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A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint
University College London, UK.
TU Berlin, Germany.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8973-1410
2014 (English)In: Research Policy, ISSN 0048-7333, E-ISSN 1873-7625, Vol. 43, no 1, p. 179-189Article in journal (Refereed) Published
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Abstract [en]

This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants’ financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated. We propose a new open clock auction for this procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability and limitations. Moreover, we highlight connections to recent advances in computer science.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2014. Vol. 43, no 1, p. 179-189
Keyword [en]
Research, Subsidies, Auctions, Procurement, Budget
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economy, Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49427DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2013.06.011OAI: oai:DiVA.org:lnu-49427DiVA, id: diva2:898849
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved

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Giebe, Thomas

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CiteExportLink to record
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  • apa
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  • Other locale
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  • asciidoc
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