistance struggle are not visible or observable (Ibid.).

According to Chenoweth & Stephan, a vital source of success in nonviolent resistance is mass participation (Ibid.). The tactical and strategic advantage of high levels of participation contributes vitally to the historical success of nonviolent struggles. Over space and time, large campaigns are much more likely to succeed than small campaigns (Ibid.).

Mass participation has the natural implication of greater diversity and representativeness - involving all sectors of society and a diversity in gender, age, class, ethnicity and religious conviction. Physical, informational and moral barriers to participation are lower in nonviolent struggles. Therefore, the ability of nonviolent campaigns to mobilise a higher number of participants with a more diverse array of skills, abilities and perspectives is greater than that of violent campaigns. (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:34ff)

The nature of mobilisation, resources, as well as the depth of a regime's legitimacy crisis are factors influencing the extent to which a movement enjoys broad-based support. Amongst the positive effects of a representative movement are the diversity of a movement's impact on the response of security forces, which are more likely to defect and shift side if their perceived loyalty to the people is at stake and they have direct bonds to the movement (Niakooee, 2013:423). Furthermore, diverse participation makes it more difficult for the opponent to isolate the participants and accuse the movement of being sectarian or terrorist (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:40).

The quantity and quality of campaign participation is a critical factor in determining the outcome of resistance struggles (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:30).
**VARIABLE 2**  
**Nonviolent discipline**

**PROPOSITION**  
A strict, collective commitment to nonviolent discipline is vital in ensuring the legitimacy and the success of a nonviolent resistance movement.

**INDICATORS**  
Primacy of the employment of nonviolent resistance methods observed. Few or no violent acts against humans are carried out in the name of the general movement. The movement explicitly expresses its wish for nonviolent discipline, and condemns acts of violence or aggression.

**QUESTION**  
Was the movement committed to nonviolent discipline?

As nonviolence has many definitions, so does nonviolent discipline. The concept of nonviolence, curbed earlier in this thesis, will be used as a reference point for analysing the nonviolent discipline and the adherence to this by the different movements.

One of the most important functions of nonviolent discipline is its contribution to the legitimisation of a movement. The opponent's possible use of violence will backfire; the violence used towards peaceful protesters will be perceived by the general public, and perhaps the media and international community, as illegitimate and unjustified (Sørensen, 2012:230f). This may help disintegrate some of the opponent's sources of power.

When a movement is consistent and explicit in its nonviolent discipline, it has been seen to be able to facilitate national and international solidarity and trigger defections from the state and security forces (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:168). Nonviolent discipline hampers conflict escalation and may help deflect violent crackdowns from the opponent (Ibid.:116).

Nonviolent discipline is also likely to generate mobilisation, since it lowers the moral and physical barriers for participation. This has been found to be a central reason for nonviolent movements to be able to mobilise large participation (Ibid.). Here, the element of nonviolent discipline is directly connected to the element of participation.
### VARIABLE 3 Organisational structure

**PROPOSITION**
Some form of centralised leadership, or formal structure, establishing and directing the resistance campaign, is important for its successful execution.

**INDICATORS**
A group or leadership appears to have planned, organised and launched the campaign. A leadership ensures the unity, organisation and discipline of the movement. The course of action is directed by a leadership. There appears to be central spokespersons.

**QUESTION**
Was there some form of leadership or formal structure of the movement? Or did it appear anarchic?

There are formal and informal structures, as well as centralised, diffused, hierarchical, flat and flexible structures. Within the nonviolent resistance research and experiences, there exists arguments for and against a formal structure. Hence, the proposition here is merely suggestive, not assertive.

Jo Freeman (1970) argues that a formal organisational structure is vital for a movement’s ability to operate efficiently, grow beyond local activities, create a communication network and foster collective efforts. If the power of a movement is neither institutionalised nor allocated, this power will be misused or used ineffectively.

Gene Sharp (1973), along with many other scholars, advocates a central leadership. According to him, resistance leaders are vital in ensuring effective implementation, the direction and the choice of political methods and pressures of movements, as well as evaluating the responses from the opponent (Sharp, 1973:41ff).

Leadership can also be conducive to ensuring unity around a shared political vision and strategy, hence avoiding divisions amongst the movement, which is vital in resistance. This is to deflect the “divide and rule” strategy. Furthermore, fundamental divisions between different factions obstruct a strategic consensus, and may cause confusion amongst the broader support base (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:141). Effective leadership has also been shown to encourage nonviolent discipline, which makes these two variables interconnected.

Christian Fuchs (2006) disputes the idea of the necessity of a centralised leadership, and suggests the 'self-organisation approach'. According to him, social movements often have a “co-operative grass roots character” entailing a decentralised, flat structure, setting them apart from the traditional centralistic style of organisation in society (Fuchs, 2006:130). Challenging the ideas of authority,
and exercising self-determination and self-management, these movements serve as a participatory model for society (Ibid.).

A self-organising group or a diffused leadership has another advantage: it makes it difficult for the opponent to target and crack down on the movement (Popovic, 2002 in York, 2002).

**VARIABLE 4**  
**Information communications technologies and social media**

**PROPOSITION**  
Communication and the effective use of media are crucial for a movement's success.

**INDICATORS**  
The movement communicates through different media and has a broad reach. The communications network appears large, efficient and resilient.

**QUESTION**  
Did the movement maximise on the beneficial aspects of media and information communications technologies?

Many scholars perceive the new communications technologies as a novel important resource for social movements, having changed the landscape of collective action (e.g. Langman, 2005; O'Lear, 1999; Wasserman, 2007 in Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). New communications technologies and social media enable a movement to communicate internally, to the wider public and to the international community. They enable citizen journalism, an important channel of direct, participatory information evading the opponent's propaganda.

They enable resistance movements to increase visibility, mobilise support and participation, communicate their goals and send messages to their opponent, create a sense of community and collective identity, and open up spaces for political debate and dissent (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:246; WRI, 2009).

Targeted communication and online information sharing can help exert pressure from below and promote government accountability (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:224ff).

Furthermore, the use of information communications technologies has been seen to correspond with less violent forms of mass protest, whereas resistance movements with a minimal use of social media have been seen to correspond with violent escalation (Stepanova, 2011).

Cyber-optimists take their faith in the Internet and social media to an even further extent: “digital technologies and global interconnectivity rendered the internet a new public sphere [...] in which transformational politics and democratic values evolve unhindered” (Ambinder, 2009 in Karagiannopoulos, 2012:151).
However, it is important not to over-rely on media or ascribe successful revolutions to the Internet and technologies. Many have criticised how the revolutions in the MENA region have been called “Social Media Revolutions”. A government has never been toppled by likes on Facebook or cyberactivity. Social media can be an extremely effective tool, but revolutions will not strive without the agency of brave, indignant people in the streets.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that information communications technologies can be used by both sides of the conflict, and for both benign and malign purposes. In this context, this means that the opponent regimes can use the same technologies for surveillance, control, harassment and obstruction of resistance activities.

**VARIABLE 5**

**Humour**

**PROPOSITION**

Employing humour as a method will increase a movement's likelihood of success.

**INDICATORS**

The use of humorous methods, such as jokes, pranks, comedy, stories, street theatre, carnival, imaginative clothing, skits, movies, political caricatures and cartoons, books or slogans is present and observable.

**QUESTION**

Did the movement use the method of humour in its campaign?

According to Sombutpoonsiri (2012) humour has increasingly been incorporated into the "protest repertoires" of nonviolent resistance movements. Humorous protest actions are an emerging tactic within nonviolent resistance and the debate on the subversive potential of humour in nonviolent resistance is growing (Sombutpoonsiri, 2012:3).

Humour can be said to be anything that causes amusement, and can involve irony, parody, satire and ridicule (Sørensen, 2008:170).

Humour is an instrument of confronting political incongruities or absurdities through symbolic actions by appealing to emotions and imagination, and thereby challenge the dominant discourse by attacking it with a nonconventional form of communication (Sørensen, 2012).

In this thesis, the phenomenon of humour will be approached as a "public transcript" in the sense that the humorous activities serve as open and confrontational resistance, as opposed to the "hidden transcript" involving humour exchanged clandestinely between people, as a cultivator of disobedience, empowerment, dignity and regime criticism (Scott, 1990 in Sørensen, 2006).

Surely, the use and impact of humorous resistance methods depend on the form, context, deployment and target, and importantly, the cultural and historical context, which will be discussed further in the analysis.
Humour may have supportive implications on a personal level, in relation to intra-group dynamics, in interactions with the general public, in relation to confronting the opponent as well as in challenging the dominant discourse.

On the personal level humour can promote personal liberation, freeing individuals from the psychological aspects of oppression as it helps dissolve fear, and may enhance individuals' motivation for participating in a nonviolent struggle (Sørensen, 2008:170). Furthermore, humour facilitates critical reflection and serves to build anti-regime consciousness (Ibid.).

On both individual and group levels, it helps overcome fear and apathy, being possibly one of humour's most important functions in nonviolent resistance. As Popovic (2012) elaborates:

"Humour melts fear. Fear is the air that dictators breathe. Without fear they cannot survive". When fear is reduced, it strengthens the morale, courage, bravery and hope in the resistance movements. Furthermore, as Berger puts it: "Those who laugh together, belong together" (Berger, 1997 in Sørensen, 2008). Humour can help break down the barriers of isolation, strengthen solidarity and sense of community, and generate new energy amongst the resistance group, making it more sustainable (Kishtainy, 2010; Sombutpoonsiri, 2012:5).

Humour can foster a lighter atmosphere within the resistance movement, which reduces the antagonism towards law enforcement authorities, contributing to the maintenance of nonviolent discipline (Sombutpoonsiri, 2012:289). This makes the variables of humour and nonviolent discipline interconnected.

Humour also has implications for a movement's interaction with the public. Utopian enactments, also called “alternate reality”, can help put oppression on the public agenda and demonstrate a possible alternative and facilitate critical perspectives of the public on the status quo (Vinthagen, 2005). Furthermore, humour can facilitate outreach and mobilisation, by creating an attractive outward image of a movement, which increases popularity and participation (Sørensen, 2008).

Humour can also help facilitate media attention, ensuring the transmission of the movement's agenda to a wider audience (Sombutpoonsiri, 2012:xii).

In terms of what impact humour as a method can have on the opponent, its ability to challenge and transform power relations - what Vinthagen terms as “power breaking” - may be of greatest importance (Sørensen, 2008; Vinthagen, 2005). Parody, satire or ridicule can subvert the propaganda of the opponent regime and dissolve its almighty image (Sørensen, 2008). Humour can also be a means of evading, and hence circumventing, Draconian laws which ban opposition and protest, by resisting in creative ways (Sombutpoonsiri, 2012:5).

Humour can furthermore undermine dominant discourses (Sørensen, 2008). It can help penetrate and expose the weaknesses of the rational discourse by showing what is true, right and just. In this
way, it can help change the perception of people, in line with framing theory.

3.3.2 Dependent Variables

Based on the elaboration of the understanding of success and failure in section 2.3.2, the dependent variables will be *successful* and *hitherto unsuccessful*.

The effect on a resistance campaign of the independent variables will be evaluated according to whether they were present in successful campaigns and absent in the unsuccessful campaigns.

3.4 Sampling - Case selection

Matching

In this section, the criteria for case selection will be established and explained. In order to make the matching as beneficial as possible, which aspects of the cases may or may not be important to consider when matching, will be discussed.

First of all, the cases subject to analysis in this study will involve nonviolent resistance movements. Secondly, as the topic is so dynamic by nature, this study aims to understand the most *current* developments within nonviolent resistance.

Society is in constant transformation, and the area of nonviolent resistance is contemporarily experiencing rapid changes and developments. Therefore, it is of highest priority to make the research of this study as up-to-date as possible. The selection of recent cases will enable the exploration of the current scene and tendencies. In this way, the study may make novel contributions to the field and has relevant implications for its future development. Therefore, the sample is narrowed down to campaigns, which have taken place in the 21st century.

Thirdly, despite the overall agency focus, it is attempted to identify which structural factors have and have not been found be important, to guide the case selection and matching process. Though structural factors may not influence the outcome, they may have an influence on the dynamics of the movement itself.

Some of the structural factors, which will be considered here are geographical location, type of regime, capacity of the opponent, literacy rate, ethnic, linguistic and religious composition of the society, and social, cultural and economic structures.

As for geographical location, nonviolent resistance movements have been found to be more successful than violent ones in all regions of the world. However, the rate of success have been higher in the Soviet Union and the Americas, and lowest in the Middle East and Asia (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:74). For that reason, the geographical location of the cases will be matched. This
study will focus on nonviolent movements taking place in the Middle East and North Africa. Amongst the common characteristics within this region is the religious predominance of Islam, the Arabic language and culture, and the history and prevalence of authoritarian rulers. When dealing with regime type, the terminology often identifies a regime as a democracy or nondemocracy. This binary can be argued to be a Westernalised conception, since many different types of regimes exist and may have different influences on their citizenry. However, for simplification, this terminology will be utilised for the matching. All of the cases involved are in the context of nondemocracies, and all of the countries “not free” at the commencement of the movement according to Freedom House's evaluation, with low scores on civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House, 2011a). The capacity of the opponent (strong/weak state) has been found to have no significant influence on the successfulness of nonviolent resistance movements. As for other structural conditions, a recent study presented in a Freedom House Special Report, has found that factors such as the level of economic development, literacy rate, or fractionalisation of the society in terms of ethnicity, language and religion do not have statistically significant effects on the outcome of a nonviolent resistance movement (Marchant et al., 2008). Finally, Chenoweth & Stephan, have tested whether or not the central objectives of a resistance campaign affect its outcome. They have made a comparison between three different types of objectives: regime change, anti-occupation and secession. Between these three, the data speaks for itself: almost 60 % of the anti-regime campaigns succeeded, whereas 35 % of those struggling against occupation and none of the nonviolent secessionist campaigns did (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:72ff). Though there are many other objectives requiring investigation for their influence, here, the case selection will focus on anti-regime movements. An external factor which may have a major impact on the outcome of anti-regime movements is the challenged regime's relations and alliances with external actors and stakeholders. Geopolitical and strategic interests are engrained in international and national politics. Some of the countries in the MENA region, which experienced uprisings, have bonds rooted in their colonial history and stakeholders concerned with their stability. The Gulf countries, being rich in oil, have great politico-economic importance to regional stakeholders as well as major international powers. The oil industry and the Gulf countries' role in maintaining regional stability may have had grave influence on the movements taking place here. It can be observed that little or no external intervention or condemnation took place in regards to the regimes' responses to protests. Iran has yet another role in the international community, being majorily isolated or otherwise having strained relations. This may have caused passivity in relation to its internal unrest and the consequential regime responses. It is acknowledged that external stakeholder relations, alliances and interests may have a significant
effect on the outcome of the protests. However, in line with the focus on agency, and due to the complexity of this factor, which requires an elaboration beyond the scope of this study, this aspect will not be regarded in the matching of the cases. Furthermore, the Gulf countries and Iran can be argued to have received minimal attention in terms of research surrounding their uprisings, relative to the Middle Eastern and North African countries, which make them relevant subjects for study. Hence, the analysis will allow for an exploration of the outcome of different movements, irrespective of their contested regime's international relations.

As many structural factors, which may be perceived as inhibitory or influential on a resistance movement have been shown to have little or no relevance for its outcome, the criteria considered for the case selection is the place, time and the objectives.

**Cases selected**

The cases selected are all resistance campaigns, which have taken place in in the Middle Eastern or North African region, in the 21st century and their central objective, amongst many other objectives, were to topple the government in power. The two successful cases will be the Tunisian Revolution, 2011 and the Egyptian Revolution, 2011, and the two cases categorised as hitherto unsuccessful will be the Bahraini uprising 2011-now and the uprising in Iran 2009-now.
Findings

The findings extracted from the case studies, will be presented as follows. First, the background of the case will be presented, including a brief explanation of the political environment, the affirmation of the movement as nonviolent as well as a presentation of the movement's objectives beyond the ousting of the regime. Finally, the presentation will explain why the movement has been determined to be successful or hitherto unsuccessful.

Then, the relevant data and information will be presented variable by variable, guided by the adjoined questions:

- Did there appear to be a great participation in the campaign?
- Did the population appear to be well-represented in the movement?
- Was the movement committed to nonviolent discipline?
- Was there some form of leadership or formal structure of the movement?
- Did the movement maximise on the beneficial aspects of media and communication?
- Did the movement use the method of humour in its campaign?

Here, a grave limitation is the extent to which a deep submergence and exploration into the cases and variables is possible within the scope of this thesis. Comprehensively and clearly answering these questions, demands profound research into the topic, the cases and the context. Hence, the questions will guide the extraction of information.

The nature and effect of each of the variables will be discussed in the following Analysis section, which will furthermore interpret the findings in order to answer the research question.

4.1 The Tunisian revolution of 2011

The Tunisian population had been suffering under a 23-long “absolute dictatorship” under Ben Ali, with bad economy, corruption, an exceedingly repressive and violent security police, extreme censorship, and lack of civil and political freedoms.

The general infrastructure of the country was in horrible conditions. The unemployment rates were growing out of proportion, exacerbating the impoverishment and marginalisation of large sections of society. (Ayeb, 2011)
On December 17, 2010, these grievances led a young vegetable vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, to self-immolate. He soon became a symbol of the corruption, the police harassment and the disastrous economic situation in Tunisia. This sparked a nation-wide moral outrage, and accelerated the momentum that drove the revolution (Ibid).

A widely consensual empirical literature describes the Tunisian revolution as (largely) peaceful and nonviolent (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012; Ayeb, 2011; Bani-Sadr, 2011; Zunes, 2011). This is reaffirmed in the observation of the nonviolent methods pervasively employed by the movement, including strikes and demonstrations, sit-ins, blockades, occupation camps and mass refusal to obey public orders.

The demands expressed at the onset of the revolutionary process ranged from employment opportunities, food security, an end to marginalisation, to individual liberties, democratic participation, securing women's rights, dignity and better living standards (Ayeb, 2011). Soon, the claims of socio-economic nature became overtly political, and the movement came to be united around one central demand: the resignation of Ben Ali (El-Khawas, 2012; Aleya-Sghaier, 2012).

The criteria for success of the Tunisian revolution can be said to have been fulfilled on January 14, 2011, when Ben Ali officially resigned and went into exile.

**Participation and representation**

An estimated 16 % of the Tunisian population of just over 10 million people participated in the revolution (Beissinger et al., n.d.).

Starting with mostly the youth and the marginalised and underclass sections of society, the movement grew to include people of all socio-economic and professional backgrounds; with the engagement of both the poor and the rich in the movement (Nepstad, 2011:487). As Habib Ayeb (2011) states: “the fall of the regime on 14 January happened as a result of a general mobilisation that largely transcended social class configurations and social categories.“

The diversity of the mass demonstration on the historic day of Ben Ali’s resignation has been described as follows: “tens of thousands of Tunisians, young and old, unemployed and employed, and from all social and professional groups, including teachers, students, pupils, lawyers, merchants, employees, and civil servants, cried in unison” (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012). Women were well-represented in the movement, in line with their relatively equal status generally in Tunisian society (Ibid.). Hence, the movement appeared to enjoy large participation and representativeness.
**Nonviolent discipline**

Aleya-Sghaier (2012) suggests that the movement had a peaceful nature. Despite the extremely violent repression of the movement, it was majorily committed to nonviolent forms of civic resistance. The movement never deployed the use of formal weapons and did not inflict any casualties (Ibid.). However, a lot of material destruction took place. Government buildings, police offices and cars, as well as shopping centres were burned down as symbolic acts (Ibid).

Since this study merely subscribes harm inflicted on other human beings as a breach of the nonviolent principle, nonviolent discipline can be said to have been adhered to in Tunisia.

**Organisational structure**

According to Ayeb (2011), this revolution took place without a leadership. Aleya-Sghaier (2012) supports this, by stating that the revolution was “spontaneous, lacking a centralized leadership”. Bani-Sadr (2011) also describes the Tunisian movement as spontaneous and horisontal, and finds this to be part of the reason for success in the Tunisian case, since no power-hungry leadership seized the power in the vacuum of the fallen dictatorship.

Youth have been said to be the main instigators of the activities, and the trade union UGTT played a prominent role in the later organisation of the movement, and provided offices and materials (Wolf & Lefevre, 2012). Despite the absence of leadership, informal and flexible structures developed.

In the later part of the revolution, more organised forces joined the movement, and local networks of solidarity and self-defence were created. So-called “Revolutionary Safeguard Committees” elected ad-hoc, organised and planned some of the activities and made efforts to provide safety in public in response to the lawlessness that occurred in the vacuum of the ousted regime(Aleya-Sghaier, 2012).

**Information communications technologies and media**

The Internet infrastructure of Tunisia was well-developed in 2011, and the Tunisian youth were engaged and progressive in their use of it (Ayeb, 2011).

Via own creativity and the support from IT companies and hackers worldwide, the Tunisians won the “cyberwar” against Ben Ali's strict control and censorship of information communications technologies, and penetrated and at times hacked the virtual system (Ibid.).

Mobile phones, the Internet and the social media were used as instruments of organisation, publicity, media attention, citizen journalism and to expose the violent state response, including killings, mass arrests and collective punishment (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012).
The Internet played an important role, and some suggest that bloggers and cyberactivists were the central protagonists of the revolution. However, this is heavily disputed, as many participants in the movement state that the Internet neither launched nor was a decisive factor in the Tunisian revolution; large portions of the participants in the movement had little and in periods no connection to the Internet (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012; El-Khawas, 2014).

Humour
Asma Moalla (2013) made focus group interviews with students and Internet observations to analyse the use of humour, which was a method widely used in the Tunisian revolution, and found that the movement employed mainly two types of situational humour: third party insult and creating “alternate reality”. A comic book series on Facebook served to promote and highlight the importance of nonviolent discipline.

4.2 The Egyptian revolution of 2011
The Egyptians were suffering under the “state of emergency” 30-year authoritarian rule of Hosni Mubarak, with a depressing and deteriorating social and political environment, corruption and excessive repression of basic civil and political freedoms (Nepstad, 2011:487).

There is general agreement within the literature that the Egyptian revolution can be characterised as nonviolent, due to the predominant appliance of nonviolent methods and tactics, such as mass protest, strikes, non-cooperation, civil disobedience and the occupation of the Tahrir Square (Engler & Engler, 2014; Zunes, 2011).

The central objective of the Egyptian movement was to topple Mubaraks regime. Furthermore, they expressed demands for the end to the Emergency Law, greater freedom, justice, a nonmilitary government elected by its people, and the proper administration of Egypt's resources (Madrigal, 2011).

The movement can be determined to have been successful, when Mubarak resigned from power on February 11, 2011, just 18 days after protests broke out.

Participation and representation
An estimation of the participation at the heights of the Egyptian uprising, found that 12 million people took to the streets (Zunes, 2011).
The movement had a broad base of support, and included a wide, diverse coalition: men and women, Muslims and Christians, farmers and students, the poor and the wealthy, secular and religious, workers and intellectuals (Kamphoefner, 2011; Zunes, 2011). The organisers in fact put efforts into creating a safe space for women and encouraged their participation, along with children and elderly.

**Nonviolent discipline**
The chanting by the assembled protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square shouting "Silmiyya! Silmiyya!" [peaceful, peaceful] signalled their determination to adhere to nonviolence (Tripp, 2013:9). Despite the violent crackdowns from the regime, the overwhelming majority of resistance activity was nonviolent. Even when violently attacked by the government-backed squads in the Tahrir Square, the protesters used minimal force to disarm and detain them, hence, adhering to the nonviolent discipline even in situations requiring self-defence (Zunes, 2011).

According to Chabot & Sharifi (2013) the nonviolent nature of the Egyptian movement was critical in allowing for the diversity of participation; it lowered the participation barriers. Due to the movement's commitment to and understanding of nonviolent discipline, careful efforts were made to cultivate positive and peaceful relations with the police force and army. Deliberate methods were used to avoid appearing threatening or aggressive to them. This ultimately may have been conducive to them defecting from the regime, and actively supporting the movement (Kamphoefner, 2011; Berger, 2011).

Some reports challenge this apparent commitment to nonviolent discipline by the Egyptian movement; several dozens of security force personnel died during the revolution (Deeb, 2012). However, some of these killings have been reported to have been committed by “enraged mobs” (Parker, 2011). Hence, it is challenging to ascribe the responsibility for these deaths, but the casualties on the side of the opponent cannot be ignored.

**Organisational structure**
The Egyptian movement was not directed by a leadership, but was rather made up by a decentralised network, facilitated by a coalition of smaller organising groups of young Egyptian activists. The organising groups did not insist on rigid structures. Rather, they launched the movement pursuing momentum-driven mass mobilisation, and were quickly joined by a panoply of civil society groups, which adopted the slogans and the framing of the existing movement. This made the movement open for everyone to join, individuals as well as groups, and inhibited the targeting of the regime of a central leadership. (Engels & Engels, 2014)
Information communications technologies and media

Egypt has a relatively solid information communication technologies infrastructure. Substantial access to the Internet was present at the birth of the movement. During the 2000s the “blogosphere” of Egypt, and the use of other social media started growing. In 2010, Egypt had 4.5 million Facebook users. (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011)

The Internet enabled the fast and wide-spread dissemination of information, and was used as a communicative tool to raise indignation and strengthen solidarity in the Egyptian population. The social media was used as a space for publicising demonstrations, and facilitating international attention and support, by transmitting information real-time to the outside world.

Videos and photographs spread like wildfire on the internet. An important example is the photographs of Khalid Said, which flooded the Internet. He became a symbol of police brutality and a driver of popular moral outrage, when he was beaten and tortured to death by police detectives in 2010 allegedly for criticising the police (Engler & Engler, 2014).

The Internet furthermore served as a space of dissidence, facilitating the popular outrage required for a revolution (Alexander & Aouragh, 2011).

The social media were also used for safety, by allowing protesters to make minute-by-minute updates about their whereabouts, when in dangerous situations (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011:1213).

When Mubarak ordered the shut down of the Internet and the phone network, with the intention to disconnect the movement internally and from the outside world, activists, supporters and outside affiliates, enabled continuous communication via alternative, non-digital channels and by finding other ways to maintain virtual connections (Ibid.).

Hence, information communications technologies were widely used by the Egyptian movement.

Humour

“Ridicule and laughter played a prominent role in the Egyptian revolution” (Helmy & Frerichs, 2013). Protesters used satire, irony and mockery against the regime.

Comedy acts were performed on the stages on the Tahrir Square, and humorous cartoons were part of an attempt by the organisers to create a sense of community within the movement. Blogger Sarah Carr describes the Tahrir Square as a “comedy explosion”. (Sussman, 2011)

Humour helped strengthen solidarity, create a sense of safety and most importantly break the “fear barrier” which would otherwise disincline many to participate in the protests (Sussman, 2011).
4.3 The Bahraini uprising 2011-now

The Bahraini population is ruled by a traditional oligarchical monarchy, with the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family having been in power since 1783. The royal family retains absolute power, since the King appoints the Prime Minister, and the upper house consisting of mostly members of the royal family can veto legislation coming from the elected lower house. Illustrative of the supreme powers of the ruling family is the State of Emergency established in 1975, which disbanded the parliament, lasting 27 years (Louër, 2011). The Prime Minister, Prince Khalifa, has ruled the country for over 40 years. The Bahraini population has endured constraints to their civil liberties, freedoms of speech, press and assembly as well as discrimination of the large Shia Muslim majority, accounting for more than 70 % of the population (Ibid.).

Zunes describes this movement as a “popular mass nonviolent movement” and his identification of the Bahraini movement as peaceful is supported by several scholars (Zunes, 2013:162; Naikooee, 2013:442; Fakhro, 2011). The movement was overwhelmingly nonviolent in its nature and methods, which included mass demonstration and rallies, collective prayers, vigils, blockades, sit-ins and the occupation of the Pearl Roundabout.

The movement erupted on February 14, 2011, initially calling for the resignation of the prime minister Al Khalifa, obviated by the most pervasive slogan of the movement, one echoing through the MENA uprisings “the people demand the fall of the regime” [in Arabic]. Other demands put forward were political reforms, civil liberties and more constitutionalism. The demands radicalised in the course of the uprising, and grew into calls for revolution and the abolishment of the monarchy. (Zunes, 2013:150ff)

The Bahraini uprising was the one most forcibly and consequently suppressed by the regime, supported by foreign troops inserted by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Zunes, 2013; Tripp, 2013:12).

Protesters were killed, more than 1600 people were detained, doctors and nurses ailing the wounded protesters were sentenced to up to life in prison, and more than 4000 people were dismissed from their jobs due to their alleged participation in the movement (Zunes, 2013:149). Following this uncompromising repression of the movement, it faded and its activities decreased.

Though the uprising is still ongoing to this date, though at a much lower intensity, the movement can be said to be hitherto unsuccessful, since it did not achieve the resignation by Prime Minister Al Khalifa, nor the materialisation of the additional demands.
Participation and representation

When taking country size into account, the Bahraini uprising was the largest in the MENA region. On February 25, 2011, more than 200,000 anti-regime protesters were estimated to collectively march in the streets, accounting for 40% of the indigenous Bahraini population, and almost one-sixth of the entire population. In this context, it is appropriate to emphasise the participation of indigenous Bahrainis, since a large portion of Bahraini residents are guest workers and non-nationals, and the central focus here is a nation's resistance to its ruler. (Zunes, 2013:149ff)

Children, elderly, women, Sunni and Shia, secularists, activists and unionists, teachers, doctors, lawyers and academics participated (Jones, 2013). However, presumably due to the large Shia Muslim majority in the country, and the discrimination and marginalisation they have suffered under, a disproportionate part of the protesters were Shia Muslims (Zunes, 2013:157). Despite this, attempts by the Bahraini regime to polarise and fractionalise the movement along sectarian religious lines majorly failed, though it managed to make some Sunnis distance themselves from the movement. Signs and slogans of the movement rejected sectarianism and promoted the unity and solidarity of all religious and non-religious groups for the cause of democracy (Ibid.).

Nonviolent discipline

Despite the violent and deathly crackdowns of the security forces, the protesters continued to raise their arms up high and shout “Silmiyya! Silmiyya!” [peaceful, peaceful] when confronted with the police and army, showing signs conveying the same message. The regime's violence backfired, and intensified the participation in the movement. (Zunes, 2013:155)

Presumably triggered by the extremely violent and consistent crackdown, the movement was outflanked by some groups, which sought a more overt confrontation and started to act violently. Though scattered acts of violence were observed, the Bahraini movement never turned to arms (Zunes, 2013:159; Ibish, 2011:4).

A breaching of the nonviolent discipline, however, happened on the morning of March 16, 2011, when the GCC military force launched an offensive on the Pearl Roundabout occupation to evacuate it and disperse the movement. This morning, besides the protesters who were killed and wounded, two government police officers were killed by protesters running them over by cars (Al Jazeera, 2012).

What appeared to be pro-government civilian mobs, but later turned out to be agents ordered by the regime to violently attack and disperse sites of protest, created an atmosphere of aggression and violence, which was blamed on the resistance movement by the regime and state media (Al Jazeera,
Considering the information here, the Bahraini movement cannot be said to have fully adhered to nonviolent discipline, as they have deliberately caused casualties on the side of the opponent.

**Organisational structure**
The was no clear leadership in the movement, which initially was loosely coordinated, but later grew more centralised (Kerr & Jones, 2011).
Mostly young grass roots organisers launched the movement by calling Bahrainis to protest in the streets on February 14, online (Zunes, 2013:150ff). Political opposition leaders, human rights organisations and civil society activists took part in organising the street demonstrations (Ibid).
Soon into the uprising, noninstitutionalised political opposition organisations established a more organised and official opposition, with leading front figures, amongst them the “The Coalition for a Republic Bahrain” composed of three of the most radical organisations involved in the protests, and “National Democratic Action Society” (Ibish, 2011:4).
The Bahraini regime acted swiftly, and imposed harsh prison sentences, some life term, on twenty-one opposition leaders (Ibish, 2011:4). These political organisation were never the leaders of the movement, and the lack of a formal leadership is displayed by the different objectives and agendas exhibited and expressed by the movement (Louër, 2011).

**Information communications technologies and media**
Since the Internet came to Bahrain, it has been used as a space for resistance. The social media were used by Bahrainis to mobilise for the initial protests (Friedman, 2012:33). The use of social media platforms swiftly increased in the initial phase of the movement. Offering an alternative to the state's tightly controlled national media, the Internet was a space used to communicate with local and global actors outside immediate social networks. Due to the lack of representation of the opposition in official media outlets, the digital spaces and social media had a significant importance. (Jones, 2013)
However, the harassment, control, surveillance and punishment of activists using the Internet and social media to express dissent, dissuaded some from using the Internet as a tool in the uprising (Jones, 2013).

**Humour**
The data on the Bahraini uprising reveal little about whether or not the movement used humour as a method of protest. However, the Pearl Roundabout has been described to have had a carnevalesque
atmosphere (Al Jazeera, 2012). Many humorous cartoons from and about the Bahraini uprising can furthermore be found on the Internet.

4.4 The Iranian uprising 2009-now

The Iranian regime resembles a theocratic democracy, but in reality functioned in 2009 as an autocracy under Ahmadinejad with the religious Supreme Leader Khamenei as the ultimate authority in the country (Karagiannopoulos, 2012:152). The Supreme Leader controls the armed forces, appoints the leaders of the judiciary and many other important political positions. The population is suffering under pervasive corruption, unconstitutional practices and extremely brutal repression of any form of dissidence enforced by a police force and an Islamist citizen militia (Karagiannopoulos, 2012:153).

The protests in Iran, which emerged as a response to the 2009 rigged and fraudulent re-election of Ahmadinejad, were nonviolent in nature (Shabani, 2013).

Central to the Iranian movement was the wish to bring down the dictatorship of Ahmadinejad. Closely related to this was the demand for a recount of the votes of the 2009 election, free and fair democratic procedures, a genuine democratic system and political and civil liberties.

It appears that the nonviolent movement dissolved following the brutal, violent crackdown from the regime (Chabot & Sharifi, 2013). The measures used to curb the movement, including strict Internet control, violent armed police attacks, incarceration and execution of protesters, resulted in an atmosphere of threat and oppression for dissidents, causing the movement to lose momentum, retreat and drastically reduce its activities (Karagiannopoulos, 2012:156).

The movement did not achieve the removal of Ahmadinejad as the country's leader, but resistance towards the governance system is still ongoing at a lower intensity level. Hence, the movement can be determined to be hitherto unsuccessful.

Participation and representation

Five million protesters in the streets at the height of the Iranian movement, which amounts to just above 7 percent of the population (Tafesh, 2012).
Though the movement appeared motley, a large part of the population, amongst them Islamists, religious conservatives and many reformists, were voluntary or involuntarily excluded from the movement, as a result of some of the radical demands from the symbolic leaders of the movement, explained later. Hence, the movement enjoyed lesser participation in relative terms compared to the other movements, and the movement cannot be perceived as having been fully representative.

**Nonviolent discipline**

There is a wide consensus that the Iranian uprising was largely peaceful and nonviolent (Chabot & Sharifi, 2013; Shabani, 2013; Monshipouri & Assareh, 2009).

The strategists behind and the symbolic leaders of the movement, made public calls for strict nonviolent discipline (Chabot & Sharifi, 2013:223). No casualties have been reported to be inflicted by the movement.

The commitment by the Iranian movement to nonviolent discipline can be argued to have yielded their “moral victory” in contrast to the legitimacy crisis of the regime (Shabani, 2013:359).

Hence, the movement can be said to have adhered to nonviolent discipline.

**Organisational structure**

There was no formal organisational structure in the Iranian movement. However, the leaders of the politico-parliamentary opposition came to be central in the Iranian movement. The two elective candidates from different parties, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have generally been perceived as the symbolic leaders of the movement (Shabani, 2013:355; Secor, 2010). They were a minor part of the internal organisation, planning and structure of the movement, but became the outward figures of the resistance movement. However, when Mousavi officially challenged the Supreme Leader system, the movement lost the support of several important regime figures who supported Mousavi to some degree, as well as many participants unwilling or afraid to question the power of the Supreme Leader. This strong and explicit political leadership, has been argued to weaken the movement (Tafesh, 2012).

Furthermore, both Mousavi and Karroubi were put in house arrest and silenced.

**Information communications technologies and media**

The technologies of our time has disabled strict censorship, and allowed the population to enlighten itself (Monshipouri & Assareh, 2009:44). Hence, the Internet as an open and global space allowed the Iranian population to access information, denied to them by the “regime-controlled” media (Karagiannopoulos, 2012:154). Furthermore, the Internet allowed anonymity, which in turn enabled
interpersonal communication and freedom to express dissent (Ibid.). When the protests broke out, the Internet was widely used for organising and information-sharing, both internally and to the outside world (since foreign journalists were barred access to Iran) (Ibid.). It served as a tool of citizen journalism, when non-state media coverage was banned: “individuals used mobile-telephone cameras and social-networking websites to provide some of the only independent coverage of the post-election crackdown in 2009” (FreedomHouse, 2011b).

The increasing politicisation of the use of Internet alarmed the regime, which responded with intensified regulation and surveillance to halt its potential function as a space for free expression, mobilisation and coordination (Karagiannopoulos, 2012:154). Mobile phone services were shut down, and the Internet slowed to an almost unusable speed. Iranian activists, Iranian diaspora and foreign computer engineers supporting the movement made sure to find ways to communicate and avoid the surveillance (Bajoghli, 2012). The regime used harsh punishments, strict laws, control, and disabled the access to many Western sources as well as blogs and social network platforms (Karagiannopoulos, 2012:154). Facebook, Twitter and Youtube were blocked by the regime after the 2009 demonstrations (FreedomHouse, 2011b). Information communications technologies can be said to have been widely used in the Iranian movement.

**Humour**

Interpersonal mocking of and joking about the regime have taken place in the Iranian movement. However, this involvement of humour rather belongs to the “hidden transcript” - the form of humour, which circulates clandestinely between people serving to break fear and build solidarity and identity (Scott, 1990 in Sørensen, 2006).

Some humorous cartoons about the Iranian movement can be observed on the Internet. The Iranian movement can not be considered to have used “humour as a method”, since this implies the use of humour as a public and confrontational means of resistance.
In this section, the findings derived from the case studies will be analysed and discussed, and evaluated according to the existing literature and research. The cross-case structured comparison was conducted in order to analyse how the variables operate in different cases and contexts, and to explore whether they appear to be contributory to a successful outcome of nonviolent resistance. Contingent inferences cannot be made from this study alone. While the findings reveal little about whether the different elements independently affect the final outcome of a movement, they contribute to an understanding of how the different elements function within the context and dynamics of the different conflicts. Here, some of the factors, which have been hitherto excluded due to the agency focus of the study, may provide possible explanations for the outcomes, where the influence of the variables does so insufficiently.

5.1 Participation and representation

There is a wide consensus within scholarly research that the relative amount of people involved in nonviolent resistance is crucial for success. Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) have presented empirical findings, which support and extend on Mark Lichbach's (1998) conjecture that no government will survive if 5 % of its population mobilise actively against it, by showing that the threshold is only 3.5 % of the population (Chenoweth, 2014). However, this study tells a slightly different story, or at least presents some exceptions. While all four campaigns achieved critical mass mobilisation, ranging from an estimated 7 % of the population participating in demonstrations in Iran to around an estimated 16 % of the populations actively engaging in protests in Bahrain and Tunisia, only two of them succeeded. Though there may be strength and safety in numbers, this alone does not guarantee a successful outcome. Many explanations can be suggested as to why the movements in Bahrain and Iran failed. One possibly explanatory factor of difference between the cases, is the nature of loyalty bonds between the regime, and the security forces and elite. In Tunisia and Egypt, dissatisfied and disconnected militaries swiftly gave up on their loyalty to the regime and refused to obey orders, whereas in Bahrain and Iran, the security forces and elite are tightly knit to and controlled by the regime. This increases the likelihood of the regimes' pillars of support to remain loyal and obey orders to crack down on protests, and reduces the probability of defections (Gengler, 2012). These
are highly important factors influencing the outcome of a resistance movement: “When a resistance campaign is able to influence the loyalties and interests of people working in society's dominant institutions, it increases its chances of success” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:46).

Another possible factor, which may override the impact of mass mobilisation, is the international and stakeholder interests involved in the conflict and their implications for the importance of upholding the legitimacy of the regimes. Here, Bahrain and Iran are contrary examples: Bahrain enjoys strong alliances abroad, and major external actors have vested interests in the stability of the country. Hence, external stakeholders and allies may have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the curtailment of the movement in Bahrain. To the contrary, Iran remains relatively isolated from or has tense relations with the international community and major powers, with the exception of Russia and other minor actors. The Iranian regime's management of the uprising may not to the same extent have been under the influence of external actors. The accountability of Iran was not at stake, and its repression of the uprising was not constrained. Hence, the presence or absence of external influences may have weakened the movements in both cases.

Thus, though the literature widely promotes the crucial impact of mass mobilisation, the findings of this study challenge this by showing that even in cases where a large part of the population supports and actively engages in a resistance movement, other factors can have strong influences on the final outcome.

In relation to a movement's representation, it is argued that the broader the social base of a movement, the stronger it is. When a movement is representative of the general society in which it takes place, it influences several factors in the campaign process, clarified in the discussion of representation in section 3. It requires comprehensive research to compare in detail the compositions of movements and their impact, but this study has obviated, that broad bases of support and a representative nature of a movement vitally strengthen the resilience of a resistance campaign and makes it less susceptible to regime propaganda and attacks. This may prove especially important in societies with a sectarian structure, as it may ease attempts to divide a population and weaken a resistance movement, or justify a crackdown by appealing to nationalist, sectarian or religious sentiments.

5.2 Nonviolent discipline

In the process of this study, it has proven problematic to determine whether or not a commitment to nonviolent discipline has been present in the different movements. In the chaos of mass revolutionary demonstrations, it is almost impossible to distinguish between violence towards
humans and other forms of aggression, and whether or not a whole movement can be made accountable for harmful actions. Many other actors may be responsible: individuals defiant of the movement's principles, factional groups with their own agenda or agent provocateurs. Furthermore, the impact of a movement fully committing to nonviolent discipline is difficult to evaluate based on the findings of this study.

The Tunisian movement remained majorly nonviolent, whereas in Egypt the deaths of dozens of security forces was reported. Here, both militaries ultimately defected from their regimes and stood on the side of the protesters, which was vital in causing the resignation of Mubarak and Ben Ali. According to most research on the topic, nonviolent discipline and military defections are closely connected, as are mass military defections and capitulating regimes.

As for Bahrain, though the movement generally promoted and adhered to nonviolent principles, the killing of two police officers as well as other continuous acts of aggression towards the security forces (though possibly not committed by “the movement”, but by individuals) may have weakened their cause. Violence towards security forces is another factor, beyond regime bonds, which makes defections less likely. When the security forces feel attacked and threatened, they will have less sympathy for the resistance movement and be more likely to willingly crush it.

The Iranian movement did not inflict harm or casualties on their opponent, but was effectively repressed. Hence, it is difficult to give nonviolent discipline part of the ultimate explanatory power for the success of resistance movements. However, the effect of nonviolent discipline may be stronger in societies where the security forces and elite are already disconnected from their regime, and weaker in societies, where this bond is strong.

However, it can be observed in several of the cases, that nonviolence had a delegitimising effect on regime violence. Violence intended to curb the protests backfired in the sense that it created a moral outrage and stronger momentum in the population for justice, increasing the participation in the movements.

5.3 Organisational structure

The information extracted in the case studies provide nuances to the discussion of the importance of a formal structure or leadership in a nonviolent resistance movement. The predominant theoretical favouring within the literature of a formal leadership, remains an under-researched assumption, and the case studies within this thesis appear to point in another direction, though even movements without a formal hierarchy or leadership, appear to develop informal structures during the course of a movement.

It can be analysed from the findings, that when the structure of a movement is hierarchical with an
officially organised leadership, it can enable the given opponent regime to perform a more decisive and targeted crackdown on the movement, such as harassment and imprisonment of the leadership. This happened in the cases of Iran and Bahrain, consequently weakening the movements, though in Iran, the leadership was mainly symbolic, and in Bahrain, not entirely integral to the movement. Furthermore, hard-line stances of the leadership may reduce a movement's inclusiveness, disinclining some participants who may not agree, and weaken the sense of ownership within the movement, as happened in Iran.

'Self-organising' or informally structured movements appear to create an open atmosphere, which welcomes diversified inputs, initiatives and objectives. However, it is crucial that the vision and the methods, including the nonviolent commitment, are shared between the manifold organisers in these cases, since the movement otherwise risks fractionalisation.

### 5.4 Information communications technologies and media

Media and information communications technologies have played an important role in all the movements. Being one of the newest and fastest developing tools within resistance, information communications technologies and social media have great subversive and democratic potential. From the case studies of this thesis, it can be observed that all movements made beneficial, innovative and progressive use of new technologies and alternative media outlets. A major research programme on the role of social media in the MENA revolutions, found that social media played a central role in shaping political debates: “Our evidence suggests that social media carried a cascade of messages about freedom and democracy across North Africa and the Middle East, and helped raise expectations for the success of political uprising” (Howard et al., 2011:2f).

According to Niekerk (2011), information communications technologies were most useful in the initial phase of the movements; some argue that mobile phones and the Internet and social media were crucial in coordinating and publicising the protests, and disseminating information to facilitate dissidence in the society, at the onset of the movements. When the movements had gained momentum, the importance of the information communications technologies arguably reduced (Niekerk, 2011).

However, very importantly, criticisms of the “technological utopian position” leading to the simplistic claim that the revolutions of the Middle East and Northern Africa were “Internet Revolutions” recur throughout the literature. Activists and researchers insist that the successes of the uprisings cannot be attributed to the technologies and Internet activities. Social media played a major role in the organisation, planning and mobilisation, but these uprisings would have never
occurred, and in some instances succeeded, without the agency of the millions of people who came out in public in the name of the nation's demands. Revolutions have occurred before the release of Web 2.0, and the uprisings in the MENA region continued, and in some places even intensified, during Internet or phone network blackouts. Government efforts to curb virtual subversive communication and activities had a counterproductive effect; it inclined more people to join public activism (O'Donnell, 2011).

Adding to this, the regimes in questions all responded to the extensive use of the Internet by the movements, some by slowing down or blocking the Internet access country-wide, or through surveillance, control, trolling, naming and shaming or giving harsh punishments. Despite these counter-revolutionary efforts on the regimes' side, the movements could not all be quelled.

One suggestion as to why the use of information and communications technologies had different effects on the different movements, and cannot be determined to be either supportive or nonsupportive of resistance, is that the subversive potential of these technologies may be larger in countries where the regime has little or no social base and is alienated from the population, such as in Tunisia and Egypt, but smaller in countries such as Bahrain and Iran, where the social bases of the regime are extensive (Stepanova, 2011; Kerr & Jones, 2011). When the nepotism and loyal bonds extends far beyond the ruling government, a subversion of its power may be more difficult.xiv

5.5 Humour
It appears from the findings of this study, that humour is an important method in nonviolent resistance. It is important to note, though, that the concept of humour has strong cultural and historical connotations. The use and content of humour differ widely amongst societies. However, "[t]hroughout the Arab World and especially in Egypt, humor has been a cornerstone element of society" (Harutyunyan, 2012)xv. Seemingly, if the use of humour is pervasive; in slogans, on signs, in songs, in activities and in the general atmosphere and setting of the mass protests, it strengthens the movement and facilitates senses of solidarity, shared identity and reduces fear. The Tunisian and Egyptian movements, the cases within this study, which have come with strong force and swiftly achieved their goals, seem to have integrated humour into the daily activities of resistance. In the case of Tunisia, according to the protesters themselves, humorous methods served both psychological and social functions; psychologically, they served as a form of 'revenge' to help recover the dignity and self-respect, denied to them by the suppression and alienation of
authoritarianism. Furthermore, they helped bring a sense of justice, liberation, recovery and relief to the victims of the protracted dictatorship. Socially, they contributed to group cohesion, the development of group identity, and a strengthening of shared attitudes and beliefs. The humour engrained in the Tunisian movement also served as a space for regime criticism, as well as for self-defence and fostering pride. (Moalla, 2013:1)

The cases where the data found have shown a lesser or minimal degree of humour as part of the movement, differ from the ones where humour was used in at least one major aspects. The repression under which these movements were carried out was more abrupt and harsh. The hard-line stances by the regimes may have induced fear and intimidation in the general populations and the movements, debilitating the movements, and eventually resulting in a reduction in their scale and level of activity. The responses of their opponent seem to have been sufficiently harsh and consistent to crush the spirit and morale of the movements at large, and disincline the masses to continue protesting. Hence, it may be possible to make a connection between the severity of state repression during the uprising, and the lesser ability of a movement to draw on humour as a source of strength. When fear and the dangers of dissent are so ingrained in the people, it may be difficult to overcome these, and take a humorous approach to their tyrant. Also, making the case that humour is an important and forceful method in resistance, it may be that the absence of humour in these movements have made them more susceptible to the regime's intimidation and repression, showing how state repression and the use of humour perhaps have mutual effects on one another.

Interestingly, the universal phenomenon of cartoons and comics are extensively integral to all four cases. Political caricature is a versatile and potent medium of humour, which has liberatory and subversive power, and can defy “ordinary processes of thought, which are policed, shaped and re-shaped [...] by ideological pressures” (Sacco, 2003).

5.6 Summary of results

Though making inferences about the elements explored in this study is almost impossible, it can be said that participation and representation are partially supportive, but not decisive in nonviolent resistance, that nonviolent discipline contributes to legitimacy and greater mobilisation, but acts of destruction and aggression in the conflict as a whole are almost inevitable and may harm the movement regardless of their responsibility for these, that information communications technologies is a novel highly beneficial tool in nonviolent resistance when utilised right, though it can never replace the bravery, determination and ultimate effect of human beings taking grave risks
in the name of the immediate and future freedom of their nation, and that humour may in fact be more supportive and effective, than one might expect.

5.7 Table
This table is presented to offer a visualisation of the analysis. The colours and values of the independent variables have been determined on the foundation of the findings, which remain deliberately unquantified, due to the complexity of the elements involved. The evaluation of the degree of supportiveness of the elements, is merely a suggestion yielded from the findings and the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE SUCCESSFUL</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE HITHERO UNSUCCESSFUL</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>The findings suggest the element to be</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elements</td>
<td>Participation and representation</td>
<td></td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>Partially Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonviolent discipline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiguous/ contextual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational structure</td>
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<td>Ambiguous/ contextual</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
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<td>Ambiguous/ contextual</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humour</td>
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<td>Supportive</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Most frequent value</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Green = arguably present  Yellow = arguably partially present  Red = arguably absent
Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to explore, which elements of nonviolent resistance can have a supportive role in affecting a successful outcome, as well as to discover which dynamics they work within.

While this study exposes suggestive tendencies to a minimal degree, and obviates the necessity to integrate structural and voluntaristic approaches to achieve a more profound understanding - it primarily contributes to an insight into how the elements function in different contexts, and serves to illuminate the complexity of the phenomena in nonviolent resistance.

In the exploration of this study into the realm of nonviolent resistance, important aspects have not been given the necessary attention to enlighten the subject sufficiently; an inevitable limitation caused by the scope of this study. The findings challenge some of the approaches, which have been the breeding ground of this study; the theoretical approach, which has made way for a number of conjectures and notions about the nature of nonviolent resistance, and on the other hand, the scientific, quantitative research approach, which attempts to separate different factors and measure their individual effect; omitting important contextual factors.

A deeper exploration is required in the aspiration to profoundly understand the complexity of factors and causal mechanisms, which are at work when human beings collectively push for fundamental changes to the society, the structures and the system they live within.

This might be enabled through alternative theoretical, analytical and methodological approaches. Future research might contribute to a deeper understanding of nonviolent resistance by exploring the subjective reality experienced by the people involved, prior to, during and after an uprising.

Furthermore, enlightening the understanding of the dynamics of nonviolent resistance, demands a profound knowledge of historical and cultural factors, via ethnographic research, and an inquiry into the psychological and social processes. Alternative methodologies involving induction may advance the understanding of the interrelated dynamics of the elements investigated, by allowing for an open-ended and exploratory point of departure and the possible integration of structural and voluntaristic approaches to clarify the contextual intricacies.

A discourse analysis would enlighten the phenomena in this study, by incorporating into the understanding the implications of the present assumptions, norms, opinions, attitudes, ideologies and the political agenda affecting the state of affairs.
Nonviolent resistance deserves further research and attention, which can illuminate for change makers, and everyone else, the mechanisms of nonviolent resistance movements, and the dynamics they work within. This may make a valuable contribution to the world, and encourage peaceful and just socio-political transformations.
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Endnotes

i) Nonviolent resistance has been shown to have a positive and significant effect on the postconflict process of democratisation. Civil resistance has been seen to strengthen "citizenship skills" and societal resilience (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:227). The chances of a country being a democracy five years after a campaign ends is 57% among successful nonviolent campaigns, but less than 6% for successful violent ones (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:213 ffl).

The type of resistance also has an effect on the probability of a country to relapse into civil war. Countries in which a nonviolent resistance campaign has occurred is 14% less likely to experience a recurrence of internal violent conflict than those countries in which violent resistance has taken place (Ibid.).

"Political defiance contributes to a more equitable distribution of effective power through the mobilization of the society [...] This process occurs in several ways. The development of a nonviolent struggle capacity means that the dictatorship's capacity for violent repression no longer easily produces intimidation and submission among the population. The population will have at its disposal powerful means to counter and at times block the exertion of the dictator's power. Further, the mobilization of popular power through political defiance will strengthen the independent institutions of the society. The experience of once exercising effective power is not quickly forgot. The knowledge and skill gained in struggle will make the population less likely to be easily dominated by would-be dictators. This shift in power relationships would ultimately make establishment of a durable democratic society much more likely" (Sharp, 1993:49 ff)

ii) Security force defections are rather a part of an external process, since it belongs to the "response" aspect of the conflict, not the mechanisms within the movement.

iii) As a response to the critique of qualitative case studies, the structured focused comparative method was created to enable a more profound understanding. The 'structured' aspect, which involves a general set of questions asked of each case, guides and standardizes the data collection. The 'focused' aspect helps delimit the study by dealing with only specific aspects of the historical cases involved, which allows for the variables of interest in this study to be closely examined (George & Bennett, 2005:67).

iv) The possibility and validity of inferences based on the method of structured focused comparison, and case study methods in general, is heavily debated. It is important to mention that this study does not attempt to identify any predictive relationship, but rather aims at causal explanations or "regularity of association" between the variables (George & Bennett, 2005). However, the method does not allow for a distinction between the causal mechanisms and other intervening variables; hence, it can only establish positive relationships, but cannot rule out the existence of other explanations for the same outcome; "the multiplicity and complexity of causes of social phenomena make it difficult to apply the logic of elimination" (George & Bennett, 2005:154). It is difficult to isolate the causes for a social phenomena. Hence, equifinality - "the plurality of causes" may be present (Mill in George & Bennett, 2005:157). A phenomenon may have multiple causations, which reside in somewhere in or between "the observable world and the unobservable ontological level" (George & Bennett, 2005:43).

v) In the social world, controlled comparison is not possible, as the cases do not "resemble each other in every aspect but one" - which is obvious, when considering the innumerable aspect of each case in this study, which set them apart from each other. It is almost impossible, and unsuitable, to apply experimental methods to the study of social life (George & Bennett, 2005:152). Not only is controlled comparison not possible - earlier empirical findings exploring the potential influence on
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a movement's outcome of different external factors, make the case that it is not necessary in relation to a number of variables which are widely, but erroneously, believed to influence the outcome (Marchant, 2008).

vi) The book "Beautiful Trouble" assembled by Andrew Boyd and Dave Oswald Mitchell (2012) is an invaluable activist resource, which offers an elaboration on theories, principles and tactics, forming a breeding ground for nonviolent resistance and offensive realpolitik. Some of the principles presented in this book, will be further analysed in this thesis, to examine their effect on the outcome.

The publication "Nonviolent struggle: 50 crucial points" (2006) is authored by Srdja Popovic, Andrej Milivojevic and Slobodan Djinovic, front figures in the Otpor movement and two-year nonviolent struggle in Serbia, which resulted in the overthrow of Milosevic. It draws on the lessons learned from nonviolent struggles across the globe, offers guidance on a "strategic approach to everyday tactics" and outlines a number of crucial principles to follow, with the aim of guiding movements to "win your rights, overcome repression, resist occupation, achieve democracy or establish justice". Some of the principles identified in this publication will be analysed for their role in the thesis, with the hope of contributing to the experience and research already made, and identify strengths within nonviolent resistance campaigns, that may guide the planning of future movements.

vii) The use of violence by the movement will weaken their message and legitimacy, and reduce the backfire (Sørensen, 2012:235)

Adhering to nonviolence is challenging. According to Vinthagen, central to nonviolent resistance is working and training towards making nonviolence the norm, and violence abnormal (Sørensen, 2012:228).

The idea here is to show the police and military force, as well as other state personnel, that they like the population are victims of the system, and facilitate a conversion by them from state loyalty to loyalty to the people. Nonviolent discipline is vital in facilitating this mutiny and loyalty shift, because hostility between the movement, and the opponent's personnel may cause aversion.

viii) The debate on humour as an aspect of popular resistance contains arguments for and against the potential impact of humour. However, in serving the purpose of this study, merely the potentially powerful aspects of humour will be identified, and later tested, and the debate and arguments against humour as a method will be left aside as it is comprehensive and beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to mention, similarly to other variables tested and analysed in this thesis, that it is very difficult to "measure the effectiveness" of humour.

The academia and research present numerous potentially supportive effects of humour as a tactic in nonviolent resistance. Surely, the impact of humorous resistance methods depend on the form, context, deployment and target.

ix) In relation to the economic structures, the study found that “civic movements are as likely to succeed in less developed, economically poor countries as in developed, affluent societies” (Marchant et al., 2008).

x) However, in contrast to other monarchies in the region, the Bahraini government has a relatively progressive and pluralistic tradition (Zunes, 2013:150).

xi) The legitimacy crisis of the regime was caused by its extreme repression of the movement
involving beatings, imprisonment, torture, rape and murder, as well as the harassment of the protesters family, lawyers and social network in order to strangle any dissent.

xii) In Iran, the Revolutionary Guard is ideologically-driven, its main mission is to protect the “Islamic system” and it has been granted expanding political power under Ahmedinejad, and the Quds special forces are directly connected to the religious Supreme Leader Khamenei. The Bahraini military is commanded exclusively by members of the ruling Khalifa family, and is composed of mainly Sunnis, as is the police apparatus (Gengler, 2012), disconnecting them from the (Shia) majority of the population, due to the sectarian structure of the Bahraini society and political arena. In both cases, the regimes are based on ideological and religious loyalties, and in Bahrain even sectarian bonds, tying them closely to their security forces.

xiii) The U.S.A is a primary ally, which remained majorily silent and passive throughout. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and the CCG, have a stronghold on Bahrain, which is politically and economically dependent on Saudi Arabia (Louër, 2011). The CCG, led by Saudi Arabia, intervened militarily during the popular uprising, to curb the unrest and make sure it did not spill over the Bahraini borders.

xiv) Other factors also influence whether or not information-communication technologies can be perceived as supportive in nonviolent resistance; the availability to Internet for the population, regional and cultural differences, and age-composition of the population and the movement, since the youth is most progressive in its use of the internet (Stepanova, 2011).

xv) The history of humour in Egyptian society is elaborated by Harutyunyan:
“ The love Egyptians have for humour and joke-telling is well-known in the Arab world. In fact, there is a common phrase used by neighbouring Arab populations to describe Egyptians, which literally translates to “son of the jokes” (ibn nukta) (Shehata 75)”
“Humor is no new addition to Egyptian society. As a matter of fact, William Fry, an American sociologist, notes that the use of humor was present in Egyptian society as early as dynastic times. Indeed, ancient Egyptians were quite advanced in the use of literary devices such as satire. Patrick Houlihan explains that “the ancient Egyptians undoubtedly chuckled at writing that employed wit, satire, word-plays, irony, puns, and other sophisticated literary devices (Houlihan). ” In addition to literature, Houlihan also examines the use of visual humor in tomb-chapel decorations as well as in illustrations on papyri and figured ostraca.”
“The use of humor in Egyptian society continued to evolve as history wore on. After the age of dynasties and during Roman rule, Egyptian advocates were legally banned from practicing law because of a known tendency to employ wit and humor in their work. Romans found such behavior offensive to the serious nature of the profession.
This historic and foundational use of humor has certainly had a major influence on the way humor manifests in Egypt’s contemporary society.”
"Contemporary Egyptian society therefore finds itself in a situation where an age old tradition of joke telling, social injustice, and a limited amount of free speech all coexist. Accordingly, Egyptian political leaders and their regimes became the primary targets of political criticism in the form of jokes. With a deeply entrenched historical and contemporary tradition of incorporating humor into society, the Egyptian tendency to use these elements is only logical when it comes to the revolution of 2011. During the revolution, the Egyptian protesters and activists were able to take joke telling and humor, something with which they were already strongly familiar, to another level. In a way, the age old tradition of political and social humor took on an evolved form, reaching a new height
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during the Arab Spring. (Harutyunyan, 2012).
xvi) This harsh repression involved violent crackdowns, long imprisonment, the loss of jobs and attempts by the challenged regimes to marginalize and ostracise the participants