The study presented in this research is a systematic human factors approach comparing two striking process accidents in Latin America: the Copiapó mining accident (2010), at the San José copper-gold mine, in Chile, and the FPSO CSM accident (2015), at Camarupim offshore oil field, in Brazil. Despite being different industrial segments - mining and O&G - more similarities than differences were observed in the treatment of process safety anomalies, especially those related to major accidents. The intense interactions between workers, equipment and processes, in both industries, have been making significant developments in the edge of innovation and technology, however increasing the complexity of risks in the workplaces. Furthermore, the differences between the preparation and handling of emergency situations show how complex, and critical, process safety is in these industrial areas. Aiming to adequately evidence how this complexity is intrinsically part of the various system that form the entire process, the FRAM (Functional ResonanceAnalysis Method) was utilized to model and analyses both accidents, under a human factors approach. Interactions and interrelations between LOPC, non technical skills, resilience and technical procedures were noticed as crucial for process safety and productivity of daily operations, as well as the preparedness for emergency situations.

It is on the sharp end of the O&G operations where the real work happens, but also where the highest risks and system demands are placed. Understanding the skills - technical and non-technical - necessary to perform efficiently and safely is not only needed to maintain the business and assets, but also to ensure the safety of lives and the environment. Accidents such as Piper Alpha (1988), P-36 (2001) and Deepwater Horizon (2010) highlight the importance of understanding the real role of the human element in these events, from the highest hierarchical levels to the sharp end, where the work as done takes place. This article presents a non-technical skills analysis focused on the sharp end of O&G operations, specifically in the facilities/utilities operations, onshore (refineries) and offshore (production platforms). The findings show the importance and presence of certain non-technical skills, as well as the need for improvement of others in the daily routine and in emergencies.

This study presents a reanalysis of the Imperial Sugar refinery accident that occurred in February 2008, in Georgia, USA, using functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) and based on technical-scientific materials and the official reports. This explosion was fueled by sugar dust in the packaging building of the refinery, causing 14 fatalities and injuring 38 workers. The purpose of this reanalysis is to seek factors and interactions that could not be well analyzed or evidenced using traditional accident investigation techniques, which are primally designed to analyze linear systems. This reanalysis with FRAM allowed us to perceive the influence of organizational elements, such as culture, in the accidental chain of the event, highlighting the need of a broader approach for accidents involving high-tech process industries. In this sense, FRAM enabled a more comprehensive analysis of the complex functioning of process plants, for both normal operation and in emergency. It was noticed that the greater the complexity of work systems, the greater the interaction and variability between personnel, equipment, and systems, requiring analysis techniques and methodologies capable of recognizing the real complexities that take place in these sociotechnical systems, especially in high-tech process plants, such as the sugar refinery in this case.

The technological evolution of several productive sectors of society has demanded the same level of evolution for the oiland gas industry, both for energy production and their own systems’ functioning. The production of crude oil and naturalgas in offshore units is one of the answers to this demand. However, these offshore units have critical onboard activities andrisks, notably FPSO units; it is necessary to have adequate recognition of the elements that can support these activities andmanage these risks, enabling productive and safe operations. In this sense, this article aims to increase the understanding ofthe complex interactions and inherent safety issues that arise in the operations of FPSOs, observing and analysing the workdone onboard such platforms. The FRAM methodology has been chosen because it allows for the recognition and analysisof the complex interactions involving workers, equipment, system and offshore environment, focusing on the oil treatmentarea of the process plant. The results demonstrated some interesting findings regarding onboard safety and the relationshipbetween human competences, work demands and process safety.

Se por um momento, qualquer pessoa de uma grande capital mundial, parar sua rotina diária e começar a analisar o ambiente ao seu redor – seu trabalho, sua casa ou qualquer meio de transporte – será possível perceber o quanto há de evolução tecnólogica nos mais diversos objetos e processos. Desde uma simples caneta esferográfica, até um veículo autônomo, é possível notar uma marcante evolução, que foi propiciada pelo contexto, necessidade, recursos e cultura da Sociedade. Portanto, caso seja feita uma pergunta do gênero “O que é tecnologia?”, a resposta não poderá se resumir a apenas um novo equipamento eletrônico ou a um novo aplicativo para smartphones. É muito mais do que isso, pois a tecnologia é algo vivo, mutável, que forma e é formada pela Sociedade, estando presente desde os mais simples, até os mais complexos objetos e processos. Neste sentido, este estudo apresenta uma destas vertentes, focada na evolução da indústria de O&G, desde os primeiros poços perfurados manualmente em terra, em 1859, até as fronteiras dos 9.000m de profundidade dos atuais poços de petróleo offshore do Golfo do México. Analisando toda esta evolução, seus fatos e dados, percebe-se que um papel singular desta indústria, que impulsiona, ao mesmo tempo que é impulsionada, a evolução tecnológica.

If for a moment, anyone from a major world capital stops their daily routine and starts to analyze the environment around them - their work, their home or any means of transport - it will be possible to see how much technological evolution there is in the most diverse objects and processes. From a simple ballpoint pen to an autonomous vehicle, it is possible to notice a marked evolution, which was provided by the context, needs, resources and culture of the Society. Therefore, if a question like “What is technology?” is asked, the answer cannot be reduced to just a new electronic device or a new smartphone app. It is much more than that, as technology is something alive, mutable, which forms and is formed by Society, being present from the simplest to the most complex objects and processes. In this sense, this study presents one of these strands, focused on the evolution of the O&G industry, from the first wells manually drilled on land, in 1859, to the borders of 9,000m depth of the current offshore oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico. Analyzing all this evolution, its facts and data, it is clear that this industry has a unique role, which drives, at the same time, technological evolution.

O ano de 2020, logo em seu início, foi caracterizado pelo decreto internacional da Organização Mundial da Saúde (OMS) oficializando o estado de pandemia instaurado pela contaminação, em escala global, da doença denominada covid-19, causada pelo novo coronavírus. Esta pandemia, além de trazer todas as consequências relativas à área de saúde, também trouxe consequências nas esferas política, econômica e social, sendo esta última caracterizada fortemente pelo distanciamento social. Dentro da esfera social, houve um impacto considerável nas atividades educacionais tradicionais, envolvendo a tríade aluno - professor - sala de aula, pois o distanciamento social impediu frontosamente esta atividade. Desta forma, como então ministrar aulas, assistir aulas, construir o conhecimento, se o local de fomento não estava mais disponível? Neste momento, a já então consolidada estratégia das aulas on-line, ainda um pouco tímida, ganha força, adeptos e recursos para seu desenvolvimento. Mas, uma dúvida surge e, durante um tempo, persiste no ar: será que as aulas on-line terão o mesmo desempenho e savoir-faire que as aulas presenciais?

A Nova Visão é um despertar. Muitos a definem como um caminho sem volta. A partir do momento em que compreendemos que os trabalhadores são a nossa fonte mais importante de conhecimentos do trabalho realizado - e, portanto, grandes solucionadores de problemas quando ouvidos - não é mais possível desaprender isso, tampouco ver a segurança no trabalho como "ato inseguro" e "condição insegura". A partir deste despertar, contar dias sem acidentes perde totalmente o sentido! A segurança no trabalho deixa de ser um olhar para o passado e passa a ser uma teia de relações nobres dentro das organizações: o aprendizado organizacional, a visão holística e a empatia. Aprender com o que dá certo não é para qualquer um! Estamos prontos para extrair o melhor do trabalhador? Sabemos onde encontrar este melhor? As possibilidades, agora, passam a ser infinitas! O novo profissional de segurança precisa ser um facilitador do aprendizado organizacional. Não se conceberá mais um departamento isolado, aquele departamento que ou libera ou proíbe. Deverá ser um departamento fluido, que, permeando toda a organização, agregando e extraindo conhecimento de todos, seja capaz de melhorá-la! 

This study presents a reanalysis of Deepwater Horizon platform accident, occurred in April 2010, in offshore Macondo field, based on books, scientific articles and official reports prepared by the companies involved in the accident. The purpose of this reanalysis is to seek elements, factors, connections, inferences, and propositions that are new or different from those already found using analysis tools and methodologies that were built for simple or linear systems. In order to have a coherent analysis between the accident and the complex sociotechnical systems involved, the FRAM methodology (Functional Resonance Analysis Method) was chosen, as it coherently and comprehensively manages to analyse from simple to more complex systems. And in fact, with this reanalysis using the FRAM, it was possible to perceive the influence of organizational elements, such as culture, in the entire accidental chain of the event. In addition, contractual pressures related to business, fear of hierarchical consequences and failures in decision making, at all levels, were also evidenced. The findings of this study highlighted the need of a differentiated approach for accidents involving high-tech industries, such as O&G. In this sense, the human factors approach applied by FRAM, provides a coherent and evolved analysis of work, ultimately fostering productivity integrated with safety.

This study presents a reanalysis of FPSO (Floating Production Storage & Offloading) CSM (Cidade de São Mateus) accident, occurred in February 2015, in the post-salt of the Camarupim fields, in the Espírito Santo offshore area, using the FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis Method) methodology, and based on technical-scientific materials such as books, articles and reports prepared by the companies involved in the accident and the Brazilian regulatory agency ANP (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis). The purpose of this reanalysis is to seek elements, factors, characteristics and interactions that could not be well analyzed or evidenced using traditional risk assessment and accident investigation techniques, primally designed to analyze simple and linear systems. In order to have a coherent analysis between the accident and the complex sociotechnical systems involved, the FRAM methodology was chosen, as it comprehensively manages to analyze from simple to more complex systems. And in fact, with this reanalysis using the FRAM, it was possibleto perceive the influence of organizational elements, such as culture, in the entire accidental chain of the event. In addition, contractual pressures related to business, fear of hierarchical consequences and failures in decision making, at all levels, were also evidenced. The findings of this study highlighted the need of a broader approach for accidents involving high-tech industries, such as O&G and aerospace. In this sense, the FRAM enabled a more comprehensive and coherent analysis of the complexities of offshore oil production systems, notably in emergency situations, as was this accident. Comparisons between the traditional analysis methodologies, with the results obtained with the application of the FRAM, showed that there are elements contributing to the accidents that need to be considered, but that techniques limited to linear and simple systems still cannot cover this recognition. It was noticed that the greater the complexity of work systems, the greater the interaction and variability between personnel, equipment and systems, requiring, both for normal operation and for emergencies, analysis techniques and methodologies capable of recognizing the real complexities that take place in these socio-technical systems, especially aboard offshore oil platforms at sea.

From the first Neanderthals and Sapiens civilizations to the current world powers, human evolution was driven by its own will to develop, grow, discover, innovate and consolidate. Walking through the history of Humanity is witnessing an entire social, cultural and political evolution, understanding how the Society can shape the individual, and how the individual constitutes the Society. At the center of this evolution is the brain, as the architect, engineer and executor of all this process. The perception, an integral part of this process, in addition to forming a mental projection of the environment, recognizes opportunities and risks, generating an individual and social memory regarding the dangers of everyday life. When this perception is faced with the First Industrial Revolution, the safety at work will be associated with industrial equipment, organizational culture, workplaces, as well as the natural and evolved perception of risk of each individual – a software present in the hardware of the brain’s structures since the first civilizations. Following this evolution, work systems also evolved from simple linear production lines to complex sociotechnical workplaces, involving people, equipment, processes and organizational culture. The methodologies and tools designed to understand these risks, however, do not evolve at the same speed, persisting a misconception that current workplaces can be analyzed, in relation to risk, like a linear production line. In this aspect, integrating the concepts of neurosciences with the Human Factors approach, which is integrative and multidisciplinary, brings a systemic understanding of work environments, understanding and demonstrating the real complexity present.