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Commercial conflict: The case of Russia's contemporary economy
Oxford University. (Extra-Legal Governance Institute)
2007 (English)Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This study has scrutinized the use of legal and extra-legal mechanisms for resolving commercial conflict. The case examined is the Russian economy after the Soviet collapse. The starting-point is the notion that rational economic actors would increasingly turn to the commercial courts if the courts were effective. These courts slowly became more effective in the 1990s if we are to judge by the growing number of civil cases submitted for review, but the low rate of enforcement of court decisions suggests the opposite. This leads to the primary research puzzle: why would supposedly rational economic actors use ineffective commercial courts, when a supply of legal and extra-legal alternatives for conflict resolution is present?

The investigation draws on a wide range of quantitative and qualitative evidence to unpack the puzzle. The qualitative evidence consists of 59 in-depth interviews with economic actors and legal specialists in Russia. The quantitative evidence includes official statistics and two surveys on enterprises in Russia. Secondary analyses have been carried out on court-case records, media reportings, and data published in research literature on the use of courts in Russia.

The study suggests that economic actors were, in fact, avoiding the ineffective courts in the 1990s and a considerable proportion of the civil cases submitted to the courts were fabricated bogus conflicts. Economic actors fabricate and submit bogus conflicts in order to strategically manipulate the court, with the goal being to achieve a veil of legality for extra-legal business activities. A central piece of evidence is that economic actors who accept corruption outside the judiciary are more likely to trust the ineffective courts, than those who reject corruption outside the judiciary. The pattern of strategic manipulation of the courts tends to subvert the law and may, over time, erode the state’s legitimacy.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford , 2007. , 389 p.
National Category
Sociology
Research subject
Social Sciences, Sociology
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:vxu:diva-7444OAI: oai:DiVA.org:vxu-7444DiVA: diva2:302519
Public defence
(English)
Supervisors
Available from: 2010-09-06 Created: 2010-03-08 Last updated: 2010-09-06Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf