In this essay I will argue that beauty is an important part of human well-being. Not only may experiences of beauty contribute to physical and mental recuperation, but beauty also figures importantly in our conceptions of ourselves and our natural and social environment. Relating ourselves to norms of beauty and evaluating our environment from the point of view of its (lack of) beauty, we form ourselves aesthetic identities that are also important aspects of our self-esteem. Given the importance of beauty to human well-being, and given that an argument can be given for a right to well-being, the conclusion of this essay will be that there is also a right to beauty.

In this essay, I intend to argue that the concept of magic can be extended to cover an agent’s use of works of art to influence her perceptions of herself and of reality. More specifically, I intend to argue that works of art can be used to create, confirm, or affirm normative identities, that is, conceptions of ourselves as standing in a special relationship to certain norms and values. My argument will include contributions to the discussion of magic as well as agency in art made by Robin Collingwood, Ernst Gombrich, and Alfred Gell. I will conclude by providing some examples of how perceptually magic uses of art can function to form normative identities. I will also say something about how to morally evaluate such uses of art.

Är det rätt att förvägra ett barn fungerande hörsel, om ett annat barn inte har råd med operationen? Bör vi acceptera att vissa grupper undantas från generella lagar och regler, av kulturella skäl? Och vilken plikt har ett materiellt starkt väst att minska den globala ojämlikheten? 

Få begrepp är så positivt laddade i Sverige som jämlikhet. Men vilken jämlikhet är det vi pratar om? I rapporten Bortom missunnsamhetens etik - argument för rättighetsbaserat jämlikhetstänkande urskiljer Per Bauhn, professor i praktisk filosofi vid Linnéuniversitetet, olika sätt att tolka begreppet och hittar ett som både är moraliskt försvarbart och politiskt användbart ur ett frihetligt perspektiv.

In this paper, I intend to develop and defend an argument claiming that the intentional vandalizing of an environment experienced by other people as beautiful implies a violation of these people’s human right to well-being. My argument presupposes that vandalist attacks on environmental beauty can detract from human well-being in two different ways. First, such attacks will undermine the self-esteem of people who have come to identify with their environment. Second, vandalist attacks will undermine people’s sense of living in a well-ordered community and of being safe and secure. Hence, assuming that there is at least a prima facie and negative human right to well-being (that is, a right not to have one’s well-being arbitrarily interfered with), acts of vandalism are prima facie morally wrong. That acts of vandalism are prima facie morally wrong does not exclude the possibility that they might sometimes still be justified, as when monuments dedicated to oppressive rulers are torn down. However, to the extent that a democratic decision procedure is available, decisions about public aesthetics should be made by the community as a whole, not by individuals acting on their own initiative. Sometimes it is argued that persons who vandalize have legitimate grievances against their society and that their acts of vandalizations should be understood as a justified protest against marginalization and alienation. However, this account does not apply to all vandals; moreover, even when it does apply, the morally preferred solution to resentful acts of vandalism should not be to condone these acts, but rather to remove those background conditions of marginalization and alienation that characterize their agents.

Politiska eftergifter till islamism har sin bakgrund i folkhemstanken om jämlikhet. Men jämlikhet mellan kulturer tycks bli viktigare än jämlikhet inom kulturer. Om vi som samhälle menar allvar med rätten till frihet, måste vi också i praktik och politik försvara denna rätt mot frihetsfientliga religiösa övertygelser, skriver Per Bauhn, professor i praktisk filosofi.