Abstract

The aim of this essay was to examine the complicated process of state-building in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. This was done by using a theory-consuming case study and utilizing Charles T. Call theory on state-building and his three gaps: capacity, security and legitimacy. By utilizing the previously mentioned theory one can see the glaring issues that exist in all three sectors of the Afghan state. Corruption is a recurrent variable that disturbs performance and trust towards officials while the Taliban are the main military force that meddles with attempts of democratization and progress. The matter of dealing with local leaders and warlords still lacks a cohesive solution and the huge influence of opium remains a considerable source of income for not only terrorists but also a part of the poor population. With the democratic institutions being so fragile and the fear of the US leaving the state by itself, the near future is going to be critical in determining the path Afghanistan will walk in.