The Nordic states have long made distinct choices regarding foreign and security policy principles. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we are witnessing a convergence of the Nordic countries’ general patterns of cooperation within their security policies. We argue that the challenging international context has led to heightened threat perceptions, triggering a reformulation of their foreign policy roles. Based on this assumption the article aims to analyse the convergence of the Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies by tracing changes in their foreign policy roles following Russia’s increasing aggressiveness. We trace the changes in the Nordic countries’ foreign policy roles through three dimensions: the changes to the international order, threat perceptions and perceptions of reduced manoeuvrability in international affairs. Our empirical analysis sheds light on how all Nordic countries perceive an increasing threat to the multilateral rule-based order, which has consequences for the roles of these states, how the threat perceptions of the Nordic states have been on high alert since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and finally how this has significantly impacted the Nordic foreign policy elites’ perception of their countries’ ability to manoeuvre and conduct autonomous foreign policy, motivating radical changes in the roles.

This article focuses on foreign policy role change in small liberal states caused by a weakening rules-based order illustrated by the decisions of Finland and Sweden to apply for membership of NATO, thereby abandoning longstanding policies of military non-alignment. Although both countries sought alignment with NATO in the context of intense security threats in northern Europe, the domestic processes of foreign policy role change proceeded along different trajectories. In Finland, the domestic process of role change was characterized by strong elite and public consensus on membership of NATO, whereas in Sweden there was more hesitation regarding giving up military non-alignment and losing freedom of action. In this article, we address a gap in the literature on role theory and domestic role change by conceptualizing the dilemma of small liberal states being compelled to reassess national role conceptions in their domestic settings in the face of external challenges outside their control, without jeopardizing national autonomy and deep-seated social identities. To this end, we construct a model for national action strategies based on scope conditions of domestic role change, varying according to the level of congruence in national identity and the degree of domestic elite consensus concerning national foreign policy.

The Nordic states have for long made distinct choices regarding foreign and security policy principles. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we are witnessing a convergence of the Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies. We argue that the challenging international context has led to heightened threat perceptions, triggering a reformulation of the foreign policy roles, held by the Nordic countries. Based on this assumption the article aims to analyse the convergence of the Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies by tracing changes in their foreign policy roles following Russia’s increasing aggressiveness. We trace the changes in the Nordic countries’ foreign policy roles through three dimensions: the consequences of a new security situation, threat perceptions, and perceptions of reduced manoeuvrability in international affairs. Our empirical analysis shed light on how all Nordic countries perceive an increasing threat to the multilateral rule-based order which have consequences for the roles of these states, how the threat perceptions of the Nordic states have been on high alert since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and finally how this have significantly impacted the Nordic foreign policy elites’ perception of their countries’ ability to manoeuvre and conduct autonomous foreign policy, motivating radical changes in the roles.

In this policy brief, central themes in Finnish foreign and security polic are analyzed. These themes are playing out in the Nordic, in Europe, in the Arctic and across the Atlantic, in a time of a deteriorating security situation in Europe. The analyzis is based on previous research findings, but also on public statements from Finnish officials. The general conclusion drawn in the brief is that Finland has moved from a role as communicator between East and West, to a role situated in the core of the West.

This policy brief looks at key Swedish foreign and security policy priorities in the Nordic, Europe and across the Atlantic, in a time of great instability and change. With the decision to apply for membership in NATO, Swedish security policy has undergone a complete reversal. At the same time, uncertainty remains regarding whether deeper engagement in the transatlantic, EU, and Nordic arenas can be unified into a single coherent Swedish foreign policy doctrine.

This chapter zooms in on Swedish policy of neutrality and its development over 200 years. Throughout the chapter the ambition is to add nuance to how this policy of neutrality has developed, not least how it has been implemented in flexible ways during changing circumstances. By doing so, the aim is to analyze in what ways the Swedish policy of neutrality can be considered to be a success or not. The chapter presents the background to the modern policy of neutrality through an analysis of the different declarations of neutrality during the 1800s and then moves on with more in-depth analysis of four snapshots, seen as critical junctures, during the 1900s: the First World War, the Second World War, the Cold War, and the post-neutral phase from 1989 onwards. The analysis reveals how the policy has been interpreted in highly flexible ways and also been limited by structural conditions such as geopolitical tension, great power conflicts and potential power vaccum. At the same time, the flexibility has often been paired with a strong desire for predictability. Throughout these periods, it has been repeatedly claimed that the purpose of neutrality is that Sweden’s  behavior should be predictable in a potential crisis and therefore less threatening. The overall conclusion of the chapter is that the success of the Swedish policy of neutrality, and its overarching goal to preserve stability and self-determination, is to be found in this tension between flexibility and predictability.