The Abraham Accords, signed by Israel and four Arab states in 2020, were one of President Donald Trump’s most renowned foreign policy successes. They were also one of few of his administration’s policies that enjoyed bipartisan support in the US. But what type of peace has emerged following the Abraham Accords? In what ways do the Abraham Accords go beyond the cold and authoritarian peace that Israel enjoys with Egypt, Jordan and to a certain extent with the Palestinian Authority? Departing from the four dimensions of cold, warm, authoritarian, and democratic peace, this article aims to problematize the peace created after the Abraham Accords. The analysis shows that change in relations between elites and publics during the two years that has followed since the signing of the accords escapes easy categorization and has elements of all four peace dimensions. Trade and tourism have increased significantly, and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco have made alterations in their education about the Holocaust. All this points to a warmer and more recognitional peace than the peace Israel has enjoyed with Egypt and Jordan. However, at the same time, local activists that protest the Abraham Accords are regularly abused. This is done not least with the aid of Israeli cyber technology, which is being exported to three of four Arab states that are part of the Abraham Accords. As we show in the analysis, the new peace and normaliza-tion agreements within the Abraham Accords are part of the modernization strate-gies of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and even Saudi Arabia for the coming decades. These modernization strategies, which include aspects of liberalization as well, shall, with the possible exception of Sudan, not in any way be confused with democratization. 

Forskningen visar med all tydlighet att det verkligen går att tvinga stormakter till kapitulation, krossa ideologier med våld och bomba bort idéer. Men kan Israel göra det med Hamas, frågar sig statsvetaren Anders Persson som forskar om Israel–Palestina-konflikten.

Det sägs ibland att människor definieras av krig. Mina föräldrar definierades av det kalla kriget på samma sätt som mina mor- och farföräldrar hade definierats av det andra världskriget. Min generation, 80-talisterna, skulle komma att definieras av vad George W. Bush den 13:e oktober 2001 kom att kalla för ”det globala kriget mot terrorismen”. För många bedömare, även de mest initierade, var det till en början svårt att föreställa sig att världens högst utvecklade industriland kunde bli så kraftfullt attackerat som USA blev den 11:e september 2001 av al-Qaida, en terrorgrupp med bas i ett av världens minst utvecklade länder. När den populära politiska talkshowen Charlie Rose i USA sände live på kvällen den 11:e september 2001 vägrade flera av de medverkande, den tidens ledande säkerhetspolitiska analytiker, att tro att det enbart var en icke-statlig grupp som låg bakom 11 september-attackerna – så massiv var chocken initialt i USA (Charlie Rose 2001).

In recent years, many academics as well as local actors have started to question the feasibility of a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. Increased Israeli unilateralism, expansionism as well as weak Palestinian institutions have instead pointed toward a “one-state-reality” where Israel is in de facto control over all lands. This in turn reveals a paradox, where international policymakers, most prominently in the EU and the US, and international organizations like the UN, seem determined to insist on a two-state solution, even though all facts on the ground indicate a move away from such a vision where the egalitarian principles inherent in the two-state solution exists in constant tension with expansionist attempts to establish Israeli sovereignty also on Palestinian land. This article unpacks various visions for the future in Israel-Palestine, based on egalitarian principles on the one hand and expansionist ones on the other and display how they current co-exist in a very uneasy relationship. The over-arching aim of the article is to understand how the EU relates to this paradox. We do this in three steps; first we conduct a mapping of visions for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict according to either egalitarian or expansionist principles, where we find one- as well as two-state solutions; second, we conduct a historical analysis on EU positions with regards to the abovementioned principles for solving the conflict, related to other powerful international actors' visions; lastly, we move to an investigation of current developments captured through recent speeches, documents and semi-structured interviews with centrally placed EU staff. Our main conclusion is that even though the EU is determined to hold on to the two state-solution, it however lacks willingness and/or power-resources to push Israel in that direction. Our interviewees seem painfully aware of the lack of viability of the two-state-solution and hence welcome criticism which could push for more egalitarian tendencies in Israel by appealing to its democratic-self-image. Here the current spread of the apartheid narrative among international organizations and an increased international human rights rhetoric emphasizing equal rights for two peoples seem to have left the EU balancing on a tight-rope where they have to choose between standing by status quo, risking supporting ultra-nationalist Israeli sovereignty-aspirations, or criticizing those, instead exposing itself to accusations of antisemitism.

When a delegation from Sweden's ruling party met withNetanyahu recently, it was all broad smiles and handshakes - afar cry from Stockholm's famed criticism of Israel. What haschanged - and why?