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  • 1.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala University.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala University.
    Vad är optimal beskattning?2010In: Framtider, ISSN 0281-0492, no 3, p. 18-21Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    Hur tar man in skatter utan att det nämnvärt påverkar individernas ochföretagens agerande? Artikeln handlar om optimal beskattning som en vägatt skapa skatteintäkter för att finansiera omfördelningen till samhälletsbehövande – utan att samhällsekonomin störs. Ekonomerna ThomasAronsson, Spencer Bastani och Sören Blomquist presenterar forskningsfältetoch diskuterar samspelet mellan inkomstskatter och varuskatter.

  • 2.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala University.
    Essays on the Economics of Income Taxation2012Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis consists of five self-contained essays.

    Essay 1. (with Sören Blomquist and Luca Micheletto) 

    Using a calibrated overlapping-generations model we quantify the welfare gains of an age-dependent labor income tax. Agents face uncertainty regarding future abilities and can transfer consumption across periods through savings. The welfare gain of switching from an age-independent to an age-dependent nonlinear tax varies between 2.4% and 4% of GDP. Part of the welfare gain is due to capital accumulation effects and part descends from relaxing incentive-compatibility constraints. The welfare gain is of about the same magnitude as the welfare gain that can be achieved by moving from a linear- to a nonlinear labor income tax. Finally, the welfare loss from tax-exempting interest income is negligible under an optimal age-dependent labor income tax.

    Essay 2. (with Sören Blomquist and Luca Micheletto)

    Previous literature has shown that public provision of private goods can be a welfare-enhancing device in second-best settings where governments pursue redistributive goals. However, three issues have so far been neglected. First, the case for supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods has been made in models where agents differ only in terms of market ability. Second, the magnitude of the welfare gains achievable through public provision schemes has not been assessed. Third, the similarities/differences between public provision schemes and tagging schemes have not been thoroughly analyzed. Our purpose in this paper is therefore threefold: first, to extend previous contributions by incorporating in the theoretical analysis both heterogeneity in market ability and in the need for the publicly provided good; second, to perform numerical simulations to quantify the size of the potential welfare gains achievable by introducing a public provision scheme, and to characterize the conditions under which these welfare gains are sizeable; finally, to compare the welfare gains from public provision with the welfare gains from tagging.

    Essay 3. (with Sören Blomquist and Luca Micheletto)

    Subsidized child care is a common phenomenon in both Europe and the United States. In this paper we study the efficiency of some of the most common types of child care subsidies. These are a (refundable) tax credit, tax deductibility and public provision. We evaluate the relative efficiency of these instruments using a quantitative simulation model calibrated to resemble the US economy. In our framework there is a special tax treatment for families with children of child care age, which is based on an assumption that agrees with facts pertaining to actual circumstances in the United States, as well as many other countries. We keep the net tax revenue for this group of tax payers constant, hence the subsidies to child care are paid for by the group itself. It is a commonly held view that in a 'good society' all children should have equal opportunities in life. Many proponents of subsidized childcare argue that one way to move in this direction is to allow all children access to good quality child care. We capture this ideological perspective by using a paternalistic social welfare function which places special emphasis on the quality of child care purchased by households. Using a standard social welfare function we find tax deductibility to be the most efficient instrument to subsidize child care and public provision the least efficient instrument. These results are completely reversed when using the paternalistic welfare function and when  society has the goal of providing all children with access to good quality child care.  Public provision then becomes the best way to subsidize child care.  An important aspect of public provision is that it is an efficient instrument in raising the quality of child care.

    Essay 4. 

    In a recent paper Alesina et al. (2011) construct a model in which different labor supply elasticities for men and women emerge endogenously from intra-household bargaining. In this paper I explore the optimal tax implications of their model in an economy with both singles and couples and inequality across as well as within households. In the model, the welfare of married women can be improved by lowering taxes for single women. However, this benefit must be weighed against the welfare cost of taxing single men and women at different rates. Moreover, if single men earn more than single women, the welfare of married women can alternatively be improved by a gender-neutral tax scheme which taxes singles at a higher rate. Because the government is concerned not only with equalizing utilities within families, but also with the redistribution between high income and low income households, gender-based adjustments in the income tax must be weighed against the welfare consequences of changing the progressivity of the tax system. I find that larger lump-sum transfers to women is always optimal. Interestingly, marginal tax rates, on the other hand, should be lower for women only if the exogenous bargaining power of men is moderate. The welfare gains of gender based taxation are sizable and the welfare gains of having tax instruments which depend on household composition are even larger.

    Essay 5. (with Håkan Selin)

    Recent microeconometric studies of taxpayers' responsiveness to taxation have shown that intensive margin labor supply and earnings elasticities typically are modest and sometimes equal to zero. However,a common view is that long-run responses might still be large since micro-estimates are downward biased owing to optimization frictions. In this paper we estimate the taxable income elasticity at a very large kink point of the Swedish tax schedule using the bunching method. During the period of study the change in the log net-of-tax rate reached a maximum value of 45.6%. Interestingly, we obtain a precise elasticity estimate of zero for wage earners at this large kink. The size of the kink allows us to derive tighter bounds on the long-run elasticity than previous studies. If wage earners on average tolerate 1% of their disposable income in optimization costs, the upper bound on the long-run taxable income elasticity is 0.39. We also evaluate the performance of the bunching estimator by performing Monte Carlo simulations.

  • 3.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala University.
    Gender-Based and Couple-Based Taxation2013In: International Tax and Public Finance, ISSN 0927-5940, E-ISSN 1573-6970, Vol. 20, no 4, p. 653-686Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, I explore the optimal taxation of singles and couples in an economy with bargaining couples. The government is concerned with the redistribution of income from individuals with high utility to individuals with low utility, recognizing that some individuals live in couple households where resources are unevenly distributed. I analyze how redistributive linear income taxes, which depend on either gender or household composition (or both) impact the distribution of utility within and across households. An interesting implication arising from the interaction between the model elements is that even though between-group lump-sum transfers always favor women, when the bargaining power of men is high, women are subject to a higher tax rate; this in contrast to previous analyses of gender-based taxation. My quantitative analysis demonstrates that the welfare effects of gender-based taxation are sizable and even larger when taxes depend on the composition of the household.

  • 4.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala University.
    Makten över skatten: optimal beskattning med ett globalt perspektiv2013Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 5.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala University.
    Two Essays in Optimal Taxation2010Licentiate thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 6.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala University.
    Using the Discrete Model to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates2013Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I perform numerical simulations of the discrete model of optimal income taxation employing a large number of taxpayer types. Moreover, I indicate how the results depend on the number of types used to represent the wage distribution. Finally, I compare simulations of the continuous and discrete optimal tax models under identical circumstances based on US wage data.

  • 7.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala University.
    Using the Discrete Model to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates2015In: Finanzarchiv, ISSN 0015-2218, E-ISSN 1614-0974, Vol. 71, no 1, p. 106-117Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I demonstrate how the discrete model of optimum income taxation can be used to derive the structure of optimal income tax rates. I compare simulations of the discrete and continuous models of optimum income taxation under identical circumstances, based on U.S. wage data. The two models produce similar results once the number of types used to represent the skill distribution is sufficiently large. Whether the discrete or the continuous model is used, in order to accurately capture the shape of the optimal schedule of marginal tax rates, a large number of taxpayers should be employed.

  • 8.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala University.
    Välfärdsekonomi ur svenskt perspektiv: Agneta Kruse och Ann-Charlotte Ståhlberg: Welfare Economics - Theory, Empirical Results and the Swedish Experience2014In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 42, no 4Article, book review (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 9.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Blomqist, Sören
    Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan, Italy.
    Public Pensions in a Multiperiod Mirrleesian Income Tax Model2018In: The Taxation of Pensions / [ed] Robert Holzmann, John Piggott, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018, p. 51-80Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics. CESifo Munich, Germany.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala university, Sweden.
    Micheletto, Luca
    CESifo Munich, Germany;University of Milan, Italy;Bocconi University, Italy.
    Nonlinear and piecewise linear income taxation, and the subsidization of work-related goods2019In: International Tax and Public Finance, ISSN 0927-5940, E-ISSN 1573-6970, Vol. 26, no 4, p. 806-834Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigate how the social welfare gain of subsidizing work-related goods depends on whether the underlying income tax system is linear, piecewise linear or fully nonlinear, focusing on child care services as a paradigmatic example of goods/services that are complements with labor supply. Our quantitative analysis employs an empirically relevant labor supply model and shows that the welfare gain of an optimally chosen subsidy is negligible when the optimal income tax is restricted to be linear but about the same as under fully nonlinear taxation when the optimal income tax is restricted to be piecewise linear. Our findings enhance the policy relevance of the optimal tax argument in favor of providing subsidies to work-related goods and also shed light on the relative welfare gains of employing piecewise linear rather than fully nonlinear income taxes.

  • 11.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics. Uppsala University;CESifo, Germany.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala University;CESifo, Germany.
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan, Italy;Bocconi University of Milan, Italy;Uppsala University;CESifo, Germany.
    Optimal commodity taxation with varying quality of goods2016In: Research in Economics, ISSN 1090-9443, E-ISSN 1090-9451, Vol. 70, no 1, p. 89-100Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A standard result in the optimal taxation literature is that when agents differ in market ability and the government aims at redistributing from high- to low-skilled agents by means of an optimal nonlinear labor income tax and a set of commodity taxes, an optimally designed commodity tax structure should encourage (discourage) the consumption of goods/services that are complement with labor (leisure). In this paper we highlight that when agents can choose both the quality and the quantity of a given good/service, this standard commodity tax result needs to be qualified. First, we show that it becomes relevant to distinguish between specific and ad valorem taxes/subsidies. Second, whether the standard result holds or not depends on how the concept of labor (leisure) complement is defined, namely, whether it is defined in terms of number of units or in terms of expenditure. We also show that levying specific and ad valorem taxes at opposite signs on a given good can be a feature of the second-best optimum.

  • 12.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics. CESifo, Germany.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala University, Sweden;CESifo, Germany.
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan, Italy;CESifo, Germany.
    Public pensions in a multi-period Mirrleesian income tax model2016Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Using an OLG model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we investigate whether an optimally designed set of public pension transfers can usefully supplement a nonlinear labor income tax as a welfare-enhancing policy instrument. We consider a Mirrleesian setting where agents' skills are private information and highlight that, even though pensions, by crowding out private savings, adversely affect the achievement of the golden-rule, they can be used as a mimicking-deterring device that makes it easier for the government to achieve the desired redistributive goals.

  • 13.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala University.
    Micheletto, Luca
    Uppsala University ; University of Milan, Italy ; Bocconi University, Italy.
    Public Provision of Private Goods, Tagging and Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneity in Needs2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Previous literature has shown that public provision of private goods can be a welfareenhancing device in second-best settings where governments pursue redistributive goals. However, three issues have so far been neglected. First, the case for supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods has been made in models where agents dier only in terms of market ability. Second, the magnitude of the welfare gains achievable through public provision schemes has not been assessed. Third, the similarities/dierences between public provision schemes and tagging schemes have not been thoroughly analyzed. Our purpose in this paper is therefore threefold: rst, to extend previous contributions by incorporating in the theoretical analysis both heterogeneity in market ability and in the need for the publicly provided good; second, to perform numerical simulations to quantify the size of the potential welfare gains achievableby introducing a public provision scheme, and to characterize the conditions under which these welfare gains are sizeable; nally, to compare the welfare gains from public provision with the welfare gains from tagging.

  • 14.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala University ; CESifo, Germany.
    Micheletto, Luca
    Uppsala University ; University of Milan, Italy ; Bocconi University, Italy ; CESifo, Germany.
    The Welfare Gains of Age Related Optimal Income Taxation2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Using a calibrated overlapping generations model we quantify the welfare gains of an age dependent income tax. Agents face uncertainty regarding future abilities and can by saving transfer consumption across periods. The welfare gain of switching from an age-independent to an age-dependent nonlinear tax amounts in our benchmark model to around three percent of GDP. The gains are particularly high when there are restrictions on debt policy. The gains of using a nonlinear- as opposed to a linear tax are even larger. Surprisingly, it is of secondary importance to optimally choose the tax on interest income.

  • 15.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala University.
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan, Italy.
    Welfare Gains Of Age-Related Optimal Income Taxation2013In: International Economic Review, ISSN 0020-6598, E-ISSN 1468-2354, Vol. 54, no 4, p. 1219-1249Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Using an overlapping generations model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we quantify the gains of age-dependent labor income taxation. The total steady-state welfare gain of switching from age-independent to age-dependent nonlinear taxation varies between 2.4% and 4% of GDP. Part of the gain descends from relaxing incentive-compatibility constraints and part is due to capital-accumulation effects. The welfare gain is of about the same magnitude as that which can be achieved by moving from linear to nonlinear income taxation. Finally, the welfare loss from tax-exempting interest income is negligible under an optimal age-dependent labor income tax.

  • 16.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala University.
    Pirttila, Jukka
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    How should commodities be taxed?: A counter-argument to the recommendation in the Mirrlees Review2015In: Oxford Economic Papers, ISSN 0030-7653, E-ISSN 1464-3812, Vol. 67, no 2, p. 455-478Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Mirrlees Review recommends that commodity taxation should in general be uniform, but with some goods consumed in conjunction with labour supply (such as child care) left untaxed. This article examines the validity of this claim in an optimal income tax framework. Contrary to the recommendation of the review, our theoretical results imply that even if all goods other than the good needed for working are separable from leisure, the optimal tax on these goods should not be uniform. Instead, commodity taxes should discourage consumption of goods with large expenditure elasticities. Our results imply that the optimal commodity tax system is dependent on the expenditure side of the government. For instance, if the government fully subsidizes the cost of the good needed for working, then commodity taxation is uniform under the standard separability assumption. Calibration exercises suggest that these results can be quantitatively important.

  • 17.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala University.
    Pirttilä, Jukka
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    Optimal Inequality behind the Veil of How Should Commodities Be Taxed?: A Counterargument to the Recommendation in the Mirrlees Review2013Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Mirrlees Review recommends that commodity taxation should in general be uniform, but with some goods consumed in conjunction with labour supply (such as child care) left untaxed. This paper examines the validity of this claim in an optimal income tax framework. Contrary to the recommendation of the Review, our theoretical results imply that even if all goods other than the good needed for working are separable from leisure, the optimal tax on these goods should not be uniform. Instead, goods with larger expenditure elasticities should be discouraged relatively more by the tax system. If the government fully subsidises the cost of the good needed for working, then commodity taxation is uniform under the standard separability assumption. Our results imply that the optimal commodity tax system is dependent on the expenditure side of the government. A calibration exercise presented in the paper suggests that these results can be quantitatively important.

  • 18.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics. CESifo, Germany.
    Blumkin, Tomer
    Ben Gurion University, Israel;CESifo, Germany.
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan, Italy;Bocconi University, Italy;CESifo, Germany.
    Anti-discrimination legislation and the efficiency-enhancing role of mandatory parental leave2016Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We study a setting where anti-discrimination legislation gives rise to adverse selection in the labor market. Firms rely on nonlinear compensation contracts to screen workers who differ in their family/career orientation. This results in a labormarket equilibrium where career-oriented workers are offered an inefficiently low duration of parental leave. In addition, family-oriented workers are offered lower wages as compared to their equally skilled career-oriented counterparts. We demonstrate the usefulness of mandatory parental leave rules in mitigating the distortion in the labor market and derive conditions under which a Pareto improvement is possible. We also characterize the optimal parental leave policy and highlight the possibility for parental leave legislation to eliminate the wage penalty of family-oriented workers by supporting pooling employment contracts.

  • 19.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Blumkin, Tomer
    Ben Gurion University, Israel.
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan, Italy.
    Gender wage gap and the welfare-enhancing role of parental leave rules2017In: ifo DICE Report, ISSN 2511-7815, Vol. 15, no 2, p. 3-7, article id 11112017002001Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A large body of empirical evidence documents the gender variation in labour market outcomes. A major factor that contributes to persistent gender gaps in labour market performance is women’s traditional role in the household. Child-related absences from work imply that women accumulate less job experience, are more prone to career discontinuities and, hence, suffer a motherhood penalty. We highlight how the fundamental gender-driven career/family conflict faced by workers in the labour market may create a normative justification for parental leave rules as a means to enhance efficiency and alleviate the gender pay gap. 

  • 20.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Blumkin, Tomer
    Ben Gurion University, Israel ; CESifo, Germany ; IZA, Germany.
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan, Italy ; Uppsala University.
    Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we allude to a novel role played by the non-linear income tax system in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. We show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market. This represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals.

  • 21.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University ; CESifo, Germany.
    Blumkin, Tomer
    CESifo, Germany ; Ben Gurion University, Israel ; IZA, Germany..
    Micheletto, Luca
    Uppsala University ; CESifo, Germany ; University of Milan, Italy ; Bocconi University, Italy.
    Optimal wage redistribution in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market2015In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 131, p. 41-57Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we highlight a novel role played by the non-linear income tax in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. Relying on the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium concept, we show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market. This represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals.

  • 22.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Giebe, Thomas
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Miao, Chizheng
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Ethnicity and Tax Filing Behavior2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze differences in tax filing behavior between natives and immigrants using population-wide Swedish administrative data, focusing on two empirical examples. First, controlling for a rich set of variables, we compare deduction behavior of  immigrants and natives with the same commuting patterns within Sweden's largest commuting zone. We find  that newly arrived immigrants file fewer deductions than natives, that immigrants with a longer duration of stay in the host country behave more like natives, and that immigrants with the longest stay file the most, even more than natives. Second, we analyze bunching behavior among the self-employed at the first central government kink point of the Swedish income tax schedule and find that self-employed immigrants exhibit significantly less bunching behavior than natives, even after a long time in the host country. We highlight residential segregation as a main driver of the observed behavioral differences. 

  • 23.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics. CESifo, Germany.
    Lundberg, Jacob
    Political preferences for redistribution in Sweden2016Report (Other academic)
  • 24.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics. Uppsala University, Sweden;CESifo, Germany.
    Lundberg, Jacob
    Ratio Institute.
    Political preferences for redistribution in Sweden2017In: Journal of Economic Inequality, ISSN 1569-1721, E-ISSN 1573-8701, Vol. 15, no 4, p. 345-367Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We examine preferences for redistribution inherent in Swedish tax policy during 1971-2012 using the inverse optimal tax approach. The income distribution is carefully characterized with the help of administrative register data, and we employ behavioral elasticities reflecting the perceived distortionary effects of taxation. The revealed social welfare weights are high for non-workers, small for low-income earners, and hump-shaped around the median. At the top, they are always negative, especially so during the high-tax years of the 1970s and '80s. The weights on non-workers increased sharply in the 1970s, fell drastically in the late '80s and early '90s, and have since then increased.

  • 25.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics. Uppsala University ; CESifo, Germany.
    Moberg, Ylva
    Uppsala University.
    Selin, Håkan
    Uppsala University ; CESifo, Germany.
    Estimating participation responses using transfer program reform2016Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we estimate labor force participation responses for married women in Sweden using population-wide register data and detailed information about individuals’ budget sets. For identification we exploit a reform in the system for housing allowances in 1997 which affected participation tax rates for households with/without children differently. Using a simple theoretical framework we provide a structural interpretation of our estimates and highlight how the employment response depends on the employment level. Our central estimate of the participation elasticity is 0.13. When splitting the treated sample into four quartiles based on the wife’s skill level we find that the participation elasticity is more than twice as large for the lowest-skill sample than for the highest-skill sample

  • 26.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Moberg, Ylva
    Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Selin, Håkan
    Uppsala University, Sweden.
    The anatomy of the extensive margin labor supply response2019In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Selin, Håkan
    Uppsala University.
    Bunching and non-bunching at kink points of the Swedish tax schedule2014In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 109, p. 36-49Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent microeconometric studies of taxpayers' responsiveness to taxation have shown that intensive margin labor supply and earnings elasticities typically are modest and sometimes equal to zero. A common view is that long-run responses still might be large if micro-estimates are downward biased owing to optimization frictions. In this paperwe estimate the taxable income elasticity at a very large kink point of the Swedish tax schedule using the bunching method. During the period of study the change in the log net-of-tax rate reached a maximum value of 45.6%. Interestingly, we obtain a precise elasticity estimate of zero for wage earners at this large kink. We also conclude by the means of numerical simulations that, even though the kink point we study is very large, income effects are unlikely to bias our estimates. The size of the kink allows us to derive tighter bounds on the long-run elasticity than previous studies. Ifwage earners on average tolerate 1% of their disposable income in optimization costs, the upper bound on the long-run compensated taxable income elasticity is 0.39.

  • 28.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Selin, Håkan
    Uppsala University.
    Finns det anhopning av skattebetalare vid brytpunkten för statlig inkomstskatt?2012In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 40, no 1, p. 22-27Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Det ska finnas en anhopning av individer vid brytpunkten för statlig inkomstskatt om individer är känsliga för marginalskatteförändringar. Ett robust mönster är att löntagare inte anhopas vid brytpunkten för statlig skatt. För småföretagare, å andra sidan, går det att detektera en tydlig anhopning vid brytpunkten, men de implicerade skattebaselasticiteterna är små. Nollresultatet för löntagare bör tolkas som att den kortsiktiga responsen på skatteförändringar vid denna inkomstnivå är negligerbar. Nollresultatet kan också användas för att beräkna en övre gräns på den långsiktiga responsen på marginalskatteförändringar.

  • 29.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Selin, Håkan
    Skillnad på marginalen: en ESO-rapport om reformerad inkomstbeskattning2019Report (Other academic)
  • 30.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Simula, Laurent
    Uppsala University.
    Commentaire - Evaluer les limites à la redistribution: approches partielles ou approche globale?: [Assessing restrictions on redistribution: partial or aggregate approaches]2014In: Economie et Statistique, ISSN 0336-1454, no 467-468, p. 163-171Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 31.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Tomer, Blumkin
    Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Israel.
    Luca, Micheletto
    Univ Milan, Italy.
    The Welfare-Enhancing Role of Parental Leave Mandates2019In: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, ISSN 8756-6222, E-ISSN 1465-7341, Vol. 35, no 1, p. 77-126Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A major factor that contributes to persistent gender variation in labor market outcomes is womens traditional role in the household. Child-related absences from work imply that women accumulate less job experience, are more prone to career discontinuities and, hence, suffer a motherhood penalty. We highlight how the gender-driven career/family segmentation of the labor market may create a normative justification for parental leave rules as a means to enhance efficiency in the labor market and alleviate the gender wage gap. (JEL D82, H21, J31, J83).

  • 32.
    Bastani, Spencer
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Waldenström, Daniel
    Paris School of Economics, France;Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Sweden.
    Vad bestämmer svenskarnas attityder till skatter?2019In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 47, no 4, p. 70-79Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Vi använder en nyligen genomförd attitydundersökning för att undersöka sambandet mellan individers stöd för olika skatter och olika bakgrundsvariabler. Resultaten visar på en del intressanta mönster avseende inkomst och utbildning. Höginkomsttagare och högutbildade är relativt sett mer positiva till punktskatter och mer negativa till statlig inkomstskatt och förmögenhetsskatt, men det finns inga stora skillnader i stödet för kommunalskatten, fastighetsskatten eller en arvsskatt. I ett försök att utröna effekten av partipolitiska sympatier, framgår att stödet för olika skatter inte alltid följer den traditionella blockpolitiken, och mönstren ser olika ut för inkomst-, kapital- och punktskatter.

  • 33.
    Daniel, Waldenström
    et al.
    Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ; Paris School of Economics, France.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Hansson, Åsa
    Lund University ; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
    Kapitalbeskattningens förutsättningar i Sverige2018In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 46, no 2, p. 6-15Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Årets SNS Konjunkturrådsrapport diskuterar och analyserar förutsättningarna för kapitalbeskattning i Sverige. Mycket har hänt sedan århundradets skattereform. Det gäller hur kapital beskattas, storleken och fördelningen av kapital och inte minst kunskapen om hur kapitalskatter bör utformas. Utifrån detta, och de brister vi finner i dagens kapitalbeskattning, diskuterar vi hur kapitalbeskattningen kan förbättras utifrån både ett effektivitets- och fördelningsperspektiv. Vi förespråkar bl a en mer likformig kapitalbeskattning och en skatteväxling från arbetsinkomstbeskattning till kapitalinkomstbeskattning.

  • 34.
    Waldenström, Daniel
    et al.
    Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ; Paris School of Economics, France.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    Hansson, Åsa
    Lund University.
    Kapitalbeskattningens förutsättningar2018Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    I rapporten från SNS Konjunkturråd 2018 analyserar och diskuterar tre nationalekonomer kapitalbeskattningens förutsättningar i Sverige. Författarna finner brister i kapitalinkomsternas beskattning och föreslår en enhetligare beskattning. De förespråkar också en löpande fastighetsskatt för både småhus och bostadsrätter men lägre skatt på omsättning av fastigheter. Rapporten pekar också på att en skatteväxling från arbete till kapital kan ge samma intäkter och omfördelning men till högre ekonomisk effektivitet.

1 - 34 of 34
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