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Public Provision of Private Goods, Tagging and Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneity in Needs
Uppsala University.
Uppsala University.
Uppsala University ; University of Milan, Italy ; Bocconi University, Italy.
2010 (English)Report (Other academic)
Resource type
Text
Abstract [en]

Previous literature has shown that public provision of private goods can be a welfareenhancing device in second-best settings where governments pursue redistributive goals. However, three issues have so far been neglected. First, the case for supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods has been made in models where agents dier only in terms of market ability. Second, the magnitude of the welfare gains achievable through public provision schemes has not been assessed. Third, the similarities/dierences between public provision schemes and tagging schemes have not been thoroughly analyzed. Our purpose in this paper is therefore threefold: rst, to extend previous contributions by incorporating in the theoretical analysis both heterogeneity in market ability and in the need for the publicly provided good; second, to perform numerical simulations to quantify the size of the potential welfare gains achievableby introducing a public provision scheme, and to characterize the conditions under which these welfare gains are sizeable; nally, to compare the welfare gains from public provision with the welfare gains from tagging.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2010. , p. 47
Series
Working paper / Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University ; 2010:14
Keywords [en]
optimal income taxation, in-kind transfers, tagging
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-51253OAI: oai:DiVA.org:lnu-51253DiVA, id: diva2:913801
Available from: 2016-03-22 Created: 2016-03-22 Last updated: 2016-04-22Bibliographically approved

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Bastani, Spencer

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf