Security Sector Reform (SSR)
—a Study on Afghanistan’s Field Performances

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Abstract

There are a lot of conflicts in the world and once a conflict reaches an end, it is vital to undertake conflict prevention tools to stop the spread of violence and support the afflicted state. The Peacebuilding concept aims to rebuild states and promote long lasting peace in the aftermath of a conflict. It undertakes Security Sector Reform (SSR) since it is a crucial part in the peacebuilding process as both constitute an important part of sustainable peace.

The objective of this study is to analyze SSR and how it has prevailed on the ground. SSR constitutes an important part in regards to states recovering processes in conflict afflicted environments, and has been embedded in a larger debate of success and failure regarding its operations. The existing literature has indicated the existence of a gap between policy and practice, regarding the implementation from headquarters into the ground reality. SSR seeks to reform fragile and failed states’ justice and security architecture, it is therefore important to grasp its operational management to understand the ongoing debate.

This is an abductive desk study using predominantly secondary material on SSR such as international documents and analytical articles. An analytical framework has been constructed based on international documents on SSR objectives, actors and activities, to compare SSR and its field operation. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has been used as a case study because of ongoing turbulences’ and the importance to improve the security situation after years of experience of SSR.

The findings demonstrate a diversity of activities regarding SSR in Afghanistan. Whereas, the analysis of the findings confirms how SSR has experienced some operational difficulties in its operation. This study shows that Afghanistan have lacked in its mission of security sector and governance reform, and compared to the international framework, the activities on the ground did not measure up because of ad hoc planning’s, lack of commitment in its operation, and insurgency challenges right from the beginning of SSR core.

Keywords

*Security Sector Reform, SSR, Afghanistan, Security, Peacebuilding*
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Afghan Interim Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Afghan Military Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
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<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>The Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministries of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministries of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>The United Nations Development Programme</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Research Problem and Relevance

Internal war and violent crises are the consequences of states’ failure and inability to provide security, safety and stability to the nation and its people. With increased violence and conflicts worldwide, the numbers of fragile and failed states have loomed large across the globe and threaten both global and regional security. Development agencies, along with international organizations have notified that peace and development processes cannot occur or be effective under circumstances of violence, social disorder or threat (IPI 2014:2). It is therefore crucial for failed or fragile states to undertake peacebuilding after experiencing conflicts. Peacebuilding has become a fundamental component in the reestablishment of a post-conflict state. Peacebuilding aims to create stability and prevent conflict relapse through reconciliation, security sector reform, human rights, rule of law, demobilization and disarmament programs, and political rebuilding to stabilize fractured states (Lederach 1998:20; Barnett 2006:100). The core aim of peacebuilding is to develop a secure and sustainable state by building environments that foster long lasting peace. The more acceptable a state’s peacebuilding activities are found by its local people, the higher the state’s chances are in achieving peace (Alliance for Peacebuilding 2013). Since SSR constitutes an important part of peacebuilding, this thesis has thereby set its focus to investigate the SSR concept, along with its application on the ground.

*Security Sector Reform*, or SSR is referred to the process of reform in the security sector and is a process undertaken by either a country experiencing severe conflict or is in need for a transformation in their security sector (Folke Bernadotte Academy 2016). A security sector is in the aftermath of a conflict standing in front of a wide range of essential undertakings in terms of disarming illegally armed groups, demobilizing oversized armies, reinserting combatants into society and deposing excess of arms after prolonged conflict, in order to restore the nascent security of the nation. Those emerging from conflicts are in vast majority struggling to maintain justice, safety and security within the nation due to the previous events which may have caused illegal activities, corruption, armed groups and so forth (Folke Bernadotte Academy 2016). A collapsed government, a weak civil society, a violent history, or a weak security sector can
challenge the security concerns of a country and will encounter new challenges. It is challenges such as introducing new constitutions, electing new political leaders and deliver human rights to the population. The state will likely require improvements in the security sector, rule of law, and security forces among other things. Historically, most state’s governments have failed to guarantee security to their people, leaving the state vulnerable. More often than not, these failures can be attributed to poor management. A state with no guarantee of safety is automatically more likely to become the next target as new conflicts arise, as they are left too weak to defend themselves. As a consequence of the country’s weak position, citizens of a weak state often turn elsewhere for comfort and security, thereby leading to the proliferation of non-state security forces such as rebel groups (Department for International Development 2004-2005:3; Sedra 2010:16).

Reform is a crucial step for a state’s recovery as well as its ability to accomplish economic development, sustainable peace, democracy, and stability. The objective of SSR is to reform the security sector while maintaining respect for human rights, ensuring effective and accountable governance, and securing democratic control within the judicial system (Folke Bernadotte Academy 2016).

SSR has played a part of peacebuilding operations around the world. SSR has a far from perfect success rate. In Malaysia, for example, Hendrickson and Karkoszk (2002:190) remark how SSR could not provide accountable and legitimate governance, as the military’s influence was too dominant. Sedra (2007:15) maintains that the SSR strategy in Iraq proved unsuccessful right from the start as it did not include the justice system and did not create accountable and democratic judicial and security institutions. Sayigh (2015) criticizes how both Libya and Yemen experienced failed SSR implementations following a fragmented control of the security sector, declining state institutions, and a paralyzed criminal justice system. The strongest critique was how the failed SSR attempts are commonly attributed to lack expertise among acting partners, thereby leading to ad hoc operations or complete withdrawal, leaving the state in a weaker position than before (Sayigh 2015; Sedra 2007:19). For this reason, it is crucial to examine the strengths and weaknesses of SSR and its applications on the ground.

Even international organizations have expressed critique. The OECD, for example, points at the gap between its concept and implementation (OECD 2007:23). Historical
evidence indicates that SSR programmes have lacked consistency operating at the
ground level. Hence there is a gap between multilateral donors’ policies and local
political realities. This reform tool’s unreliability proves to be an obstacle for future as
well as existing fragile and failed states. A concept that cannot guarantee or fulfil its
objectives on the ground is not a sufficient option. The consequences of SSR become
evident when the post-conflict societies are unable to recover due to a botched SSR
implementation.

Despite all of the findings, SSR remains a very well-needed concept in the international
context for post-conflict settings. However, as we see more states worsen as a result of
poor SSR implementation, it is becoming increasingly important to address the
problems with SSR. At the moment, SSR cannot fully be considered sufficient in its
operation since it repeatedly exhibits major problems in its assistance to communities
on the ground. On the other hand, without the presence of SSR, there is a heightened
risk of human rights violations or conflict arising (United Nations Peacekeeping 2016).
Understanding the strengths of SSR and uncovering its weakness would be of great
value to post-conflict societies. This thesis sets out to contribute to the search for
improvements to the underlining cause of why operations are unsuccessful in SSR
programme implementation.

1.2 The Objective and Research Questions

Embedded within the larger debate on the conceptual success and failure of SSR
worldwide, this thesis will examine the SSR concept on the ground. A case study has
been conducted to analyze the international framework on SSR and compare how SSR
implementation fared in Afghanistan.

In order to be able to fulfil the objective and come to a cohesion regarding the research
problem, the following research questions have been developed with focus on
Afghanistan’s SSR case to see how SSR prevailed at the ground:
- What are the objectives of SSR in Afghanistan, and what activities have been launched to reach those objectives?
- Who are the actors involved?
- What was the result of SSR in Afghanistan, and what are the lessons learned for Afghanistan?

1.3 Previous Research

The SSR Agenda evolved to its current standing in the 1990s, it emerged in security and development policy circles as an approach to broaden national security (Ball 2010:29). In recent years have a number of articles and books on SSR and Afghanistan appeared. The various literatures on the illustrated subjects provide a diversity of perspectives on SSR and in-depth points of views, often highlighting specific case studies. Most articles such as *The Future of Security Sector Reform* (Ball 2010) and *Security Sector Reform 101* (Sedra 2010) capture the wholeness of the holistic SSR and its objective, while others concentrate on *Security Sector Reform Programming* (Foaleng & Ousmane 2015) or *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (Giustozzi 2008).

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Development Assistance Committee have published the *Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (OECD 2007), a comprehensive guide which contains detailed information on SSR as a core concept and the SSR step-by-step process, followed by the stages in its implementation. It also brings in different case studies, and includes a guide for international enrollment. It is an accessible handbook open for the public. The handbook has no critical analysis; it only mentions the methods used and how they can become functionally contradictory and sometimes fail in its reform stage. The OECD is not the only to represent essential information on SSR. Multiple international bodies have provided definitions, handbooks and frameworks regarding SSR. The United Nations (UN) (United Peacekeeping 2016), Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (Foaleng & Ousmane 2015), African Union (AU) (African Union 2013) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Folke Bernadotte Academy 2016) are a few examples of institutions who have released manuals on SSR and its operational skills, actors enrollment, SSR objectives, together
with demonstrations on case studies and their own involvement in SSR operations and programmes.

This thesis will investigate those case studies that focus on SSR in Afghanistan. The existing literature on Afghanistan has published a large number of sources on the historical events during the 19th and the 20th century. Authors such as Kelly et al (2011) have set their focus on SSR and the security force assistance while Arbabzadah (2011) has focused on the difference between the emerging extremist groups in the 1980 in terms of Talibans and Mujahideens. Others as Khan (2012) have concentrated on the human cost of Soviets invasion and armed conflict. Meanwhile Hodes and Sedra (2007) have researched on the search for security after the Taliban fall. Wardak (2004) chose to focus on building justice system in a post-war Afghanistan, however, in the last couple of years, the number of literature has decreased even though Afghanistan have undergone and experienced a number of events in relation to their intensely mediated conflict. While the existing literature have covered a lot of different aspects in Afghanistan’s past, the focus must be directed for their ongoing struggles. It is therefore important to continue the focus on Afghanistan and their SSR in the search of security for the nation since the country still is experiencing difficulties with their operations of SSR. The current literature lacks to provide what should be done from this point forward since million of dollars of aid are streaming in, as well as the external support, but Afghanistan is still were they were when SSR took off. It is therefore essential to continue the search of improvements in Afghanistan and why this thesis hopes to contribute to further debate to the illustrated topics.

1.4 Methodology and Analytical Framework of this Thesis

This study is an abductive desk study based particularly on international SSR documents and literature on Afghanistan. This thesis has constructed an analytical framework from international organizations SSR documents to analyze SSR.
1.5 Structure

This thesis consists of six chapters, each chapter, including a short description of its content for the respective chapter to briefly introduce the reader, and the chapters are structured as follows:

Following this introduction, chapter two, Methodology Framework, explains the chosen methodology to conduct this research and consists of the chosen method and used material with an explanation of these choices. Chapter three contains the Analytical Framework Chapter, where both the conceptual framework and analytical framework are presented, introducing SSR and creating an international framework of SSR. Chapter four consists of the Findings Chapter, presenting Afghanistan’s history and beginning of SSR. Chapter five presents the Analysis, the findings are being analyzed and the analytical framework is applied to analyze the research problem. In the sixth and last chapter, the results of this thesis are discussed in the Conclusion.
2. Methodology Framework Chapter

This chapter will provide the methodological choices of this study to answer the research questions and analyze the underlining research problem. It consists of a discussion of the chosen method and its approach, the advantage of conducting a case study and the choice of material, ending with the limitations and delimitations of this research.

2.1 Qualitative Research

Depending on what type of research the researcher aims for, the choice of method will be formed and conducted after that particular research and its researcher. The choice of using a qualitative research is if the researcher wants to gain an in-depth analysis of a context instead of a more statistical and data analysis with variables with the quantitative research (Creswell 2013:17). A qualitative research enhances in-depth analysis of knowledge regarding the topic(s) and research problem. Hence this study contains a qualitative study as it focuses on a single case study and concept, which requires a more in-depth point of view rather than a statistical perspective.

2.2 The Abductive Approach

The study has taken an abductive approach to research the illustrated subjects. Danermark et al (2002:80-81) describes the structure of abduction to be an individual phenomena in which is interpreted within the analytical and conceptual framework. It allows the frameworks on individual phenomena to be interpreted and recontextualized, and to be generated for new alternative explanations to be understood in a new way (Danermark et al 2002: 80-81). Danermark et al (2002:88) states how objects studied in the social science category often are described as “individual phenomena, and, as manifestations of -or parts of -general structures”. The mentioned manifestations are referring to the non observable events while the individual phenomena refer to the observable ones. The abductive approach will be considered the best option if the intention is to analyze individual phenomena to observe if manifestations are parts of them or social structures (Danemark et al 2002:89). Since this research is based on an
abductive approach, the recontextualise/ recontextualising will be considered since this research will analyze, interpret and explain SSR and the way it operates to enrich a new perspective of the concept regarding its application on the ground.

2.3 Case Study

A case study has been performed to gain a more in-depth knowledge in relation to SSR and its performances on the ground. A case study is a design of inquiry, and the researcher use the case to develop an in-depth analysis where the researcher collects a variety of information over a period of time. Case studies provide detailed analysis, generally strong precisely, and essential to answering the outlined research questions (Creswell 2013:14). A case study allows the researcher to achieve higher possibility of conceptual validity, and to gain strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses (Bennett & George 2005:19).

Afghanistan has become known as the most intensely mediated conflict, yet far from a solution. It is a highly insecure country with a lot of experiences of SSR from a longer period of time, thereby a prime country for SSR. For this particular research, Afghanistan has been applied to provide a detailed context with a deeper understanding to reach the relevance for this research objective (Asia Society 2016).

2.4 Ethical Consideration

There is no need for ethical consideration since it is a desk study dealing with secondary sources such as documents, literature, reports and research papers on this thesis subjects. This research will not be dealing with sensitive information such as personal information, interviews and so forth, hence there is no need for ethical considerations at this point.

2.5 Text Analysis

This study is based on a qualitative textual analysis since this research intends to focus on interpreting and analyzing literature on the illustrated subjects. A textual analysis is a
type of method to gather information by analyzing previous materials and its content (Boréus 2015:175). Esaiasson et al (2012:215) explains how a qualitative text analysis is more than a brief interpretation of the surface, one must acquire to go more in-depth to find the answers of the chosen literature. Through meticulous reading, one can identify the essential argument of the text (Esaiasson et al 2012:210).

2.6 Data Collection and its Reliability

To understand the SSR and the SSR implementation in Afghanistan, the focus has been drawn to assessing previous research, mostly secondary sources. It is already a lot of notable experts and scholars that touched upon these topics and their work has been of great value to rely upon. Although, in relation to secondary sources, it is of most importance to acknowledge and bear in mind how authors and scholars can have their own opinions, perceptions or be biased in their information. Therefore, this research has deliberately payed attention on the illustrated subjects as well as the authors, and treated all material with caution and required peer reviewed sources to gather reliable information.

In regards to triangulation of information, this thesis has tried to triangulate information by using other sources and reviewing the chosen sources for information that is coinciding in different sources. In terms of sources the information gathered is based on academic literature, books, websites, governmental documents and reports. There is a large number of documents available, mostly on SSR, but also in relation to Afghanistan from trustworthy organizations in terms of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO’s). It is organizations such as The United Nations which have provided documents on their conducts on Afghanistan’s SSR implementation of resolutions and agreements regarding the SSR process (United Nation 2015); The Department for International Development (DFID) has published documents on SSR as a whole regarding its operations, its undertakings of activities, actors, aims and so on, for the understanding of this holistic concept (DFID 2002; DFID 2000); Folke Bernadotte Academy as created handbooks on SSR and how FBA is involved in SSR operations worldwide (Folke Bernadotte Academy 2016); The African Union has provided policy frameworks on SSR, telling how AU operates with SSR in the African continent (African Union 2013); DCAF has published a diversity of documents with
SSR through different perspectives such as programming, civil society and governance, and their part in SSR missions worldwide (Loada & Moderan 2015; Foaleng & Ousmane 2015); and last, The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has published reports on Afghanistan and its undertakings of SSR activities during the years and for the search for security (International Monetary Fund 2008). The mentioned organizations have been major sources used throughout this thesis, along with scientific articles collected from Google Scholars and OneSearch.

2.7 Limitations

One must be aware of possible limitations performing a qualitative research. In the outlined methodology, this research has been set to contain a qualitative desk study with an abductive approach. By other means, this research has not been performed in Afghanistan in the form of a field study. The Swedish Foreign Department announced as early as 2006 to avoid trips to Afghanistan. Their recommendations are still of value, since the country is still experiencing turbulences (Sveriges Ambassad 2016). This research has thereby been conducted in the form of a desk study due to safety concerns along with the language barrier and resource availability in Afghanistan. The accessibility of guaranteed resources cannot be ensured since a lot of the information is not available for the public, secret and classified inner circle documents which exclude a lot of sources. Another indicator of my choice of study has been time limitation, to conduct a field study or to interview field experts abroad.

The collected literature mainly contains Western authors with a western point of view, it is important to have in minded how this limits the Afghan perspective on the subjects, only pursuing the work from Western ones. On the other hand, the Afghan literature would most likely consist of Pashtu and Farsi (also known as Persian) which is of no use to me since I do not understand or practice the languages nor have any access to a translation of such literature. However, literature in English has been accessible and enabled this research. As mentioned in the previous section, another limitation has been the reliance on secondary sources; articles, books and websites of organizations with information on SSR, peacebuilding and Afghanistan.
2.8 Delimitations

A delimitation concerning this research has been done in the timeframe of 2001- and onward in the case of Afghanistan to capture the beginning of SSR and more of their modern timeline in history, while only touching upon the early history in a brief manner since their conflict goes back years before 2001. Their earlier history has consisted of civil wars and foreign occupation since the 1970s. This thesis does not seek to go in-depth of the previous historical events since the focus is set on their modern timeline when SSR was implemented and onward.

The second delimitation is set out to focus on one case study, whilst the performance of SSR has launched many more cases. This, to compare the international framework on SSR and its actual accomplishments by examining Afghanistan as a specific case, a case study with many years of struggle and hopes of SSR. By focusing on one case with a lot of ongoing debates, this study will hopefully contribute to a new perspective concerning the case and create further debate on the topic where it also might be used to solve other similar cases.
3. Analytical Framework Chapter

This chapter will begin to present the Conceptual framework with an introduction to SSR and its operation followed by the Analytical framework. The analytical framework will be constructed from a number of documents in relation to the international community’s manuals on SSR.

3.1 The Conceptual Framework

This chapter will present security, the security sector, the security sector reform, SSR objectives, the actors’ involved in SSR, local ownership, and possible challenges for SSR.

3.1.1 Security

The security concept has over the years emerged in new paradigms, its traditional definition has been defined to maintain state stability, military activities, protection of territorial integrity, and focus on the vital interests of the state across the use of legal, coercive and political instruments on international or state levels. Murray (2007:108) formulates, “In conflict and post-conflict environments, security usually means cessation of fighting, incapacitation of belligerents, restoration of a legitimate government and the protection of national sovereignty”.

The concept has recently embraced safety concerns and well-being of people, and become reflected in the national security aspect. National security is the internal values a state strives to protect by securing and protecting its nation, respective population and territorial integrity from internal and external threats. It seeks for internal security within the nation where the focus is on public safety, to promote peace and maintain a safe atmosphere. Internal security can be achieved by upholding, national law, reliable security sector and governance, and defend the state against internal threats. Referring to major crimes, cyber attacks, terrorist threats, and extremist groups. Meanwhile, a nation also strives to uphold external security with control over territorial means in terms of borders and air-space from external threats such as aggression by foreign countries (Heurlin & Kristensen 2009:175; Inglesia 2011:1-2; Drent el al. 2015:7; Holmes 2016).
3.1.2 The Security Sector

The African Union (2013:4) defines the security sector to comprise institutions, groups and individuals responsible for the provision, oversight and management of security for state and population, however, the components of the security sector will vary depending on the national context.

SSR seeks to reform the institutions and actors within the security sector since it is the actors within the sector who promotes security through the institutions and whose responsibility is to maintain security and safety for the nation (United Nations Peacekeeping 2016). Sedra (2006a:324) defines the sector as encompassing all the authorized bodies, in which to use force. The bodies and actors are reformed to operate and manage responsibilities in a more consistent manner of good governance and other democratic norms. The actors involve are:

- **Core Security Actors**
- **Management and oversight bodies**
- **Justice and the rule of law**
- **Non-statutory security forces**

*(Cited from OECD 2007 page 22)*

If a country has or experiences a dysfunctional security sector, the security sector is in an incapable shape to provide security to both its people and state. A dysfunctional sector, unreformed, would most likely serve to perpetuate insecurity than subdue it (Sedra 2003:10).

3.1.3 Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform is an inherently a national and political process and has come to be accepted as an indispensable element in statebuilding and state democratic transitions under various settings as failed, fragile and post-conflict settings, to facilitate their transitions into stable, peaceful and democratic states. It was first in 1998 SSR was introduced to the public debate as a concept by the British politician Clare Short, and later on into the UK Secretary of State for International Development. SSR goal is to
establish; ‘good security sector governance’, strengthen its efficiency, accountability and effectiveness of security institutions and public defence, enhance the state capacity so it can respond, anticipate and prevent towards threats and the like to ensure security (Loada & Modera 2015:12; Sedra 2006:323). A country with previous experience of conflict will also have to consider Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in their SSR process. The attention of DDR programs is to decommission and deconstruct military units, collect or even destroy weaponry in order to facilitate war-to-peace transition and end violence (Sedra 2010:16).

A country must have some preconditions while undertaking SSR, such as a minimum level of security and institutional capacity as it cannot operate in security vacuum or confront immediate threats of security (Sedra 2010:8). By undertaking SSR programmes, policies, furthermore activities and plans for governments and their security sector, the aim is to help them manage security, justice and safety matters in a more consistent manner of democratic principles (Loada & Modera 2015:12). SSR seeks to transform institutions into accountable and professional ones without discrimination, and respect for international norms, rule of law, and to promote integrity and unity. Among this, gender is an important inclusive prioritization in SSR (Folke Bernadotte Academy 2016; Yasutomi & Carmans 2007:111). Welch (2014) formulates that gender equality is an integral part in SSR and to have a successful SSR programme since gender equality strengthens a society and involved both womens opinion as well as mens. Gender discrimination can otherwise cause a discrepancy in the process.

SSR has been defined by major international bodies, underneath is African Union and OECD definition on SSR.

In regards to The African Union “...SSR refers to the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people.” (Cited from African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform 2013 page 6).
Whereas the OECD/DAC “…Security sector reform means transforming the security sector/system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that they work together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.” (Cited from DCAF ISSAT 2016).

No universal or precise model has been spotted but SSR is as African Union and OECD has frames it, a concept which aims to transform the security sectors institutions and actors so they can operate in a more effective and consistent manner to democratic norms.

3.1.4 SSR Objective(s)

The SSR overall objective is to guarantee and make sure justice, defence and security institutions provide accessible, accountable and efficient public services, and operates according to the rule of law, human rights and principles of good governance. Meanwhile, SSR must respond to the security needs of the state and its citizen’s, as well be accountable through effective oversight for civilian citizens and authorities (Loada & Modera 2015:12). It seeks to enhance an environment that will be conducive to democracy, development and poverty reduction. It is to help governments of both transnational respective developing countries to fulfil legitimate security functions of their own and strengthen the relationship between state and non-state service providers. Strengthen governance structures and vindicate the organizational structures within government likewise management systems at both sub-national and national levels. Develop the capacity of the state so it can respond to development and management of institutions, policy and so forth. The objective is to establish a security sector fiscally sustainable and resourced to meet future as well existing threats, and be able to secure the people’s security needs (Department for International Development, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2004-2005:9; Sedra 2010: Folke Bernadotte Academy 2016).

Through programmes, designed by external expertise in change management, communications skills and programmes management, SSR strategies aims to undertake
SSR objectives in the form of policy analysis and development, capacity building, and technical assistance (OECD 2007:11).

3.1.5 Actors

Once an SSR is implemented, it will concern and involve a diverse range of actors. The involved actors can be broken down into two categorizations; the local actors (the actors who receive) and the external actors (the actors who provide).

The national context will determine the actors involved, however, there are typical stakeholders in each case in which whom it will concern.

3.1.5.1 Local Actors

Local actors are referred to the national actors and institutions in the recipient country who will receive the SSR. It is the actors within the nation in terms of state and non-state actors and is a mixture of stakeholders, OECD/DAC Guidelines (2007:22) has categorized four groups of actors, seen in Table 1;

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Core security actors</strong>: armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Management and oversight bodies</strong>: the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• **Justice and the rule of law**: judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems.

• **Non-statutory security forces**: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, political party militias

(Table put together by author from OECD 2007 page 22).

Since there are many actors involved in the security sector, this thesis will focus on the most general actors within the sector, seen above. The focus vary from each national context regarding the list of state security providers, not all nations include military forces or guerrilla armies and so forth, and why actors differ from one context to another. In addition, there is a fifth group – *public and civil society oversight* worth notifying since they constitute a part among Security management and oversight bodies (DCAF 2015:3). They exist at the ground level in terms of advocacy groups, NGO’s, media, union and trade associations, community groups, ethnic minorities, political parties, victim groups and research organizations. The civil society actors are more aware of particular groups and challenges in the society, compared to the other stakeholders mentioned above. For instance, they are more aware of the citizen’s perspective, and the relationship between citizens and security forces and defence, and the citizen’s security issues. Their awareness and expertise can contribute to innovative and relevant solutions regarding SSR programmes (Foaleng & Ousmane 2015:12). However, civil society can appear weak in post-conflict environments since the relation between them and the state can be characterized by mutual suspicion. The question can also be addressed of whom among the civil society actors that should be engaged in SSR processes (Sedra 2010:18).
3.1.5.2 International Support: External Actors

The international support involves external actors in terms of donor countries and governments, IGO’s, donor agencies, member states, bilateral and multilateral organizations with an overall objective to increase the capacity of partner countries to meet justice and security challenges in a consistent manner for rule of law, principles of governance and democratic norms (Canada, Slovakia & DCAF 2006:6). DFID acknowledges three major external actors;

- Development/ Financial Actors
- Security Actors
- Non-state Actors

The development and financial actors support the security-sector through financing, analysis, advising and giving technical assistance service in the form of multilateral development and financial agencies actors; the IMF and World Bank (WB), and other bilateral development assistance agencies. While security actors provide support through members of donor countries’ security forces such as intelligence services, military and police forces, representatives of various regional organizations. Organizations in terms of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and so forth, as well as different members of civilian police missions and internationally-constituted peacekeeping forces. The non-state actor’s carry out an increasingly important role, they assist SSR with effort supported by multilateral and bilateral actors. Some non-state actors constrain SSR through non-transparent commercial deals with civil authorities, but also through security forces with regional and international organizations, private security companies, arm producers and commercial enterprises, but also through the unregulated provision of arms (DFID 2000:4).

Basically, the external actors provide knowledge to link reform across the justice and security sectors; professionalize the civilians through mentoring and training activities; minimize competition and duplication; enhance synergy and cooperation; assist local actors with a comprehensive understanding of the components in good governance of the security sector; and, assist and provide local actors in developing and monitoring security policy. All the mentioned external actors are responsible to ensure the right
expertise on the ground and fulfil their missions regardless what role and obstacles they may face along the way concerning programmes, plans or activities (DFID 2000:10; Canada, Slovakia & DCAF 2006:6).

3.1.6 SSR Programmes

The aim of implementing and designing SSR programmes is drawn to strengthen both the operational effectiveness of security institutions and their strategic coherence, while considering accountability mechanism as well as the internal governance and their legal frame. Constructing an SSR programme, one must understand the root causes as well dynamics of the conflict, and the relevant stakeholders to conduct and develop effectively programmes. It can either be the indigenous government or international organizations who raise the question of considering SSR in a country. A country that experienced conflict can be requested to undertake SSR if it has spill over-effects and drags in other countries and stakeholders. Nevertheless, a country per se may also request assistance of SSR if the government realizes their incapability to manage the security sector (Loada & Moderan 2015:12; OECD 2007:30).

Programmes are designed by integrated donor teams in the form of IGO’s, donor – countries, governments, agencies, and the like with technical expertise to assist and help provide security. The first step in the procedure and design is to undertake a comprehensive assessment for the specific country to address a suitable SSR Strategy. The assessment provides clarity and a nuanced understanding of the local context and gives the host government a hunch of the benefits of the transformation process. On the other hand, especially in relation to post-conflict settings, time is a limitation to quickly design and implement projects due to the pressure which easily can undermine the assessment (OECD 2007:42-43; Sedra 2010:9).

The assessment should be conducted in the form of a partnership between the donor community and the indigenous government as it engages a multiple range of actors and requires locally –design, evaluation and implementation. The donor community can, however, argue against the assessment and it is therefore important that both partners meet an agreement on what the objective with the assessment should entail. It is, for instance required to have cross-government training to enable the involved actor’s
reform support through technical, political and strategic understanding of SSR (Sedra 2010:9-10). The external assistance must also understand how vulnerable and poor people experience security, safety and justice to determine priorities to help and improve safety concerns. It is important to understand how security relates to the broader perspective to the social-political environment in order to assess how to support the reform programmes. If the assessments narrows down and only sets its focus on one part of the security sector, it will lack the big picture since the sector is affected and impacted by the security system in other parts –social, political and economic processes (OECD 2007:42-43 & 50).

Besides the assessment, programming involves the Consensus-Building & Preparation which requires teamwork between the civil society and partner governments to develop the security sector so it reflects the local context. The local context refers to the cultural aspect, historical background, religion, local actors and local priorities when laws, policies and principles are reinforced. Further steps in the programme design are Preparing the Foundation, SSR Strategy Design, Procurement & Capacity Development, Sectoral and System Wide Reforms, and Long-Term Programming. A process in which undertakes a preparation phase, secondly an implementation phase ending with a consolidation phase (Sedra 2010:9-16).

3.1.7 Local Ownership

In recent years, the emergence of local ownership has grown to be an essential part of SSR. The reason and argument are, SSR must be driven and shaped by the particular country’s local actors instead of the external actors otherwise the implementation cannot properly be fulfilled. Local ownership is the mean of letting the locally determine priorities instead of having external actors imposing, thereby letting institutions, activities and security policies be designed, implemented and managed by locals. In contradiction, locals indicate most likely to require external support for domestic initiatives. There is no such evidence indicating that shifting from “foreign” to “local” ownership would mean flourishing progress. The question would rather be who is identified as local and who among the locals will be engaged in SSR and to what extent? Local elites might as well not be compatible in regards to the vision of a democratic and a professional security sector. Particularly fragile and conflict-affected
states can experience difficulties enhancing local ownership due to weak institutions, or absence of government or capacity limitations. In contrast, the international community has been criticized regarding too much power obsession, likewise, their absence of coordination and coherency, and their deficiency in strategic planning for long-term commitment. The reform processes need to contain a mutual cooperation between both parts since the absence of local ownership or lack of commitment by external stakeholders will not lead the reform into success (Donais 2008:3-5; Nathan 2007:9).

3.1.8 Challenges

SSR is set out to be a long-term endeavour, unlikely, historical evidence have indicated for how misguidance, interruption and lack of commitment have impeded this endeavour, turning the process into a short-term failure (Sayigh 2015). The capacity of locals to absorb changes has sometimes been hard to accept or handle, and been ill-equipped to respond to for international actors, and is one of the challenges SSR can face (Tardy 2016:2). In contrast with the international actor’s ambition, the partner country’s governance institutions and security sector can most likely oppose reforms, as higher profile people can be corrupt, or have other ideological and political reasons to give resistance. The same goes for non-statutory actors, guerrilla, rebel and extremist groups. More than often, their goal is the opposite of the state, and why SSR can be met with challenges through local stakeholders (Sedra 2010:16; Nathan 2004:31).

3.2 The Analytical Framework


The OECD is an international organization which through inclusive partnership with DAC –a specialized committee, cooperates to ensure better living standards for humanity in the developing world. DAC constitutes of a range member states which have agreed on the following: to secure an expansion of aggregate volume in terms of resources to be available for developing countries with the aim to improve their
effectiveness. Together have OECD/DAC provided a major guide with an in-depth view of SSR and its operation. The handbook consists of both practical experience and research experience and their expertise is of great value compared to other organizations frameworks on SSR. OECD occupies a central position within SSR practice and SSR debate and the reason it constitutes a part of this analytical frame (OECD 2007).

The African Union is an IGO, seeking to end Africa’s conflicts and increase development, defeat corruption and combat poverty by achieving security and peace for Africa, accelerate socio-economic and political integration, create accountable democratic institutions, promote human rights and establish good governance (Hanson 2009). The majority of SSR processes takes place in Africa, and the reason AU constitute a part of this scheme to bring in the African context on SSR (African Union 2013:6).

DFID leads UK’s work to build a more prosperous, healthier and safer world by promoting development and end extreme poverty. It was together with Short’s speech DFID’s embedded the SSR concept and brought it into force in the policy lexicon. DFID became the most ardent early proponent in relation to the SSR concept. In DFID Issue paper, DFID outline SSR as a whole and their part in SSR. Their work and involvement is of great importance to bring forth in the analytical framework, involving UK’s work and ambitions regarding SSR (DFID 2002; Sedra 2006a:323).

The framework of the OECD, AU, DFID seen in Table 2, have been put together after separately analyzing each organization’s framework on SSR regarding; actors imposing, actors receiving, and SSR activities, before drawing the conclusion that their operational way is very alike and hence been put together into one big international SSR framework. The table is meant to be read vertical, and not horizontal.

All three share a common vision of SSR and emphasize a concept that is a priority in the immediate aftermath of conflict to address fundamental core security issues and establish accountable and efficient governance and security sector to provide safety and security to the populace and nation while containing programmes to address these concerns. This framework has been developed to understand SSR operational way by analyzing three different international communities and their manuals on SSR.
Table 2  
Security Sector Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>SSR Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imposing</strong></td>
<td><strong>Receiving</strong></td>
<td><strong>SSR Activities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development &amp; Financial Actors;</strong> bilateral development assistance agencies; and multilateral financial and development assistance agencies such as the IMF, the WB, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td><strong>Core security actors:</strong> police service, customs authorities, armed forces, presidential guards, gendarmeries, border guards, paramilitary forces; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards, and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militia)</td>
<td>Ensure the effectiveness of security sector personnel through comprehensive capacity-building programmes, including the equitable, accountable and, provision of transparent, recruitment mechanisms, equipment, appropriate training and gender compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizations;</strong> Regional or International IGO’s; the UN, the NATO, the EU, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)</td>
<td><strong>Justice and law enforcement institutions:</strong> judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems</td>
<td>Humanitarian law training, international human rights and gender training within security sector for security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Actors:</strong> members of security forces from donor countries such as relevant civil authorities as</td>
<td><strong>Management and oversight bodies:</strong> legislative and legislative select committees, the executive, national security advisory bodies, ministries of</td>
<td>Security forces training, education, seminars, security training, re-structuring, small arms control activities, equipment educational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil society groups to play a constructive advocacy role through basic training on human rights and conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Justice training course that aims at raising awareness of human rights in the barracks among military judges and prosecutors as well as service members and civil society organizations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>justice and interior, intelligence service, police forces, minister of defence armed forces, representatives of regional security organisations and internationally-constituted peacekeeping forces</strong></th>
<th>defence, internal affairs, and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions), foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units)</th>
<th>activities, education on the role of armed forces in democratic society, strengthening military personnel management systems, providing mentoring support to change agents, (anti-terrorism programmes) management issues, democratic policing, security affairs, offer constructive advice to policy makers and participation in wider debates on security sector reform and building the capacity of civil society organisations to engage with their governments on SSR issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consultancy companies; Private Military Companies (PMC) and Private Security Companies (PSC)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-statutory security forces:</strong> guerrilla armies, liberation armies, political party militias, private security companies, private body-guard units.</td>
<td>Create and strengthen oversight bodies; human rights commission, police commission, auditor general’s office. Assist relevant legislative committee and the legislature as a whole to develop capacity to evaluate security sector policies and budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Member States; European community, the NATO, DAC and African member states</strong></td>
<td><strong>Civil society Organizations/ Actors:</strong> NGO’s, human rights organizations, media, woman’s groups, ethnic minority groups.</td>
<td>Conduct SSR training workshops with RECs and member states and other stakeholders Gender activities, involve woman and girls more in elements of security sector, leadership, prevent gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting the development of local capacity to deliver training and education DDR of ex-combats; Financial assistance and Counseling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Financial resources (Aid) to finance SSR processes Media training on security in democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Identify and thereby support potential reformers in security bodies and government  
Assistance to promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights

Courses funded under defence diplomacy

(Table put together by the author from OECD 2007, African Union 2013, and DFID 2002)

**Actors Imposing:** refers to the international stakeholders in which designs the programme and provide support through operations in the field, while cooperating alongside with the actors receiving. Moreover, after analyzing respective international community’s “imposing actors” the conclusion was, all three organizations operate with similar actors; donor countries security actors, bilateral development assistance agencies as well as multilateral financial and development assistance agencies since IMF, WB and UNDP operates in an international extension, and provides support worldwide. Whereas the organizations member states are more likely to operate on closer basis, Africa contains of their member states providing assistance to African nations while DAC has theirs’. Both AU and OECD/DAC are assisted through their members with support in SSR activities, whereas DFID does not consist of any of their own, but cooperates together with NATO who consist of member states as well European Union (EU) with their member states, addressed depending on the case. Besides this, each of these international communities’ have within, further cooperation with actors, not generalized as common stakeholders to act in implementations everywhere, but consists of bilateral stakeholders and operates more on a smaller basis compared to the other major bodies which draws their attention everywhere as the IMF.

**Actors Receiving:** refers to the actors receiving the SSR support while cooperating through agreements and commitments with the actors imposing. The OECD, AU and DFID all searching to reform the same actors since it is the core actors of the
governance and security sector. On the other hand, AU (2013:5) indicates for “Civil Emergency Units: such as fire fighting, riot control, natural resource protection, search and rescue services, and units natural disaster management,” actors which cannot be identified as a specific theme of OECD and DFID.

The involvement of core security actors is essential in SSR programming, they are key actors organized to use force, and it is through them as numerous individual and institutional changes are going to be implemented. They are entrusted as they have responsibility of protection through constitutional and political norms of the system for its state and citizens, and vital to reform (Foaleng & Ousmane 2015:9-10). The justice and rule of law, and management and oversight bodies sets up rules and laws pertaining to the security of the citizens and the state. They control the role of the executive (prime minister, president, head of state) in implementing security policy. While non-statutory groups are most likely to have other attentions of the state, undermining the security and possibly aiming of a separate state, compared to the other actor’s (Loada & Moderan 2015:8).

**SSR Activities;** with a mutual vision of SSR, the international communities’ undertakes similar activities in their operations to improve each of the actors and institutions. While anti-terrorism activities simply is addressed in particular cases where terrorism may occur.

*Applying the Framework*

After presenting the findings, in the analysis chapter, I will use this analytical framework to compare the findings to this rather theoretical theory based understanding of SSR to analyze the actors that were supposed to go in, and what actors which did go in, likewise with what activities should have been done and what activities actual were done, and analyze what actors were set out to be reformed and which actors were reformed, in order to gain a better understanding of SSR field performance.
4. Findings Chapter

This chapter will begin to provide a brief overview of Afghanistan previous historical events, 1978-2001 to easier understand the security concerns in the country and the need to consider SSR. Then take a closer look at the SSR process in Afghanistan in terms of its beginning, actors, activities and SSR phases.

Source: United Nations Cartographic Service Map on Afghanistan

4.1 Historical Background

The history of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has during its historical past left us with enduring lessons for its future discussions. The modern conflict in Afghanistan goes back to the revolution in 1978 with the Invasion of the Soviet Union, when Afghanistan was whipsawed into a Cold War battlefield, and took a heavy toll. At this accurate time, Afghanistan began to experience an increased escalation of events, involving overseas actors, such as United States (U.S.), Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Khan 2012:210; Rubin 2009:15; Utrikespolitiska Institutet 2015).
It was in the late 80’s as Soviet was demanded to immediately withdraw their troops, in the belief of ending Afghanistan’s misery, instead, a fratricidal civil war occurred between ethnic militias with power rivalry, causing further insecurity within the nation (Utrikespolitiska Institutet 2015). Over a million Afghans were reported killed, traumatized or wounded and over six million become refugees, resulting in a drastic population descent in conjunction with the conflicts and increased insecurity. In the same phase, new groups emerged, the Talibans, and the Al-Qaida –Bin Laden’s global jihadism, both extremist groups and opposition groups towards the government. Afghanistan entered a new phase as the Taliban took power in 1996 (Otfinoski 2004:32; Arbabzadah 2011; Globalis 2015).

By the time the Talibans conquer, insecurity escalated, creating security implications within the country, mostly through; scourge of crime; warlordism; increased narcotics trade; corruption; total spoiler groups; and culture impunity interference in Afghanistan’s traditional structure in governance (Their 2009:2; Utrikespolitiska Institutet 2015). Sedra (2003:37) remarks how the warlords posed the most potential threats in connection to the nascent political order, constituting of war commanders from the previous civil war(s) and its decentralized political tradition. The warlords operation strove for power and wealth, using drug trade, criminal activity, taxation and the like to gain power and wealth. The drug operations quickly became a security threat for both the Afghan security and democracy, and the international security. During 2002, the drug industry appeal to be the world’s foremost producer of heroin. At one point, the Afghan GDP consisted largely by the drug trade and illegal business, causing insecurity, corruption and fueled insurgency (Sedra 2003:37).

In 2001, the Taliban regime fell. It was after the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center in the U.S. as the U.S. invaded Afghanistan under an offensive to eliminate the regime after being harboured by the terrorists. At the end of the year, the U.S. had together with the Northern Alliance, the Afghani faction, succeeded with an overthrow of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, but left a security vacuum across Afghanistan, and a decline in their political, economic and social situation (Utrikespolitiska Institutet 2015).
4.2 The Security Situation in Afghanistan

In the aftermath of the Taliban regime, and previous wars, Afghanistan was fractured along political and ethnic lines, and virtually destroyed in all state security institutions. Afghanistan experienced dysfunctional judiciary institutions, mostly corrupt, a weak rule of law, physical lack of infrastructure in the judicial sector in the form of courthouses, lawyers and prison system, whereof the judges lacked formal legal training as the security sector was dysfunctional. The country had very low security as a lot of exposing threats was still present from the Taliban era in terms of warlords and ongoing illegal drug operations (International Crisis Group 2010:1; Sedra 2003:32).

Meanwhile, the country’s police consisted of corrupt and clientelism forces and military with former combats from previous civil wars. The police largely consisted of Mujahedeen fighters, owed their allegiance to the regional commanders instead for Afghanistan’s new government, and had minimal formal training which was of no security to the people (Sedra 2007:11). Whereas Afghanistan location played another input in their security concerns, landlocked with the neighboring countries, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, China and Uzbekistan. A high intense area—the Middle East, which has caused further inputs on their security situation as a lot of activities has taken, and is taking place there (Landguiden 2015).

4.3 The SSR Process

In 2001 was a Conference held in Bonn (Germany) under UN auspices, led by a group of international diplomats that charted and consensus for the political course of Afghanistan, where the Afghanistan’s principal factions and representatives of several different political groups signed the Bonn Agreement. It was to establish an Afghan Interim Authority, without the newly defeated Talibans, to structure a nascent security sector for Afghanistan’s future security concerns. In this agreement, a new leader was selected—President Hamid Karzai by the international stakeholders to rule Afghanistan with the Afghan Interim Authority and was subsequently elected in 2004. The aim of the Bonn Agreement was to promote; long lasting peace; national reconciliation; and to respect human rights as the benchmark was to establish key institutions of a democratic
and sovereign state with new institutions and the presidential election (United Nations 2015; Fields & Ahmed 2011:5).

Within a year was another Conference hosted in Tokyo (Japan) 2002 for the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA), giving them a chance to reaffirm its determination regarding pursuing development and reconstruction process according to the Bonn Agreement with Reconstruction Assistance (Ministry of Finance Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Directorate General Budget 2016). In the same year, in Geneva (Switzerland), the multi-sectoral donor support launched the Afghan SSR process, consisting of ‘The Group of eight’ (G8) countries, representing the U.S., Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom (U.K.), Japan, France, Russia and Canada. The SSR Agenda was formally established in 2002 after two security donors meetings, it forged an agenda consisting of the five pillars, each of them appointed to be overseen and guided by the lead nations (Laub 2014). The U.S. was responsible to reform the Afghan military; Italy to improve the judicial system; Germany to support and reform the police system; Japan DDR of former combatants, and last, the U.K. responsible to undertake the counter-narcotics section (Sedra 2006a:330-331).

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar 1</th>
<th>Pillar 2</th>
<th>Pillar 3</th>
<th>Pillar 4</th>
<th>Pillar 5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Reform</td>
<td>Police Reform</td>
<td>Judicial System</td>
<td>Counter-Narcotics</td>
<td>DDR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table put together by author Laub 2014)
4.3.1 Objectives of the Implementation

The objective of implementing SSR in Afghanistan was to restore Afghanistan’s lost political stability, launch economic recovery, create accountable security forces, strengthen the leadership and create a functioning state and security sector to enable security and justice, while respecting Afghan values and traditions. The underlining reason was interlinked with Afghanistan’s inability to maintain security and stability after the fall of the Taliban regime. The overall objective was set out for Afghanistan to pursue reform within the military, the judicial system, the police system, DDR and reduce drug trade, which had curbed the largest security concern across the country (Security Sector Reform Resource Centre 2015).

4.3.2 Second Phase

The second SSR phase began in the timetable of 2006-2010, signed at the London Conference (United Kingdom) in 2006 by the Afghan government, the UN and the international community, titled Afghanistan Compact. The Compact was established on the basis of the first phase and contained a framework which required a stronger partnership between the international community and Afghan government where the benchmark was security, donor coordination, economic development and rule of law reform to reach statebuilding (Ayub 2009:9; International Monetary Fund 2008:2).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals;</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Governance, Rule of Law and Human Right</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Table put together by author from NATO 2006)*
4.3.3 Third Phase

Short after, a third SSR phase was introduced between 2008-2013 involving focus on nationwide security, following the first two phases to counter-narcotics, promote human rights, rule of law, infrastructure, education along with other undertakings to reach security and accountable and trustworthy governance (International Monetary Fund 2008).

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Pillars 2008</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1</td>
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<td>Pillar 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pillar 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table put together by author International Monetary Fund 2011)

In the aftermath of these phases have a number of international conference appeared. In total have over eighteen Conferences on Afghanistan been conducted between 2001-2015 (upcoming Brussels 2016) and they are very detailed with different parts of SSR, for more information, see Table 7 in Appendix 1.
4.3.4 Actors Recipient of SSR

Formally established in 2002, the first SSR phase had set out a diversity of undertakings directed to Afghanistan’s local stakeholders. It was directed to Core security actors; the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) such as an Afghan National Police (ANP) containing Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Armed Forces, Afghan Local Police (ALP) together with Afghan military and paramilitary forces (Army 2015). Furthermore, Justice and rule of law actors; the whole judicial system in terms of judges, lawyers, prison facilities, justice ministries, prosecution services, judiciary, human rights commission and traditional justice system. As well, Management and oversight bodies; such as Executive, Legislative, Ministries of Defence (MoD) and Interior (MoI), Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, National Security Advisory Bodies, the Office of the Prosecutor General, Civilian Authorities for management of Security Sector, Parliamentary, constitutions such as the Election Commission, and Financial Management Bodies needed new reliable actors and institutions (Ibid:2016). Not forgetting the Non statutory actors as well, which reflected Afghanistan’s warlords, different faction groups within terrorist activities and rebel groups, in contra, these groups were disbanded rather than integrated since they constitute a threat to the government (Central Intelligence Agency 2016).

4.3.5 Actors Imposing SSR in Afghanistan

Once SSR was assigned to be established, a variety of international actors were involved. Already mentioned, it involved the donor countries from the Bonn Agreement, but also assistance from NATO, EU, WB, IMF, UN and other partner countries, and were at its core, a donor driven process. They were brought in to achieve the objectives of the implementation, and the actors per se establish further bilateral organizational actors to enable a successful SSR process (Security Sector Reform Resource Centre 2015; Karp & Ponzio 2007:220).

4.3.6 SSR Activities

The five pillars set up in Bonn introduced varieties of reform initiatives with the help of the lead nation’s assistance to fulfil the security vacuum and defeat counter-terrorism.
After the first phase, the following phases continued the reforms of the first phase to improve SSR activities, and included a diversity of programs, training, activities, aid funding, and other donor assisting performances.

**Security Forces**

Short after the Taliban fall, NATO was together with their allied the U.S. creating the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003. ISAF was established on NATO’s member states troops for military support in post-Taliban Afghanistan. They conducted stability and security operations in Afghanistan to build up security and security forces in the nation. NATO has since the beginning of the agreement in 2002 fought insurgency and expanded their troops across the country, and lately, NATO have agreed to assist Afghanistan beyond 2016 since there have been a lot of turbulences in the area with increased extremist groups (NATO 2016).

**Military**

The cornerstone of the military reform and Security Force Assistance (SFA) was directed into the hands of the U.S. to create the Afghan National Army (ANA) by recruiting non-factional and multi-ethnic armies across Afghanistan. The U.S. main objective was to achieve accountable and effective security forces to uphold security in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In the beginning of the SSR process, the Afghan Officials and the U.S. military planners created detailed force structures, calculating figures on 21,000 support staff, 43,000 grand combat troops, and a targeting 70,000 personnel ANA along with some other measurements in the reform of military forces (Kelly et al 2011:23-25). To be able to build up ANA, the U.S. military and reconstruction strategy provided; funding of equipments of vehicles, technology, weaponry, and educational equipment activities; reform of forces through arms, training activities and educational courses; and strengthened military personnel management systems for ANA’s operational skills during the 20th century. The equipment was donated and salvaged on behalf of the Soviet Union, as the U.S. work on building and training ANA of anti-Taliban’s militias. The calculation on 70,000 personnel expanded later to 80,000 through the process. The International Conferences have yearly undertaken further
considerations in terms of training and reform activities in relation to ANA (Kelly et al 2011:23-25; International Monetary Fund 2008:4).

**Police**

The police reform process, led by Germany quickly introduced Afghanistan to a rebuilt National Police Academy. Germany operated to assist the Afghan Government with police reform and strove to build up ANP with respect for the rule of law. By doing so, Germany trained Afghan police instructors with basic policing skills, and mentored those in charge of local as well national trainings through literacy training, defence courses, law training, humanitarian-related activities and so on. Germany funded aid to reconstruct infrastructure of police buildings, checkpoints and stations. They also assisted activities and special training courses for woman with intervention techniques and self-defence courses (Federal Minister of the Interior 2012:5-6 & 21; Institute for the Study of War 2016).

The Federal Foreign Office of Berlin (2012:9-10) has described Germany’s engagement through bilateral police projects. A lot of the training and assistance were made through bilateral organizations such as the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) in which operated together with Germany on behalf of the police training, consisting of European member states mentoring and training senior staff respective senior police officers of the Interior Ministry. The EUPOL’s rule of law department aimed to strengthen links between public prosecutor officers and the police, and strengthen the judicial system by providing partner countries civilian experts and police officers (Federal Minister of the Interior 2012:9-10; Suroush 2015).

**DDR**

The principle funder Japan was attributed to dissolve warlords with DDR. However, the responsibility was later deferred to the UNDP and the U.S. with DDR across policy and operational levels, still in the command of Japan. The UNDP introduced a DDR program, The Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) in 2003, a three year program designed with sufficient funding for its operation with the cooperation of MoD
to target 100,000 soldiers and officers and provide literacy assistance, food aid, and emergency employment (Giustozzi 2008:171; Hartzell 2011:2).

The primary purpose of the DDR programme was to provide; assistance for vocational training for the previous combat forces as AMF; demilitarize the country through operations with the disbanding of armed groups; reintegrate ex-combats into Afghanistan’s civilian society; collect weaponry; and break the linkages between AMF troops and AMF commanders. The DDR was in general considered a very large task due to the existing diversity of faction groups from the previous historical events. As such, DDR undertook another programme, Targeting the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) in 2005 to reinforce monopoly for state in the use of force. DIAG has since operated to DDR combats since the international agreements, set out by the stakeholders and Afghanistan’s government during the years have extended DIAG’s operation on Afghanistan’s war-to-peace transition (Karp & Ponzio 2007:225; Sedra 2003:36; International Monetary Fund 2008:6).

**Counter-narcotics**

Allotted the status of counter-narcotics reduction, U.K’s remit was to eliminate poppy cultivation and rebuild Afghanistan’s agriculture system. AIA banned consumption of heroin and poppy cultivation and introduced together with U.K. a poppy eradication program to control the drug production. Their strategy was to offer farmers an amount per hectare of their production and introduce farmers to other agriculture productions as the idea was to eliminate the poppy farming across the country. The task was extended since the poppy cultivation was another large task in the SSR process, constituting most of the Afghan farmer’s livelihood along with the country’s GDP which required time to turn around (Sedra 2003:37).

**Judicial legal system**

The fifth lead nation, Italy, was divided the task to reconstruct Afghanistan’s judicial and legal system and strengthen the rule of law. Together with the UNDP they initiated reconstructions with respect to Afghanistan’s Islamic legal principles and Sharia Laws to encounter a successful reform in the legal framework. The UNDP initiated the
‘Rebuilding the Justice System in Afghanistan’ project in 2003, a project involving provision and reconstruction of training law officers and judges, equipping courthouses, and providing training courses and seminars for the systems staff members and raise the awareness of human rights. The project included to provide special attention in the aim of ensuring gender equality by having training seminars and activities to involve woman in a wider extension. The aim of reforming the judicial system was to enhance reliable and efficient judicial institutions, the Supreme Court, Office of the Prosecutor General and the Ministry of Justice, and have the legal system to introduce new laws and streamline existing ones (Sedra 2003:37-38; Wardak 2004:328).

The reforms continued in line with the increased international agreements (see Appendix 1) and SSR phases as the Afghan Compact continued to outline and promote legal and human rights awareness in the system, build judicial personnel and institution capacities, whereas the ANDS focused on empowering the National Assembly, local governance and religious affairs to be shaped accordingly to the society and Islamic religion (NATO 2006:7-8; International Monetary Fund 2008:3).

**UN & IMF**

Besides the donor nations, UN underwent a number of transformation roles in Afghanistan. The UN established United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with management of UN humanitarian and DDR programme assistance to contribute to security by assisting the other actors (Tanin 2016). While the IMF provided aid funding through implementing programs and other aid support activities to rebuild economic institutions and advise Afghan government on reforms and economic policies (International Monetary Fund 2016).
5. Analysis

In order to reach this study’s objective, this chapter will analyze the findings chapter and apply the analytical framework to answer how SSR prevailed on the ground-level through the case of Afghanistan since SSR has been embedded in a larger debate of success and failure, and whether this study could contribute to further research. This thesis has not aimed to discredit any achievements in Afghanistan SSR process, rather analyze the process.

5.1 International Framework Vs Actual Result

The launched SSR Agenda agreed on to undertake the five pillars which was designed to reduce insecurity and terrorism with the help of the lead nations while transforming the justice and security architecture of the Afghan state. The established agreement looked eminent on the paper, but as it was reaching the ground, actions started to speak for themselves, where the need for new SSR phases was constructed.

Outlined in the findings, Afghanistan underwent a transition process and experienced a decade full of intense and high expectation of hopeful improvements with the settled agreements (see Table 7 in Appendix) starting already with the Bonn Agreement in 2002. However, after analyzing its outcomes, it has indicated that SSR already at its core experienced a couple of downfalls, impeding the operations and moving it in the opposite direction. It has led to further undertakings of SSR after Bonn, and affected Afghanistan’s current situation since they still struggle to maintain security. The analysis has indicated for a number of indicating factors which can trace the innumerable obstacles faced in post-invasion Afghanistan, starting with Afghanistan itself.

Saikal (2014:20) has indicated how Afghanistan’s culture of corruption and poor governance, followed by their historical legacy with mosaic society, largely illiterate population, terrorism, intellectual capital, weak national economy, narco-state, and competing neighbourly countries impeded the offset of SSR in 2002. Jalali (2009:23) has added that Afghanistan contained of a crumbled infrastructure, uncoordinated international aid and primacy of factional loyalties. Whereas Sedra (2006b:95)
remarked that by the time Afghanistan implemented SSR, they neither had presence of security, nor institutional capacity, necessary components for a successful SSR. Furthermore, the international actors were faced with insurgency right at the beginning, even though, Sedra (2011:230) has acknowledged the failure to adequately assess those challenges and problems Afghanistan was experiencing. It was illustrated that the international stakeholders involvement were based on self-interest, Murray (2011:44) indicates how the U.S. ulterior motive was to present close to Iran, while India and Pakistan used Afghanistan as a battleground to practice political quarrels, and the U.K. for territorial interest. Saikal (2014:26) also indicates how the U.S. and its fellow partners demonstrated poor knowledge and understanding of Afghanistan’s history, and the –cultural, regional and social complexities, an important step in the SSR assessment. Giustozzi (2008:215) points out how Afghanistan local ownership of SSR has been dominated by various factions and actors, as they had struggled to assert control over the SSR processes by serving their own interests. In relation to the analytical framework, the framework demonstrated how SSR operational way is constructed in terms of both actor’s commitment and cooperation to manage SSR where self-interest has no part in the process. It has also emphasized for how activities should be undertaken to assist a country to manage security in a consistent manner through undertakings of coordinated programmes and activities, and not in relation to ad hoc and quick fix planning. Also stating for the importance of undertaking local complexities while designing the programme which were absent in Afghanistan.

In regards to the agreement per se, it was no substantial evidence pointing or explaining why and how the tasks were divided as they were. Ayub et al (2009:9) indicated how it quickly became apparent, the lead nation and their approach were not able to guarantee coherent policy coordination in relation to the various sectors which caused a complete lack of policy-making in terms of the cross-sector reforms. Ayub et al also emphasizes how development initiatives were focusing in too large extent on regional capitals and Kabul, lacking the overall attention to other parts across Afghanistan (Ayub et al 2009:9).
5.1.1 Objective Vs Field Result

In the findings chapter it has been clear, after the Bonn Agreement was settled, Afghanistan underwent a diversity of reforms and undertakings of different actors. Hartzell (2011:4) has remarked how the five pillars contained of a logical connection, only that the donor nations operated without much planning or joint coordination, which undermined the SSR process, and why additionally conferences and SSR phases were considered to undertake further activities at the end of the first phase.

*Insufficiency and Lack of Resources*

Of the core security pillars the U.S. pursued the creation of ANA, while NATO ISAF and Germany ANP. However, a mismatch was conceded between the actors and their ability to conduct their work in the same pace which impeded the process. According to Saikal (2014:23) the military and reconstruction strategy by the U.S. and its allies NATO and the UN never were commensurate with the Bonn Agreement goals. The U.S. efforts suffered from ill-coordinated and transient leadership in the SSR process, but according to the Western lens, the U.S. achievements could be declared as a success. From their point of view, ANA had successfully been professionalized through training and equipments of new technological resources (Murray 2011:48). On the other hand, it was only a facade of the U.S. as they tried to disguise the actual image on the ground, since they never adapted onto the level and standards of policing conditions of Afghanistan. It affected ANA’s ability to manage the majority of the equipments since it was too advanced with dubious serviceability, and the training was mostly in the league of the U.S. international trainers. The insufficiency from the U.S. to assist and create reliable ANA forces led to woefully underequipped combat units, an insufficient number of military mentors and trainers, and caused further inputs and difficulties in the retraining ANA personnel as well as recruiting qualified leadership candidates (Jalali 2009:25). Meanwhile, after analyzing the activities set out in the analytical framework and comparing them to Afghanistan, Afghanistan’s forces experienced an absence of coordination and coherency in planning and undertakings in activities, mentoring, training, and courses and so forth. The activities set out in the different phases and conferences were far from achieved in reality as the U.S. policy makers indicated
towards too much primary coercive in their operation which undermined and resulted in killings, human rights violation and dishonouring of civilians (Saikal 2014:26-27).

A Mismatch between Activities

The scrutiny of the ANP reform was a year behind of the Bonn Agreement, and was not in pace with DDR and ANA. Sedra (2003:36) has remarked the importance regarding reliance on activities as the impact of police reform initiatives are dependent on the other pillars progress and all intricately entwined but must be pursued on a parallel basis. Despite the restoration of the National Police Academy, Murray (2011:48) indicates how Germany barely had begun the police reform, worse off was Afghanistan’s justice sector, additionally impeding Afghanistan’s SSR. The Afghan forces struggled since it was a sufficient lack in the forces in line with wrong prioritizations of Germany and the U.S. as well the EU member states experts. EUPOL were mainly stationed in Kabul and thereby lacking the overall attention to Afghanistan’s other parts (Suroush 2015).

The EUPOL effort mainly consisted of assisting the police reform from the first phase struggle, as the ANP forces were dysfunctional and had insufficient training, causing ANP to have little impact to improve the security for the nation. Scant attention had been provided to advance the administrative reforms in Afghanistan’s ministry which caused undermine in the state’s capacity to handle Afghan security forces for the long run. Looking at the analytical framework, a diversity of bilateral actors and international donor countries operated to achieve reliable and efficient forces. However, in following years and in the aftermath of the second and third phase, conferences and agreements appeared most prominently and involved further undertakings in police as well military force reform. Still today, they are highly prioritized at the headquarter level, even though a diversity of activities and actors been taking on this activity through 2002-2015 (Sedra 2007:11; Suroush 2015).

Insufficiency and Ad Hoc Operations

The insufficiency within the international troops to maintain peace in the country caused Afghanistan’s fledgling security forces without the fulfilled requisite capacity to fill this
gap and expeditiously be delivered into the field, mainly without institutional support and necessary equipment for their roles. Not only undermining their operational effectiveness, but also the SSR operation itself (Sedra 2007:18). The Afghan SSR programme contained as the analytical framework has outlined to undertake a diversity of activities to reform security actors and institutions. On the other hand, the imposing actors in Afghanistan managed their operations in ad hoc and short-term consistencies in relation to the agreement. The U.S. had given the responsibility to the Department of Defence for the police program which caused blurry distinction between police and military. The U.S. meddled and interfered in most parts of Afghanistan’s SSR process, also one of the undermining causes of why planning, reforms, and delays and so on, appeared in most areas since donors disagreed and had diverse visions of the specific areas in charge of, and caused unnecessary obstacles in the process. Hence undermining to create reliable security forces and indicated for lack in the SSR process. Some would argue that the U.S. rather hindered than promoted development, while others argue that SSR had more or less already failed before its implementation (International Crisis Group 2007).

Overwhelming Task

The DDR phase, lead by Japan, as well the UNDP on behalf of the Afghan government, became a rough challenge. Hartzell (2011:4) remarks how delays in initiation and design of the DDR process, followed by the growing levels of insecurity impeded the process. The DDR’s ANBP was led by an ad hoc UNDP sub-entity which caused future implications in the DDR of ex-combats. The SSR process requires a coherent planning, to avoid ad hoc operations. Hartzell (2011:4) remarks how there were no comprehensive assessment conducted to inform the program’s design, and the numbers had to be relied upon by the Afghan MoD. A compromised figure of 100.000 participants of DDR, later lowered to 50.000, recognized how AMF commanders purposely overstated the figures to collect more salaries from the ministry. Hodes and Sedra (2007:84) notify how disarmament was stated to be a central goal, in contrast, the disarmament was in the practice treated as a peripheral aspect. The overreaching goal with the DDR was to break the historic patriarchal bond between ex-combats and their commanders, and integrate them into civil society. However the DDR suffered from poor vocational counselling within the programme and was in general considered a failure since it
struggled to reintegrate ex-combats as many kept their strings attached to previous groups (Hodes & Sedra 2007:84). Looking at the analytical framework, one can see that DDR is an integral part in the process. In addition, the DDR activity was harder to accomplish since the imposing actors were incapable to cut the connections between previous combats and their networks, resulting in a much lower number of DDR of ex-combats than anticipated.

*Unsuccessful Donor Attempts*

The U.K. and AIA created the poppy eliminate program for the Afghan farmers, in contrast, it never lasted since farmers gained more by having their poppy farming, representing many Afghans livelihoods, and why the deal with the U.K. and AIA was not in their interest. According to the farmers, they were not duly compensated since they earned more on the poppy than regular wheat, and why the poppy elimination became a hard task for the U.K and resulted rather in the opposite effect as poppy farming increased (Sedra 2003:37). During Afghanistan’s SSR endeavour, the counter-narcotics task was repeatedly considered a priority matter inextricably interlinked with Afghanistan’s security aspect. However, the agreement was set out to eliminate the production, on the other hand, the external actors were unable to fulfil their task as the poppy farming still in 2015 is a big concern in Afghanistan and a threat to security due to the ongoing poppy activities (UNODC 2016:13).

*Undivided Progress*

During the whole SSR process, the judicial reform was considered to be the secondary objective, compared to the reform of the security forces. The lack of maintaining equal support and attention by the external actors undermined the process. The actors should have operated and provided an equal focus on all activities. Afghanistan SSR agreements were definitely not attributed to operate in this consistency to reach accountable and efficient security sector governance. Furthermore, the analysis has indicated how this task was considered enormous for Italy to manage and why Italy together with the UNDP struggled to develop the legal framework to respect Islamic legal principles (Sedra 2003:38). By the time the reform took place, Afghanistan lacked the physical infrastructure within the judicial system and intellectual elite. Nearly every
facet of the justice system from the human capacity in terms of trained jurists, judges to infrastructure – courthouses, prison system and so on were lacking and caused a low public trust (Sedra 2011:234).

The Karzai’s government lacked the political will to end political interference in operations and to tackle the culture of impunity. Even if the Afghan government had international assistance, to repair Afghanistan’s judicial infrastructure, it was considered to be ad hoc (Hodes & Sedra 2007:74). Grono (2011) has remarked in regards to Karzai downwards that many Afghan power holders benefited from a patronage based system where they could buy and maintain loyalty. The corruption was endemic and made Italy’s reform hard, implementing proper rule of law and effective justice sector since it was in no interest of these actors.

Supposed to amelioration intra-governmental tensions, instead the international actors, Italy and the U.S. crashed in their reform plans due to inter-donor rivalry. They differed in the legal traditions, and impeded system-wide and coherent reform strategy, permitting recalcitrant actors to avoid reforms. The Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, and the Office of the Prosecutor General, the three main judicial institutions to be reformed into efficient, accountable and effective institutions, turned hostile to each other (Sedra 2007:12; Grono 2011). The donor’s behaviours, interference, attentions and aims followed by a corrupt system, prevented the Afghanistan’s judicial system to allow it’s fully potential and operate in a consistent manner to Islamic legal principles and function smoothly, which was the main objective with reforming the Afghanistan’s judicial system. In contradiction, Sedra (2011:234) remarks how a notable progress had been achieved in prison and judicial system with infrastructural development and law collection, even though it had been ad hoc.

The Result

After comparing Murray 2011, Jalali 2009, Sedra 2003, 2007 and Saikal 2014 together with the other mentioned scholars, the Afghanistan SSR programme can be considered a high-profile failure. Compared to the analytical framework, SSR has been developed to operate in stable security and political environments. In regards to Afghanistan’s case, SSR was faced with acute insecurity conditions and insurgency. The insurgency distorted the process in a number of ways and altered the process timelines set out to be
a long-term vision but was characteristically viewed as a short-term remedy. The international actors’ responsibilities overlapped at times and became competitive in their roles, which further aggravated by incommprehensive as well fragmented SSR approach, followed by a power obsession along the operations. Moreover, their tasks from policy to ground actions turned out very differently than supposed, and resulted in a thorny SSR experience for Afghanistan.

5.1.2 SSR Phases

The Afghan government was during the first SSR phase (2002-2006) assumed to hold elections, respecting human rights, to develop a constitution, combat terrorism, establish functional government and reduces illicit drugs. This was of course harder than anyone thought and after a few years from the agreement were signed, the struggle for a credible government and providing security for the Afghan’s continued to be a challenge. The whole Bonn Agreement had in general concentrated on the political process, furthermore on developing new constitution and electoral process as well holding parliamentary and presidential elections, which been partly successful (Murray 2011:47-48). Further steps were required, and a rational approach was considered for the development of economic and social life institutions, the Afghanistan Compact (2007-2010) (NATO 2006).

The second phase was created from the weakness of the first one, whereas the third phase was created to improve the spectrums on the poor management from the two previous SSR phases. Already in the first phase, Afghanistan lacked coherency and undertakings in the different areas which was forwarded to the other phases, as they tried to improve and continue the SSR operations due to previous flaws but failed there as well. International conferences have been hosted until 2015 to improve the different activities in SSR. The conferences per se have contained further requirements in terms of cooperation and necessary measurements and undertakings from both the Afghan government and international stakeholder’s part, since the programme obviously experienced a challenging environment in the field. The Conferences have contained detailed information and essential requirement for the SSR process. Even though a lot of undertakings have been made, Afghanistan is still in 2016, after more than three SSR phases and over eighteen conferences struggling with most aspects concerning security.
SSR has only contributed to a slight differentiation of progress in Afghanistan, where additionally a conference is to be held, this time in Brussels 2016 (European News Room 2016; Murray 2011:50).

5.2 Summary of Problems Encounter

The problems that emerged between 2001-2015 were noticed with the ad hoc planning, self-interest involvement, uneven progress and mismatches between the sections, lack of resources in the different sections, disagreement and diverse visions, insufficient levels of donor support followed by ill-coordinated and transient leadership from the external actors. While poor infrastructure, terrorism, narco-state, acute insecurity conditions, security forces owed their allegiance to the regional commanders from previous war, lack of political commitment among major stakeholder, no presence of security nor institutional capacity, and endemic corruption among the local security sector and governance actors. Following a tremendous pressure on Afghanistan’s nascent security institutions, actors as well as structures, deploying security forces straight away from activity and training ground to battle, no explanation of the division of the Bonn Agreement activities, and there was no local ownership involved in the SSR activities.

The lesson learned has been drawn after the external actor’s insufficient level of donor support, ad hoc operations, ill-coordinated and transient leadership and so forth, and implying that SSR cannot properly be fulfilled without the commitment and coordinated planning from external actor’s part. The policy recommendations are therefore directed in terms that all SSR programmes must contain full external commitments and guidance’s from the international stakeholders.

In relation to the local actors, their lesson learned have been drawn after analyzing Afghanistan’s corruption within government and security sectors, lack of commitment and willingness among actors in the SSR process, which has indicated that SSR has not been sustainable in the terms of improving Afghanistan’s security concerns. Furthermore, the policy recommendations are thereby directed in terms of the necessity to always address a strong commitment and cooperation from local actors to reach a successful SSR.
Regarding the activities, the problem was that they had no local ownership, rushed activities and pressured the security sector and so on, where the lesson learned can be drawn from, quick fixes in SSR activities and the absence of local ownership is not sustainable. The policy recommendation will thereby be that all SSR programmes should emphasize local ownership and long-term operations.

Furthermore, the backdrops of the entire process can be acknowledge with the inefficiency, delays, lack of initiatives and lack of resources from all parts which marred the entire process.
6. Conclusion

This chapter will summarize as this research has sought to demonstrate the discoveries of SSR application on the ground, from headquarters level into ground-level, in order to answer the research problem.

This paper has focused on SSR and demonstrated the importance of addressing SSR in the aftermath of conflict afflicted environments. Although in the analysis, SSR has indicated to be insufficient with the absence of coordination and coherence among actors imposing while supporting the efforts in the field, and their deficiency in strategic planning for long-term commitment. On the other hand, SSR can be an essential component after experiencing conflict in the recovering process and to reach security. The analysis indicates how policy on SSR can tend to make perfect sense devised at the headquarters, but might not in the real life scenario in the sense as it does not permeate to the field-officers dealing with the implementation. Evidence has shown that donor communities and field practitioners do not have such evidence or tools needed to accomplish and make their programmes work in practice. Such evidence has been demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s security situation was extremely worrisome after years of civil wars, and was fractured along political and institutional lines as well dysfunctional to provide security and safety to its people. SSR was addressed to restructure the architecture of the state, but their SSR programme indicated to be insufficient and unsustainable in its operation for the long run since stakeholders on both local and international levels have lacked coherency, commitment, communicational skills and willingness throughout the process to succeed. After analyzing the Afghanistan’s SSR process, the process was treated more as technical rather than political by the donors. Hence indicating how donor community and field officers lacked a common tool to tackle and reach progress in reality compared to the outlined policy. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s implementation from policy into field can be interpreted as an awning disparity as the policies been too unreflective and utopian in relation to the prevailing ground reality.

Since the analysis has indicated for how higher grounds and field officers cannot prove their sufficiency with providing programmes, SSR will still be an ill-equipped concept
until further measurements regarding its operational way are considered. Even though, SSR is still necessary but requires that democratic institutions are enforced and that a principle acceptance from democratic politics of security actors, government and civil servants is achieved. Without local ownership, SSR is not sustainable and should therefore emphasize for local ownership in every single case. SSR is a lengthy process and requires gentle cooperation across actors on national and international levels and can take up to decade(s) to functioning.
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# 8. Appendices

Appendix 1 SSR Conferences on Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conferences</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Focus area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Strengthen institutions and economic growth, promote security and reduce counter-narcotics while strengthening security forces through ANDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Counteract the threats of terrorism, organized crime and drug trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hague</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Political discussion state of affairs and future perspectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Afghanistan to take control of certain police and military functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Partnership -include coherent support by the international community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon Summit</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>ISAF -lead security responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Economic development and overlook security concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonn</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Long-term engagement from international community and political process for long-term stabilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Support ANSF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Summit</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Afghan Government and International community -Undertake the necessary measures to ensure a smooth political transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Promotion of political consultations and foster regional cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astana</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Fight terrorism, improve infrastructure,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dealing with the problem of refugees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Afghanistan to set out its vision for reform and international community to support it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Poverty reduction, regional economic growth, and economic, political and regional security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader’s Summit</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Upcoming) Brussels</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Will contain sustained political and financial support to Afghan peace, state-building and development discussions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Cited from European News Room 2016; Embassy and Permanent Representative of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Vienna 2016).*
This map reflects the War from 2001 when U.S. invaded Afghanistan. The map describes the areas of where Taliban activities occurred (the orange area); the areas of the major Western military basis (blue dots); the areas by U.S. and their allies (green spots); the Opium cultivation areas (brown rings, the bigger the rings are = the more opium); whereas the red lines demonstrate Pakistan supply line into Afghanistan.