The global financial crisis of 2007–2008 exposed weaknesses in the management of liquidity risk within the Swedish banking sector, as banks experienced significant liquidity pressures despite the regulatory emphasis on capital adequacy. This contributed to the introduction of Basel III, under which liquidity risk became more directly regulated through the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The purpose of this study is to examine how the relationship between capital and liquidity was reflected in banks’ liquidity risk management under Basel II and how this relationship changed under Basel III. The study applies a qualitative comparative document analysis of annual reports from eight Swedish commercial banks, comparing 2008 under Basel II with 2024 under Basel III. The findings indicate that liquidity risk under Basel II was mainly discussed in relation to refinancing pressure, funding access and liquidity reserves, while Basel III reflects a more structured and formalised approach to liquidity governance. The analysis further indicates that capital and liquidity became more explicitly treated as interconnected components of financial resilience, although they remain governed through distinct regulatory measures. Differences across banks also suggest that funding structures and business models, rather than bank size alone, are important for understanding how liquidity risk is managed, communicated and integrated into broader risk-management practices.