This paper analyzes the duty of external auditors in Swedish joint stock corporations to report suspicions of crime to the public prosecutor. The focus is on the auditors’ experiences since the enactment in 1999. First the background, purpose and critique of the legislation are described, and analyzed with regulation theory. Thereafter follows an investigation of the effects of the legislation. Empirically, the analyses are based on official documents as well as primary data from a postal inquiry survey and secondary data from previous interview studies. The analyses show that the consequences of the legislation concern the auditors’ professional self-identity rather than their client relations. The decrease in client trust feared by the profession did not come about. The legal effect of the reform is ambiguous. On the one hand, there are indications that the legislation is disarmed by some auditors through a “creative compliance”. On the other hand the survey demonstrates a widespread “responsive” utilization of the duty, making it a useful complement to other crime control.