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Publications (10 of 17) Show all publications
Bastani, S., Giebe, T. & Miao, C. (2020). Ethnicity and tax filing behavior. Journal of Urban Economics, 116(March), 1-16, Article ID 103215.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Ethnicity and tax filing behavior
2020 (English)In: Journal of Urban Economics, ISSN 0094-1190, E-ISSN 1095-9068, Vol. 116, no March, p. 1-16, article id 103215Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We analyze differences in tax filing between natives and immigrants, focusing on two empirical examples. First, we study deductions for costs associated with traveling between home and work allowed in the Swedish tax code. Using the total population of  commuters within Sweden's largest commuting zone, we find that newly arrived immigrants file substantially less than natives, immigrants with a longer stay behave more like natives, and immigrants with the longest stay file the most, even more than natives. Second, we analyze bunching behavior among the self-employed at a large salient kink point of the Swedish income tax schedule. We find much less bunching among immigrants, even after a long time in the host country, and the largest differences relative to natives in residential areas with a high immigrant concentration. Our findings have implications for the equity and efficiency of the tax system and the spatial patterns of residential and occupational choices for different ethnic groups.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2020
Keywords
Deductions, Tax filing, Bunching, Immigrants, Natives, Integration
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-89974 (URN)10.1016/j.jue.2019.103215 (DOI)
Available from: 2019-11-08 Created: 2019-11-08 Last updated: 2019-12-09Bibliographically approved
Bastani, S., Giebe, T. & Miao, C. (2019). Ethnicity and Tax Filing Behavior. Kalmar, Växjö: Linnaeus University
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Ethnicity and Tax Filing Behavior
2019 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

We analyze differences in tax filing behavior between natives and immigrants using population-wide Swedish administrative data, focusing on two empirical examples. First, controlling for a rich set of variables, we compare deduction behavior of  immigrants and natives with the same commuting patterns within Sweden's largest commuting zone. We find  that newly arrived immigrants file fewer deductions than natives, that immigrants with a longer duration of stay in the host country behave more like natives, and that immigrants with the longest stay file the most, even more than natives. Second, we analyze bunching behavior among the self-employed at the first central government kink point of the Swedish income tax schedule and find that self-employed immigrants exhibit significantly less bunching behavior than natives, even after a long time in the host country. We highlight residential segregation as a main driver of the observed behavioral differences. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Kalmar, Växjö: Linnaeus University, 2019. p. 60
Series
Working paper series: Linnaeus University Centre for Discrimination and Integration Studies ; 2019:1
Keywords
deductions, tax filing, bunching, immigrants, natives, integration
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-81347 (URN)
Available from: 2019-03-27 Created: 2019-03-27 Last updated: 2019-06-13Bibliographically approved
Angelova, V., Giebe, T. & Ivanova-Stenzel, R. (2018). Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?. Economics Letters, 166, 31-34
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?
2018 (English)In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 166, p. 31-34Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents’ performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2018
Keywords
Contest, Tournament, Real-effort, Experiment, Contract theory, Forward-looking
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics; Economy, Ledarskap, entreprenörskap och organisation; Economy, Business administration
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-71049 (URN)10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.004 (DOI)000429761600007 ()2-s2.0-85042301935 (Scopus ID)
Funder
German Research Foundation (DFG), CRC TRR 190
Available from: 2018-02-23 Created: 2018-02-23 Last updated: 2019-08-29Bibliographically approved
Giebe, T. & Lee, M. (2015). Competitors In Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard Or Also Listened To?. SSRN
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Competitors In Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard Or Also Listened To?
2015 (English)Other (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

There are legal grounds to hear competitors in merger control proceedings, and competitor involvement has gained significance. To what extent this is economically sensible is our question. The competition authority applies some welfare standard while the competitor cares about its own profit. In expectation, there is neither a pure conflict  nor a complete alignment of interest. We distinguish hard and soft information and ask whether hearing the competitor might convey valuable but non-verifiable information to the authority. We find that the authority will mostly have to ignore the competitor's cheap talk but, depending on the authority's own prior information, strictly following the competitor's selfish recommendation can improve the authority's decision. Under a consumer welfare standard, non-verifiable information should be ignored. Complementary to our analysis, we provide empirical data of competitor involvement in EU merger cases and give an overview of the legal discussion in the EU and US.

Place, publisher, year, pages
SSRN, 2015. p. 52
Series
SSRN Working Paper Series
Keywords
Merger control, Antitrust, European Commission, Signaling, Efficiency, Competitors, Rivals
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49424 (URN)10.2139/ssrn.2569832 (DOI)
Funder
German Research Foundation (DFG), CRC 649
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2019-08-07Bibliographically approved
Giebe, T. & Schweinzer, P. (2015). Probabilistic procurement auctions. Review of Economic Design, 19(1), 25-46
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Probabilistic procurement auctions
2015 (English)In: Review of Economic Design, ISSN 1434-4742, E-ISSN 1434-4750, Vol. 19, no 1, p. 25-46Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of money that they offer. Sellers are privately informed on the offered quality of the technology or good. We assume that the procurer cannot perfectly identify the best offer. Thus, with positive and decreasing probability, the second, third, etc. best ratio offered is selected as the winner of the auction. We model this decision process as based on a general noisy ranking of offers. We show that, although the problem seems to be analytically intractable in general, there exists a simple symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium in which everyone follows the simple heuristic to match the same ‘focal’ price–quality ratio.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2015
Keywords
Auctions, Contests, Price–quality ratio, Procurement, Scoring
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49426 (URN)10.1007/s10058-014-0161-6 (DOI)
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved
Ensthaler, L. & Giebe, T. (2014). A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint. Research Policy, 43(1), 179-189
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint
2014 (English)In: Research Policy, ISSN 0048-7333, E-ISSN 1873-7625, Vol. 43, no 1, p. 179-189Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants’ financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated. We propose a new open clock auction for this procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability and limitations. Moreover, we highlight connections to recent advances in computer science.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2014
Keywords
Research, Subsidies, Auctions, Procurement, Budget
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49427 (URN)10.1016/j.respol.2013.06.011 (DOI)
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved
Giebe, T. & Schweinzer, P. (2014). All-pay-all aspects of political decision making. Public Choice, 161(1), 73-90
Open this publication in new window or tab >>All-pay-all aspects of political decision making
2014 (English)In: Public Choice, ISSN 0048-5829, E-ISSN 1573-7101, Vol. 161, no 1, p. 73-90Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Decision-making processes are studied using non-standard all-pay structures. Our interest is motivated by regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications in which individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the general public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, a winner-takes-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2014
Keywords
Auctions, Contests, Regulation, Conflict
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49422 (URN)10.1007/s11127-013-0127-1 (DOI)
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved
Ensthaler, L. & Giebe, T. (2014). Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement. European Journal of Operational Research, 234(3), 774-779
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
2014 (English)In: European Journal of Operational Research, ISSN 0377-2217, E-ISSN 1872-6860, Vol. 234, no 3, p. 774-779Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer’s problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer’s objective function, but only his constraints. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. We report the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer’s problem. We find that simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers are interim optimal.

Keywords
Game theory, Mechanism design, Knapsack problem, Subsidies, Budget, Procurement
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49425 (URN)10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.031 (DOI)
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved
Giebe, T. & Schweinzer, P. (2014). Consuming your way to efficiency: public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries. European Journal of Political Economy, 36, 1-12
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Consuming your way to efficiency: public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries
2014 (English)In: European Journal of Political Economy, ISSN 0176-2680, E-ISSN 1873-5703, Vol. 36, p. 1-12Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We revisit the classical result that taxation of private consumption is distortionary and therefore precludes the efficient provision of public goods. We introduce a nonlinear consumption tax which we call a ‘tax lottery’. Under this scheme, an ad-valorem consumption tax is supplemented with a lottery in which consumers can win cash prizes. The winning probabilities in this lottery depend on all consumers' private good consumption decisions. We show that for a given ad-valorem tax, an appropriately designed lottery can implement an efficient allocation in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The lottery component corrects the distortion in private consumption due to the ad-valorem tax, while the resulting tax revenue is sufficient to efficiently provide the public good and pay out the lottery prize.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2014
Keywords
Public goods, Contests, Taxation, Tax refunds
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49432 (URN)10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.06.006 (DOI)
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved
Giebe, T. (2014). Innovation contests with entry auction. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 55, 165-176
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Innovation contests with entry auction
2014 (English)In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, ISSN 0304-4068, E-ISSN 1873-1538, Vol. 55, p. 165-176Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We consider innovation contests for the procurement of an innovation under moral hazard and adverse selection. Innovators have private information about their abilities, and choose unobservable effort in order to produce innovations of random quality. Innovation quality is not contractible. We compare two procurement mechanisms—a fixed prize and a first-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse selection problem. We find that–if effort and ability are perfect substitutes–both mechanisms implement the same innovations in symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, regardless of whether the innovators’ private information is revealed or not. These equilibria are efficient if the procurer is a welfare-maximizer.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2014
Keywords
Procurement, Contest, Auction, Innovation, Research, Tournament
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49431 (URN)10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.02.004 (DOI)
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-8973-1410