The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein have created a failed state and power vacuum in Iraq, which in turn allowed an insurgency to break out. Iraq has slid from Sunni insurgency into a violent sectarian civil war. In 2006 the U.S. released a new COIN strategy and in 2007 called for surge in troops in order to fill the security vacuum that was created. Hence, the aim of this research paper is to investigate U.S. COIN efforts in Iraq from 2006 to 2010 and in what ways they have succeeded and failed. 

This research paper has tested U.S. COIN theoretical framework that was developed by David Kilcullen in 2006 and hence applied it on the case of Iraq. The framework is based on classic COIN theory and experiences in peacekeeping over recent decades. However, this new framework insisted on that security operations must be carried out in support of a political strategy, coordinated with economic improvement activity and incorporated with an information campaign.

The empirical conclusion showed that U.S. new COIN strategy with the surge in troops succeeded in decreasing violence in 2008 to its lowest level for the first time in four years of war. This security improvement helped the Shiites and the Sunnis to end the civil war and allowed for political reconciliation and slight improvement in the economic approach. These improvements remained constant between 2007 and 2009 until the Iraqi national election of 2010, where the situation became worse again due to the political disputes. As it has been argued the COIN strategy and the surge in troops did not have any positive effect except for only temporary.