This article discusses the effects of standard corruption measurement, as used in comparativeresearch, for its accuracy in estimating and understanding corruption. Implicitly, standard measurementstreat corruption as a one-dimensional phenomenon (measured by a single score) that can varyin incidence between countries (or other geographical entities), but not in form. Such measurementsalso tend to equate corruption with bribery. This article argues that the degree to which onedimensionalbribery-focused measurements constitute a suitable proxy for corruption differs acrosscountries (i.e., the measurement discrepancy is not random across countries). In particular, thesemeasurements are ill-suited to capture corruption in established democracies with highly developedeconomies, where corruption is expected to center on gaining access to and influence within strongstate institutions rather than on bribery. Sweden, a “least-corrupt” case, is used to illustrate theeffects of relying on such measurements in such a setting, and to show that whereas bribery mightbe a relatively rare event, undue influence and interest conflicts can be a frequent occurrence.