This review article critically examines variation in the meanings of Nordicness ­– i.e., the perceptions and recognitions of a specific Nordic role in the foreign and security policy of the various Nordic states (Brommesson 2018) – in IR as expressed in research published over the last 60 years. The aim is reached both through a quantitative overview of the number of articles published in Cooperation and Conflict, the premier Nordic journal on IR celebrating its 60thanniversary, as well as through a review of the meanings of Nordicness expressed in the research published in the journal and elsewhere. The quantitative overview reveals how the number of articles concentrating on the Nordic has varied over time, with low numbers in the first and latest decades of Cooperation and Conflict, high numbers in the second decade (1975–1984), stable medium numbers from the mid 1980s to 2015, and low numbers thereafter. The qualitative review reveals variations in the meaning of Nordicness, with a focus on balancing roles when there was increased security policy tension during the Cold War, and a focus on Nordic actorness on the global stage, based on roles as “forces for good”, when the structural conditions have been more permissive.

This book traces the evolution of Sweden’s grand strategy from 1945 to 2024, understood as a coherent policy encapsulating an overarching idea of how a state achieves its national objectives. In the book, small state grand strategy is identified through national foreign policy roles which at certain times coalesce into master roles forming the basis of grand strategy. During this period, Sweden’s foreign policy roles were shaped according to the degree of autonomy and integration deemed necessary for security, economic development, and social cohesion as perceived by the domestic political elite. Four foreign policy action strategies building on domestic agency and the influence of systemic structures depict the domestic process of role adaptation. The ensuing empirical analysis identifies a set of evolving roles. The autonomous security seeker, based on a policy of neutrality and strong national defence, acted as Sweden’s master role during the Cold War, complemented by the roles of autonomous activist and hesitant European. After the Cold War, the role of integrated security provider emerged but subsided in 2022, when a new role of integrated security seeker emerged as Sweden applied for NATO membership. In parallel, the role of European integrationist gradually strengthened in tandem with the role of security provider, eventually merging into a coherent role set together with the new master role of an integrated security seeker, combining alliance memberships of the EU and NATO. This role set is a manifestation of Sweden’s grand strategy in an increasingly unstable international security environment.

This article addresses the Nordic European Union (EU) member states' changing national role conceptions prompted by concerns about a weakening international rules-based order, a flagging transatlantic commitment and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The heightened threat perceptions in northern Europe resulted not only in a renewed relevance of and support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Denmark, Finland and Sweden but also in an emerging appreciation of the EU as a security provider. This is puzzling because the three Nordic EU member states have traditionally insisted, for different reasons, on keeping the EU's security dimension firmly separated from NATO and have opposed the strengthening of the EU's capabilities within the realm of military security. Based on elite interviews and official documents from the mid-2010s to 2023, we examine how the heightened security concerns and a weakened rules-based order resulted in changed national role conceptions in these states to include the integration of the EU as a security provider. The article's theoretical contribution lies in conceptualising the reconstitution of roles through external geopolitical events, thereby explaining simultaneous role change and the incorporation of the EU as a security provider into the national role conceptions of the Nordic EU member states.

This article zooms in on the pre-conditions on the citizens level for deeper Nordic cooperation on civil defence matters. Historical ties, Nordic security cooperation, high-trusting citizens, and the fact that all five Nordic states now are members of NATO speak in favour of increased cooperation on civil defence. Still, the experiences from the Covid 19-pandemic with different strategies, diverging policies and closed borders, as well as heated exchanges of views, provide us with contradicting expectations. Based on a unique dataset with over 11 000 Nordic respondents we address these mixed expectations and study the trust of the Nordic citizens in both their respective government’s civil defence preparedness, as well as the citizens’ preferences regarding Nordic and other forms of international cooperation in this area. The results show a significant variation of trust in the civil preparedness of national governments (Finland highest trust, Sweden lowest trust). The variation returns in the desire for deeper international cooperation with considerably lower level of support for enhanced Nordic cooperation among the Danish respondents, and strong support for such cooperation among the Finns, Norwegians, and Swedes. Hence, our results indicate a potential for enhanced cooperation among some Nordics, but not all.

The Nordic states have long made distinct choices regarding foreign and security policy principles. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we are witnessing a convergence of the Nordic countries’ general patterns of cooperation within their security policies. We argue that the challenging international context has led to heightened threat perceptions, triggering a reformulation of their foreign policy roles. Based on this assumption the article aims to analyse the convergence of the Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies by tracing changes in their foreign policy roles following Russia’s increasing aggressiveness. We trace the changes in the Nordic countries’ foreign policy roles through three dimensions: the changes to the international order, threat perceptions and perceptions of reduced manoeuvrability in international affairs. Our empirical analysis sheds light on how all Nordic countries perceive an increasing threat to the multilateral rule-based order, which has consequences for the roles of these states, how the threat perceptions of the Nordic states have been on high alert since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and finally how this has significantly impacted the Nordic foreign policy elites’ perception of their countries’ ability to manoeuvre and conduct autonomous foreign policy, motivating radical changes in the roles.

Sedan 1990-talets mitt har antalet studenter i högre utbildning i Sverige ökat kraftigt. Idag läser drygt var tredje person i varje kohort vidare vid högskola eller universitet. Fler studenter innebär en större spridning i studentunderlagets förutsättningar vilket skapar utmaningar för den undervisande personalen. Frågan är om svenska lärosäten har de förutsättningar som krävs för att upprätthålla en god kvalitet på undervisningen? Skiljer sig förutsättningarna mellan lärosäten? Mellan discipliner? Dessa är några av frågorna som tas upp i rapporten ”Massuniversitetets utmaningar för kvaliteten på högre utbildning”.

This article investigates the defence policies of the Nordic and Baltic countries from the perspective of shared security culture. To that end, the article analyses conceptualisations of total defence and resilience in a comparative perspective and inquires into existing and prospective regional cooperation in this area, in order to determine to what degree there exists a common security culture based on shared norms and identities and manifested in practices of security cooperation. The study, which draws on 19 interviews with civil servants from the eight states of the region, shows that while there is fertile ground for a shared security culture to emerge, thus far, due to variations in conceptualisations, threat perceptions, and interaction preferences, only three Nordic states show clear signs of a shared security culture. The study contributes to existing research by situating the concept of resilience in (total) defence discourses; by expanding the theoretical work on security culture to an international context; and by offering a unique empirical account of the process of (re)building total defence policies in a region crucial to European security.

This article focuses on foreign policy role change in small liberal states caused by a weakening rules-based order illustrated by the decisions of Finland and Sweden to apply for membership of NATO, thereby abandoning longstanding policies of military non-alignment. Although both countries sought alignment with NATO in the context of intense security threats in northern Europe, the domestic processes of foreign policy role change proceeded along different trajectories. In Finland, the domestic process of role change was characterized by strong elite and public consensus on membership of NATO, whereas in Sweden there was more hesitation regarding giving up military non-alignment and losing freedom of action. In this article, we address a gap in the literature on role theory and domestic role change by conceptualizing the dilemma of small liberal states being compelled to reassess national role conceptions in their domestic settings in the face of external challenges outside their control, without jeopardizing national autonomy and deep-seated social identities. To this end, we construct a model for national action strategies based on scope conditions of domestic role change, varying according to the level of congruence in national identity and the degree of domestic elite consensus concerning national foreign policy.

Resilience – the ability of a society to resist and recover from challenges to national security – constitutes the centrepiece of comprehensive security approaches of modern states. Often labelled total defence, such whole-of-society approaches are prevalent not least among small states in efforts to enhance the deterrent effect of the armed forces as well as to secure the continuous functioning of society. This paper investigates the nature of resilience in the Nordic- Baltic countries through the perspective of security culture. More specifically, the paper has three aims: (1) to analyse conceptualizations of resilience among the Nordic and Baltic countries in a comparative perspective; (2) to inquire into existing and prospective regional cooperation regarding resilience and total defence in order (3) to determine to what degree there exists a common security culture, expressed through shared norms and identities underlying security cooperation. Our analysis draws on official documents (such as government white papers and bills, national security strategies from the countries of the region as well as documents from Nordic organizations, the EU and NATO) as well as a set of interviews with civil servants in the different Nordic and Baltic countries. The investigation is directed at differences and similarities regarding the understanding and organization of resilience among the eight states in focus as well as the patterns of cooperation in the area of resilience, with an aim to assess the degree of shared security culture in the region.

This article studies perceptions of governance, trust and threats among local politicians and local civil servants responsible for Swedish crisis management and civil defence. Local politicians and civil servants have key roles in the ongoing development of Swedish civil defence, as implementation to a large extent builds on the crisis management capacity of the municipalities. The article argues that the practitioners on the local level function in a context characterized by uncertain and ambiguous governance structures and especially local civil servants assume a role akin to that of street-level bureaucrats. Uncertain and ambiguous preconditions increase the importance of trust both between levels and within the same level of governance. Based on a survey with 209 local politicians and civil servants we study percep-tions of governance, trust, and threats. The results confirm perceptions of uncertain and ambiguous governance structures within the planning for and development of civil defence. The respondents ascribe higher responsibility to local, regional and national public actors when planning for civil defence, compared to the responsibility of citizens, the private sector and the EU level. The results also show high variations regarding levels of trust in the civil preparedness of different actors. Still, the experiences from the Covid 19-pandemic have increased the trust in the preparedness of almost all actors. Perceptions of threats relate to concrete threats like disruption in supply of food, electricity and internet. Notably, the highest threat perceptions concern activities aiming to destabilize democracy.