This paper discusses the background and aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, exploring safety culture in relation to three essential elements: (I) knowledge, (II) leadership (power), and (III) critical thinking. In my discussion, I establish links between safety culture and these key issues, advocating a long-term outlook on safety and risk management. These findings are based on case study analyses, involving evaluations of accident reports, dialogue seminars, and interviews with representatives of the nuclear community in Japan and Sweden. For the most part, the argument I will pursue is not concerned with what Japan could or should have done differently but the trials and hazards of our society. How, then, can we give the Japanese experience a broader significance? In safety-critical activities, we consider best practice the reliable response although its formulas may have to be modified to particular conditions and circumstances. In other words, there are tacit dimensions of knowledge related to professional activities that are vital to their overall quality. However, the impact of commercial pressures, formalization and the desire to measure, monitor, and control the culture and behavior of workers may force professionals to deprioritize their judgments. Also, disempowerment of knowledge tends to upset the proactive and critical thinking of operatives and employees. If we interpret this as a process of complacency or degeneration, we should consider possible counterweights.