Open this publication in new window or tab >>2025 (English)In: AAR '25: Proceedings of the sixth decennial Aarhus conference: Computing X Crisis / [ed] Clemens Nylandsted Klokmose;Lone Koefoed Hansen;Morten Kyng, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) , 2025, p. 71-95Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]
Computing technologies can function both as instruments for public health management and mechanisms for political control. This study investigates the deployment of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in Iran's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with a particular emphasis on Kurdish communities in Kermanshah province, a historically marginalized group. Through 22 interviews, we explore how state-controlled digital infrastructures influenced citizen engagement with pandemic-related ICT services. Although government-developed tracing applications, information platforms, and digital health services were ostensibly designed to manage the crisis, they also facilitated mass surveillance, imposed restrictions on mobility, and suppressed alternative narratives. A crisis of trust prompted citizens to adopt alternative strategies, such as encrypted messaging, informal information networks, and social media. By illustrating how trust, mistrust, and digital infrastructures are co-constructed in crisis contexts, this paper contributes to critical computing research by raising significant questions about governance, design, and ethics during times of uncertainty.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2025
Keywords
Computing in Crisis, Crisis Informatics, Digital Control, Iran, Political Computing, Surveillance, Trust and Mistrust
National Category
Information Systems, Social aspects
Research subject
Social Sciences
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-142856 (URN)10.1145/3744169.3744177 (DOI)2-s2.0-105013574398 (Scopus ID)9798400720031 (ISBN)
Conference
AAR 2025: The sixth decennial Aarhus conference: Computing X Crisis, Aarhus, Denmark, 18 - 22 August, 2025
2025-12-122025-12-122026-01-08Bibliographically approved