Allmänhetens förtroende för samhällsaktörers hantering av coronapandemin utgör en central frågeställning vad gäller pandemin, särskilt i ljuset av Sveriges jämförbart höga förtroendenivåer i kombination med att den svenska strategin för att hantera krisen inledningsvis avvek från nordiska och europeiska grannländers strategier. I kapitlet analyseras dels allmänhetens förtroende för privata och offentliga samhällsaktörers hantering av coronapandemin, dels hur hanteringen av pandemin inverkar på förtroendet för civil beredskap inför en framtida kris. Resultaten speglar skillnaderna i förtroende mellan olika aktörer, med högt förtroende för central statsförvaltning och regioner, medan förtroendet för andra medborgare, kommuner, EU och privat näringsliv är lägre. Skillnaderna analyseras utifrån kön, ålder, inkomst, hemvist och politisk orientering. Kapitlet innefattar också en jämförelse av data från pandemins första våg (Corona-SOM våren 2020) och tredje våg (SOM 2021) som visar på såväl kontinuitet som förändring i allmänhetens förtroende, i den omedelbara pandemihanteringen och vad gäller beredskapen inför en framtida kris.

The Covid 19 pandemic has put the issue of public trust at the centre of political analysis. This article inquires into the level of public trust in Sweden concerning current crisis management as well as preparedness for future crises. The empirical basis for this study consists of unique data generated through two surveys on the Covid 19 virus conducted during 2020 in Sweden. Respondents were asked to assess their trust in different actors' crisis management. In addition, the first survey asked about how the actions of different actors impact on the forward-oriented trust held in Swedish emergency preparedness for a future severe crisis. Four key findings stand out. First, the results display rather weak levels of interpersonal trust. Second, a surprisingly high level of institutional trust can be found during the initial phase of the pandemic. Simultaneously we see somewhat decreasing levels of trust later during the pandemic. The results include interesting variations across age, gender and education. Third, relating the results to earlier research on trust in Sweden, the results contain indications of stable trust levels despite the all but stable contextual conditions. Fourth, the analysis shows important variations in trust levels among different institutions and layers of government.

This article studies perceptions of governance, trust and threats among local politicians and local civil servants responsible for Swedish crisis management and civil defence. Local politicians and civil servants have key roles in the ongoing development of Swedish civil defence, as implementation to a large extent builds on the crisis management capacity of the municipalities. The article argues that the practitioners on the local level function in a context characterized by uncertain and ambiguous governance structures and especially local civil servants assume a role akin to that of street-level bureaucrats. Uncertain and ambiguous preconditions increase the importance of trust both between levels and within the same level of governance. Based on a survey with 209 local politicians and civil servants we study percep-tions of governance, trust, and threats. The results confirm perceptions of uncertain and ambiguous governance structures within the planning for and development of civil defence. The respondents ascribe higher responsibility to local, regional and national public actors when planning for civil defence, compared to the responsibility of citizens, the private sector and the EU level. The results also show high variations regarding levels of trust in the civil preparedness of different actors. Still, the experiences from the Covid 19-pandemic have increased the trust in the preparedness of almost all actors. Perceptions of threats relate to concrete threats like disruption in supply of food, electricity and internet. Notably, the highest threat perceptions concern activities aiming to destabilize democracy.

This article zooms in on the pre-conditions on the citizens level for deeper Nordic cooperation on civil defence matters. Historical ties, Nordic security cooperation, high-trusting citizens, and the fact that all five Nordic states now are members of NATO speak in favour of increased cooperation on civil defence. Still, the experiences from the Covid 19-pandemic with different strategies, diverging policies and closed borders, as well as heated exchanges of views, provide us with contradicting expectations. Based on a unique dataset with over 11 000 Nordic respondents we address these mixed expectations and study the trust of the Nordic citizens in both their respective government’s civil defence preparedness, as well as the citizens’ preferences regarding Nordic and other forms of international cooperation in this area. The results show a significant variation of trust in the civil preparedness of national governments (Finland highest trust, Sweden lowest trust). The variation returns in the desire for deeper international cooperation with considerably lower level of support for enhanced Nordic cooperation among the Danish respondents, and strong support for such cooperation among the Finns, Norwegians, and Swedes. Hence, our results indicate a potential for enhanced cooperation among some Nordics, but not all.

Arbetet med civil krisberedskap är centralt för hur samhället förmår förebygga och hantera kriser av olika slag. Den civila beredskapen inkluderar grundläggande förmågor som att ge sjukvård, upprätthålla livsmedelsdistribution och se till att infrastruktur som elnät och internetkommunikation fungerar, även i en allvarlig kris eller till och med ett krig. Under coronapandemin har diskussionerna gått varma om vad som är den rätta strategin för att bekämpa spridningen av Covid-19, om hur olika aktörer agerar och hur de borde ha agerat. Det är rimligt att tro att agerandet i samband med pandemin på ett mer generellt plan reflekterar den civila beredskapen och samhällets möjliga agerande i samband med andra allvarliga kriser eller till och med krig i framtiden. Viktiga frågor i sammanhanget är vilket förtroende medborgarna har för olika aktörers hantering av pandemin och hur hanteringen i sin tur eventuellt har påverkat förtroendet för svensk civil beredskap. Dessa frågor står i fokus för våra analyser i den här rapporten.

Coronapandemin kan beskrivas som en global kris som i allt väsentligt har hanterats nationellt. Det globala samarbetet inom framför allt Världshälsoorganisationen WHO har ifrågasatts och kritiserats, inte minst av USA, som nu förbereder för att lämna organisationen. EU-samarbetet har innefattat samordning av vissa krisinsatser och gemensamma ekonomiska stödåtgärder, men strategier för hälso- och sjukvård har hanterats på nationell nivå liksom resande- och gränsfrågor. Bland de nordiska länderna syns inte bara olika val av strategier för att hantera smittspridningen utan också konkurrerande ansatser vad gäller gränspolitik. Situationen har inneburit tydliga utmaningar mot den fria rörligheten i Norden men också mot nordisk sammanhållning i stort. Mot den här bakgrunden analyserar vi i denna rapport opinionsläget kring frågan om Sverige bör söka fördjupat internationellt samarbete inom området civil beredskap, i den nordiska kretsen, på EU-nivå eller i FN-sammanhang.

In this article the Swedish public management during the Covid 19 pandemic 2020- 2021 is analyzed in the light of previous identified challenges for Swedish civil defense. Such challenges are in the article contextualized in the light of contempo- rary research with the move from government to governance, but also through pub- lic inquiries and public debate concerning the future Swedish civil defense. The chal- lenges identified are network governance, multi-level governance and public-private partnerships. The rationale behind this study departs from the idea that the identi- fied challenges for the development of a modern civil defense could be expected to be manifested during a severe civil crisis like the pandemic. If these challenges are occurring in the management of the pandemic, then they are likely to be relevant to be addressed as Sweden move forward to reestablish the planning for a modern civil defense to be used during future severe crisis or even during war. The results from the study of the experiences of relevant actors during the public management of the pandemic confirm that at least two of the identified challenges are relevant to address further, namely multi-level governance and network governance.

In this policy brief, central themes in Finnish foreign and security polic are analyzed. These themes are playing out in the Nordic, in Europe, in the Arctic and across the Atlantic, in a time of a deteriorating security situation in Europe. The analyzis is based on previous research findings, but also on public statements from Finnish officials. The general conclusion drawn in the brief is that Finland has moved from a role as communicator between East and West, to a role situated in the core of the West.

This introduction presents the rationale for studying Nordicness in Nordic foreign and security policy with an overview of the renaissance of the Nordic dimension in research on Nordic foreign policy. The introduction also includes an analytical framework on Nordic security culture, developed from Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein [1996. Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security. In P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 33–75). New York: Columbia University Press.]. This framework is used throughout the special section.

I den föreliggande artikeln studeras värderingar bland kristdemokratiska sympatisörer under perioden 2010-2020. Under den här perioden har graden av religiositet bland kristdemokratiska sympatisörer minskat dramatiskt. Utifrån den observationen är syftet med artikeln att studera den avtagande religiositeten bland kristdemokratiska väljare och dess effekt på centrala kristdemokratiska värderingsfrågor. I artikeln formuleras tre hypoteser som beskriver en förväntan om att kristdemokratiska sympatisörer över tid betonar kristna värden i mindre utsträckning, att de blivit mer kritiska till internationell solidaritet och att kristdemokratiska väljare med begränsat religiöst engagemang är än mer kritiska till internationell solidaritet, jämfört med de kristdemokratiska sympatisörer som är mer religiösa. Resultat baserat på data från Survey 2010, Survey 2012, Survey 2014, Survey 2016, Survey 2018 och Survery 2020 bekräftar de tre hypoteserna.

In the article it is argued that the discussion within political science on new medievalism has lacked empirical substance and that this concept has been used in an anecdotic and sweeping manner. Departing from the ambition to contribute to the empirical substance of new medievalism, the Sovereign Order of Malta – a medieval, but still active, catholic chivalric order – is studied inductively. Based on different empirical illustrations, four different characteristics of the Order of Malta as a (new)-medieval actor in international politics is formulated; non-territoriality, overlapping sovereignty, valuebased actorness and support of international law. These characteristics are related to the European integrationprocess, with empirical illustrations from the Lisbon treaty, since the relation between the EU and its´ member-states often is regarded as the premier example of a new medieval order. In the article it is argued that the situation in the EU match the earlier and more sweeping understanding of new medievalism, but that the situation in the EU still lacks components before it can be seen as a new medieval case in accordance with the more ambitious model based on the Order of Malta.

This paper focuses on Nordicness, i.e. the perception and recognition of a Nordic role in Swedish foreign policy. Based on a framework about security cultures, it identifies and analyses Nordicness – defined in terms of role perceptions – in Swedish foreign and security policy. The analysis identifies three roles: internationalist leader during the period of active foreign policy in the latter part of the Cold War, Europeanized follower during the height of reorientation towards the EU and today’s Nordic balancer. The analysis reveals how Nordicness recently began re-appearing in a security environment characterized by increasing levels of tension. Compared to the Cold War period, shared Nordic norms and identity are less apparent today. Instead, the material security environment has become increasingly important. Recent increases in Nordicness in Swedish foreign policy have taken place in the context of a tenser security situation and have been associated with national security rather than a shared mission of internationalism. The article concludes that, in addition to internationalism, Nordicness has become a source of considerably more materialistic concerns.

In this article, ideological tranformations within the Swedish Christian Democratic party throughout the past years is analysed. This is done in comparison with previous research on the ideological character of the party from the 1960’s to the early 2000’s. The party´s ideology is analysed with a two dimensional model, i.e. universalism – par- ticularism and confessionalism – secularism. These two dimensions are derived from the ideological debate within the Dutch CDA during the 1990’s, a party that has op- erated in a similar context as the Swedish Christian Democrats have. Based on the two dimensions speeches and op-ed articles by the party leadership is analysed. The con- clusion is that the Swedish Christian Democrats has moved from a position of a strong Christian inspiration to a more secular direction, and that the party also has moved from strong universal beliefs to less universal and more particularistic beliefs

This chapter analyzes the role conceptions of Swedish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The chapter’s point of departure is a theoretical framework based on role theory, including the scope conditions for role change and the possibility of the Europeanization of foreign policy roles. Based on a reading of previous studies of Swedish foreign policy and primary sources, the chapter first analyzes how Swedish foreign policy role conception was Europeanized during the 1990s and early 2000s. Secondly, it examines how this Europeanized role was subsequently complemented by a reemerging Nordic one. The conclusion of the chapter is that Sweden’s foreign policy role conception today is characterized by multiple roles.

In 2017, the Swedish government took the initiative to conduct a country­wide information campaign with the aim of informing the citizens on what to do in the event of a serious crisis or war. In this article the effects of this information campaign are studied through a unique panel survey with identical surveys sent out immediately prior to the campaign and two weeks after the campaign. Concerning the effect, the level of responsibility for civil preparedness ascribed to different actors increased after the campaign, including the responsibility of the citizens. This effect is significant. However, the study reveals no significant effect on the lev­ els of trust with the trust in different authorities and their civil preparedness remaining on a mid­level before as well as after the campaign. Moreover, we do not see any general proof of higher risk perceptions or higher fear of threats as a result of the campaign, with the im­ portant exceptions of fear of measures to destabilise democracy and severe power cuts. In the article it is argued that despite current trends of strong individualisation with effects on media consumption and respect for authorities, the Swedish campaign illustrates that it is still possible to reach the greater part of the population with vital information and also, to at least some extent, affect attitudes.

Junior partners in a coalition government are torn between an eagerness to profile themselves, and to show loyalty to the coalition. We investigate when, how and why junior coalition parties affect foreign policy and profile themselves despite demands for national unity. We study two Swedish centre-right governments in 2006–2010 and 2010–2014. The parties' foreign policy positions in election manifestos are compared to the foreign policy positions presented in the joint Alliance manifesto and yearly government declarations. An explorative analysis of possible explanations for junior parties' influence is based on elite interviews. The results indicate that junior coalition parties might influence the foreign policy in symbolic value related issues, but less so in issues with real policy implications. Our analysis reveals the importance of the leading member of the coalition and how junior parties converge over time towards the position of the senior coalition member.

This chapter provides a critical discussion of the mediatization of policy in general, and of EU foreign and security policy in particular. A common argument in public debate and research is that the media logic is increasingly affecting how policy is formulated. Brommesson and Ekengren are critical of this (as they see it) oversimplified perspective, and they analyse EU foreign and security policy from the opposite point of view in this chapter. Foreign policy is usually described as a conservative policy area, in as much as it is informed by a long-term perspective, and foreign policy is not the subject of public debate to the same extent as other policy areas. Based on this reverse perspective, the authors ask whether policy actors are actually taking advantage of the opportunities provided by mediatization to strengthen long-term policy objectives. The chapter sheds light on the relationship between policy and mediatization through a comparative analysis of two important strategy documents of EU foreign and security policy: the European security strategy of 2003 and the EU global strategy of 2016. The authors discuss the overarching question of whether the formulation of EU foreign and security policy is dominated by media logic, in other words, whether this policy has been mediatized.

This book examines under what scope conditions foreign policy actors are more or less likely to adopt media logic. The authors analyze this media logic under three specific scope conditions: uncertainty, identity, resonance. First, they lay out the general adaptation of media logic in the general debate of the UN General Assembly 1992-2010. They then explore the adaptation of media logic under six different foreign policy decision-making processes in Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom concerning the cases of humanitarian intervention in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, both in 2011. The results of this study indicate the need to move beyond the assumption of a general process of mediatization affecting politics in total, across contextual factors. Instead, they point in the direction of a nuanced process of mediatization more likely under certain scope conditions and in certain political contexts.

This study analyses to what extent a change of government in times of unchanged international structure affects the ideology of foreign policy. The main contribution is to investigate the role of political culture, as reflected through institutional design, as an intervening variable. Effects of changes of government in the United Kingdom in 1997 and 2010 and in Sweden in 1994 and 2006 is studied by analysing speeches in the General Debates of the UN General Assembly. The analysis is based on four ideal types. The results indicate that institutional design is an influencing intervening variable of foreign policy ideology. In the UK, a country dominated by majoritarian institutional design, foreign policy ideology changes more extensively in times of government change than in Sweden, a country dominated by consensual institutional design.

A Mediatized Swedish Parliament? Media Adaption among Swedish MPsThe purpose with this article is to investigate if and how the members of the Swedish Parliament adapt to media. Do they adapt to media in line with cartel the-ory and its expectations on elite control and homogenization? Or, do they adapt in line with Kitschelts’ expectations on individualization and fragmentation? In the article, based on mediatization theory, we study how the MPs have adapted to media over time, from 1985-2010, with a special focus on 2010.The results indicate that there is an elite among the MPs, who perceives an increasing influence of media and who also uses and adapts to traditional media to an increasing extent. This perception is prevalent among all ‘elite’ MPs in all parties. The MPs in the top use media-related activities to an increasing extent; while the other MPs use them to a lesser extent.

The Nordic states have long made distinct choices regarding foreign and security policy principles. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we are witnessing a convergence of the Nordic countries’ general patterns of cooperation within their security policies. We argue that the challenging international context has led to heightened threat perceptions, triggering a reformulation of their foreign policy roles. Based on this assumption the article aims to analyse the convergence of the Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies by tracing changes in their foreign policy roles following Russia’s increasing aggressiveness. We trace the changes in the Nordic countries’ foreign policy roles through three dimensions: the changes to the international order, threat perceptions and perceptions of reduced manoeuvrability in international affairs. Our empirical analysis sheds light on how all Nordic countries perceive an increasing threat to the multilateral rule-based order, which has consequences for the roles of these states, how the threat perceptions of the Nordic states have been on high alert since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and finally how this has significantly impacted the Nordic foreign policy elites’ perception of their countries’ ability to manoeuvre and conduct autonomous foreign policy, motivating radical changes in the roles.