Since 2008, Europe has been facing an economic crisis with considerable impacts on all EU member states. The enduring crisis situation has been an exogenous trigger for policy changes and has impacted different EU policy fields. Studies have examined the crisis effects on the European internal market by focusing predominantly on financial market regulations. One area has been neglected so far. The regulation of public procurement is one core driver for competitiveness and growth in the member states. Public procurement has become a ‘policy strategy instrument’ and is considered key for lifting the EU out of the crisis. It accounts for approximately 14% of EU GDP involving a population of over 250.000 contracting public authorities. In 2014, new EU rules were adopted to reshape the European public procurement procedures. The public procurement regime reflects two opposite dynamics: the strengthening of the internal market by harmonization and the orientation on national priorities. By analyzing the impacts of the economic crisis on the EU policy on public procurement through historical institutionalist lens, this study demonstrates how the economic crisis shaped the regime on public procurement and how the EU managed to enhance harmonization and European integration despite an increasing national protectionism.Share this page

While previous research on the impact of the economic crisis on EU policy has primarily focused on the internal market and financial market regulations, the effect on public procurement has so far been neglected. This lack of attention is surprising. Public procurement accounts for approximately 14% of the EU GDP and involves over 250.000 contracting public authorities.Therefore, procurement is considered essential for lifting the EU out of the crisis by promoting competitiveness and growth. Nevertheless, public procurement reflects contradictory developments. Whereas the European Commission strives for greater harmonisation, member states often focus on national priorities. By comparing the old and new procurement regimes through the lenses of historic institutionalism, this article demonstrates that the EU managed to enhance harmonisation despite tendencies of increased national protectionism. The article finds that procurement became a much more prominent policy instrument for greater market integration subsequent to the economic crisis.

In the Council of the European Union (EU), a qualified majority is mostly required to adopt legislative acts. Based on this majority rule, individual member states can be outvoted and are subsequently obliged to implement the law. This article analyses whether opposition in the Council of the EU affects the transposition of directives into national law by using the example of Austria from 2000 to 2008. The results demonstrate that domestic factors, rather than a negative political attitude, were responsible for delays and procedures when implementing previously contested directives. However, the effects of opposition in the Council on implementation were particularly apparent in cases where there was a high degree of misfit between EU provisions and the domestic legal structure.

While many studies have focused on the European Commission and its potential to act as a policy entrepreneur, scant research has been undertaken into how intergovernmental institutions as a whole are able to shape and advocate certain policies. This paper fills that gap by analysing the Council debates on two major European Union strategies, namely the Small Business Act for Europe and the Europe 2020 strategy.

The debates were analysed on the basis of newspaper articles in the daily bulletins of Agence Europe, and the 469 statements identified were qualitatively evaluated by means of content analysis. The results demonstrate that the Council as a whole is able to act as a policy entrepreneur if certain conditions are met, namely a common interest and political goal among member states, a need for economic measures due to a crisis situation, and the possibility of shifting unpopular decisions to Brussels.

While many studies have focused on the European Commission and its potential to act as a policy entrepreneur, little research has been undertaken into how intergovernmental institutions as a whole are able to shape and advocate certain policies. This article fills that gap by analysing debates in the Council of the European Union on two major strategies: the Small Business Act for Europe and the Europe 2020 strategy. These debates were analysed using newspaper articles in the daily bulletins of Agence Europe, yielding 469 statements which were qualitatively evaluated by means of content analysis. The results demonstrate that the Council as a whole is able to act as a policy entrepreneur if certain conditions are met, namely a common interest and political goal among member states, a need for economic measures due to a crisis situation, and the possibility of shifting unpopular decisions to Brussels.

In order to adopt binding legislation in the Council of the European Union, a qualified majority is required in most policy fields. Due to this majority rule, individual Member States can be outvoted when adopting legislation that has to be implemented into national law. What are the specific effects of being outvoted in the Council on the transposition of Directives? Does oppositional behaviour in the Council (defined as a vote against or an abstention) actually induce Member States to transpose the respective Directive with a delay or not in compliance with the law? This doctoral thesis will answer these questions by using the example of Austria during the investigation period from 2000 to 2008. In order to answer the research questions, a mixed methods approach with the integration of both qualitative and quantitative elements was chosen. Initially, a comprehensive data set was generated which included information on all formally adopted Directives and the voting behaviour of Member States between 2000 and 2008. The analysis of this data set revealed – among other things – that out of 439 Directives, Austria voted against a new law five times and abstained from voting in seven cases. Only Belgium (with 19 oppositional votes) showed an oppositional attitude more often, while France was equal to Austria with 12 cases of oppositional voting. Austria’s cases of opposition referred to the following Directives: Firearms Directive (2008/51), Critical Infrastructure Directive (2008/114), Timeshare Directive (2008/122), Directive laying down minimum rules for the protection of chickens kept for meat production (2007/43), Directive for working conditions of mobile workers engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector (2005/47), Packaging Waste Directive (2004/12), Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35), Linking Directive (2004/101), Directive on the intra-Community trade in and imports of semen of domestic animals of the bovine species (2003/43), Directive as regards health requirements for animal by-products (2002/33), Tobacco Products Directive (2001/37) and Directive on measures for the control of classical swine fever (2001/89). These twelve Directives, the corresponding decision-making process at EU level, and the respective transposition at the national level were analysed qualitatively, which included 22 expert interviews. A survival analysis was then applied to calculate and compare the delays in the transposition of approved and opposed Directives. The number of initiated infringement procedures (including preliminary proceedings) was also assessed. The results demonstrate that, rather than a negative political attitude, other factors were crucial for delays and procedures when transposing Directives during the period under investigation. These factors included changes of government, domestic conflicts, federal structures, issue linkage (the linkup of EU-Directives with national reforms), the transposition deadline set by the Commission, uncertainties about the level of adaptation, and administrative difficulties. It is not common political practice in Austria to express an oppositional stance towards an EU-Directive by neglecting to implement the Directive.

This article explores whether disintegration, in the form of increased non-compliance with EU law, has occurred in the EU member states between 1997 and 2016. The contribution is twofold. First, we develop hypotheses to test the argument that non-compliance with EU law increases when member states experience growing economic constraints and political turbulence. However, the hypotheses are conclusively rejected. Second, while we demonstrate distinct differences between member states’ compliance by the end of the 1990s, our time-series analyses demonstrate that these disparities disappeared over time. Taken together, our findings not only suggest that economic factors, government capacity, and, above all, domestic politics become gradually decoupled from the European integration process but also that cultural differences in law observance become increasingly irrelevant to explain the behaviour of governments. We conclude by arguing that the strong trend towards harmonisation probably is explained by a changed culture of EU transposition and enforcement.

This article explores whether a process of disintegration affected the transposition deficit and infringement procedures in the EU member states between 1997 and 2016. The contribution is twofold. First, we develop hypotheses to test the argument that non-compliance with EU law increases when member states experience growing economic constraints and political turbulence. However, the hypotheses are conclusively rejected. Second, while we demonstrate distinct differences between member states’ compliance by the end of the 1990s, our time-series analyses demonstrate that these disparities disappeared over time. Taken together, our findings not only suggest that economic factors, government capacity, and, above all, domestic politics become gradually decoupled from the European integration process but also that cultural differences in law observance become increasingly irrelevant to explain the behaviour of governments. We conclude by arguing that the strong trend towards harmonisation probably is explained by a changed culture of EU transposition and enforcement.