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One-Party Dominance and Democratic Backsliding in Botswana and Tanzania: Whither Peace and Development?

Author: Issa Noor Omary
Supervisor: Jonas Ewald (PhD)
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Examiner: Christopher High (PhD)
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Abstract

Over the past decade, a third wave of autocratisation has stormed the world, hitting democracies and autocracies alike. The ongoing democratic backsliding is attributed to a range of factors. From “executive aggrandisement” and strategic manipulation of elections to "autocratic lawfare”. Such autocratic tendencies are contributing to autocratisation in dominant party regimes in Africa. If most dominant party systems are increasingly autocratising in Africa, then there is a problem with the dominant party structure that warrants academic inquiry. However, the literature on one-party dominance and democratic consolidation in Africa are a bit old, hence do not address the current debates on democratic backsliding in the continent. Botswana and Tanzania are interesting cases of autocratising dominant party systems because they have witnessed rapid erosion of democratic qualities over the decade. But what effects do these patterns of democratic backsliding have on the quality of democracy in dominant party systems in Africa?

Employing a comparative research design (MSSD) and using historical institutionalism and the substantive democratic theory as well as relying on secondary data in Botswana and Tanzania (Mainly Afrobarometer surveys, V-Dem Index, CPI Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and Freedom Index), this study explores this question within the framework of peace and development research. It analysed four variables: management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition. Findings suggest that a dominant party structure in Botswana and Tanzania creates conditions that erode the quality of democracy, hence democratic backsliding. Therefore, the thesis argues that autocratisation in Botswana and Tanzania suggests reproduction of one-party dominance at the expense of consolidation of substantive democracy. This way, a dominant party structure in Africa appears to be a peace and development research problem because it creates strong incentives for dominant parties to autocratise rather than democratise when challenged by a strong political opposition.

Keywords: One-party Dominance/Dominant Party System, Dominant Party, Substantive Democracy, Democratic Backsliding, Third Wave of Autocratisation, Path-Dependence, Peace and Development, Botswana, Tanzania

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List of Abbreviations

BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BNF	Botswana National Front
BPF	Botswana Patriotic Front
BPP	Botswana People's Party
CAG	Controller and Auditor General
CCM	*Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (The Revolutionary Party)
CHADEMA	*Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* (The Democracy and Development Party)
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CUF	Civic United Front
DCEC	Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (Botswana)
DISS	Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services
EPA	External Payments Accounts
FPTP	First-Past-the-Post
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
MDSD	Most Different System Design
MSSD	Most Similar System Design
NCCR	National Convention for Construction and Reform - *Mageuzi*
NEC	National Electoral Commission
ORPP	Office of the Registrar of Political Parties
OYEBO	Organisation for Youth and Elections in Botswana
PCCB	Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (Tanzania)
PRI	*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (Revolutionary Institutional Party)
REDET	Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania
RITA	Registration, Insolvency, and Trusteeship Agency
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SAP	*Sveriges Socialdemokra-tiska Arbetarparti* (Swedish Social Democratic Party)
TEMCO	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee

TEW	Tanzania Elections Watch
UDC	Umbrella for Democratic Change
ZEC	Zanzibar Electoral Commission
4Rs	Reconciliation, Resilience, Reforms, and Rebuilding

1. **Introduction**

Over the past decade, the democratic discourse has been dominated by discussion around trends and patterns of democratic backsliding or autocratisation taking place worldwide (Diamond, 2015; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Cassani & Tomini, 2019; Lührmann & Rooney, 2021; IDEA, 2021; Arriola et al., 2023; V-Dem, 2023). But opinions are divided on whether those trends constitute a general pattern of backsliding or mere brief episodes of the same. Some say it is a worldwide pattern of backsliding risking democratic breakdown in electoral autocracies due to autocratic consolidation (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Cassani & Tomini, 2019; IIAG, 2022:48; V-Dem, 2021:6; 2022:6; 2023:6). Others assert that trends of backsliding are on the rise in established liberal democracies associated with political figures who have ascended to power or about to do so (Coppedge, 2017:3; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018:9; IDEA, 2021:1; Lührmann & Rooney, 2021:618). Others conclude that it is a general pattern of democratic stagnation rather than backsliding but coupled with brief episodes of backsliding and democratic progress (Bermeo, 2016:6; Arriola et al., 2023:266). Some cautioned that the global recession in democracy might lead into something much worse in all regime types, not just in autocracies (Diamond, 2015:153).

Whatever angles these perspectives take, what is clear is that democratic backsliding is spearheading a wave of autocratisation. In some quarters, it is known as a "third wave of autocratisation" (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; V-Dem, 2021; 2022; 2023). Autocratisation is simply defined as de-democratisation suggesting democratic backsliding (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Roggeband & Krizsán, 2020). Meanwhile, the 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) observed that since 2018, Africa has seen a wave of democratic backsliding as governments have been increasingly infringing rights, limiting freedom of expression and association, and encroaching on civic space (IIAG, 2022:48). But what effects do these patterns of democratic backsliding have on the quality of democracy in dominant party systems in Africa? The subsequent section presents a backdrop to this question.

1.1. **Background and Justification**

Literature is divided about the causes and effects of democratic backsliding in varieties of regimes, including those under one-party dominance. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018:9) examining democratic weakening in America argued that accelerated democratic erosion has been ongoing since the 2000s and is rooted in "extreme partisan polarisation" featuring democratic and republican parties. They further argue that such backlash erodes two fundamental norms underpinning America's fledgling democracy: mutual toleration and restraint from abusing incumbency advantage for "maximum partisan advantage" (*ibid*). Also, Cassani and Tomini (2019:135) argue that autocratisation is not a one-directional process as it can be radical or moderate in pace and full or partial in form. Whatever pace or form it takes, such a process is on the rise in Africa targeting electoral autocracies and often leads to closed autocracy (*ibid*). They further argue that the causes for autocratisation can range from military intervention, electoral process manipulation, and infringement of political rights to civil liberties restriction and declining horizontal accountability (*ibid*). Autocratisation takes at least three forms. Democratic backsliding (from liberal democracy to defective democracy or from defective democracy to electoral autocracy); democratic breakdown (from liberal democracy to electoral/closed autocracy or defective democracy to closed autocracy); or autocratic consolidation (from electoral autocracy to closed autocracy) (*ibid*).

Furthermore, Lührmann and Rooney (2021:618) examining the actions of President Donald Trump and Recep Erdogan during the declaration of state of emergencies in the U.S-Mexican border in February 2019 and in Turkey after a failed coup attempt in July 2016, concluded that executives with autocratic tendencies are likely to abusive emergency powers to centralise power in a democracy, hence leading to democratic backslide. They further argue that state of emergency often functions as "executive empowerment" as there are little limitations for declaration of such emergencies by executives (ibid). Contrary to the noted arguments about a general pattern of democratic backsliding, Bermeo (2016:14) argues that contemporary forms of democratic backsliding are ambiguous because they erode rather than shatter democracies. Such forms of backsliding manifest in what she calls promissory coups, executive aggrandisement, and strategic manipulation of elections (*ibid*). But she

noted “trends in backsliding reflect democracy’s slow progress and not its demise” (Bermeo, 2016:6). Likewise, subscribing to Bermeo’s argument about democratic stagnation, Arriola et al. (2023:266) building on six cases across Africa, argue that Africa is experiencing a general pattern of democratic stagnation rather than backsliding. But they acknowledge the presence of brief periods of both backsliding and democratic progress. They further argue that such stagnation in Africa is taking place under a legal façade which they term “autocratic lawfare” (*ibid*). Using Zambia and Senegal as examples, they contend that party alternation does not insulate African democracies from stagnation (*ibid*). Additionally, they argue that there is increasing use of nationalistic claims like safeguarding sovereignty to cover incumbents’ autocratic tendencies (*ibid*).

While the noted perspectives vary in their accounts of democratic backsliding, they all point to myriad effects of democratic recession on democratic consolidation. Such effects are contributing to autocratisation in dominant party regimes in Africa, especially Botswana, Burundi, Mozambique, Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (Rakner, 2018; IDEA, 2021:10-14; V-Dem, 2021:31; 2022:19; 2023:39; Arriola et al., 2023:265; Gloppen et al., 2023; Oosterom & Gukurume, 2023). Such regimes employ similar tactics as those cited in the previous paragraph like executive aggrandisement which undermines vertical and horizontal accountability, strategic manipulation of elections, autocratic lawfare, and abuse of emergency powers (IDEA, 2021:14-21). However, Botswana and Tanzania are interesting cases of autocratising dominant party systems. Botswana is interesting because along with Seychelles, they were the only liberal democracies in Africa in 2021 (V-Dem, 2022:14); yet Botswana has backslide to electoral democracy in less than a year while Seychelles saw an upward movement (V-Dem, 2023:39). Also, Botswana is among ten democracies that have experienced decline in clean elections since 2015 (Diamond, 2015:146; IDEA, 2021:14). While improving in two indicators[1] and bouncing back on one[2] in the 2022 IIAG, Botswana saw slow improvement in human development (IIAG, 2022:18). Meanwhile, Tanzania saw rapid backsliding in the East Africa region since 2011 (IDEA, 2021:10; V-Dem, 2022:19). Whereas participation, rights, and inclusion are slowly deteriorating in Tanzania, security and rule of law are increasingly

[1] Foundations for economic opportunity and participation, rights & inclusion.
[2] Security & rule of law.

deteriorating (IIAG, 2022:18). These dynamics make Botswana and Tanzania interesting cases for comparative study of the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy. After all, the two countries are the oldest dominant party systems in the continent.

As indicated above, there is a general consensus in the literature about the ongoing wave of autocratisation (or at least episodes) (Diamond, 2015; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Cassani & Tomini, 2019; Lührmann & Rooney, 2021; IDEA, 2021; Arriola et al., 2023; V-Dem, 2021; 2022; 2023). But scholars differ as to the causes and effects of this wave of backsliding (Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Cassani & Tomini, 2019; Lührmann & Rooney, 2021; Arriola et al., 2023). While these scholars have cited different causes and effects and used different case studies in explaining democratic backsliding, none of them have comparatively analysed the effects of dominant party structure on the quality of democracy. Democratic backsliding entails declining democratic quality. If most dominant party systems are increasingly autocratising in Africa (Diamond, 2015:146; Rakner, 2018; IDEA, 2021:10; V-Dem, 2021:31; 2022:19; 2023:39; Arriola et al., 2023:265; Gloppen et al., 2023; Oosterom & Gukurume, 2023), then there is a problem with the dominant party structure that warrants academic inquiry. There is only one none-comparative case study on autocratising dominant party system (Zimbabwe) in Africa in the latest literature (Gloppen et al., 2023; Oosterom & Gukurume, 2023). Most existing literature are ten years old or more (Doorenspleet, 2003; Bogaards, 2005; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2014), thus are not capturing the current debates on democratic backsliding in dominant party systems in Africa . This suggests a gap in the literature. Therefore, this thesis aimed at filling this gap by exploring the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania in order to understand its implications for peace and development research.

1.2. **Relevance to Peace and Development Research**

The transition to liberal democracy during the third wave of democratisation saw one-party dominance becoming a profound feature of many electoral democracies and electoral autocracies across Africa (Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013a:2; Jager & Du Toit, 2013:3). Such structural persistence of one-party dominance in Africa is said to

impinge on fundamental democratic institutions under legal façade, hence contributing to the current wave of autocratisation (Rakner, 2018). This phenomenon has four implications for peace and development. Firstly, citing ZANU-PF actions in Zimbabwe, Gloppen et al. (2023:236) argue that dominant party systems make dominant parties retain political power by undemocratic means like intimidation and harassment of the opposition. Sometimes such parties use direct violence against the political opposition as was the case of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) under Ian Khama (Diamond, 2015:146).

Secondly, one-party dominance decreases electoral competition thus limiting policy alternatives and policy choices for citizens. Mainwaring and Scully (1995:2) puts it "the nature of parties and party systems shapes the prospects that stable democracy will emerge, whether it will be accorded legitimacy, and whether effective policy-making will result". Thirdly, dominant party systems in unconsolidated democracies are at higher risks of reverting to de facto single-party rule which is hostile to civil liberties and political rights and the just rule of law (Burchard (2013:101; Rakner, 2018). In most single party regimes, the state is fused with the ruling party as the incumbent party assuming absolute control of the policy process which is referred in the literature as party supremacy (Mihyo, 2003:68). Tanzania had a typical example of party supremacy doctrine during the single party era where the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)*[3] consolidated a corporatist regime which presided over absolute control of all spheres of social life in the country (Ewald, 2011:145). In such regimes, democratic control mechanisms, the independence of judiciary, and the dispensation of justice are undermined as the functions of the state are subordinated under the party.

Finally, autocratising dominant party systems are associated with high-level corruption in the government due to weaknesses in institutional control and weak checks and balances, including weak parliamentary oversight (Gray, 2015:382; Gloppen et al., 2023:236). Rampant corruption undermines democratic accountability, good governance, and socio-economic development. It may also contribute to increased organised crime that may unleash persistent violence on the society. For decades, the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) in Mexico presided over 'Pax

[3] The Revolutionary Party.

Mafiosa'[4] which collapsed after its electoral defeat in 2000 resulting in unprecedented rise of organised crime (drug trafficking and human trafficking), high-level corruption, and the partial capture of the Mexican state by the drug cartels and the Mafia (Buscaglia, 2016). The noted linkages between one-party dominance and peace and development prompted me to comparatively explore the two long-standing dominant party systems in Africa (Botswana and Tanzania) in order to understand how such systems affect the quality of democracy in the two countries and their implications to peace and development. I am of the view that a consolidated democracy implies peace and development due to its substantive contribution to democratic governance, political stability, and inclusive development outcomes. So, if dominant party systems in third wave electoral democracies or electoral autocracies stand in the way of democratic consolidation, then the phenomenon of one-party dominance becomes a peace and development research problem.

1.3. **Research Problem**

Whereas evidence in the literature suggest that one-party dominance in advanced democracies had consolidated democracy hence contributed to stability, positive peace, and inclusive economic development as was the case in Sweden, Italy, and Japan (Pempel, 1990; Esping-Andersen,1990; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999). Of course some of these liberal democracies like Israel and Italy are currently backsliding but they are not under one-party dominance (V-Dem, 2023:39). Most Africa's dominant party systems are autocratising with serious consequences for peace and development (Diamond, 2015:146; Rakner, 2018; Cassani & Tomini, 2019:136; IDEA, 2021:10; V-Dem, 2021:31; 2022:19; 2023:39; Arriola et al., 2023:265; Gloppen et al., 2023; Oosterom & Gukurume, 2023). But under what conditions do autocratising dominant party systems in Africa affect the quality of democracy? The answer to this question requires a comparative contextual investigation of the effects of such autocratising systems on the quality of democracy in Africa.

But there are no comparative studies exploring the noted phenomenon in Africa's dominant party systems. There is only one none-comparative case study on autocratising dominant party system (Zimbabwe) in Africa in the latest literature (Gloppen et al., 2023; Oosterom & Gukurume, 2023). Most existing literature are ten

[4] The clientalist pact between the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) and different organised crime networks in Mexico before the PRI electoral defeat in 2000.

years old or more (Du Toit, 1999; Doorenspleet, 2003; Bogaards, 2005; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2014), hence are not addressing current debates on democratic backsliding in dominant party systems in the continent. This thesis, therefore, aimed at filling this gap by exploring the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania in order to understand such conditions affecting peace and development in the noted regimes. As we have seen in the background section, Botswana and Tanzania are interesting cases for exploring the effects of dominant party structure on the quality of democracy because they have experienced rapid democratic backsliding since 2011 (Diamond, 2015:146; IDEA, 2021:14; V-Dem, 2023:39) and are the oldest dominant party systems in Africa.

1.4. **Research Objective**

Contrary to the existing discourse about electoral competition under one-party dominance, Burchard (2013:122) contends that unlike in Tanzania elections in Botswana's dominant party system produces significant levels of competition. However, Botswana is among ten democracies that have experienced decline in clean elections since 2015 (Diamond, 2015:146; IDEA, 2021:14). Furthermore, Botswana has backslided to electoral democracy from liberal democracy in less than a year (V-Dem, 2023:39). Meanwhile, Tanzania saw rapid backsliding in the East Africa region in the last decade (IDEA, 2021:10; V-Dem, 2022:19). But as Lührmann and Lindberg (2018:3) observe we are not equipped with the appropriate conceptual and empirical tools to systematically explain such vague processes. Hence, the main objective of this thesis was to explore the effects of the autocratising dominant party system on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania. The specific objectives were twofold. Firstly, to examine conditions leading to democratic backsliding in Botswana and Tanzania. Secondly, to analyse the implications of such domination and backsliding for peace and development in the studied countries. One-party dominance is an independent variable and the quality of democracy is a dependent variable.

The main research question:

i. How are dominant party systems affecting the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania?

The specific research questions:

i. What are the conditions leading to democratic backsliding in Botswana and Tanzania?

ii. What are the implications of one-party dominance for peace and development in Botswana and Tanzania?

1.5. **Outline of the Thesis**

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the thesis background and justification. It links one-party dominance and peace and development research. It then discusses the statement of the problem and concludes the chapter with discussions on research objectives and research questions. Chapter two starts with a definition of key concepts and then presents a systematic review of literature discussing debates around one-party dominance and democratic consolidation. It then proceeds to discuss a framework for analysis emerging from the review of literature which links research objectives and the theoretical framework. The chapter is concluded with a concise discussion of the research gap. Chapter three presents a review of theoretical approaches underpinning this thesis: substantive democratic theory and historical institutionalism.

Chapter four presents the methodological framework discussing comparative research design, case selection, research approach, data collection methods, thematic analysis, validity and reliability, limitations and delimitation of the thesis, and ethical considerations. Chapter five presents research findings on the four variables used in measuring the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania. Chapter six presents a comparative analysis of key findings using substantive democratic theory and historical institutionalism (path-dependent model) as analytical tools. Chapter seven presents concluding discussion of the thesis reflecting on the research questions informing this thesis.

2. **Literature Review**

This chapter defines key concepts underpinning this thesis and it then proceeds to systematically review the literature identifying debates around one-party dominance, democratic consolidation, and democratic backsliding. It then develops a framework

for analysis after the review of literature. Such a framework for analysis links the research objectives and the theoretical framework. Finally, the chapter narrows down to discuss the research gap emerging from the review of literature.

2.1. **Definition of Key Concepts**

2.1.1. **Democracy**

Democracy is a multifaceted and a value-laden concept. As such, it has generated competing theoretical accounts and various contextualised typologies depending on agreed or contested norms and values. As a conceptual tool and an empirical phenomenon, democracy has become a catchword in peace and development discourse. To minimalist scholars, democracy is synonymous with multiparty elections (Schumpeter, 1942; Huntington, 1991). To maximalist theorists, democracy is about sustaining inclusive socio-economic development and managing democratic order (Mkandawire, 2006; Ewald, 2011). To liberals, democracy is about building and consolidating liberal democratic institutions (Diamond, 1994; Bratton, 1994; Zakaria, 2004). To Marxists, democracy is not just a mere idea but a material and a historical phenomena (Tandon, 1979). These different perspectives on democracy suggest two things. Firstly, the concept is multifaceted. Secondly, these different conceptions have implications for peace and development. Building on the above perspectives, this thesis adopts a maximalist conception of democracy which builds on the substantive democratic theory used in this study. This conception also links this study to peace and development research. Therefore, I define substantive democracy as a system of governance characterised by peaceful and inclusive development, constitutional rule of law, increasing democratic accountability, thriving democratic space, absence of electoral violence, and protection of minority rights (V-Dem, 2021; 2022; 2023).

2.1.2. **Dominant Party and Dominant Party System**

Dominant party system as a distinct variant in a pluralist party system is invisible in the classical typologies of party systems developed by Duverger (1951). Bogaards (2005) adopts Sartori's definition of party dominance. According to Sartori (2005), "a party becomes dominant in a parliamentary system after three consecutive electoral victories" or, by extension, the dominant party controls the executive for three successive terms. To Bogaards (2005), a dominant party combines electoral, parliamentary, and executive dominance over a specified period. Meanwhile, when

analysing competitiveness in Botswana's dominant party system, Burchard (2013) noted that dominant party systems are defined by absence of party alternation at the national level. This means that a party hegemony is determined by its long endurance in power as is the case of CCM and BDP. This thesis conception of the dominant party is based on Bogaards' criterion one, two, and three to anchor our concept formation framework within the existing scholarly literature. I define a dominant party as a single party that has maintained control over the national legislature and retained the executive office consecutively for at least four uninterrupted election terms. Across the study cases, an election term is based on a five year electoral cycle. In this thesis, I have used the dominant party system and one-party dominance interchangeably.

2.2. **Dominant party system and democratic consolidation**

The classic debate on dominant party system and democratic consolidation focused on dominant party systems in industrialised democracies. This debate is based on two arguments. Firstly, the dominant party is a much better stabilising factor than fragmented parties in a multiparty system (Arian & Barnes, 1974:600). Reference is often made to the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP, or *Sveriges Socialdemokra-tiska Arbetarparti*) and its welfare state in Sweden which contributed to substantive democracy in the country (Esping-Andersen,1990:33). Secondly, a democratic dominant party is likely to consolidate a durable democratic system because it exhibits effective competition and democratic control of the government (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:3). Here, the Labour Party in Israel (1948-1977), Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (from 1955), the Christian Democrats in Italy (1945-1996), and SAP in Sweden are often cited as principal examples in the old literature (Du Toit, 1999:195). The central argument in the classical text is that a democratic dominant party system is a positive sign indicating democratic stability. However, such types of one-party dominant democratic systems which existed in industrialised economies like in Japan, Israel, Sweden, and Italy were known as 'uncommon democracies' (Pempel, 1990:5; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:344). As Pempel (1990:6) puts it "a central puzzle for single-party dominance within the industrialised democracies is how or why it occurs under situations of social dynamics and political openness." But some of these liberal democracies like Israel and Italy are currently backsliding

(V-Dem, 2023:39). Suggesting that they are not spared by the third wave of autocratisation.

However, the old literature based its analysis on advanced democracies where electoral competition was relatively free and fair and supported by effective mechanisms for democratic control of the government and institutionalised democratic norms and values like mutual toleration and freedom of expression. Such institutionalised democracies had a well-consolidated middle class and high GDP per capita which provided a solid foundation for democratic consolidation (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Rich democracies were thought to be immortal (156-157; Zakaria:70). However, some of them like Brazil, Hungary, India, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, and United States recently have had episodes of autocratisation (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2018:3; Levitsky & Ziblatt; 2018:9; IDEA, 2021:14; V-Dem, 2021:18; 2022:23; 2023:24). Also, Makulilo (2017:60) contends that it is fallacious to concede that democracy is strictly an outcome of economic development. In rejecting the precondition for democracy argument, he argues that African countries like Botswana, Zambia, Benin, and Ghana were able to democratise under the condition of relative poverty (Makulilo, 2017:60), thus falsifying the dominant framework in the democratic discourse and modernisation theory that sought to tie democratisation to economic prosperity of a polity.

Meanwhile, in current autocratising dominant party systems, the regime manipulates electoral competition into their advantage and encroaching the democratic space to consolidate power (Diamond, 2015:146; Rakner, 2018; Gloppen et al., 2023:236; Oosterom & Gukurume, 2023). Dominant parties adopt three principal strategies to this end: undermining democratic norms without getting rid of democratic institutions through executive aggrandisement, strategic manipulation of elections, and use legal façade to legitimise their actions (Diamond, 2015:146; Bermeo, 2016;14; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019:1105; Arriola et al., 2023:266). The objective is to facilitate political control and suppress rival power contenders. Hence, such regimes preside over what would be termed a democratic façade (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019:1097). For instance, Kaufman (1999:180) cited the tendencies of Mexico's PRI, before their electoral defeat in 2000, to resort to electoral fraud whenever an imminent threat to their electoral monopoly emerged in the

political opposition. But the PRI example suggests old tactics used by autocratic dominant parties. Current autocratising dominant parties strategically manipulate elections by engaging in actions that lead to uneven electoral playing-field without resorting to open electoral fraud (Diamond, 2015:146; Bermeo, 2016:13). But to contextually examine the noted strategies employed by autocratising dominant parties to maintain their grip on power and how such actions impinge on democratic consolidation, I have to consider the nature of the electoral competition in Botswana and Tanzania. In particular, a close examination of the extent of tolerance on the political opposition and political pluralism and the conduct of the electoral process. But what effects do autocratising dominant party systems in Botswana and Tanzania have on the quality of democracy? I would like to bring this question to the next section discussing the effects of autocratising dominant party systems on democracy in the studied cases.

2.3. **Dominant party system and democracy in Botswana and Tanzania**

The existing comparative literature on one-party dominance in Africa looks at the phenomenon from different angles. Some focus on the effects of one-party dominance on democracy in Africa (Doorenspleet, 2003:169; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2014). Other studies analyse the endurance of one-party dominance in Africa and on how such systems stagnate democratic progress in the continent (Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; Jager & Du Toit; 2013; Tesfahun, 2015). Nevertheless, the noted literature on one-party dominance and democracy in Africa are a bit old, hence not up to date on the current debates on democratic backsliding (Du Toit, 1999; Doorenspleet, 2003; Bogaards, 2005; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2014). One relatively newer literature employed MSSD to analyse the causes for the endurance and decline of single party dominance in Botswana and Senegal using six variables, namely; historical legacy, social cleavage, institutions, political culture, government performance, and incumbent advantage (Tesfahun, 2015). Tesfahun (2015:23) argued that incumbency advantage is the most significant mechanism that illuminates the endurance and decline of one-party dominance in Botswana and Senegal respectively. The role of incumbency advantage in sustaining one-party dominance in Botswana is what Bermeo (2016:14) calls “executive aggrandisement” which contributes to the current global backsliding of democracy. Diamond (2015:146) attributes incumbency advantage in Botswana to

"personalisation of power" by President Ian Khama. Therefore, the noted arguments about incumbency advantage, executive aggrandisement, and personalisation of power require a contextual analysis of the scope of presidential power (variable) in the studied cases.

One of the first serious attempts to comparatively study dominant party systems in Africa using exclusively a qualitative approach is the work edited by Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013) and Jager and Du Toit (2013). Jager and Du Toit (2013) used MSSD and qualitatively compared dominant party systems in southern Africa where one-party dominance is enduring and used MDSD to comparatively analyse historically and culturally diverse cases outside Africa (different systems) where one-party dominance contributed to competitive multiparty democracy and party turnover (similar outcomes). Therefore, Jager and Du Toit (2013:18) argue that "to assess the impact of the dominant party system on the quality of democracy, the influence of an 'uneven playing-field' — in terms of access to resources — on the rule of law, separation of powers, and political and civil liberties needs to be examined."

Furthermore, Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013) identified seven causal mechanisms of endurance and non-endurance of one-party dominance in African democracies. These mechanisms include; historical legacy, social cleavages, institutional design, political culture, government performance, state-party relations, and foreign influences (Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013:10-20). While such mechanisms have been used by Bakari and Whitehead (2013) to explore the endurance of one-party dominance in Tanzania, they are also relevant in examining and analysing the effects of autocratising dominant party systems on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania. Nonetheless, what sets apart this thesis from the previous studies on dominant party systems discussed in this chapter (Arian & Barnes, 1974; Pempel, 1990; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; Jager & Du Toit; 2013; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2014; Tesfahun, 2015; Diamond, 2015; Bermeo, 2016; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Rakner, 2018; Gloppen et al., 2023:236; Oosterom & Gukurume, 2023), is that this study does not only focus on systematic comparative study of the effects of autocratising dominant party system on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania but also analyse its implications

for peace and development research. This distinguishes it from purely political science literature on one-party dominance such as those reviewed in this chapter.

To achieve the study objectives, I had to consider a framework for analysis which builds on the already researched framework. The best candidate is the framework developed by Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013). The rationale is that the noted framework is anchored in substantive democracy and historical institutionalism as well as links one-party dominance and peace research. Furthermore, such a framework anchors this thesis in the current debate on triggers and effects of third wave of autocratisation. As noted above, Tesfahun (2015) did use similar variables as Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013). But he excluded international influence and state-party relations and added incumbency advantage (not that different from state-party relations, just a change of wording) in his analytical framework. Therefore, I developed a framework comprising four variables, namely; management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition. I will operationalise these variables in the theoretical framework chapter.

2.4. **Research Gap**

The existing comparative literature on one-party dominance in Africa looks at the phenomenon from different angles. Some focus on the effects of one-party dominance on democracy in Africa (Doorenspleet, 2003:169; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2014). Other studies analyse the endurance of one-party dominance in Africa and on how such systems stagnate democratic progress in the continent (Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; Jager & Du Toit; 2013; Tesfahun, 2015). Nevertheless, the noted literature on one-party dominance and democracy in Africa are a bit old, hence do not capture the current debates on democratic backsliding in the continent (Du Toit, 1999; Doorenspleet, 2003; Bogaards, 2005; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2014). The 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance observed that democracy has been backsliding in Africa since 2018. Such backsliding is attributed to “executive aggrandisement” and strategic manipulation of elections (Bermejo, 2016:14); “personalisation of power” by incumbents (Diamond (2015:146); or "autocratic lawfare” (Arriola et al., 2023:266). Such autocratic tendencies are contributing to autocratisation in dominant party regimes in Africa;

especially Botswana, Burundi, Mozambique, Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (Rakner, 2018; IDEA, 2021:10-14; V-Dem, 2021:31; 2022:19; 2023:39).

However, Botswana and Tanzania are interesting cases of autocratising dominant party systems. Botswana is interesting because it has backslided from liberal to electoral democracy within a year (V-Dem, 2022:14; 2023:39). Also, Botswana is among ten democracies that have experienced decline in clean elections since 2015 (Diamond, 2015:146; IDEA, 2021:14). Meanwhile, Tanzania saw rapid backsliding in the East Africa region since 2011 (IDEA, 2021:10; V-Dem, 2022:19). If most dominant party systems are increasingly autocratising in Africa (Diamond, 2015:146; Rakner, 2018; IDEA, 2021:10; V-Dem, 2021:31; 2022:19; 2023:39; Arriola et al., 2023:265; Gloppen et al., 2023; Oosterom & Gukurume, 2023), then there is a problem with the dominant party structure that warrants academic inquiry. Therefore, this thesis aimed to fill this knowledge gap by exploring the effects of the autocratising dominant party system on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania in order to analyse and understand the implications of such domination and backsliding for peace and development research.

3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter discusses historical institutionalism and the substantive democratic theory as principal theoretical frameworks guiding analysis in this study. It then discusses the framework for analysis and theoretical relevance of the four selected variables used in this study to analyse the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania. It then concludes the chapter by operationalising the variables.

3.1. Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism argues that with time institutional rules, constraints, and the reaction to them condition the behaviour of actors in the political process. It implies that political structures shape political conduct temporally and spatially. As Hay (2002:15) highlights, “the timing and sequence of events matters since history is ‘path dependent’ that large consequences may follow from small or contingent events.” It indicates that institutions are embedded in a specific normative and historical context (Heywood, 2013:15). The institution of one-party dominance in Botswana and

Tanzania is a historical phenomenon shaped by different historical trajectories. Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013:10) employed historical institutionalism to comparatively study the endurance of single party dominance in African democracies arguing that "the endurance of one-party dominant systems seems to be related to the history of the dominant parties and party systems in question." I have used this theory to provide a path-dependent explanation of the four variables which explain the effects of the dominant party system on the quality of democracy in the studied cases and their implications for peace and development. The noted mechanisms are rooted in the history of dominant parties and certain policy choices made by these parties in the studied cases.

As an analytical tool, the path-dependent model helped me explain the interconnectedness of the dominant party system with the sequences of past events which link the four variables with policy choices made at critical juncture by dominant parties in Botswana and Tanzania. Also, this analytical tool helped me avoid what Mahoney (2001:113) regards as "the problem of infinite explanatory regress into the past" thus helping perform a filtering function to set the parameters for within-case analysis and cross-case comparison. However, a major limitation of historical institutionalism is that it reduces institutional development to path-dependence, hence overlooking other variables beyond particular historical trajectories. Moreover, it restricts a multilevel analysis of politics of peace and development in the studied cases.

Figure 1: Analytic Structure of Path-Dependent Explanation



Adopted from (Mahoney, 2001).

3.2. **Substantive Democratic Theory**

Historical institutionalism complemented substantive democratic theory by assisting with the longitudinal analysis of trajectories of one-party dominance and how such

domination affects the quality of democracy. Unlike liberal democratic theory which stresses on individual liberty, laissez faire, and constitutional liberalism (Zakaria, 2004), the substantive democratic theory is premised on social equality rather than social hierarchy by emphasising on social democracy and social justice. Thus, the theory argues that democratic consolidation is about achieving sustained economic growth and peaceful and inclusive development, hence goes beyond procedural matters of electing a government which is a dominant perspective of democracy during the third wave of democratisation (Mkandawire, 2006; Ewald, 2011:47-51). Therefore, to analyse and compare the implications of one-party dominance for peace and development in the study cases, it is imperative to employ the maximalist rather than the minimalist democratic theory. The noted theoretical choices informed the research design, data analysis, and cross-country comparison.

The justification for using two theories is that historical institutionalism links the four variables used to analyse the effects of dominant party system on the quality of democracy to the history of dominant parties and dominant party system in the studied cases. By that logic, substantive democratic theory helped to analyse the effects and implications of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy and peace and development in Botswana and Tanzania.

3.3. **The Framework for Analysis**

The framework for analysis comprises four variables. The noted variables are; management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition. I have used historical institutionalism and the substantive democratic theory to analyse the effects of autocratising dominant party systems on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania using the noted variables. The four variables are data containers providing valuable information to answer the research questions. In subsequent subsections, I operationalise the selected variables and discuss their theoretical relevance.

3.3.1. **Theoretical Relevance**

The noted variables have theoretical relevance because they create conditions which facilitate or hamper consolidation of substantive democracy. Hence, they are relevant in explaining democratic progress or backsliding in the studied cases. Also, the

conditions which they create are closely connected to certain antecedent conditions and policy trajectory decided at critical juncture by dominant parties in Botswana and Tanzania. Thus, they are relevant for path-dependence analysis. The scope of presidential power is likely to create conditions for horizontal accountability or executive supremacy which affects separation of powers and democratic checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and the judicial arm of the state. Democratic theorists view a relatively weaker presidency more democratic than a strong presidency (Ewald, 2011:56; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018:177; Lührmann & Rooney, 2021). For instance, vesting more power over state resources in the presidency might create an incentive for powerful presidents to autocratise as was the case of President Alberto Fujimori's suspension of Peruvian parliament in 1992 in order to centralise power to avoid bargaining with key actors in Peruvian politics on important policy issues (Lührmann & Rooney, 2021:622). Actions like that of Fujimori negatively affects peace and development as it contributes to democratic breakdown.

Additionally, the selected variables create conditions for structural persistence of one-party dominance which produces reactions and counter-reactions against such structural patterns. As I have explained in detail in section (1.2.), both structural persistence of one-party dominance and its reactive sequences affect peace and development. Among the foremost strategies used by autocratising regimes to consolidate power is tilting the playing-field against opposition forces (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018:177). Such skewed playing-field in terms of access to resources work in favour of the dominant parties whilst undermining inter-party competition (Jager & Du Toit, 2013:18). For instance, in Tanzania's dominant party system, skewed playing-field occurs under a condition of institutional design (including the design of electoral and party laws) and persisting state-party fusion suggesting continuation of de facto single party system in the multiparty era (Bakari and Whitehead, 2013:115; Makulilo, 2015:92). Therefore, the nature of the electoral competition variable has theoretical relevance in this study.

3.3.2. **Variables Operationalisation**

This section presents specific measurement indicators for selected variables. For the first variable (management of social tensions facing the regime), I have used ethnic

tensions, class cleavage, and the state-traditional authority conflict as indicators for assessing the effects of this variable on the quality of democracy in the studied cases. For the second variable (the scope of presidential power), I have used presidential constitutional powers, the exercise of executive powers, and horizontal accountability as measurement indicators. For the third variable (governance performance), I have delimited the thesis to only six relevant indicators to answer the research questions. Namely; managing the economy, narrowing wealth disparities, job creation, combating corruption in the public sector, improving delivery of social services, and preventing or resolving violent conflict. For the final variable (the nature of the electoral competition), I have used tolerance on the political opposition and political pluralism and the conduct of the electoral process as measurement indicators. The subsequent chapter discusses the application of the noted variables and measurement indicators as employed in this thesis.

4. **Methodology**

The chapter discusses the methodological framework underpinning this thesis. It explain methodological choices and their justifications on the comparative research design, case selection, research approach, data collection methods, thematic analysis, validity and reliability, and limitations and delimitation of the thesis. Finally, it discusses some ethical considerations about the thesis.

4.1. **Research Design**

This study employed a comparative case study design. It is a qualitative exploratory design. It has used the Most-Similar System Design (MSSD) by comparing cases which are as similar as possible on the independent variable but produce different outcomes on the effects of the explanatory variables across the study cases. In Comparative research, the methodological principles informing the applicability of MSSD are based on three criteria: level of analysis, research strategy, and the status of the dependent variable (Anckar, 2008:389). Meanwhile, MSSD research interest is on independent variables hence operating with varying dependent variables. Lijphart (1971:684) views the limitation of MSSD is a small number of cases but many explanatory variables to operationalise. However, since I employed a qualitative approach, my interest was to use MSSD to explain why the study cases have dissimilar outcomes in terms of the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of

democracy and peace and development using such variables as management of social tensions facing the regime; the scope of presidential power; governance performance; and the nature of the electoral competition. The selected variables were identified following a systematic review of the literature.

The study cases are similar in the independent variable. That is across the cases, the dominant party system appears to be a central feature of the political system, and the dominant parties have been in power for over four successive election terms. 'The four successive election terms' is a criterion I used in this study to establish party dominance in a political system. Despite Botswana and Tanzania experiencing rapid backsliding in the quality of democracy over the decade (2011-2022), Botswana just backslided to electoral democracy and Tanzania has consolidated into an electoral autocracy (V-Dem, 2023:41). Additionally, the unit of analysis is at the system level (a country's party system).

4.2. **Case Selection**

The justification for selecting the noted cases are fivefold. Firstly, the two countries have experienced the longest period of one-party dominance than any other country in Africa. CCM in Tanzania and BDP in Botswana have enjoyed hegemonic status since independence with minimal and inconsistent electoral challenge from the political opposition. Secondly, Tanzania and Botswana have been holding multiparty elections after every five years. However, Freedom House ranked Botswana and Tanzania as freer and partly free regimes, respectively (Freedom House, 2022a; 2022b). Meanwhile, V-Dem categorises Botswana and Tanzania as electoral democracy and electoral autocracy, respectively (V-Dem, 2023:39). Thirdly, the two countries despite having social cleavages of various magnitudes have not experienced protracted armed hostilities since independence. This makes the two countries interesting cases for comparative analysis in peace and development research.

Fourthly, the two countries are natural resources dependent economies with extractive industry contributing significantly to the national economy. Party monopoly of key policy decisions about energy and mineral resources extraction and distribution of wealth accrued from the extractive sectors affect the prospects for peace and development in these countries. For instance, in 2012 and 2013, riots erupted in Mtwara in Southern Tanzania over the government decision to construct a 532

kilometre natural gas pipeline from Mtwara region to the economic hub of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. The riots were fuelled by widespread concerns among the locals in Mtwara that the new pipeline will deprive them of the benefits generated from the onshore natural gas extraction thus contributing to further economic marginalisation of southern Tanzania (Must & Rustad, 2016). Such local riots may mobilise into a full-scale armed uprising unless the local grievances are adequately addressed by the regime in power.

Fifthly, Botswana and Tanzania share similar colonial experience having been under British rule for a greater part of their colonial history and subjected to British indirect rule. They had relatively small number of white settlers. Thus, the transition to postcolonial state was not by armed revolt but negotiated between nationalist groups and Britain. This paved the way for the adoption of a Westminster parliamentary democracy. But the imperatives within these countries changed mainly due to internal pressure (the desire for nation-building) and external pressure (the Cold war). So, the two countries followed contrasting development trajectories immediate after independence. Whereas Tanzania embraced African socialism (Ujamaa and self-reliance) under a single-party system, Botswana retained a parliamentary multiparty democracy (albeit fused with presidentialism) and state capitalism. Such contrasting paths shaped their subsequent development trajectories which can be adequately explained using historical institutionalism (path-dependent explanation). The noted justifications make the two cases comparable and interesting for comparative study in peace and development studies.

Nevertheless, Tanzania and Botswana also differ in many respects. But the most significant difference is a huge variation in population size between the two countries. Botswana has a population of approximately 2.675 million people with 69% living in urban areas as of 2023 (Worldometer, 2023). According to the August 2022 census, Tanzania had a population of 61.741 million people with less than 40% living in urban areas (URT, 2022:4). Such a huge population difference has implications on democracy in the noted countries. The proponents of the importance of population size for democracy tend to advance at least two arguments. Firstly, democracy cannot survive overpopulation as population explosion undermines the quality of democratic participation and the extent of inclusion in the political process and on governing of

the polity (Bartlett, 2000:65-66). This discourse tends to correlate the population size of the polity and democratic advancement. Thus, the smaller the polity the better. Sale (1996:8) acknowledging the thesis put forward by Dahl and Tufte (1973) about the relation of population size to democracy asserted that "…in smaller units, people are more politically active, can understand the issues and personalities far more clearly, participate more in all aspects of government, and regard themselves as having some effective control over the decisions of their lives."

Secondly, effective citizen participation in democratic governance (citizen effectiveness) and the capacity of a democratic system to fully deliver citizens' collective preferences (system capacity) are two equally important criteria of an ideal representative democracy or polyarchy (Dahl & Tufte, 1973:20-25). However, smaller and larger countries differ on the two criteria. Such differences, according to Eulau (1974:1302), are due to "conflicting democratic goals." Smaller political units are believed to strengthen citizen effectiveness in enhancing democratic governance by promoting participant democratic culture and make control over leaders easier but such units are said to have minimal capacity of meeting collective preferences of its citizens compared with larger units due to absence of pluralism resulted by small social cleavages (Eulau, 1974:1302; Barry, 1974:493). In smaller countries like Botswana, citizens are more homogeneous with little ethnic or linguistic cleavages rather than in larger multi-ethnic units like Tanzania where there are multiple cleavages at different levels. Managing social tensions resulting from these cleavages affect the prospects for peace and development in a country.

4.3. **Research Approach**

The study employed abduction as its logic of inquiry. It used historical institutionalism and substantive democratic theory to investigate the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania in order to understand their implications for peace and development in the studied countries. At a methodological level, abduction is a methodological approach which helps a researcher use theoretical insights in order to investigate and understand a certain empirical phenomenon. As Bryman (2012:401) highlights "abduction is broadly inductive in approach but is worth distinguishing by virtue of its reliance on explanation and understanding on participants' worldviews." In this case,

understanding the effects and implications of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy and peace and development by grounding theoretical accounts to data collected from different datasets.

4.4. **Data Collection Methods**

I conducted a desk study instead of a field study. The rationale for this methodological decision is that adequate, quality, and up-to-date secondary data to answer the research questions were accessed from multiple printed sources. Thus, I relied on review of documents as a main data collection data method.

4.4.1. **Review of Documents**

Review of documents helped me access secondary data from credible qualitative and some quantitative data-sets. Datasets used were Afrobarometer surveys, World Bank Datasets[5], Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (2022), Freedom Index (2022), V-Dem indices (2023), and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) (2019 & 2022). Sources like Afrobarometer surveys have reliable first hand data drawn from interviews with respondents in Botswana and Tanzania. Also, local data sources such as statutes[6], social media and cyber spaces[7], newspapers[8] provided aggregated and dis-aggregated secondary data. Furthermore, different research and professional reports were used from national electoral commissions and observer groups in Botswana and Tanzania.

4.5. **Thematic Analysis**

Because the data collection methods underpinned this study were the review of documents and the type of data are secondary data, the study employed thematic analysis and qualitative content analysis to analyse data. The themes were derived from the framework for analysis developed from research questions, the systematic review of literature, and theoretical approaches. The framework consists of four variables that I used to measure the effects of the dominant party system on the quality of democracy and its implications for peace and development in Botswana and Tanzania. These variables include; management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the

[5] Development of the Corruption Index in Tanzania 2003-2022.
[6] Political Parties (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Tanzania).
[7] The Patriot on Sunday, Economic Intelligence & Botswana Youth (Botswana); JamiiForums (Tanzania).
[8] The Patriot on Sunday (Botswana); Mwananchi & Citizen (Tanzania).

electoral competition. The noted variables were used to extract data from the secondary sources as indicated in section (4.4.1.) until data saturation was achieved.

4.6. **Validity and Reliability**

The credibility of academic research largely depends on its originality and how well the research is crafted academically. Thus, validity and reliability are very important in this regard. Validity is about the accuracy of a measure and reliability is about the consistency of a measure. To ensure validity, the study selected four variables to measure the effects of dominant party systems on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania. The question was, can the selected mechanisms accurately measure such effects? The varying effects of one-party dominance on democracy in the studied cases as demonstrated in the findings and analysis chapters indicate that the four variables accurately measure the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy. However, a major limitation is that this study relied only on secondary data and examined only two similar cases (Botswana and Tanzania). This poses a challenge to external validity. Thus, it is difficult to generalise the findings on the wider African context. Therefore, replication of the study findings depends on using a similar theoretical framework (historical institutionalism and substantive democratic theory) and analytical framework (the four variables) as well as similar research design (MSSD).

4.7. **Limitations and Delimitation of the Study**

4.7.1. **Limitations**

Three limitations were notable throughout this thesis. Firstly, since the researcher is a Tanzanian, he is more familiar with the Tanzanian context than Botswana's. Secondly, since I employed a desk study, it denied the thesis rich qualitative primary data drawn from semi-structured interviews with key informants in the two countries. This means the study findings were limited to perceptions of domestic and international actors as captured by Afrobarometer surveys, CPI, IIAG, Freedom House, V-Dem, UNDP and Word Bank datasets, and some qualitative remarks from political actors, academics, civil society actors, government officials, and some media outlets. Therefore, I was very careful not to use dramatic words in the findings and analysis chapters such as 'findings reveal or evidence shows'. Instead, I used less dramatic words like 'findings indicate or evidence suggests' as a way of appreciating the noted limitation.

Thirdly, For practical reasons and empirical limitations, the thesis could not explore all potential variables which explain the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania, thus delimited to examine only four variables highlighted in this chapter identified after a systematic review of literature. For instance, ruling party relations with economic elites is an important variable in measuring the effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy. However, it was excluded because not only is it difficult to measure but also required detailed evidence that cannot solely be based on secondary data. Ethically, I could not allow myself to extend this study beyond what is evidenced. Therefore, such a variable deserves further research.

4.7.2. **Delimitation**

As justified in this chapter and in the previous chapters, this thesis is delimited to the analysis of effects of autocratising dominant party system on the quality of democracy in the study cases and the implications of such autocratisation for peace and development in Botswana and Tanzania. Therefore, the thesis delimited its analysis to four variables: management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition.

4.8. **Ethical Consideration**

Since the primary source of data is secondary data, this thesis presented the actual data as accessed in the documents and datasets used to answer the questions. Also, I cited the data sources accordingly to simplify validation of the secondary data. Moreover, I indicated how the secondary data were generated by some of the datasets used. Therefore, the study poses no harm to the research subjects.

5. **Findings**

This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the four variables which I used to measure the effects of the dominant party system on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania. The noted variables are; the management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition. Three questions inform the findings presented in this chapter. How are dominant party systems affecting the quality of democracy in

Botswana and Tanzania? What are the conditions leading to democratic backsliding in Botswana and Tanzania? What are the implications of one-party dominance for peace and development in Botswana and Tanzania?

5.1. **Botswana**

5.1.1. **Management of social tensions facing the regime**

Findings indicate that Botswana is facing social and political tensions which emanate from different social cleavages within the society. Seabo and Masilo (2018:64-68) identified four types of cleavages in Botswana: state-traditional authority, ethno-linguistic, urban-rural, and class cleavages. However, Tesfahun (2015:16) observed that the politically significant cleavages in Botswana cut across ethnic and class lines. Likewise, Taylor (2002:5) asserts that Botswana's trajectory is inextricably linked to class relations. Also, Molutsi (1989a:105) has classified Botswana's petty bourgeois into five distinct fractions: the political elite, traditional chiefs, bureaucratic elite, the business elite, and prominent ranch owners (kulak).

Findings further suggest that historically the noted factions of the ruling class had vested interests in the cattle industry, the primary productive sector of Botswana's economy (Taylor, 2002:5; Seabo et al., 2018:86). To manage the internal competition among the ruling elite in Botswana and facilitate elite consolidation, the competing factions forged a power bloc (the BDP) that aimed at mediating the internal conflicts within the hegemonic class resulted by intense competition in the main sectors of the economy and the struggle for political power. Sebudubudu and Molutsi (2011:11) primarily associate this successful "grand coalition" among the national elite in Botswana to personal ties between different fractions of the ruling elite. However, findings indicate that the personalisation and centralisation of power by the immediate past president (Ian Khama) to benefit his family and cronies had split the BDP (Diamond, 2015:146). The outcome of such intraparty conflicts is the defection of Khama and his allies to the opposition just before the national elections in 2019 (Seabo & Nyenhuis, 2021:854). Also, such conflict unleashed increasing autocratic tendencies of his successor, President Mokgweetsi Masisi who feared that diffusion power within the party and the state might further spilt the BDP and weaken his rule (The Patriot on Sunday, 25 July 2019). Hence, benefit the influential political opposition.

Moreover, findings suggest that state-chieftainship conflict is the most intense cleavage in post-independence Botswana. Ifezue (2015:281) observed:

> Sir Seretse Khama's regime was not pro-chieftainship. In the late president's opinion, chieftaincy was autocratic, out-moded and needed reform and replacement by 'modern' representative and more accountable systems at local levels, to mirror what was happening at national level.

The early BDP hardened approach to chieftaincy was defined by the Chieftain Law of 1965 and 1987 that stripped chiefs of their powers on substantive issues and transferred the powers to the central government. Nevertheless, the Bogosi (House of Chiefs) Act (2008) redefined state-chieftainship relations attempting to mediate the conflict between them and curb growing tribalism in the country. With this act, the House of Chiefs were unwillingly transformed into an advisory council of the government, thus were incorporated into the modern state as part of the nation-building (Ifezue, 2015:293).

Findings indicate that the BDP nation-building agenda was biased towards the dominant Tswana (50% of Batswana) as it elevated Tswana culture (including statutorily making Setswana a national language) at the expense of ethnic minorities (Seabo and Masilo, 2018:65). Seabo and Masilo (2018:65) observed that President Ketumile Masire "warned 'ethnic minority rights' activists 'not to spoil the prevailing peace and unity in the country by fighting for ethnic language groupings to take precedence over Setswana, and that tribes insisting that their languages become medium of instruction within their respective areas would break up the nation'." Such a statement was not coincidental because the BDP support base is mainly ethnic Tswana (Bangwato and Bakwana tribes) (Tesfahun, 2015:16).

The above findings suggest that ethnic cleavages are very strong in Botswana and are the centre for social and political tensions facing the country. Nevertheless, Afrobarometer round 9 survey[9] (2023c) indicates that the majority of Batswana identify equally with the national identity and ethnic identity (60.3%). Only 11.1% and 13.3% subscribe only to ethnic identity or national identity respectively (Table 1).

[9] Interviewed a sample size of 1,200 adults between 23 July and 10 August 2022.

This suggests that both ethnic identity and national identity are equally strong in Botswana.

Table 1: Q84C. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Motswana and being a ___[R's ethnic group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?

	Urban	Rural	Semi-urban	Men	Women	Total
I feel only (ethnic group)	8.0	10.4	13.0	9.9	12.3	11.1
I feel more (ethnic group) than (national identity)	2.4	2.8	3.7	3.9	2.4	3.1
I feel equally (national identity) and (ethnic group)	61.9	58.3	61.3	60.9	59.8	60.3
I feel more (national identity) than (ethnic group)	8.0	2.8	5.0	5.2	4.3	4.7
I feel only (national identity)	7.6	18.0	11.9	13.5	13.1	13.3
Not applicable	10.0	7.1	4.4	6.2	6.7	6.5
Don't know	2.2	0.6	0.6	0.4	1.4	0.9

Source: Afrobarometer (2023c).

Such strong ethnic and national identities seem to confirm the arguments about the current ethnic tensions facing the BDP regime. That is the contention between ethnic and national identities. For instance, the increasing agitation for ethnic minority rights in the country.

Meanwhile, Afrobarometer (2019)[10] findings suggest that half of Batswana (52%) strongly believe that traditional leaders mostly work in cooperation with elected leaders to get things done. 16% of Batswana agree that traditional leaders are mostly in competition with elected leaders for resources, power, and influence (Table 2).

Table 2: Q89B. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: Traditional leaders are mostly in competition with elected leaders for resources, power and influence.
Statement 2: Traditional leaders mostly work in cooperation with elected leaders to get things done.

	Urban	Rural	Semi-urban	Male	Female	Total
Agree very strongly with Statement 1	7	8	7	8	7	7
Agree with Statement 1	8	5	11	10	7	9
Agree with Statement 2	19	26	27	25	26	25
Agree very strongly with Statement 2	58	52	50	52	53	52
Agree with neither	1	4	2	2	3	3
Refused to answer		0	0		0	0
Don't know	6	4	3	3	4	4

Source: Afrobarometer (2019).

[10] Interviewed a nationally representative sample of 1,200 adult Batswana between 26 July 2019 and 10 August 2019.

These findings do not sufficiently support the above argument about state-chieftain conflict as the most intense conflict in post-independence Botswana. Therefore, suggesting that more qualitative data is needed to generate sufficient evidence to qualify this argument.

5.1.2. **The scope of presidential power**

Findings suggest that in Botswana, the presidency is the most powerful of all state institutions. Sebudubudu et al. (2013:55) note that since independence, parliamentary institution has been very weak in Botswana, and that this weakness was unnoticed due to the goodwill of past statesmen. Furthermore, Seabo et al. (2018:85) highlight that Botswana's constitution entrusted the presidency with enormous executive powers. Also, the president is the chair of the ruling BDP. In the context of weak democratic control mechanisms, the president may abuse his constitutional powers to the detriment of political opponents and dissidents, hence benefiting the ruling party and his cronies (Diamond, 2015:146). Evaluating President Ian Khama's administration, Seabo et al. (2018:95) conclude that "the trust in the presidency under his reign is on the wane." Subscribing to this assessment, Sebudubudu et al. (2013:55) conclude that "it can be argued that Ian Khama has made the weakness of parliament as well as other oversight institutions even more pronounced." Matumo (in Sebudubudu et al., 2013:55) observed that "the current President (Ian Khama) has given Batswana the opportunity to retrospect and educate themselves about the constitution and the powers that it vests on the presidency". These findings seems to confirm the central argument advanced in the literature on democratic backsliding which contends that there is positive association between executive aggrandisement and autocratisation (Diamond, 2015; Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Lührmann & Rooney, 2021).

Nevertheless, findings indicate that the majority of Batswana are increasingly demanding statutory limitation of presidential power. Afrobarometer survey published on 20 February 2023[11] indicates that citizens are increasingly calling for limitation of presidential powers (17% percent increase since 2008), including demanding that the

[11] Interviewed a nationally representative sample of 1,200 adult Batswana in July-August 2022.

president must abide by the laws and court rulings (see figure 2). Respondents were asked to share their views about two interrelated statements[12].

Figure 2: President must always obey laws and court decisions | Botswana **| 2008-2022**



Source: Afrobarometer (2023a).

These findings suggest that majority of the Batswana are vehemently opposed to executive aggrandisement and personalisation of power by the president of the republic by demanding for the limitation of presidential power.

Also, it was alleged that President Mokgweetsi Masisi interfered the process of allocating judges for some cases (Afrobarometer, 2023b:1). This suggests that Masisi has been engaging in executive aggrandisement and centralisation of power undermining the independence of judiciary and effective checks and balances.

5.1.3. **Governance performance**

Findings suggest that the prolonged BDP's dominance in Botswana's politics is mainly because of its good performance in governance and economic management (Seabo & Molebatsi, 2017:1). However, findings further indicate that the recent dwindling trust in the presidency in Botswana is attributed to public perceptions of democratic governance, corruption, economic performance, and education (Seabo et

[12] **Statement 1**: Since the president was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong. **Statement 2**: The president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.

al. 2018:86). Furthermore, findings suggest that the growing inequality in Botswana is partly associated with specific policy choices by the BDP government and partly by the capitalist development policy embraced by the country since independence (Taylor, 2002:22). Thus, it is argued that the persisting economic inequality in Botswana may increase support for the political opposition in the country (Taylor, 2002:22).

Whereas Afrobarometer round 9 surveyed 18 indicators to evaluate government performance in Botswana, this study delimited its evaluation to only 6 indicators relevant to answer the research questions. Also, the indicators related to social amenities were combined into a single indicator (improving delivery of social services). These indicators include; managing the economy, narrowing wealth disparities, job creation, combating corruption in the public sector, improving delivery of social services, and preventing or resolving violent conflict.

Findings based on Afrobarometer round 9 survey[13] indicates that the current government is performing either very badly or fairly badly in managing the economy (Table 8), narrowing wealth disparities (Appendix 1), creating jobs (Appendix 2), and combating corruption (Appendix 3).

Table 3: Q46A. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: Managing the economy?

	Urban	Rural	Semi-urban	Men	Women	Total
Very badly	37.2	34.3	35.2	35.6	34.9	35.3
Fairly badly	29.8	32.1	30.8	30.5	31.6	31.1
Fairly well	28.6	29.5	29.6	30.3	28.5	29.4
Very well	3.6	3.1	2.6	2.7	3.3	3.0
Refused	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.3
Don't know/Haven't heard enough to say	0.3	0.7	1.5	0.8	1.1	1.0

Source: Afrobarometer (2023c).

While improving in two indicators[14] and bouncing back on one[15] in the 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), Botswana saw slow improvement in human development since 2017 (IIAG, 2022:18). But the country is ranked fifth in overall governance in Africa and IIAG 10-year trend (2012-2021) shows overall governance

[13] Fieldwork for Round 9 in Botswana was conducted between 23 July and 10 August 2022. Using a representative sample of 1,200.
[14] Foundations for economic opportunity and participation, rights & inclusion.
[15] Security & rule of law.

in Botswana has slightly improved (IIAG, 2022:13). However, IIAG (2022:33) observed that "12 countries have declined in all 4 underlying sub-categories of Security & Rule of Law since 2012, including 3 of the 5 highest scoring countries: Botswana (3rd), Cabo Verde (4th) and Namibia (5th)." These findings suggest that by just looking at the ranking alone, one cannot easily identify such underlying declining trends in security and rule of law in Botswana (subcategories: security & safety, rule of law and justice, anti-corruption, and accountability and transparency). Furthermore, IIAG findings in the noted category are reflected in the Afrobarometer Round 9 findings on fighting corruption in government. Thus, indicating backsliding in democratic governance in Botswana. Nevertheless, both Afrobarometer and IIAG findings contradict the 2022 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) on Botswana (scored 60/100). CPI indicates that the country has least public sector corruption and ranked 35 among 180 countries. Such contradiction emerges because Transparency International CPI is limited to experts' and businesspersons' perceptions of corruption in the government. Thus, their non-representative sample represent partial findings. Afrobarometer survey and IIAG use representative samples and robust data collection methods.

Meanwhile, UNDP's 2022 Human Security Special Report classify Botswana among the countries with high human development (UNDP, 2022:122). Also, the 2019 Human Development Report observed that "For Botswana, Lesotho, Eswatini and Namibia inequality fell: The incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew at different paces: from 10% points to 88% points more than the average" (UNDP, 2019:117). Additionally, the 2020 World Development Report observed:

> "Botswana's dominant position as a source of high quality diamonds enabled the government to negotiate a relocation of De Beers's sorting, aggregation, and sales operations from London to Gaborone, which has contributed to substantially strengthening Botswana's value-added position in the diamond value chain." (World Bank, 2020:177).

But what explain these findings discrepancies? Perhaps it might be because of variation in data collection methods or measurement indicators. But Afrobarometer Round 9 suggests that the current government is performing fairly well in preventing or resolving violent conflict (Appendix 4) and improving delivery of basic social

services[16]. Interestingly, the findings on this variable (governance performance) in the Afrobarometer study are almost similar across the surveyed indicators in urban, rural, and semi-urban areas suggesting similarity of experiences on these matters among communities across the country. Based on the findings, some crucial indicators of democratic governance are declining in Botswana[17], while some improvements have been made in other indicators suggesting a general pattern of democratic backsliding. Here, we can also reflect over one more dimension - peoples expectations. It might be that the longer history with relatively well governed economy, and the closeness to South Africa, have raised peoples expectations in Botswana.

5.1.4. **The nature of the electoral competition**

Findings indicate that at least two factors explain the extent to which the nature of electoral competition affects the quality of democracy in Botswana. Also, these factors have implications for peace and development in the country. The noted factors include; tolerance of the political opposition and political pluralism and the conduct of the electoral process.

5.1.4.1. **Tolerance on the political opposition and political pluralism**

However, Sebudubudu et al. (2016:11) observe that since independence the BDP has been tolerant of the political opposition and political pluralism in Botswana. Burchard (2013:123) concluded that "the dominant party label may not be as useful as previous research has suggested. It is an ambiguous label that masks important levels of competition and turnover" under one-party dominance as evident in Botswana.

Findings indicate that since independence in 1966 there has been increased tolerance towards the political opposition and political pluralism by the ruling BDP. There are no apparent restrictions on opposition parties' activities like organising meetings, rallies, political campaigns, numbers of parities, formation of new parties, or contesting for political power (Sebudubudu et al., 2016:11). Also, the democratic space in the country allowed for the operations of critical civil society organisations. These developments have led to international democratic indices to continuously classify the country as an electoral democracy (Freedom House, 2022b; V-Dem, 2023:39). Nevertheless, findings indicate that the democratic condition in the country

[16] *See* Q46F, Q46G, Q46H, Q46I, Q46K & Q46L in Afrobarometer Round 9 Survey for Botswana.
[17] Security & safety, rule of law and justice, anti-corruption, and accountability and transparency.

has been deteriorating in both the previous administration under President Ian Khama and the current one under President Mokgweetsi Masisi affecting inter-party competition and political pluralism in the country (Diamond, 2015:146; IDEA, 2021:14; V-Dem, 2023:39).

Highlighting the ongoing democratic weakening in Botswana, V-Dem (2023:20) notes that the country is engulfed in the ongoing wave of autocratisation as it has witnessed continuous democratic erosion in the past decade. What Luhrmann and Lindberg (2019) consider a "third wave of autocratisation". Four institutions have been cited to have mostly experienced persistent attacks from autocratising regimes, the media, CSOs, academic and cultural freedom, and freedom of expression (V-Dem, 2023:24). Commenting on the state of political pluralism and participation in Botswana[18], Freedom House (2022b) noted that the right of political parties to form and operate is legally protected and guaranteed in practice but the political opposition mounted serious allegations of abuse of state resources by the BDP, including using prominent state media to its own advantage. Furthermore, targeting and harassing opposition figures and interference into the operations of opposition parties by state apparatuses have continuously been observed under President Masisi administration. For example, the main opposition party, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) and its senior leader Duma Boko and his family, reported to have been harassed and interfered by state agencies during the 2019 election campaigns (Freedom House, 2022b).

Highlighting these events, a prominent local media outlet in Botswana, The Patriot on Sunday published on their Facebook page on 25 July 2019 a statement from UDC Head of Communications, Moeti Mohwasa lamenting "what is currently unfolding in our political landscape is catastrophic for our democracy, particularly in an election year. These can be summarised as acts of cowardice, intolerance, and an attempt to retain power by all means including undemocratic ones." Signalling a risk of descending into violence, Mohwasa further expressed concerns that "we are aware that the current regime wants to create chaos in the country and thereafter impose a state of emergency which will among others, delay the process of elections and

[18] Based on a survey question (B1): Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?

thereby extending President Masisi's rule against the will of the people" (The Patriot on Sunday, 25 July 2019). Nonetheless, the election went on in October 2019 with the immediate former President Ian Khama defecting to the opposition.

Adding to such allegations was the arrest of three opposition cadres from the Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF) by the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS) in November 2021 (Freedom House, 2022b). Such reports suggest worrying tendencies of the ruling BDP of using security apparatuses to intimidate the political opposition and political dissidents in the country. Angered by such intolerant behaviour, Lawrence Ookeditse, Publicity Secretary for BPF lamented:

> The Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services, DIS, has arrested three BPF linked individuals in what is a continuation of blatant provocation and abuse of power by the Masisi led regime. The only crime the trio has committed is their being associated with the BPF. The three are indefatigable BPF Women's League Chairperson, Ms. Catherine Sepora, a mother whose school going child remains inconsolable; former BPF Publicity Secretary Mr. Justice Motlhabane who now serves as an administration officer at MP. Lesedi Leepeetswe's Constituency Office and former BPF Youth League National Organizing Secretary Mr. Ogaufi Nthobelang… (Botswana Youth, 30th November 2021).

Similarly, fearing apparent defection of several BDP legislators in July 2020, the state in Botswana enacted a law in February 2021 that prohibits national and local legislators (including independent legislators) from crossing the floor when serving their office terms otherwise they will lose their parliamentary seats (Economic Intelligence, 18 August 2020; Freedom House, 2022b). Nevertheless, highlighting his misgivings about the politics of floor crossing in Botswana, a critical Batswana columnist Adam Phetlhe observed:

> The BDP and the Opposition are displaying shameful hypocrisy with respect to floor crossing. And this is a political game they have played for the longest time. When the game favours either player, the other complains and vice-versa…The Opposition is conveniently hypocritical by not sticking with the principle that floor crossing is undesirable when it suits it and somewhat somersaults when it doesn't. Either party cannot complain about floor crossing because they have both benefited from it at different times. It has been and still is a two-way street if you like (The Patriot on Sunday, 13th December 2020).

Therefore, findings indicate that in recent years the BDP has become increasingly intolerant on the political opposition, fearing losing their majority in parliament (currently stands at 38/57 against 19/57 seats for the opposition parties) and ultimately

relinquishing power in subsequent elections. The fear has increased unprecedentedly following the defection of the immediate former president Ian Khama to the opposition in 2019 culminating in internal instability in the ruling BDP.

5.1.4.2. **The conduct of the electoral process**

Generally, findings indicate that the conduct of the electoral process affects the nature of the electoral competition and in turn affects the quality of democracy and peace and development in Botswana. Findings indicate that Botswana is among ten democracies that have experienced decline in clean elections since 2015 (Diamond, 2015:146; IDEA, 2021:14). Such decline contributed to the backsliding of the country from liberal democracy in 2021 to electoral democracy in 2022 (V-Dem, 2022:14; V-Dem, 2023:39). Also, findings suggest that the majority of Batswana are not against one-party dominance if and only if elections are free and allow fair competition among competing parties (Afrobarometer, 2023b). Afrobarometer survey published on 27th April 2023 indicates that more than half (54%) of Batswana say they support popular sovereignty and free and fair electoral competition even if it returns the same party to power[19]. Respondents were asked to share their perspectives about two opposing statements[20]. Figure 3 below illustrates these findings.

Figure 3: Political Party Turnover | Botswana | 2022



Source: Afrobarometer (2023b).

[19] The findings were based on a nationwide representative sample of 1,200 adult Batswana interviewed between July and August 2022.

[20] **Statement 1**: In a democracy, it is better if power sometimes changes hands in elections from one political party to another. **Statement 2**: In a democracy, as long as a government is elected by the people in a free and fair election, it doesn't matter if one party always wins and continuously governs the country.

Botswana is an electoral democracy where elections are the primary means for the majority of Batswana to influence the policy process and development outcomes by electing a national parliament and the local councils. Also, the president is elected by the national parliament. The above findings suggest that to the majority of Batswana, the quality of the electoral process matters in sustaining the democratic order in the country. But if the quality of elections is declining, then it suggests that the democratic order is at stake evident after the backsliding of the country to electoral democracy in 2022.

Moreover, findings suggest that 39% of Batswana convinced that multiparty democracy and inter-party competition does not lead to violent conflicts[21] (Afrobarometer, 2023b). Meanwhile, 27% of Batswana say that such competition often or always leads to violent conflicts (Appendix 6). Also, 80% of the people view plural politics and inter-party competition as a necessary condition for improved democratic governance and inclusive development in the country[22] (Afrobarometer, 2023b). Only 19% of Batswana view multiparty competition as a divisive phenomenon (Appendix 5). Therefore, the above findings indicate that multiparty competition in Botswana experiences some degree of electoral violence. Diamond, (2015:146) links such electoral violence to BDP's intolerance of opposition manifesting in persistent intimidation and assault on opposition politicians culminating in the possible murder of a prominent opposition candidate few months before the October 2014 parliamentary elections. This confirms Bermeo's (2016:14) argument about the strategic manipulation of elections, a strategy used by autocratising regimes to stay in power.

However, the conduct of the electoral process in Botswana in the past three decades (1994-2019) has been described to be peaceful, transparent, free and fair by domestic and international observers (ECF-SADC, 2019:8; AUEOM, 2019:8; IEC Botswana & IDEA, 2019). But during the post-election assessment stakeholder workshop for the

[21] Respondents were asked: In your opinion, how often, in this country, does competition between political parties lead to violent conflict?

[22] **Statement 1**: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Botswana. **Statement 2**: Many political parties are needed to make sure that Batswana have real choices in who governs them.

2019 General Elections held between 25 and 26 February 2020, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Botswana noted:

> The IEC is currently not a body corporate and therefore lacks the necessary regulatory and enforcement powers to fulfill its mandate of guaranteeing accountability and transparency in the electoral process. The absence of a regulatory legal framework to ensure accountability and transparency can have unintended consequences on the conduct of the electoral process. For instance, it can undermine the ability of voters, political parties, the media and civic groups to exercise their right to participate in the electoral process without risk of violations to their freedoms and rights.

The above statement indicates that the election management body in Botswana lacks clear autonomy in the execution of its constitutional and statutory mandate. Also, IEC Botswana noted the 2019 elections witnessed the highest number of election petitions (IEC Botswana & IDEA, 2019:5). Such a high number of election petitions are an expression of dissatisfaction with the electoral process on the part of the petitioners. Adding to these concerns were the persistent problem of voter apathy among youth in the country. Highlighting this problem during similar stakeholder workshop for the 2019 General Elections, Bernard Bogosi, Director, Organisation for Youth and Elections in Botswana (OYEBO) noted "contrary to popular discourse that Botswana youth are averse to participating in the electoral process, they are only consciously withholding their vote as an expression of protest against the existing wealth disparities in society" (IEC Botswana & IDEA, 2019:25). Such findings might further suggest that youths in Botswana think of elections in the country are manifestations of power contestation among elites rather than a means to substantive development outcomes.

Finally, findings suggest that Batswana have been supporting multiparty competition since independence. Also, the opposition have consistently registered more than 40% of the total national vote between 1994 and 2014. In 2014, the opposition vote reached 50% and the remaining 50% went to BDP (Sebudubudu et al., 2016:15). In the last election in 2019, the BDP amassed 52% of the total national votes while the opposition collected 47% (IEC Botswana, 2019:26). Such increasing electoral competition explains why the BDP is increasingly clamping down on the opposition. Appendix 8 presents percentage of seats and votes garnered by political parties in

Botswana (1965-2019) which severs as evidence of the extent of inter-party electoral competition over that period.

5.2. **Tanzania**

5.2.1. **Management of social tensions facing the regime**

Unlike Botswana, Tanzania is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with more than 126 tribes. Findings indicate that Tanzania has relatively succeeded in consolidating national integration by adopting Kiswahili as a lingua franca (Bakari and Whitehead, 2013:102; Hunter, 2015; Chiriyankandath, 2017:38). Also, the state abolished traditional authority[23] in order to consolidate political power at the national level. This was one of the strategies that the ruling party employed to manage ethnic, regional, and religious identities in the country (Ewald, 2011:121). Whitehead (2009:42) observe:

> Regimes that push for the collective usage of a less alienating and more universally spoken language, such as Kiswahili in Tanzania, may ultimately stitch together a stronger degree of convergence rather than divergence. This convergence constitutes a shared macro-structural collective identity that is more resistant to micro-level attempts by political entrepreneurs to mobilize subnational identities.

Whitehead argument is confirmed by Afrobarometer round 8 survey (2021)[24] findings which indicate that nearly half of Tanzanians identify only with national identity rather than ethnic identity (43.8%). Additionally, a substantial number of Tanzanians identify equally with national identity and ethnic identity (40.8%). Furthermore, a minority of Tanzanians subscribe only to ethnic identity (4%) (Table 4).

Table 4: Q82B. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Tanzanian and being a _____[R's ethnic group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?

[23] *See* the Abolition of Chieftaincy Act in 1962.
[24] Based on a sample size of 2,398.

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
I feel only (ethnic group)	2.6	4.8	4.4	3.6	4.0
I feel more (ethnic group) than (national identity)	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.5
I feel equally (national identity) and (ethnic group)	39.4	41.5	38.2	43.5	40.8
I feel more (national identity) than (ethnic group)	8.5	6.5	6.6	7.7	7.1
I feel only (national identity)	45.0	43.1	46.4	40.9	43.8
Not applicable	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.8	1.5
Don't know		0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2

Source: Afrobarometer (2021).

However, findings suggest that ethnic and racial cleavages are still very strong in the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar. Such social tensions have implications for peace and development in the isles. Hettiger (2010:46) observed that "…racial issues remained implanted in Zanzibar culture and came to a head in 1995 and 2000, during the first multi-party elections since the revolution." Also, Cameron (2002:326) observe:

> CCM's 'othering' of the opposition - CUF leaders as 'Arabs' and Pembans as 'washamba na wapumbavu' (bumpkins and fools') potentially had as its logical outcome the possibility of pogroms against Pembans on the mainland and ethnic attacks in Zanzibar by CCM wanamaskan (squads) and security forces.

While such observations might be somehow overstated, they do suggest that ethnic and racial divisions still predominate party politics in Zanzibar. For instance, the January 2001 violent suppression of opposition demonstrators protesting irregularities in the general elections of October 2000 leaving an estimated 35 people dead and 600 injured (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Such divisions are said to have retarded democratic transition in the isles (Bakari, 2001:315). However, the Afrobarometer round 8 survey suggests that the majority of Tanzanians say that there is more that unites all Tanzanians as one people (66.7%). Only a minority of 4.2% say that there is more that divides them (Appendix 9).

The above findings suggest that social and political conflicts are more intense in Zanzibar than in the Tanzania mainland. But CCM remains the primary trigger of the socio-political conflicts in Zanzibar due to its reluctance to relinquish power in the isles. Based on the findings, however, CCM can also be credited for the success of its

national build agenda which forged a strong national identity and national cohesion in Tanzania.

5.2.2. **The scope of presidential power**

Findings suggest that Tanzania has a powerful executive. Indeed, the first president of the country Julius Nyerere was quoted saying that "I have sufficient powers under the constitution to be a dictator" (Bakari & Whitehead, 2013:103). It implies that despite constitutionally having a hybrid system (dual executive - president and prime minister), Tanzania has an imperial presidency. Noting the concerns of the political opposition in that regard, Bakari and Whitehead (2013:103) observe that "extensive presidential power such as these allow institutional space for the perpetuation of personal rule, patronage, and neopatrimonial forms of government, despite the presence of multiparty politics." Therefore, findings indicate that imperial presidency contributes to the endurance of one-party dominance in Tanzania where the president doubles as the chairperson of the ruling party.

Furthermore, findings suggest that imperial presidency in Tanzania is susceptible to abuse by the executive, thus entrenching a culture of impunity as well as undermining constitutionalism and the existing mechanisms for democratic control of the government in the country. Commenting on the High Court ruling that declared President John Magufuli's sacking of CAG (Prof. Mussa Assad) as unconstitutional, a prominent High Court advocate, Rugemeleza Nshalla lamented "we are happy that the court has finally declared that remove of the former CAG was unconstitutional but it is unfortunate they declined to declare that the appointment of the new CAG was also unconstitutional too" (The Citizen, 6 December, 2022). Also, a prominent opposition leader, Zitto Kabwe was quoted saying "there had been a plan for a while to remove Prof Assad from the CAG position because he was resolute, takes bold positions and does not obey orders from above. Constitutionally, they have failed" (The Citizen, 6 December, 2022).

But, Afrobarometer round 8 survey (2021)[25] indicates that the majority of Tanzanians (75.8%) say that the president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong (Table 5). Additionally, the majority of Tanzanians (84.9%) say that the president adheres to court decisions and laws of the country (Appendix 10).

[25] Based on a sample size of 2,398.

Furthermore, the majority of Tanzanians (83.7) say that the president does not ignore Parliament or just do what he wants (Appendix 11). Moreover, a substantial number of Tanzanians say that officials who commit crimes never (48%) or rarely (29%) go unpunished (Afrobarometer, 2021).

Table 5: Q30B-TAN. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Statement 1: Since the president was elected to lead the country, [he] should not be bound by laws or court decisions that [he] thinks are wrong. **Statement 2**: The president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if [he] thinks they are wrong.

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Agree very strongly with 1	13.5	13.3	11.7	15.1	13.4
Agree with 1	9.9	8.9	8.2	10.3	9.2
Agree with 2	25.8	22.7	25.7	21.7	23.7
Agree very strongly with 2	49.8	53.2	53.6	50.5	52.1
Agree with neither	0.3	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.7
Don't know	0.7	0.9	0.1	1.7	0.9

Source: Afrobarometer (2021).

Whereas Afrobarometer findings indicate that the president does not ignore the courts and laws of Tanzania or ignore the parliament, the unconstitutional dismissal of the CAG by President Magufuli in 2019 suggests the contrary. Such dismissal indicates the tendencies towards executive aggrandisement and further centralisation of power by the incumbent which contributes to autocratic consolidation.

5.2.3. **Governance performance**

Findings suggest that satisfaction with public governance in Tanzania has improved (IIAG, 2022:97). However, the IIAG 10-year trend (2012-2021) indicates that security and rule of law category increasingly deteriorated in Tanzania. IIAG (2022:32) further noted that such the fastest decline of security and rule of law category has setback governance progress in Africa in the last decade. Furthermore, right to life, freedom from violence, right to equality before the law, right to liberty and personal security, and right to education were cited as the five most violated human rights in 2022 in Tanzania (LHRC, 2023:12). The above findings suggest that the country is backsliding in some important aspects of democratic governance.

Meanwhile, UNDP classifies Tanzania among the countries with low human development (UNDP, 2022:122). LHRC (2023:242) findings suggest that the failure of impressive economic growth in the last ten years to contribute to substantial

reduction of poverty has translated into low human development in the country. Of course the country climbed three slots in the HDI rankings from 163rd in 2020 to 160th in 2022 (LHRC, 2023:242). Nevertheless, Afrobarometer round 8 survey (2021) indicate that most Tanzanians say the previous government (Magufuli's administration) performed fairly well in managing the economy, combating corruption, job creation, reducing wealth disparities, improving social service delivery, preventing or resolving violent conflict, and managing natural resources such as gold, Tanzanite, and natural gas[26]. Such good performance ratings across the selected indicators suggest that Magufuli's administration was committed to promoting economic development and closing the gap between rich and poor. But the caveat is that freedom of expression during the Magufuli's administration was seriously curtailed, therefore suggesting round 8 findings might not reflect the actual condition on the ground. Once the Afrobarometer round 9 survey is published, it is necessary to draw comparison between the round 8 and round 9 findings to arrive at a strong conclusion.

Recent CAG reports indicate that there is gross mismanagement of public resources in government (URT, 2023). Also, LHRC (2023:248) observed that in the fiscal year 2020/21, "the CAG found indicators of corruption, fraud, and embezzlement worth Tshs. 4,590.73 billion, increasing from Tshs. 1,770.84 billion during the financial year 2019/20". The findings by CAG suggest there is increasing public sector corruption in Tanzania. The recent World Bank findings showed that in the past two decades, corruption has marginally declined in Tanzania's public sector. Falling from 75 points in 2003 to 62 points in 2022 (WordData.info, 2022). Such marginal decline in corruption suggests it is mainly because of pressure from the donor community rather than the political will of CCM to fight grand corruption that the country witnessed slight decline of public sector corruption over the two decades. Investigating the infamous Tegeta Escrow Scandal[27], Gray (2015:382) observed:

> In October 2014, the ruling party CCM found itself embroiled in a corruption scandal that once again caused significant turbulence within the highest echelons of the state. This case involved the alleged illegal payment of US$122 million by senior state officials to businessmen under the guise of energy contracts.

[26] *See* Q50A, Q50C, Q50E, Q50F, Q50G, Q50H, Q50I, Q50K, Q50L, Q50M, Q50N, and Q50Q in Afrobarometer Round 8 Survey in Tanzania (2021).

[27] A 2014 infamous grand corruption scandal in Tanzania involving senior officials in the ruling party, cabinet ministers, judges, senior bureaucrats, some clergymen, prominent businesspersons, and international businesses.

According to the 2022 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Tanzania has scored 38 out of 100 in the perceived levels of public sector corruption (ranked 94/180 countries) and is amongst the 124 countries that have stagnated since 2012 (Transparency International, 2023). Commenting on the latest CPI index, a senior university lecturer remarked:

> During this time, corrupt public servants had no reason to fear because there was free-hand leadership that allowed this situation to exist. Many times people were afraid of him (President John Magufuli) due to his words and threats, but he was not quick to take strong action against the corrupt despite the fact that he hated the practice. During that time, some government institutions were laden with corruption. Currently, things are different, and in the next 10 years, Tanzania will have made progress due to the current leadership style (The Citizen, 4 February 2023).

However, responding to the recent CPI index, the chief government spokesperson said:

> Through the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), we have implemented phases 1, 2, and 3 of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan. Phase 3 was completed in July 2022. We are currently reviving the existing strategy to come up with another phase that will have better methods and involve more citizens in preventing and fighting corruption. These strategies take place every five years (The Citizen, 4 February 2023).

The noted remarks from the government are reflected in the latest findings in the Afrobarometer survey[28] published on 24 May 2022. The survey indicates that eight in 10 Tanzanians (83%) say the government is doing 'fairly well' or 'very well' in combating public sector corruption (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Government performance in fighting corruption | Tanzania | 2021

[28] Interviewed a nationally representative sample of 2,398 adults between February and March 2021. Respondents were asked: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Fighting corruption in government?



Source: Afrobarometer (2022)

Nonetheless, the noted Afrobarometer findings contradict the above CPI on Tanzania suggesting there is significant corruption in the country's public sector. Such contradiction emerges because CPI is limited to experts' and businesspersons' perceptions of corruption in the public sector. Thus, their non-representative sample represents partial findings. But given that the country was marred with rampant corruption in the past two decades, CPI, IIAG, World Bank, and CAG findings as well as the remarks by the noted academic do suggest corruption is still a serious problem in Tanzania's public sector. Also, the remarks by the government spokesperson suggest two things: corruption is still a serious problem and that the government is committed to fight it. But based on the findings, such commitment is limited to fighting petty corruption not grand corruption.

5.2.4. **The nature of the electoral competition**

Findings suggest that at least two factors explain the extent to which the nature of electoral competition affects the quality of democracy in Tanzania. Also, these factors have implications for peace and development in the country. The noted factors include; tolerance of the political opposition and political pluralism and the conduct of the electoral process.

5.2.4.1. **Tolerance towards the political opposition and political pluralism**

Revisiting electoral competition in Tanzania, Makulilo (2015:92) found that electoral competition is substantially low resulting from the incomplete de-linking of CCM and the state. Likewise, Bakari and Whitehead (2013:115) found state-CCM relations as amongst the potential setbacks for competitive politics in Tanzania. Findings suggest

that historically national security consciousness conditions CCM's perspective of plural politics and political participation in Tanzania (Mihyo, 2003). Such constructed consciousness affects the ruling party's perception of opposition politics and tolerance towards the political opposition in the country. Thus, suggests that CCM, in the eyes of its leaders, stalwarts, and supporters, symbolises national stability and national security due to its legacy as a state-party. Even after the return of multiparty system in the country, CCM has persistently recreated old and new perceived national security threats and consistently used them as a pretext to obstruct and undermine the political opposition and political pluralism in the country (Mihyo, 2003). Also, they have been exploiting this strategy to garner support for the purpose of regime legitimation by instilling fear of national security to the masses.

TEMCO (1997) observed that threats and scaremongering dominated the 1995 inaugural multiparty general elections in Tanzania. The dominant narrative in CCM election campaign messages was that once in power the political opposition was going to instigate violence leading to bloodshed. The ruling party invoked fear among electorates by displaying films depicting ethnic cleansing in neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi (TEMCO, 1997:100). Furthermore, TEMCO election monitors observed and reported the following events during the 1995 general elections in Tanga region, "In Kilindi, CCM candidate for Handeni constituency organised the screening of the Rwanda and Burundi genocide films and issued a threat about an army takeover in the event of an opposition electoral victory!" (TEMCO, 1997:101). However, Afrobarometer round 8 survey (2021) findings suggest that 40% and 18.7% of Tanzanians strongly like and somewhat like respectively to have people who support a different political party as neighbours. Only 14.8% and 9.4% strongly dislike and somewhat dislike neighbours of different political orientation respectively (Table 6).

Table 6: Q86E. For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: People who support a different political party?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Strongly dislike	9.4	17.5	12.8	16.9	14.8
Somewhat dislike	7.7	10.3	9.3	9.6	9.4
Would not care	18.2	15.8	16.4	16.8	16.6
Somewhat like	19.8	18.1	18.6	18.8	18.7
Strongly like	43.7	38.2	42.8	37.1	40.0
Don't know	1.1	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.5

Source: Afrobarometer (2021).

The noted findings suggest that many Tanzanians do not find political pluralism a divisive phenomenon. Hence, renders the above CCM's narratives about the political opposition less meaningful.

Moreover, findings suggest that the controversial Political Parties (Amendment) Act (2019) grants excessive discretionary powers to the Registrar of Political Parties. Such powers seriously encroach the autonomy of political parties in managing their affairs. It also elevates the office of the registrar of political parties (ORPP) into a policing organ for political parties rather than playing a facilitative or a coordination role. Commenting on these concerns in February 2017, a prominent political analyst in Tanzania, Deus Kibamba highlighted that "the legislative process on the political parties amendment act was rushed and that the process was less inclusive as CSOs and other key actors were not extensively consulted leading to the omission of key issues about party politics, including patriarchal structures within parties" (Mwananchi, 13 February 2019). Kibamba added:

> Instead of urging stakeholders to provide civic education to political parties, the new amendment law created unnecessary cumbersome procedures for stakeholders to do so. From section 3(5) (g) to section 5 (5B) (2) what you see are hurdles towards provision of civic education to parties. Furthermore, giving ORPP powers to regulate the provision of civic education to parties increases bureaucratic setbacks to democratic development in Tanzania" (Mwananchi, 17 February 2019).

Furthermore, findings indicate that the opposition voiced concerns against the conduct of ORPP. These concerns were vivid when ORPP was accused of instigating intraparty conflicts in several major opposition parties in the country in order to weaken them and reduce their increasing influence in the political process in the country. Commenting on the alleged incitement by the ORPP in the ongoing intraparty conflicts in the opposition NCCR Mageuzi which saw the dismissal of its national chairperson and the deputy chairperson, the party's publicity secretary, Edward Simbeye lamented:

> Once a particular faction reach out to the registrar to invite him at a substantive party meeting, he is required to inquire whether such meeting is constitutional? The registrar has constitutions of all registered political parties and his obligation is to ensure justice within parties by adhering to party constitutions" (Mwananchi, 25 May 2022).

Commenting on the ongoing NCCR Mageuzi conflict, secretary general of the main opposition party (CHADEMA), John Mnyika contended "that intraparty conflict is incited by the registrar and the ORPP has been doing this for the past six year of the fifth phase administration" (Mwananchi, 25 May 2022). Similar concerns were raised by the former CUF secretary general Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad in 10th April 2017 at the height of the CUF national leadership crisis. Maalim Seif furiously said "we know that the ORPP has been pressuring the Registration, Insolvency, and Trusteeship Agency (RITA) to get fake members of CUF board of trustees registered with RITA" (ibid). Meanwhile, responding to some of these allegations, Justice Francis Mutungi (then Registrar of Political Parties) commented:

> NCCR Mageuzi had invited us to their party meeting. We sent our people from ORPP, the deputy registrar Mr. Nyahoza represented us. Fortunately, what happened afterwards is linked to the ORPP! The registrar does not have the powers to intervene in parties affairs and antagonise factions within parties (ibid).

The noted remarks suggest that the impartiality of the registrar of political parties is seriously questioned as the registrar is solely appointed by the president who is also the chairperson of the ruling party. Also, draconian laws like the Political Parties (Amendment) Act (2019) suggests the "autocratic lawfare" strategy cited by Arriola et al. (2023:266) which autocratising regimes use to disguise their autocratic tendencies. It further confirms Lührmann and Lindberg (2018) thesis that contemporary autocratisation is a game of deception indicating democratic backsliding in Tanzania.

5.2.4.2. **The conduct of the electoral process**

Findings indicate that the conduct of the electoral process tended towards favouring the ruling party, hence significantly affecting multiparty competition in the country. Such a tilted playingfield has implications for peace and development in the country. Several criticisms levelled against the conduct of the electoral process. One being the independence and impartiality of the election management bodies [National Electoral Commission (NEC) and Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC)]. The second is the militarisation of the electoral process by the incumbent party and use of party militias by some opposition parties in response to violence and intimidation from the ruling party militias and security apparatuses. Third is the abuse of incumbency advantage. Finally, the intimidation and harassment of the political opposition. Commenting on

the conduct of the electoral process during the 2020 general elections in Tanzania, Freedom House (2022a) noted:

> The late president (John Magufuli) won the October 2020 presidential election with 84.5 percent of the vote in a contest that was markedly less free and fair than the 2015 election, which he had won with 58 percent. The 2020 election was marred by widespread fraud and vote-rigging; threats of violence against opposition figures; the use of force by police against participants at opposition rallies; the suspension of media outlets and social media; the obstruction and dispersal of opposition candidate Tundu Lissu's rallies; and other irregularities. International and local observers were denied accreditation, as were many international media outlets. Turnout was just 50 percent, down from 67 percent in the previous poll.

Highlighting such alleged electoral fraud and the climate of fear during the 2020 general elections in Tanzania, Tanzania Elections Watch (TEW) (2021:69), a group of critical regional experts noted:

> Significant security challenges were evident around the 2020 elections, particularly because of the high-handed approach state security agents adopted in executing their mandate. Arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention, sexual violence, outright intimidation of opposition candidates, agents and supporters and violence against women raised questions on the role of security services in elections. The conduct of the security services created a climate of fear prior to, during and after the election. Police arrested opposition politicians Halima Mdee and Upendo Peneza on Election Day but later released them. The heavy presence of armed security personnel was not only intimidating and provided a visible threat of violence.

Thus, TEW (2021:68) certified the 2020 general election in Tanzania as not free and not fair by underlining that "the lack of transparency, repressed stakeholder engagement and accountability deficits in the general management of the electoral process detracted from the overall quality of the elections." However, responding to some of these allegations, the Chairperson of NEC, Justice Semistocles Kaijage (quoted in Mwananchi, 28 October 2020) lamented:

> There are reports circulating on social media about the presence of fake ballot boxes in Kawe (Dar es Salaam), Pangani (Tanga) and Buhigwe (Kigoma) constituencies. The general unofficial details about these allegations have not been confirmed and do not specify which polling stations are responsible for the incidents. The details of the allegations have not been formally submitted to NEC. The Commission urges the public to ignore these unofficial reports.

Also, IIAG (2022:18) observed that participation, rights, and inclusion were slowly deteriorating in Tanzania while security and rule of law increasingly deteriorated in the country between 2012 and 2021. Thus, IIAG (2022:19) concluded that the increasing deterioration in the IIAG categories security and rule of law and participation, rights and inclusion in Africa undermine peace and development (the capacity of African countries to respond to both internal and external challenges). Furthermore, a prominent domestic elections observer group in Tanzania, Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) noted that during the 2020 general elections, its observers spotted the deployment and use of party militias by the ruling CCM (green guards) and the opposition CHADEMA (red brigade) during election rallies in Manyara, Arusha, and Ruvuma regions as tools to inflict violence and intimidate on each other (REDET, 2021:75). But the majority of Tanzanians strongly disapprove (50.1%) or disapprove (16.1%) single party system or one-party dominance while 16.8% and 15.6% of citizens approve and strongly approve such systems respectively (Afrobarometer, 2021) (Table 7).

Table 7: Q20A. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disapprove	54.7	47.8	56.1	43.8	50.1
Disapprove	16.2	16.0	16.5	15.5	16.1
Neither approve nor disapprove	1.4	1.1	1.4	0.9	1.2
Approve	12.6	18.8	12.7	21.1	16.8
Strongly approve	14.7	16.0	13.3	18.0	15.6
Don't know	0.3	0.4		0.7	0.3

Source: Afrobarometer (2021).

Such Afrobarometer findings suggest increasing support of political pluralism in Tanzania. Also, it implies that the majority of Tanzanians view a strong political opposition as necessary for democratic consolidation. But the alleged strategic manipulation of elections by the ruling party suggests democratic backsliding in Tanzania. Moreover, CCM's intolerance on political opposition and political pluralism as manifested in the proliferation of electoral violence during the 2020 general elections is contrary to popular opinion in Tanzania.

But what do we make out of the findings presented and discussed in this chapter? The next chapter comparatively analyse the findings in the Botswana and Tanzania cases and demonstrates whether they were sufficiently able to answer the research questions.

6. **Analysis**

This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the four variables which explain the effects of the dominant party system on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania and the implications of such domination for peace and development amid the wave of democratic backsliding in the studied cases. It uses substantive democratic theory and historical institutionalism as analytical tools.

6.1. **Management of social tensions facing the regime**

Although the country appears politically stable and socially cohesive, findings suggest that there are deep-seated contentions between ethnic and national identities in Botswana. The manifestation of such ethnic tensions were twofold. One is agitation for language rights and equal representation by minority ethnic groups who are also protesting the cultural and political dominance by the majority Tswana (Seabo and Masilo, 2019:65; Makgala et al., 2020:222). The second is the politicisation of tribal identities, for instance during the 2019 general elections attributed to the conflict between the former President Ian Khama[29] and the incumbent President Masisi (Makgala et al., 2020:231). Meanwhile, tribal and ethnic polarisation are minimal in Mainland Tanzania despite having nearly 126 tribes. However, Zanzibar experiences deep-rooted ethnic polarisation resulting in a volatile situation in the isles. What explains this cross-country and within country variations? The explanations for such variation are path-dependent associated with the nation-building trajectories embraced by the BPD and CCM at critical juncture in the two countries.

The BDP sought to manage tensions arising from different social conflicts and achieve national integration through dominant Tswana values and liberal democratic institutions (Nyamnjoh, 2013). This marked a critical juncture in the national integration process in the country. Hence, the nation-building process appeared not an

[29] Also a tribal chief of Bangwato tribe, the largest of the ethnic Tswana tribes.

attempt to reconcile conflicting identities but assimilation of non-Tswana tribes[30] into ethnic Tswana disregarding the cultural diversity in the country. Of course the moral imperative for such action was justified by the customary Tswana policy of inclusion and accommodating minorities and foreigners (Nyamnjoh, 2013; Seabo and Masilo, 2019:64; Makgala et al., 2020:241). However, the national integration process is a political project. One could argue that the political imperatives underpinned the BDP's nation-building agenda were not aimed at forging an inclusive national identity encompassing all tribal groups, but to consolidate power around the dominant ethnic Tswana to counter the influence of nationalists Botswana People's Party (BPP) and later Botswana National Front (BNF).

But a series of reactive sequences started in the late 1980s where identity politics and open tensions over belonging resurfaced as minority ethnic groups demanded tribal equality in representation and access to resources and opportunities (Nyamnjoh, 2013; Makgala et al., 2020:241). In substantive democratic theory, a functioning democratic culture is a necessary condition for democratic consolidation (Ewald, 2011:68), and the stability of democratic order. But, for democratic culture to institutionalise, respect for social and cultural rights is indispensable. But findings suggest that the BDP nation-building process was biased towards the dominant Tswana as it constructed a national identity founded on Tswana cultural values (including imposing Setswana as a national language) while suppressing ethnic minority cultures (Seabo & Masilo, 2018:65). Such social exclusion creates conditions that retard consolidation of substantive democracy in the country.

Unlike the BDP's nation-building agenda, CCM forged linguistic homogeneity by adopting Kiswahili (a lingua franca) and abolished tribal authority (chieftaincy) in 1962[31] as well as successfully co-opted tribal chiefs in the party structures in the 1960s. Such strategies fostered national integration and to some extent helped to manage ethnic diversity. This marked a critical juncture in the nation-building process in Tanzania. Kiswahili became a unifying force among Tanzanians and integral to the country's national identity thus preventing tribal polarisation. Of course this was possible because certain antecedent conditions such the East African long distance trade and migrant labourers during the colonial era had facilitated the spread of

[30] Some minority tribes - Ku Bukalanga, Basubiya, Wayeyi, Bakalanga, Basarwa, and Bakgalagadi.
[31] *See* the Abolition of Chieftaincy Act in 1962.

Kiswahili in the hinterland. This suggests that Kiswahili had already become a lingua franca prior to independence. What the ruling party did was to formalise it by adopting it as a national language. Another strategy that CCM used to manage social tensions in the decades preceding the return of plural politics was corporatism indicating a totalitarian system. Following the January 1964 army mutiny, corporatism was used by CCM to subdue competing social forces such as the army, bureaucrats, trade unions, cooperative societies, religious organisations, and local chiefs to prevent such forces from organising against CCM's supremacy (Mihyo, 2003:68; Ewald, 2011:145). Therefore, such a corporatist framework facilitated the reproduction of one-party dominance in Tanzania as it hierarchically directed economic and social change while also cemented the party's position in the political system.

Corporatism facilitated the management of various social tensions facing CCM and resulted in prolonged political order in Tanzania. But it affected democratic transition and multiparty politics in the country. There were continuity of certain authoritarian institutions and practices of the single party era in the multiparty era such as the persisting state-ruling party fusion, strong presidency, and intolerance to political pluralism and dissidence (Bakari and Whitehead, 2013:115; Makulilo, 2015). Substantive democratic theory views the quality of democratic institutions and their substantive outcomes as a necessary and sufficient condition for democratic consolidation (Mkandawire, 2006:26; Ewald, 2011:71). In historical institutionalism, the aforementioned authoritarian elements are not only reproducing CCM's dominance but also undermine democratic institutions and their capacity to produce substantive development outcomes. Nevertheless, the quest for CCM to reproduce its dominance in Zanzibar politics has been met with reactive sequences from opposition elements leading to recurring electoral violence in the isles. Therefore, recurring electoral violence in Zanzibar in the historical institutional perspective suggests that it is a reaction to the status quo and counter-reaction to mounting resistance against one-party dominance in the isles. Hence, provide reflections on the main research questions guiding this study.

6.2. **The scope of presidential power**

It appears from this study that the majority of citizens in Botswana and Tanzania demand certain limits be imposed on the executive powers, but still the executive president wields enormous powers which are prone to abuse, including disregarding the constitution and other laws of the land as well as undermining democratic control of the government. Such powers consolidate executive dominance over other principal pillars of the state, the legislature and the judiciary, hence affecting horizontal accountability. Substantive democratic theorists view strong presidencies in most developing democracies problematic for democratic consolidation because it weakens democratic governance by undermining horizontal accountability and compromises the independence of judiciary (Ewald, 2011:58; Diamond, 2015:146; Bermeo, 2016:14). Such circumstances create a conducive environment for executive aggrandisement and personalisation of power by incumbents. This way, the dominant party structure comes into the equation of democratic backsliding because it reproduces a strong presidency in order to tighten the dominant party's grip on power.

As Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013:15) put it, the power of the executive does matter for one-party dominance. There are strong incentives for strong presidents to consolidate one-party dominance. Likewise, there is strong incentive for dominant parties to support executive centralisation of power. The primary reason is that strong presidencies gives a dominant party direct access to national resources by capturing and centralising power at the centre. Such access to these resources is facilitated through patronage and a range of pork-barrel policies. Highlighting the patronage function of African political parties, Tordoff (2002:132) observed "in Tanzania economic liberalisation benefited Tanzanian businessmen with close connections to the ruling party." Thus, democratisation or autocratisation becomes a question of regime survival. That is there are strong incentives for dominant parties to autocratise than further democratise because once the latter flourishes it would cost them due to power diffusion. Moving in the autocratic direction creates conditions for erosion of democratic qualities and institutions like political rights and civil liberties as well as social and economic rights. Such democratic recession is the exact opposite of substantive democracy envisaged by democratic theorists. Therefore, the ongoing democratic backsliding in Botswana and Tanzania can be viewed from this lens.

Nevertheless, recurring unconstitutional actions by incumbents are more profound in Tanzania than in Botswana because constitutional powers enjoyed by the executive in those countries vary substantially. In Botswana, the ex-president is liable for criminal or civil proceedings for offences he did in his capacity as President after he ceases to to hold such office[32]. On the contrary, in Tanzania it is strictly prohibited to file in court criminal or civil proceedings against an ex-president for anything he did in his capacity as President[33]. The noted dissimilarities suggest contrasting trajectories of regime development. Whereas CCM consolidated a single-party system and a statist development model between 1965 and 1992 which necessitated power centralisation; the BDP, throughout its history, retained plural politics and a market economy which required diffusion of power. Such policy choices marked a critical juncture which shaped political development in subsequent decades in both countries. Of course Article 41 of the Botswana Constitution worked against the fortune of the former BDP Secretary General, Gomolemo Motswaledi who was unlawfully dismissed from his position by the party president (Ian Khama, also the president of the republic) in 2009, and later suspended for 60 days from the party but could not find justice in court because the noted constitutional provision prohibits any criminal or civil proceedings against a sitting president of the republic (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017:3). Such absolute immunity, as Motswaledi's case suggests, worked against intraparty democracy as he was systematically prevented from running in the 2009 parliamentary elections because of the two months suspension from the party.

Although Gray (2015:396) contests that "in Tanzania, regardless of the formal constitutional rules, power is not centralised around the president", study findings seem to contradict his argument, especially if a thorough assessment is done on President Magufuli's tenure. Such observation by Gray (2015) is temporally limited because it largely depends on the personal traits and leadership style of the person occupying the presidency. Therefore, vesting enormous powers on the executive president dis-empowers the citizens and hampers effective mechanisms for democratic control and government accountability. This setback democratic consolidation and inclusive development in the studied cases. Hence, provide reflections on the main research questions guiding this study.

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[32] *See* Article 41 (1) & (2) of the Botswana's Constitution of 1966 (2016 version).
[33] *See* Article 46 (3) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 (2005 version).

6.3. **Governance performance**

Across the six indicators used to evaluate governance performance in Botswana and Tanzania, public sector corruption, job creation, and narrowing wealth disparities appeared to be the most critical governance challenges in the studied cases. Such challenges indicate that the benefits of long-term economic growth marginally trickled down to benefit the poor masses in the studied cases. Institutions like corruption were perceived as major hurdles in this regard. Substantive democratic theorists view inclusive economic development, poverty reduction, and curbing socioeconomic inequality as important indicators of substantive democracy as they accord legitimacy to the democratisation process (Mkandawire, 2006:2; Ewald, 2011:71). Additionally, substantive democratic theory appreciates the role of formal democratic institutions in fostering democratic consolidation (Mkandawire, 2006:26), although institutions alone are not sufficient conditions for substantive democracy as suggested by the study findings.

Based on the findings, public sector corruption seems to be a far more serious governance problem in Tanzania than in Botswana. This suggests that the government in Tanzania could check but not control grand corruption in the public sector. However, anti-corruption reforms in Botswana, for instance the establishment of the Botswana Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in 1994, were perceived to be more efficient in fighting petty corruption rather than elite corruption (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017:5). The main explanatory factor for such variation in the perceived public sector corruption in Botswana and Tanzania is that anti-corruption reforms over the past two decades in Tanzania were setback by power dynamics within the ruling party as grand corruption featured in elite power struggle within CCM and extended in the higher levels of the state as well as the domestic private sector (Gary, 2015:401), as evident in the External Payments Accounts (EPA), Richmond, and Tegeta Escrow scandals. Such elite power struggle resulted in diffusion of power among factions thus combating grand corruption largely depended on the consensus among different factions within the ruling CCM. This suggests that whenever such consensus fails, fighting elite corruption becomes difficult for anti-corruption watchdogs in the government. Thus, indicating that the government through the PCCB could hardly intervene in elite corruption because of the noted

structural constraints. It further suggests that CCM stands in the way of consolidation of substantive democracy by undermining accountability and transparency, including anti-corruption reforms.

No wonder the former CAG (Prof. Mussa Assad) in December 2018 remarked that despite the CAG report revealing that there was gross mismanagement of public funds in the public sector, the parliament failed to hold the government accountable suggesting a weakness of the legislature (BBC, 3 April 2019). The said parliamentary weakness can be explained by two factors. One is already discussed in section (6.2.). That a powerful executive president in Tanzania undermines horizontal accountability. The second factor is the mechanism that the ruling party uses to control the parliament through the prime minister. He is the linchpin in the relationship between the government and CCM on the one hand and its parliamentary caucus and ruling party's legislators on the other hand. The prime minister is also a principal member of CCM Central Committee, a 24-member top policy making organ of the party. His dual role as the head of government business and chief whip of the party in parliament serves to contain the parliament in order to advance both the ruling party and the executive's interest in the national legislative body (Lohmann, 2019:9). Under such conditions of oversight institutional weakness, the country has witnessed marginal decline of public sector corruption between 2003 and 2022 as suggested in the World Bank findings. Of course a strong presence of opposition parties in the national parliament between 2005 and 2020 have helped uncover the aforementioned grand corruption scandals implicating senior CCM officials in the government (Ewald, 2011:150). This demonstrates the democratic role of the political opposition in enhancing democratic governance in the country at a time when the ruling party, the parliament, and the government have failed to confront elite corruption. But vibrant opposition figures are absent in the current 12th parliament (2020-2025) due to the tragic events of the 2020 general elections. So, where does this opposition absence in the current parliament take Tanzania in terms of democratic governance? Well, the country is in the trajectory of democratic backsliding as suggested in the findings chapter.

The path-dependence model sees persistence of institutions or structural patterns as interconnected to past events, especially policy options selected at critical juncture. Findings suggest that the structural patterns and institutions that are impinging

democratic governance in Botswana and Tanzania are one-party dominance, elite corruption, social inequality, and poverty. Taylor (2002:22) attributes the growing inequality in Botswana to BDP's market-led development policy embraced since independence. The BDP's decision to follow the market economic model marked a critical juncture in this regard as it resulted in accumulation of wealth among the elite who controlled two major sectors of Botswana's economy, the cattle and extractive industries. Hence, contributing to persistence of wealth disparities between rich and poor in the country. Such persisting economic disparity in Botswana is also attributed to the dominant party system and the BDP's social policies. As Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh (2017:10) observe "Botswana's poverty and social inequality are an outcome of the political economy of natural resource wealth, with social transfers introduced only reluctantly, in a top-down manner, and only to ensure loyal support of the mainly rural poor. Perhaps herein lies the secret to the 50-year dominance of the BDP!". This suggests that Botswana's high HDI ranking masks underlying poverty and social inequality in the country. It further indicates that the country has consolidated elite democracy rather than substantive democracy.

Meanwhile, the rapid increase in social inequality and poverty in Tanzania after economic liberalisation is related to the "smash and grab capitalism" (Ewald, 2011:109), resulted from CCM's mismanagement of economic liberalisation policies. CCM's decision to liberalise the economy and pursue market-led policies was a critical juncture that set the country in the trajectory of rampant elite corruption, social inequality, and increasing poverty. Such liberalisation policies benefited domestic private sector elites with close ties to the ruling party (Tordoff, 2002:132; Gary, 2015:400). Therefore, the perceived wealth disparities, rising unemployment rates, and corrupt forms of accumulation suggest the failure by democratic institutions under one-party dominance to foster substantive democracy in Tanzania. Hence, provide reflections on the main research questions underpinning this study.

6.4. **The nature of the electoral competition**

It appears that the BDP and CCM have been undermining electoral competition leading to autocratisation. They impede three institutions which are crucial for effective electoral competition: the opposition parties, political pluralism, and the electoral process. However, the degree of intolerance on the political opposition and

political pluralism as well as the manipulation of the electoral process significantly vary in the studied cases. The situation is more serious in Tanzania than in Botswana. These variations are closely linked to the history of dominant parties and the different trajectories of political regime development followed by dominant parties in the two countries. Botswana has been under a multiparty system throughout its history. The decision by the BDP elite to retain plural politics in subsequent decades following the country's independence marked a critical juncture in the political development in the country. The resulting democratic space helped opposition parties to grow and vibrant civil society to flourish.

But what were the antecedent conditions that made the BDP elite embrace liberal democracy and market economy? Well, there were different political cleavages and social conflicts in the decade leading to Botswana's independence (Makgala et al., 2020:216). One is of 'political-ideological nature' and the other is of 'class-tribal nature'. The political-ideological factor is related to the power struggles between the moderate BDP and the nationalist BPP. The British colonists had created the BDP and installed it to power to contain the alleged pro-communist BPP (Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh, 2017:1). Thus, one could argue that the BDP decision to embrace a liberal democracy trajectory was based not on elite consensus or their agency but a pact with Britain as a condition for inheriting political power at independence. The 'class-tribal factor' was a domestic problem. The British indirect rule system left some authority with chiefs who represented tribal identities. The challenge for the post-independence state was nation-building. That is how they could reconcile different powerful tribal identities into a national identity. The BDP sought nation-building and consensus through dominant Tswana values and liberal democratic institutions (Nyamnjoh, 2013). Hence, one could argue that the decision by the BDP to embrace liberal democratic institutions aimed at helping the ruling elite consolidate power while managing different social cleavages and political conflicts among elites by providing a space for rival power contenders to contest for political power through democratic avenues rather than violence. But why is Botswana currently autocratising? Why is the BDP becoming increasingly intolerant of the political opposition? Does it mean that liberal democratic institutions are threatening BDP dominance? Well, the path-dependence model suggests that such BDP intolerance are counter-reactions to the increasing popularity of the opposition parties among electorates in recent

elections. The opposition garnered 53% and 48% of popular votes in the last two elections in 2014 and 2019 respectively. Such electoral gains suggest that the political opposition is perceived as an alternative government by many Batswana. Increasing opposition popularity means that the BDP has become increasingly unpopular among electorates. Thus, a strong opposition induced fear in the BDP leading to encroachment on the democratic space to maintain its electoral hegemony suggesting a reactive sequence.

Unlike the BDP, CCM has a long history of intolerance towards opposition elements and political pluralism. Such intolerant behaviour often leads to recurring electoral violence during the election period. The antecedent conditions for such intolerance can be traced back in the post-independence major political upheavals, including the January 1964 Zanzibar revolution, the Cold war proxies, security threats from colonial regimes in southern Africa, army mutinies, and CCM[34]-trade unions conflicts over speedy Africanisation and pay rise. Thus, CCM either overreacted to these perceived and real threats to the country's internal and external sovereignty or deliberately exploited the situation for political expediency by establishing a single-party regime in 1965 which presided over absolute control of all social forces in order to tighten its grip on power. This marked a critical juncture in the political development in Tanzania. Hence, leading to CCM-controlled democratic transition in the 1990s (Makulilo, 2015). Such top-down democratic change resulted in a tilted playing-field as CCM dictated the rules of the game, including the design of the electoral system at the expense of the political opposition suggesting structural persistence of one-party dominance.

Consequently, the events of the 2020 general elections and the prevailing democratic erosion in Tanzania are reactive sequences to the increasing electoral gains by opposition parties since 2005. Put it this way, one could observe a causal relationship between the degree of autocratisation and opposition electoral gains. For instance, the historical electoral gains by the opposition during the 2015 general elections[35] were met by increasing autocratic counter-reactions in the 2019 civic elections and the 2020 general elections. The aim was to reproduce CCM's domination, hence ensuring

[34] By then known as the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) before merging with the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the ruling party in Zanzibar, in February 1977 to form CCM.
[35] The opposition garnered 41.52% of presidential votes, 26.22% of parliamentary seats, and 27.14% of local council seats in 2015 general elections.

continuity of one-party dominance in Tanzania. While the strategic manipulation of elections and autocratic lawfare have been cited as among the drivers of the third wave of autocratisation (Bermeo, 2016:14; Arriola et al., 2023:266), findings suggest that in Botswana and Tanzania, they are not only contributing to democratic backsliding but also reproducing one-party dominance. It indicates that there are strong incentives for the BDP and CCM to resort to the aforementioned autocratic tendencies to undermine electoral competition because such actions guarantee structural persistence of one-party dominance in Botswana and Tanzania. By resorting to such autocratic tendencies to maintain dominance, the dominant party system negatively affects the quality of democracy resulting in fragile peace and undermines inclusive development in the studied cases. Thus, provide reflections on the main research questions underpinning this thesis. Nevertheless, the current President Samia Suluhu who succeeded President Magufuli (2015-2021) on 17th March 2021 has promised major democratic reforms (the 4Rs - stands for Reconciliation, Resilience, Reforms, and Rebuilding). Whether such reforms are genuine or mere political rhetoric remains to be established in the forthcoming 2024 civic elections and the 2025 general elections.

7. **Conclusion**

The study explored the effects of the dominant party system on the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania in order to understand the conditions leading to democratic backsliding and the implications of such autocratisation for peace and development research. While the thesis was limited to the analysis of perceptions based on four variables, findings indicated that dominant parties with strong presidency in Africa whether in an electoral democracy (Botswana) or electoral autocracy (Tanzania) have strong incentives to autocratise rather than democratise in the third wave of autocratisation. The difference between such regime types is the pace of autocratisation. Erosion of democratic qualities occurred faster in electoral autocracy than in electoral democracy. Because in the former democratic control mechanisms are near dysfunctional. Thus, autocratisation in longstanding dominant party systems in Africa suggests reproduction of one-party dominance at the expense of consolidation of substantive democracy. It is in that context that a dominant party structure becomes a peace and development research problem and amongst explanatory variables for the ongoing wave of democratic backsliding. Therefore, this

thesis has furthered the debate on potential explanatory factors for the ongoing wave of democratic backsliding by attempting to make a case about the role of dominant party structure on democratic backsliding. Below are the main findings for each of the research questions.

How are dominant party systems affecting the quality of democracy in Botswana and Tanzania?

The BDP and CCM managed social tensions facing their regimes by creating conditions that reproduce one-party dominance. In Botswana, such strategy uncovered inherent tribal inequalities suggesting incomplete national integration and persisting social exclusion of ethnic minorities. In Tanzania, while such a strategy succeeded in maintaining political order in the Tanzania mainland, in Zanzibar it is reproducing CCM's dominance by direct violence against firm opposition elements resulting in fragile peace. Findings suggest that the scope of presidential power and the nature of electoral competition are creating and recreating incentives for CCM and BDP to autocratise rather than democratise because autocratisation is presumed as synonymous to regime survival. For governance performance, findings indicate that the benefits of long-term economic growth marginally trickled down to benefit the poor masses in Botswana and Tanzania due to perceived wealth disparities, rising unemployment rates, and corrupt forms of accumulation.

What are the conditions leading to democratic backsliding in Botswana and Tanzania?

In all the four analysed variables, a dominant party structure is producing and reproducing conditions that hamper consolidation of substantive democracy. But findings suggest that the centralisation of power by the president, the legitimation of autocratic actions through draconian laws, and the strategic manipulation of elections through harassment and intimidation of the political opposition that contributed the most to democratic backsliding in Botswana and Tanzania.

What are the implications of one-party dominance for peace and development in Botswana and Tanzania?

“Peace research is a research into the conditions for moving closer to peace or at least not drifting closer to violence” (Galtung, 1969). If we view peace in its broader meaning (positive peace), then findings suggest that dominant party systems in Botswana and Tanzania are creating conditions for fragile peace rather than sustainable peace which in turn results in fragile democracy susceptible to backsliding.

Areas for further research

The study findings suggest that dominant party structure appears to be an explanatory factor for democratic backsliding in Botswana and Tanzania. But to strongly make a case about the analytical significance of one-party dominance in the current debate on the third wave of autocratisation, more research is needed in this area. This thesis delimited two four variables and two comparative case studies. Therefore, further research is needed on other potential variables such as ruling party relations with economic elites. Furthermore, more case studies on the dominant party system in Africa and elsewhere need to be explored.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Q46E. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?

	Urban	Rural	Semi-urban	Men	Women	Total
Very badly	51.5	46.3	49.0	49.8	47.2	48.5
Fairly badly	31.0	35.6	32.2	31.0	35.3	33.2
Fairly well	13.9	13.2	15.6	16.2	12.6	14.4
Very well	0.6	1.2	1.0	0.4	1.6	1.0
Refused	0.4				0.2	0.1
Don't know/Haven't heard enough to say	2.5	3.7	2.3	2.5	3.2	2.9

Source: Afrobarometer (2023c).

Appendix 2

Q46C. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: Creating jobs?

	Urban	Rural	Semi-urban	Men	Women	Total
Very badly	68.0	59.6	60.0	61.6	61.1	61.4
Fairly badly	17.3	24.5	28.2	24.4	25.1	24.7
Fairly well	14.1	12.8	10.3	12.2	11.7	11.9
Very well	0.3	3.0	0.4	0.9	1.7	1.3
Don't know/Haven't heard enough to say	0.3	0.2	1.1	0.9	0.4	0.6

Source: Afrobarometer (2023c).

Appendix 3

Q46J. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: Fighting corruption in government?

	Urban	Rural	Semi-urban	Men	Women	Total
Very badly	47.5	32.3	38.4	38.5	37.4	37.9
Fairly badly	21.9	25.0	31.0	27.4	26.8	27.1
Fairly well	23.7	30.8	23.2	26.7	25.5	26.1
Very well	2.8	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5
Don't know/Haven't heard enough to say	4.1	8.1	3.9	3.9	6.9	5.5

Source: Afrobarometer (2023c).

Appendix 4

Q46M. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: Preventing or resolving violent conflict?

	Urban	Rural	Semi-urban	Men	Women	Total
Very badly	13.3	12.1	14.6	12.2	14.7	13.5
Fairly badly	14.0	11.7	13.0	11.2	14.2	12.7
Fairly well	43.9	46.4	46.5	48.1	43.9	46.0
Very well	13.8	13.4	15.2	16.5	12.1	14.3
Don't know/Haven't heard enough to say	15.0	16.5	10.6	12.1	15.1	13.6

Source: Afrobarometer (2023c).

Appendix 5

Support for multiparty competition | Botswana | 2022



Source: Afrobarometer (2023b).

Appendix 6

Competition between political parties leads to violent conflict | Botswana | 2022



Source: Afrobarometer (2023b).

Appendix 7

Percentage of seats and votes garnered by political parties in Botswana (1965-2019)

	1965		1969		1974		1979		1984		1989		1994		1999		2004		2009		2014		2019	
Party	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V
BDP	99	80	77	68	84	77	91	75	82	68	91	65	67	55	83	54	77	51	79	54	65	47	66.7	52
BNF			10	14	7	12	6	13	15	20	9	27	33	37	15	25	21	26	11	21				
BPP	0	14	10	12	7	6	3	8	3	7	0	4	0	4				2	0	1.4				
BIP	0	5	3	6	2	4	0	4	0	3	0	2	0	4						0				
BAM															0	5	0	3						
BCP																					5	20		
BCP/BAM															2	11	2	16	9	22*				
NDF																	0	1						
UDC																					30	30	26.3	36
AP																							1.8	5
BMD																							0	0
RAP																							0	0
BPF																							5.3	4
Other	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	5	0	1	1	1.4	0	3	0	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Sebudubudu et al. (2016:16) & Reconstructed by the researcher (2023)

S= Seats

V= Votes

Appendix 8

Q85. Tanzanians are very diverse. They come from different religions, ethnic groups, political parties, and economic and social backgrounds. Overall, would you say that there is more that unites all Tanzanians as one people, or more that divides them?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Much more that divides us	5.4	3.7	4.4	4.1	4.2
Somewhat more that divides us	7.4	8.1	8.6	7.0	7.8
Somewhat more that unites us	21.7	19.9	19.8	21.3	20.5
Much more that unites us	65.2	67.4	66.8	66.5	66.7
Don't know	0.3	0.9	0.4	1.1	0.7

Source: Afrobarometer (2021).

Appendix 9

Q40B. In your opinion, how often, in this country, does the president ignore the courts and laws of this country?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Never	79.7	87.6	83.1	86.8	84.9
Rarely	7.7	5.4	7.6	4.7	6.2
Often	3.3	0.8	1.9	1.3	1.6
Always	2.6	1.0	2.4	0.6	1.5
Refused	0.0		0.0		0.0
Don't know	6.7	5.3	5.0	6.5	5.8

Source: Afrobarometer (2021).

Appendix 10

Q40C. In your opinion, how often, in this country, does the president ignore Parliament and just do what he wants?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Never	78.4	86.4	81.1	86.5	83.7
Rarely	8.0	5.9	8.1	5.0	6.6
Often	4.2	1.6	3.5	1.4	2.5
Always	2.5	0.9	2.0	0.9	1.5
Refused	0.3			0.2	0.1
Don't know	6.6	5.2	5.3	6.0	5.7

Source: Afrobarometer (2021).