Förändringsteori används idag mest som ett projektplanerings- och utvärderingsbegrepp. När detta begrepp här studeras ur ett historiskt perspektiv har diskussionen lyfts över projektnivå och till makronivån och kopplingen till de bredare utvecklingsteorierna.Texten börjar med en genomgång hur utvecklingspolitikendiskuterats och förändrats över tiden för att sedan se vilken effektdetta haft på biståndspolitiken och på de metoder som används föratt bedriva bistånd. Från en sådan genomgång dras följandeslutsatser.1. Sveriges bistånd har haft i stort samma övergripandemålsättningar de senaste 50 åren – med fattigdomsminskningsom kärna.2. Hur den fattigdomsminskning som man strävat mot ska uppnåshar utgått från olika utvecklingsteorier. Dessa utvecklingsteorierhar varierat under perioden, och det har funnits parallella teorier. Det är också så att olika aktörer kan ha olika syn på utveckling,och därmed utvecklingsteorier. 3. Förändringsteorier i biståndet är försök att formulera hur manpraktiskt ska kunna bidra till utveckling, oftast i linje med enspecifik utvecklingsteori. 4. Trots att utvecklingsteorierna varierat under åren har det funnitsen gemensam kärna som hela tiden lyfts fram – ägarskaps-perspektivet, att det handlar om hjälp till självhjälp.5. Trots att ägarskap hela tiden (i teorin) varit prioriterat så har det inte alltid varit helt lätt i praktiken integrera detta i deförändringsteorier som i praktiken styr givarnas genomförande.6. Oavsett utvecklingsteori så är en förändringsteori som inte tarsin utgångspunkt i lokalt ägarskap dömd att misslyckas. Detgäller även i en kontext där allt mindre svenskt bistånd går till enstatlig motpart, alltmer kanaliseras genom andra aktörer och därandelen lokala partners blivit allt större.

This report was commissioned by ForumCiv to investigate how Swedish civil society organisations work with development effectiveness. At the same time, an effort should be made to identify obstacles and opportunities in the implementation of development effectiveness prin- ciples to find potential for improvements. The study was conducted through telephone interviews with 11 major Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). As this report is qualitative in nature, it does not go in-depth into whether each and every indicator has been fulfilled or not. Rather, it uses a more analytical approach to try to understand how each CSO deals with the overall principles and how CSOs relate to their partners in recipient countries. The interview questions therefore mainly deal with general principles of ownership, results, inclusive partnerships, transparency and accountability.The discourse on development effectiveness stems from late 1960s and the introduction of country planning which was based on the concept of ownership. Dur- ing the crisis years of the 1980s, a period of donorship prevailed but ownership was revived in the name of aid effectiveness in the early 2000s by a serious discussion in the OECD/DAC leading to the Paris Agenda in 2005. From that date, ownership has been back on the agenda for most of the time and is an important part of the international community’s and Sweden’s strategy of how to implement development cooperation efficiently.The Declaration from Paris in 2005, and later the one from Busan in 2011, defined aid effectiveness in five and four points, respectively. With the increased engagement of the CSO community after Busan 2011, the concept of aid effectiveness was found to be too narrow and there- fore changed towards a wider concept of development effectiveness. The eight Istanbul Principles agreed by the CSO community in 2010 list the original concepts ofmethodology and add a number of points more related to the content of aid such as equality, climate, and human rights. Development effectiveness is thus defined by a large number of principles.CSOs all take the concept of development effectiveness seriously and have introduced most of the principles into their strategies and working methodology. Devel- oping good partnerships with their counterpart organisations in recipient countries is the basis of their theory of change, making ownership possible and allowing for an entry point to beneficiaries and ultimate target groups for their work. Transparency and accountability are other important principles that are given high priority by all the CSOs surveyed and are under constant scrutiny. Harmo- nisation and alignment were less prioritised by most of the CSOs and would do well from increased attention.Two areas are more problematic and would benefit from more attention and work. The first relates to the ques- tion of reporting results and the relationship with Sida, where CSOs express the view that some issues require further discussion and clarification. The second regards the room for flexibility and innovation in a world full of problems and contradiction, such as shrinking space for civil society, nationalism, and global challenges such as the Covid-19 pandemic, economic recession, and climate change. If Sida or the Swedish government are not pre- pared to take any financial risk, CSOs, despite their best efforts, could face insurmountable challenges.In a complicated world with many global challenges, development effectiveness is more important than ever. To enable the honourable principles to be implemented, all actors have to cooperate and work for its proper im- plementation, and this requires dialogue, compromise, and flexibility.

This report presents fieldwork data from four case studies carried out between May 2013 and December 2015 on to the extent to which Tanzanian Local Government Reform Programme has brought about more democratic decision-making processes. The main findings point to several positive changes. Good governance reforms, aiming to restructure central and local governments, decentralise, improve capacity and good — and democratic — governance at all levels, have been undertaken and implemented. Parliament and the councils have been strengthened, as well as civil society organisations and media, and they are better able to participate in policy formulation and decision-making. The local government now has well elaborated structures for governance and democratic participation from the sub-village level to the district level. However, the outcomes of the government reforms on democratic processes at the local level have been limited. This study examines the extent to which various actors at different levels can exercise horizontal and vertical accountability. Our findings indicate that the reforms have not adequately changed existing power relations, the interests of the political elite, or the dominant ideology of political actors. Real power still lies in the hands of the ruling party elites at the national and district level and constrains power sharing at the local government authority level and at the ward, village, and sub-village level. Making it difficult for the op-position parties to establish themselves as a viable democratic force at local level. The Local Government Reform Programme has not provided adequate mech- anisms, processes, and incentives to hold political elites and the duty bearers to account, neither vertically nor horizontally, at the different levels of local government. Power distribution has remained top-down with increasing conflict of interest between political and economic elites and citizens, which have not been adequately addressed by local governance. In addition, mediating competing claims over resources remainsa challenge, as the reforms have failed to sufficiently strengthen the governance system at the local levels. A key constraint to improved governance is the lack of awareness, knowledge, and capacity to process information by citizens and elected members of the political structures. The village and the sub-village structures have a huge and underestimated potential, both as entry points into the political system, and as effective mechanisms for democratic governance. However, the opportunity the local government reform programmes had to make a “local turn” – and that briefly did so – appears rather to have turned back to recentralisation.

In this short article I give two contrasting and interesting examples of how heritage can contribute to build peace and cohesion, even in diverse societies that have suffered from protracted conflicts. The first example is Rwanda, a country that has experienced one of the worst genocides since the Second World War. It is difficult to imagine a country more torn apart. In this article I present a positive concrete example of how it is possible, even after a genocide, to build peace and development with the help of a combination of heritage and civil society organisation, local government, universities and international organisations. The second example is Tanzania, a country which is an exception in a region, where all neighbouring countries have been involved in protracted violence, where no violent conflicts, so far, has developed (Ewald 2013). With the Tanzanian case I would like to illustrate the role popular music can play for peaceful development and social cohesion.

Why is EA music so interesting and important?

Entertain, have fun, dance, enjoy life; Ceremonial and official functions; national days; family festivities/weddings. Important for building knowledge of the history and culture.Create feeling of belonging and identity. Convey wisdom and moral values (or the opposite:Tease, discuss and criticize social and political issuesPolitical mobilisation/awareness - for good and less good reasonsStrengthen knowledge about and use of SwahiliAnd has been successful! Strengthen Swahili as a lingua franca in Eastern Africa – and strengthened the feeling of belonging together in Eastern Africa

Music in East African has developed in a fantastic way!It has developed through a combination of global, transnational, trans-cultural, local and international influences – like all music – to a rich diversity of various genres, with a genuinely distinct sound and style It has made Eastern Africa known far outside the individual countriesIt create jobs and economic opportunities in a rapidly growing cultural sector, together with dance, video, film and TV production – entertainment industry It’s vitality, energy and creativity inspires Eastern Africans – and others - and make them both proud and aware of the importance of the Swahili cultureIt can promote the unity of the citizens to overcome ethnic and religious division and motivate the youth – but could as well be used for the opposite…It has promoted Swahili as lingua franca in the region – and the greater region - and maybe in front of all contributed to build a feeling of belonging and common identity in the Eastern African Region – from the Somali Coast, Comoros, Mozambique's, Malawi, Zambia, Eastern DRC, Southern Sudan and the EAC countries.

This report highlights the successes and the most serious challenges of democracy at this stage in Tanzania and the priorities needed to address them. The summary also outlines possible entry points through which political dialogue and technical cooperation initiatives could be feasible and have the greatest impact.

Tanzania is going through a period of rapid economic, political and cultural change. In a relatively short time, some 25 years, the country has moved from being a one-party state-led system to a market economy and multi-party system, all within the context of limited institutional capacity and resources. Electoral democracy is now fairly well established in principle, even if the independence of the Electoral Management Bodies is questioned. Democratic institutions have been strengthened, although the executive branch continues to dominate over the legislative and judiciary. Freedom of press, association and speech has improved. However, Tanzania cannot be regarded as a deep democracy. The conditions for an open and competitive political system, such as the full respect for political rights, competitive elections, independence of the institutions in charge of accountability promotion and protection of key democratic stakeholders, are not yet fully met. A more comprehensive, substantive democracy would better deliver on political, economic, social and cultural rights by increasing the accountability and participation around political decision-making.

However, compared with its neighbours in the sub-region and the whole of Africa, Tanzania does fairly well, as indicated by e.g., in Freedom House index.The main challenge is whether the current political system and power structure has the capacity to continue reforms, furthering the opening up of the political space; and leading to a stronger democratic culture and better economic and social development for the Tanzanian people, in a peaceful way.

The economy grows but reduction of poverty remains limited New economic activities develop, and so do an elite and a small middle class in urban, and some rural areas. Expectations are rising, not least among the youth. However, despite economic growth, basic needs poverty has only slightly been reduced from 34,4% to 28%, while the number of people below the poverty line has increased in absolute terms, as a result of continued high population growth. 44 per cent of the population live on less than 1.25 USD a day. Cleavages between the poor and the better off, and between urban and rural areas are deepening. The 2012/2013 household budget survey indicates that poverty has increased everywhere except in Dar es Salaam, and a few larger cities. Hence there is a trajectory of poverty decline but it is still very fragile. Even if the provision of health and education services has improved, - the relative quality of service delivery is arguably not improving or even deteriorating.

Changing values. An important heritage of Tanzania is Julius Nyerere’s legacy of nationalism and altruism. However these values have eroded over time, weakening the social fabric that has held the nation together since independence.Globalisation and an increasing number of young people completing their education cycle; rapid urbanisation (particularly among young adults); and the rapid expansion of TV, mobile telephones and internet access have brought about a change in values and expectations and have increased divides between generations and societies, men and woman urban and rural areas. These changing values have also raised awareness, not least of girls and women’s rights, which clash with the traditional patriarchal values. New networks and tools to voice concerns and hold those in power to account have started to develop. Old paternalistic power structures have started to be questioned, potentially opening up the political landscape.

New economic actors, especially BRIC countries, are changing the rules of the international game. With an increase in foreign direct investments, Tanzania is becoming less dependent on western aid, causing the majority of the ruling party, and the political administration to challenge traditional reliance on western donors and western perspectives. As a result, support for a western-type liberal democracy from some factions of the political and economic elite might shift towards new role models, such as the BRIC states.A diverse multi-party system has continued to develop since its inception in 1992.

Although opposition parties have made progress over the last 10 years, they are still weak and the former only party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), is still ruling. CCM has a well-developed organisation, characterised by a strong central authority. The party has robust personal networks, with close links to all levels of the administration, as well as to various economic elites and power centres outside the party, including the security forces. Even if gradually fading away, the one-party culture is still alive, especially at the local level in rural areas, where the majority of the population still lives. A remarkable change appears to have occurred between 2010 and 2014: In the 2014 Afro barometer survey, 75% of respondents from Tanzania gave support to multi-party democracy, which is among the highest in the Sub Saharan Africa.Until recently, no other party has proven strong enough to challenge CCM. Even though Tanzania now has 21 registered political parties, only five managed to get into Parliament in 2010. The majority election system contributes to preserving CCMs dominance. Only CUF and CHADEMA, and to a lesser extent NCCR-Mageuzi, have transformed into institutionalised political parties and, having received substantial support in the elections, command a degree of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the distribution of financial, human and organisational resources between CCM and the opposition parties remains skewed. Power struggles exist not only between the ruling party and the opposition, but also within each party between different factions and between the opposition parties. These divisions are rarely based on ideological or political differences, but rather on personalities and patronage. Nevertheless, changes have taken place both within the ruling party, through new generations of members whose political world view was formed in a multi-party context, and from outside the party where rapid urbanisation, globalisation and changes of values have provided a breeding ground for new political ideas. In the last five years CHADEMA has developed as a viable alternative to CCM and managed to capture the attention of the young, entrepreneurs and the educated urban middle class. The party won a substantive 27 percent of votes in the 2010 election, and a much higher share of votes in the cities. In the December 2014 local election the opposition preliminarily secured 34% of the seats. Four parties in the opposition have formed a loose coalition called Ukawa, with the aim to field one joint candidate in all constituencies and for the Presidency. For the first time, CCM is facing a real challenge in the 2015 election, even if it is unlikely that it would lose its power on the mainland. In any case, the low voter turnout on the mainland in the 2010 elections (39 percent compared with 73 percent 2005) and the civic polls in December 2014  might signal voter (or democracy) fatigue. Zanzibar maintained its traditionally high voter participation with 89 percent of voters exercising their right in the island of Unguja, and 85 percent in Pemba. Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT) started by a breakaway faction from CHADEMA 2014 after a power struggle over ideology and leadership with one the periods most effective politicians, Zitto Kabwe, Public Account Committee chairman and a driving force in exposing corruption and misuse of power as one of the leaders, might contribute to a vitalisation of ideology based political debate as the party has declared itself as socialist, while the CHADEMA and CUF have taken on faith based conservative and liberal ideology, respectively.The integrity of the political parties and freedom of organisation and assembly are still limited by various outdated laws and institutions. The Police at times use excessive force with political activists and do not allow public demonstrations. As the multi-party system is not yet consolidated, issues surrounding intimidation and unfair competition are likely to persist for years. The opposition parties would not necessarily be more democratic or efficient than the current ruling party, but they have not yet been given the chance to prove themselves.

This paper present fresh field work data from three case studies carried out in different fieldworks in the period January 2014 to February 2015 on to what extent the Tanzanian Local Government Reform Programmes (LGRP) 1996/2000-2013 (5) has brought about more democratic and decentralised decision making processes. The main findings point to that even if the local government has well elaborated structures for governance and democratic participation from the sub-village/street to the district level, the outcomes of the LGRP on improving the democratic processes at the local level has been limited. We examine to what extent various actors at various levels can - and do -exercise horizontal and vertical accountability. Our findings indicate that the local government reforms have inadequately changed the existing power relations, political elite interests and ideology of the political actors. Real power still lies in the hands of the ruling party elites at the National and District level and constrains power sharing at the Local Government Authority (LGA) levels and at the Ward, Village and Sub village level. The Local Government Reform has not provided adequate mechanisms, processes and Incentives to hold political elites and the duty bearers to account, neither vertically nor horizontally, at the different levels of local government. Power distribution has remained Top-Down with increasing conflict of interest between the Top and the Bottom. Local governance is inadequately addressing the existing competing interests e.g. personal versus public, party versus collective, local versus national. In addition, mediating competing claims over resources remains a challenge as the local government reforms have inadequately strengthened the governance system at the local levels. One of the largest constraints is the lack of awareness, information and capacity to process information by citizens, and elected members of the political structures. The Village and in particular the Sub-village structures have, however, a huge and underestimated potential, both as entry point in the political system, and as effective mechanisms for democratic governance. The overall conclusion is that the decentralisation process has been reversed to a re-centralisation process.

Fördjupas den demokratiska samhällsutvecklingen i Tanzania? Valen 2015.Tanzania är ett intressant exempel i Afrika, med en relativt god demokratisk och ekonomisk utveckling - och inga väpnade konflikter. Det senaste året har dock ett antal lagar införts som begränsar informations och yttrandefrihet och den föreslagna nya konstitutionen kritiseraras av oppositionen.  Situationen på Zanzibar är spänd. Och den politiska temparaturen het inför de uppkommande valen hösten 2015. I vilken riktning går den politiska utvecklingen i Tanzania?