In Sweden, as in many other countries all over the world, the question of equality is one of the most critical concerns. In the international policy discourse, there is a dissatisfaction with unequal educational opportunities for students. As a global trend, educational policies aiming to address the inequality in education emphasise global competiveness with a focus on comparative studies, such as OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment, and greater accountability (Schultz, 2019).
All students must have access to education to achieve the best results possible. In the Swedish Education Act, education must be equivalent regardless of where in the country it is organised (SFS 2010:800). In an equivalent education, students are compensated according to their background and conditions, which means that each student receives the support required to achieve the school’s goals. The equivalence mission rests on every stalkeholder who is responsible for education.
Monitoring results is an important task for educational managers at the local school level. Portrayed as loosely coupled (Weick, 1976) and multi-leveled (Uljens, 2015), the school organisation is supposed to be rationally managed to effectively operate, holding every level accountable for students’ learning outcomes. The various levels in the school system can be illustrated as ‘webs of contracts’ (Wohlstetter et al., 2008), where local school agents, for example teachers, undertake actions on behalf of a principal (Gailmard, 2014). According to Ferris (1992), “the principal ‘contracts’ with the agents to act on the principal’s behalf” (p. 333). The contract further involves the delegation of discretion and decision-making authority to the agents (Soudry, 2007). In turn, the principal may make decisions that affect the actions agents take.
Drawing on the principal-agent theoretical framework, the aim of this study is to empirically examine the functionality of the local school system, particularly with respect to the contract of equal opportunities for all students to improve school results. The following research question has guided the study: How does the local school system function to uphold the contract of giving all students equal conditions for increased merit values?
The study is part of a research project in a Swedish municipality. Previous results from the project (Rapp, 2021; Ståhlkrantz & Rapp, 2022) show that the superintendent, as principal, prioritises the continuous improvement of academic outcomes. The superintendent emphasises that the main priority is for students to achieve high merit values. However, this priority is not supported by all agents in the school organisation. For example, one teacher considers that the students are too young to have to worry about their grades (Rapp, 2021). There are also school principals who prioritise students’ well-being over their academic outcomes (Ståhlkrantz & Rapp, 2022). These are examples of different beliefs and values (Robinson, 2017) that can exist on various levels in the school organisation.
As a multi-leveled governed system, there is a distribution of power among different system levels but also a dynamic relationship and interaction among various actors and their interdependency in the school organisation (Wilkoszewski & Sundby, 2016). To handle expectations and requirements from the principal, local school agents use adaptive strategies, such as bridging and buffering (DiPaola & Tschannen-Moran, 2005) and acting as gatekeepers (Ståhlkrantz & Rapp, 2022). When this occurs, the contract between principal and agents is broken, which makes it difficult or even impossible to realise the principal’s intentions. With the problems ecountered in a multi-leveled school organisation, the hypothesis of this study is that the picture of an ideal, well-functioning school organisation as a “governing chain” with “webs of contract” that aim to give students equal educational opportunities for optimal goalfullfilment may be better illustrated as a diversified, semi-functional school system.MethodDespite being a small Swedish case study (Yin, 2009), this study is of international interest because it provides in-depth insights into how global education policies are translated to a local context. Empirical data were collected using a questionnaire and focus interviews (Cohen et al., 2018), with respondents consisting of local school administrators and primary school teachers. The school has a principal, three assistant principals, about 80 teachers, and more than 850 students (aged 6–16). All teachers were invited to answer a digital questionnaire with a total of 47 questions. The questions were, among other areas, about the school’s governance, cooperation and trust in the governing chain, knowledge results, and the demand for higher merit values. The response rate was 49%. The municipality’s digital survey system was used to administer the survey. Before sending out the questionnaire, all respondents were informed of the purpose of the study. When the survey was distributed, they were informed that participation was voluntary and that answers would be kept anonymous (Vetenskapsrådet, 2017). To deepen the understanding of the survey responses, three focus interviews were conducted with randomly selected teachers. A focus interview with the school’s principal and assistant principals was also conducted. The content of the focus group questions was based on the answers given in the questionnaires. Each interview took 60-90 minutes and was recorded. Before the focus interviews, the interviewees were informed that participation was voluntary and that the recorded interviews will be kept anonymous (Vetenskapsrådet, 2017). In the analysis of the empirical materials, it was integral to identify the framework behind the functionality of the school organisation in upholding the contract of equal opportunities for all students to improve their learning outcomes. Since the principal-agent theory emphasises the responsiveness of the agent’s decisions to the principal’s goals, how this responsiveness is mediated by available actions, and institutional contextual factors, this framework is suitable for studying accountability in public education (Ferris, 1992; Gailmard, 2014). Within the principal-agent relationship, Wohlstetter et al. (2008) identified five key problems: (1) limited decision rights, (2) information asymmetry, (3) divergent objectives, (4) weak incentives, and (5) adverse selection. As a final step, these key problems were utilised as analytical tools to analyse empirical data.Expected OutcomesThe school is governed by national constitutions, which together with local educational priorities, form the contracts that agents are supposed to fulfill. This can be achieved in a diversified and multi-level system, where each level is responsible for its work. Following previous research on principal agency (Ståhlkrantz, 2022) and teacher agency (Bergh & Wahlström, 2018; Priestly et al., 2012), it is argued that school principals and teachers apply high levels of agency and discretion in their daily work. The principal-agent theory reveals that teachers, as agents, are in the best position to make decisions about education. Through incentives and regulations, the principal can ensure that agents responsibly fulfill their delegated role. However, if agents do not share the same beliefs and values as the principal, the former will not execute the activities requested. A functional, tightly coupled system presupposes that local school agents undertake actions on behalf of the principal and that every level in the governing chain is acoountable for the students’ learning outcomes. Preliminary results of this study indicate various problems in the principal-agent relationship in the local school organisation. In the ideal governing system, if the result is not good enough, accountability can be demanded. However, this ideal image is not consistent with the reality in education. At the local school level, no one in the governing chain is held accountable for improving students’ learning outcomes. Thus, the students themselves become responsible for their own merit values. Teachers decide the learning content and manner of teaching. In other words, if teachers do not prioritise increased merit values, the principal has very limited options to manage the school organisation according to contracted objectives and values. As such, it might be more accurate to illustrate the school organisation as a semi-functional organisational system rather than a functional governing chain.References
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