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Competition and fatigue
Technical University of Berlin, Germany.
Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8973-1410
Technical University of Berlin, Germany.
2022 (English)In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, ISSN 0167-2681, E-ISSN 1879-1751, Vol. 198, p. 236-249Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Sustainable development
SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
Abstract [en]

We study how subjects deal with fatigue in a sequence of tournaments that are linked through fatigue spillovers. We develop a model that allows us to predict the consequences of varying the severity of competition as well as the ease of recovery over time. Even in the presence of fatigue, effort should positively respond to an increase in incentives in a single tournament. A less obvious consequence is the need for strategic resting before and after that tournament. We test our theory using a chosen-effort experiment. While an increase in incentives in the second of three tournaments does lead to higher effort in that tournament, we observe only a tendency for the predicted strategic resting before and after. The increase in incentives does not yield the predicted higher total effort. When recovery is made harder, effort responds negatively as predicted. We complement our study with a real-effort task. Subjects seem to have difficulties simultaneously dealing with physical fatigue as well as the cognitive problem of allocating effort over time.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2022. Vol. 198, p. 236-249
Keywords [en]
Incentives, Fatigue, Recovery, Tournament, Theory, Experiment
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-111369DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.032ISI: 000795684600010Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85128334834Local ID: 2022OAI: oai:DiVA.org:lnu-111369DiVA, id: diva2:1652225
Funder
German Research Foundation (DFG), CRC TRR 190Available from: 2022-04-18 Created: 2022-04-18 Last updated: 2022-06-16Bibliographically approved

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Giebe, Thomas

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
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Output format
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