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Bad governance of family firms: The adoption of good governance on the boards of directors in family firms
Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Management Accounting and Logistics. (Corporate Governance Research Group)ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8009-9949
Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Management Accounting and Logistics. (Corporate Governance Research Group)
2016 (English)In: Ephemera : Theory and Politics in Organization, ISSN 2052-1499, E-ISSN 1473-2866, Vol. 16, no 1, p. 53-77Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The concept of good governance, as the manifestation of a larger ideology of shareholder value maximization, is designed for and promoted by large, manager-controlled listed corporations. The increasing adoption and growing legitimacy of good governance have led to the formation of a dominant institutional logic, which family firms experience pressure to adopt. Particularly strong is the pressure to increase the independence of the board of directors. While the process of change towards more independent boards may not necessarily contribute to increased economic efficiency or be fully able to fulfill the governance needs of family firms, these firms continue to adopt such practices. Drawing on institutional theory, we propose that institutional pressure is the dominant reason for family firms to adopt board independence. We then deduce potential consequences of this change, including positive consequences in terms of creation of both social and economic value, as well as negative consequences in terms of dilution of board meetings, demotivation of managers and decreased collaboration in the boardroom. Our study suggests that the benefits associated with the adoption of good governance can become offset by a decrease in the strategic adaptability of a firm.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 16, no 1, p. 53-77
Keywords [en]
Family firms, corporate governance, board of directors, good governance, agency theory
National Category
Business Administration
Research subject
Economy, Business administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-50789OAI: oai:DiVA.org:lnu-50789DiVA, id: diva2:912265
Available from: 2016-03-16 Created: 2016-03-16 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved

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Ponomareva, YuliyaAhlberg, Jenny

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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
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  • Other locale
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