“Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities” is a famous aphorism commonly attributed to Voltaire. The choice to publish under an alias for François-Marie Arouet, reveals that there was some sort of awareness of the relationship between power, knowledge, truth and people’s tyrannical tendencies on his part. What our dear enlightened friend could most likely not foresee, is the enormity of the scale of how big such atrocities can get under the precept of good intentions. For example, both the reign of terror following the French Revolution and the world wars gathered their emotional energy precisely due to their promise of being a manifestation for the greater good. Such dogmatic moral justification of collective benefit, then rationalize and normalize otherwise inexcusable individual transgressions. One of the fads of Anglophone Higher Education over the recent decades has been the introduction of research impact. Both in terms of quality evaluation of research and as a goal for Higher Education in general. For example, the UK national research evaluation defines impact as a ”change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia”. However, since such evaluation constitute part of the wider performance-based research-funding ecosystem; it is highly unlikely that anyone would ever intentionally submit something they themselves regard as a negative. Hence, implicit in this evaluation of research impact is an appeal to the public good. The article systematizes conceptually the distinction between the categories of greater and public good as socially constructed within the context of research in particular and wider society in general. Specifically, we apply the theoretical lens of interaction ritual chains to discuss the confluence of purpose, emotional excitement, and social manipulation in the generation of (research) impact. Conceptually, we distinguish between externally to the university enforced categories of benefit, as compared to bottom-up co-created categories arrived at in collaboration between the university and external stakeholders. Thematically, we focus upon four interconnected contexts in how notions of benefit are constructed and what their role are from the point of view of a microsociology. These are: research grant applications, the research process itself, the publication process and finally research impact evaluation, all in order to approximate the life cycle of research impact and how it relates to notions of the greater or the public good respectively. We conclude with reflecting upon Karl Jaspers ruminations of the utility of ideals for universities, such as scientific truth and academic freedom, as means to differentiate between (genuine) public good and (faux) greater good. Arguably, within the current arrangement not only are these categories undifferentiated, but the instrumentality for other purposes is also the norm and actively promoted by the individuals involved. Specifically, for the state, arguments of impact serve as both justification of investments into research and policy directions. For the research disciplines, they justify their relevancy as to incur future funding. For universities, they receive direct funding through it and use it for promotional purposes. Lastly, academics themselves apply it to argue for their own promotions. Hence, there seems little criticality within contemporary Anglophone universities towards the potential conflation, not to speak of an awareness of the consequences as insinuated by Voltaire.