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  • 1.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Antikorruption: arbetet mot korruption2012In: Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption? / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Stockholm: Transparency International Sverige , 2012, 1, p. 99-112Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Beyond Unidimensional Measurement of Corruption2017In: Public Integrity, ISSN 1099-9922, E-ISSN 1558-0989, Vol. 19, no 1, p. 58-76Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article discusses the effects of standard corruption measurement, as used in comparativeresearch, for its accuracy in estimating and understanding corruption. Implicitly, standard measurementstreat corruption as a one-dimensional phenomenon (measured by a single score) that can varyin incidence between countries (or other geographical entities), but not in form. Such measurementsalso tend to equate corruption with bribery. This article argues that the degree to which onedimensionalbribery-focused measurements constitute a suitable proxy for corruption differs acrosscountries (i.e., the measurement discrepancy is not random across countries). In particular, thesemeasurements are ill-suited to capture corruption in established democracies with highly developedeconomies, where corruption is expected to center on gaining access to and influence within strongstate institutions rather than on bribery. Sweden, a “least-corrupt” case, is used to illustrate theeffects of relying on such measurements in such a setting, and to show that whereas bribery mightbe a relatively rare event, undue influence and interest conflicts can be a frequent occurrence.

  • 3.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Corruption2016In: Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance / [ed] Farazmand, Ali, Springer, 2016, p. 1-10Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Umeå universitet.
    Corruption in Sweden: Exploring Danger Zones and Change 2002Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Ethics Management Strategies in Public Organisations: The Case of Sweden2019In: Presented at The Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Administration (Panel: Best Practices in Public Ethics Management: The Role of Democratic Values), March 10, 2019, Washington, D.C, 2019Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Exploring Corruption in Sweden: Types of Corruption, Danger Zones, and Control Mechanisms2008Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ever more research is engaged in understanding corruption. But we still need more knowledge about which areas in society it affects, and how institutional and contextual conditions influence corruption and the risk of corruption. Moreover, countries regarded as among the least corrupt have seldom been examined. This book addresses these gaps. It employs a multi-method approach that combines case- and variable-orientated strategies to study corruption and corruption risks in the public sector in Sweden, a country that the literature regards as having few problems of this type. The empirical studies are conducted using a comparative logic and with an eye to international comparisons. The study draws upon a range of data, such as surveys, newspaper articles and primary sources, including legal documents and a large number of personally conducted interviews. This book is relevant for scholars, students and practitioners with an interest in corruption risks in representative democracy in general and the public sector in particular.

  • 7. Andersson, Staffan
    Hederlighetens pris: en ESO-rapport om korruption (Ds 1999:62)1999Book (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Korruption i Sverige2012In: Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption? / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Stockholm: Transparency International Sverige , 2012, 1, p. 79-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Lessons from a Least Corrupt Case2015Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 10.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Litteraturgranskning/anmälan av avhandling: Conditions for Corruption: Institutions, Executive Power, and Privatization in Argentina and Chile in the 1990s, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, av Viviana Stechina.2010In: Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, ISSN 0039-0747Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption?2012Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 12.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Offentlig sektor2012In: Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption? / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Stockholm: Transparency International Sverige , 2012, 1, p. 203-232Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 13. Andersson, Staffan
    Partifinansiering: en riskzon för korruption (i SOU 2004:22)2004Report (Other academic)
  • 14. Andersson, Staffan
    Personvalskampanjer i kommun- och landstingsvalen 2002 (i SOU 2004:22)2004Report (Other academic)
  • 15. Andersson, Staffan
    Political Corruption in Sweden2003In: Corruption in Contemporary Politics / [ed] Martin Bull & James Newell, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan , 2003, p. 135-148Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Riksrevisionen2012In: Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption? / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Stockholm: Transparency International Sverige , 2012, 1, p. 329-350Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Sammanfattning och rekommendationer2012In: Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption? / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Stockholm: Transparency International Sverige , 2012, 1, p. 17-37Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Slutsatser och avslutande diskussion2012In: Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption? / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Stockholm: Transparency International Sverige , 2012, 1, p. 469-479Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 19.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Storbritannien2015In: Komparativ politik: nio politiska system / [ed] Denk, Thomas & Anckar, Carsten, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2015, p. 41-75Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Storbritannien2018In: Komparativ politik: tio politiska system / [ed] Thomas Denk, Carsten Anckar, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2018, 2 uppl., p. 41-76Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [sv]

    Storbritanniens styrelseskick beskrivs traditionellt som inriktat på att skapa en kraftfull verkställande makt med få inbyggda kontrollmekanismer. Detta brukar benämnas majoritetsdemokrati eller Westminstermodellen efter det område i London där det brittiska parlamentet ligger. Utmärkande för styret är en monark som statschef med ceremoniella uppgifter, parlamentarism som tillsammans med majoritetsvalsystem och tvåpartisystem skapar starka regeringar och territoriet organiserat som en enhetsstat. Konstitutionen brukar också beskrivas som ”icke-skriven”, eftersom den inte är kodifierad i en samlad lag med särskild ställning. Dessa drag och landets utveckling mot demokrati är ett resultat av en lång historisk process med gradvisa förändringar. Flera av styrelseskickets särdrag är dock under förändring med fler inslag av maktdelning. Det gäller såväl förhållandet mellan den centrala och den subnationella nivån – vars folkvalda församlingar övertid tilldelats ökade befogenheter – som förhållandet mellan institutioner, där regeringen och parlamentets traditionella suveränitet har påverkats. Dessutom har Storbritanniens beslut att lämna Europeiska Unionen ytterligare bidragit till påfrestningar och nya frågeställningar kring maktdelningen mellan olika styrelsenivåer.

  • 21.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Studying the Risk of Corruption in the Least Corrupt Countries2008In: Public Integrity, ISSN 1099-9922, E-ISSN 1558-0989, Vol. 10, no 3, p. 193-214Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article provides a conceptual framework for studies of areas of politics and public policy in which political corruption is most likely to emerge (danger zones). The use of principal-agent theory in qualitative case studies is recommended. This approach gives attention to context, to the specifics of institutional design, and to individual choice as found in the "least corrupt" countries of the world.

  • 22.
    Andersson, Staffan
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    The Varieties of Corruption: Lessons From a Least Corrupt Case2013In: Corruption in least corrupt countries. Scope, causes and consequences, Bergen 26-27 August 2013., 2013, p. 1-36Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the main drivers of the rapid growth of corruption research the last 20 years is the easy access to empirical data via corruption rankings and composite indices that can be used for large-N analysis. It is also these indicators that mainly are used to place countries in the comparative literature (and elsewhere) and in analyses of the relationship between corruption and, among else, democracy, economic output and growth and institutional performance. Without doubt this literature has contributed to the field but there are also problems. In focus here are the effects of the habitual treatment of corruption as a single-dimensional phenomenon, and often tantamount to bribery, and as spatially constant within a country. I argue that the effects of this on our estimations and understanding of corruption are particularly well illustrated by established democracies with highly developed market economies placed in the category of “least-corrupt” countries (as manyWest European states), as corruption in these countries on theoretical grounds can be assumed not to centre on bribery. In the article I use Sweden, almost always referred to as a least corrupt case, to unveil what we see using various corruption indicators but also what we do not see when we employ the standard comparative measurements and legal data. Although we would expect corruption types other than bribery to be important in such a case (a least corrupt one), not least conflict of interest, this is missed out when we use the indicators that have become the standard in the literature. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the accuracy of corruption measurement and by arguing for studies that nuance our picture of corruption, and also bring in conflict of interest.

  • 23.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Anechiarico, Frank
    Hamilton College, USA.
    Corruption and Corruption Control: Democracy in the Balance2019Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Corruption in politics and public administration is pervasive and difficult to eliminate. It has a strong effect on public attitudes toward government and is at the same time badly understood. A clear, comprehensive understanding of corruption is critical to the goal of ethical government that is trusted by the public. In this short and accessible text, Staffan Andersson and Frank Anechiarico demonstrate how the dynamics of life in organizations both generate corruption and make it difficult to prevent without undermining the effectiveness of government. They argue that how we define corruption, how we measure it, and how we try to combat it are strongly interrelated and should not be seen as separate issues. The authors demonstrate how this integrated approach, together with a focus on the damage caused by corruption to civic inclusivity and participation, can serve as an entry point for understanding the quality of democracy and the challenge of good governance. Using examples from mainly the United States and Sweden, Andersson and Anechiarico establish that recent anti-corruption reforms in public administration have often been narrowly focused on bribery (exchange corruption) and law enforcement approaches, while doing too little to other problems and forms of corruption. Corruption and Corruption Control: Democracy in the Balance will be of great interest to all students of politics, public administration and management, and ethics.

  • 24.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Anechiarico, Frank
    Shaping the State to Private Purposes:  A Comparison of Conflicts of Interest in Sweden and the United States2014In: The 2014 EGPA Annual Conference,  8-12 September, Speyer, Germany, Permanent Study Group VII : Quality and Integrity of governance, 2014Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 25.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Anechiarico, Frank
    The political economy of conflicts of interest in an era of public-private governance2014In: Routledge handbook of political corruption / [ed] Heywood, Paul M., Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, p. 253-269Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 26.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Anechiarico, Frank
    The political economy of conflicts of interest in an era of public-private governance2012In: 2012 EGPA Annual Conference, 5-8 sept 2012, Bergen, Norway, 2012Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Babajan, Tigran
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Korruptionen i det svenska folkstyret: vad säger medborgarna?2014In: Surveyjournalen, ISSN 2001-9327, Vol. 1, no 2, p. 103-121Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 28.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Bergh, AndreasLund University.Erlingsson, GissurLinköping University.Sjölin, MatsLinnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet2010Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 29.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Bergh, Andreas
    Erlingsson, Gissur Ó
    Avslutning: Vad kan vi lära oss?2010In: Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Andreas Bergh, Gissur Ó Erlingsson, Stockholm: Norstedts Förlag, 2010, p. 260-275Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 30.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Bergh, Andreas
    Lund University ; Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    Erlingsson, Gissur ó
    Linköping University.
    Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet i mogna demokratier2014In: Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Andreas Bergh, Gissur Ò Erlingsson, Mats Sjölin, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2014, 2, p. 15-27Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 31.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Bergh, Andreas
    Lund University ; Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    Erlingsson, Gissur Ó
    Linköping University.
    Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet i mogna demokratier2010In: Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Andreas Bergh, Gissur Ó Erlingsson, Mats Sjölin, Stockholm: Norstedts Förlag, 2010, 1, p. 15-27Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 32.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Bergh, Andreas
    Lund University ; Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    Erlingsson, Gissur Ó
    Linköping University.
    Vad kan vi läras oss?2014In: Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet / [ed] Andersson, Staffan, Andreas Bergh, Gissur Ó Erlingsson, Mats Sjölin, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2014, 2, p. 263-278Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 33.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Bergh, AndreasLund University ; Research Institute of Industrial Economics.Erlingsson, Gissur ÓLinköping University.Sjölin, MatsLinnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet2014Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 34.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Bergman, Torbjörn
    Södertörns högskola.
    Controlling Corruption in the Public Sector2009In: Scandinavian Political Studies, ISSN 0080-6757, E-ISSN 1467-9477, Vol. 32, no 1, p. 45-70Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies in the framework of principal-agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.

  • 35.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Bergman, Torbjörn
    Södertörns högskola.
    Ersson, Svante
    The European Representative Democracy Data Archive, Release 2. Main sponsor: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (In2007-0149:1-E). [www.erdda.se]2013Other (Other academic)
  • 36.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Bergman, Torbjörn
    Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Umeå universitet.
    Ersson, Svante
    Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Umeå universitet.
    The European Representative Democracy Data Archive, Release 32014Other (Other academic)
  • 37.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Bromander, Tobias
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of pedagogy.
    Legitimate and legal boundaries for political entrepreneurship2016In: Political entrepreneurship: regional growth and entrepreneurial diversity in Sweden / [ed] Karlsson, Charlie; Silander, Charlotte; Silander, Daniel, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, p. 21-39Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 38.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Bromander, Tobias
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Politiska entreprenörer, nätverk och intressekonflikter2015In: Politiskt entreprenörskap: Den offentliga sektorns sätt att skapa bättre förutsättningar för entreprenörskap lokalt, regionalt och nationellt / [ed] Silander, Daniel & Silander, Charlotte, Stockholm: Santérus Förlag, 2015, p. 133-152Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 39.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Erlingsson, Gissur Ò.
    Linköping University.
    Förvaltningsreformer och korruptionsrisker2014In: Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet / [ed] Andersson, Staffan, Andreas Bergh, Gissur Ó Erlingsson, Mats Sjölin, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2014, 2, p. 192-234Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 40.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Erlingsson, Gissur Ó
    Linköping University.
    Förvaltningsreformer och korruptionsrisker2010In: Korruption, maktmissbruk och legitimitet / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Andreas Bergh, Gissur Ó Erlingsson, Mats Sjölin, Stockholm: Norstedts Förlag, 2010, p. 192-234Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 41.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Erlingsson, Gissur Ó.
    Linköpings universitet.
    New Public Management and Risks of Corruption: The Case of Sweden2012In: The Social Construction of Corruption in Europe / [ed] Dirk Tänzler, Konstadinos Maras and Angelos Giannakopoulos, Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, p. 33-58Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 42.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Ersson, Svante
    Umeå universitet.
    The European Representative Democracy Data Archive2012Other (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We believe that a key to progress in terms of a better understanding of democratic politics rests on a research agenda that combines the best of cross-national statistical research with in-depth studies of historical pathways (path dependency), norms and practices in an analysis of rational politicians seeking power and policy influence. To enable us to conduct research on both that which is common across countries and specific to regions and the historical configuration of an individual country, we have built a new database with comparative data on cabinets, parliaments and political parties. It contains comparative data on 29 European countries

  • 43.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Ersson, Svante
    Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Umeå universitet.
    Redeback, Shanthi
    Umeå universitet.
    Regeringen2012In: Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption? / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Stockholm: Transparency International Sverige , 2012, 1, p. 141-164Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 44.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Ersson, Svante
    Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Umeå universitet.
    Redeback, Shanthi
    Umeå universitet.
    Riksdagen2012In: Motståndskraft, oberoende, integritet: Kan det svenska samhället stå emot korruption? / [ed] Staffan Andersson, Stockholm: Transparency International Sverige , 2012, 1, p. 115-138Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 45.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Heywood, Paul M
    Corruption and Democratic Stability: on the Unintended Consequences of International Anti-Corruption Campaigns2008In: Governments, NGOs and Anti-Corruption: The New Integrity Warriors, Routledge, London , 2008Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 46.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Heywood, Paul M
    University of Nottinham.
    The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency International’s Approach to Measuring Corruption2009In: Political Studies, ISSN 0032-3217, E-ISSN 1467-9248, Vol. 57, no 4, p. 746-767Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 47.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences. Statsvetenskap.
    Martínez Cousinou, Gloria
    Institute for Advanced Social Studies of Andalusia, Spanish Council for Scientific Research.
    Controlling political corruption in the United Kingdom2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Existing case studies of control of political corruption often lack a theoretical framework that can provide for systematic empirical research and comparisons between cases and countries. To remedy this, we apply principal-agent theory qualitatively to study the United Kingdom, with a particular emphasis given to an in-depth study of control measures employed to Parliament, the Executive and political parties. We give a detailed account of the approach undertaken to control political corruption in these risk areas for corruption, and discuss its implications and why some types of measures prevail over others.

  • 48.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Martínez-Cousinou, Gloria
    El control de la corrupción: Un marco analítico para su estudio2009In: Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia, ISSN 1315-2378, Vol. 43, p. 103-126Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Institutional Control of Corruption: an Analytical Framework for its Study

    Designing and implementing institutional mechanisms to control corruption are key strategies for improving the democratic quality of political systems. For this reason, not only does this issue occupy a priority position in the political agenda of a number of governmental and international organizations, but there is also a large body of specialized literature on this subject.

    In spite of a number of existing studies that focus on the importance of the role that institutions play in curbing corruption, the literature centered specifically on the empirical evaluation of such mechanisms in a particular country, or on the theoretical analysis of how they contribute to increased accountability of public officials, is less abundant. To address this lack, this article suggests an analytical framework based on the Principal-Agent theory, to propose systematic empirical research of institutional measures for controlling corruption. This analytical framework is based on two criteria for classification. The first one distinguishes between ex ante and ex post measures, depending on when the specific mechanisms are enacted: before or after the delegation of authority between the Principal and the Agent has taken place. The second criterion distinguishes between a priori and a posteriori measures, depending on whether the specific mechanism is implemented before or after the act of corruption itself has occurred. Different theoretical consequences derive from each approach in terms of the projected effectiveness of the ensuing controls in reducing agency problems.

    Thus, the proposed framework serves to shed light on two main issues: the identification of the prevailing approach to control corruption in a specific country, and the estimation of the theoretical effectiveness of that approach. However, the most important innovation prompted by the application of this analytical framework, is that it provides for several types of comparison: between different approaches for controlling corruption in various case studies, between various areas of heightened risk for corruption within a country -such as party financing, corruption of members of parliament, ministers, etc.- and between such specific risk areas in different countries. To allow these different types of comparison, the concept of a danger zone of corruption is proposed. This concept refers to the areas and functions of the system that are vulnerable to corruption: areas of vulnerability where occurrence of corruption is likely, and conditions that are likely to promote corruption. Using this concept, it is possible to delineate the vulnerable areas in a specific system, and thereafter, to apply the proposed analytical framework in order to better describe the current approaches taken to control corruption in a given country.

    The necessary specific steps to identify these danger zones, as well as to empirically apply the proposed analytical framework are detailed in this article, using several examples from the British system. Due to the highly developed institutional measures to circumvent corruption in place in the United Kingdom, this case effectively illustrates the utility of the proposed framework.

    In summary, the purpose of this article is to fulfill a deficit in the existing literature on the control of corruption, by providing a novel theoretical framework for the descriptive analysis of institutional mechanisms and their theoretical effectiveness in specific contexts and at the comparative level.

  • 49.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Martínez-Cousinou, Gloria
    Institute for Advanced Social Studies of Andalusia, Spanish Council for Scientific Research.
    El control institucional de la corrupción. Un marco analítico para su estudio2008In: Conference: IV Congreso Andaluz de Sociología: Sponsored by the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, and Carmona (Seville, Spain), 2008Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 50.
    Andersson, Staffan
    et al.
    Växjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences.
    Sjölin, MatsVäxjö University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences. Statsvetenskap.
    Arbetsgrupp: Offentlig korruption och politisk etik: Konferens: Nordic Political Science Association’s annual conference 20082008Conference proceedings (editor) (Refereed)
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